A program just is a descriptive form of the causal condition that results in computation. That can be instantiated via the program externally or the conditional state externally. Higher level processes can emerge from the combination of internal systems and external interaction but it is the internal system that is the supervening system. The differences in higher level processing are acquired from their intrinsic systems not the external input which is identical between two systems. The very system itself supervenes upon the data flow.
Don't know what your point is here - is the system deterministic? - Yes. Are there emergent patterns of activity determined by the specific inputs? Yes.
Intentionality is aboutness. There is no 'aboutness' under determinism only causal orientation.
Information is the aboutness of data. i.e. data in some context. Information has meaning, and meaning is the associations information has in some system. No problem with determinism there - in fact, the introduction of significant randomness vitiates meaning, making it unreliable or uncertain.
Data is apprehended. It is not observed by the empirical senses because it is conceptual.
The concept of data is, obviously, conceptual. Actual data (i.e. instances of data) are physical.
Data can exist conceptually apart from the big bang ever banging. Namely the catalogue of universes being 0. Data is independent of matter and simply refers to objective truth.
The concept of data is abstract, and can be considered to refer to objective truth because data instances are material properties, and so necessarily have/are real-world correspondences - but that truth is meaningless/unknown until the data are interpreted, and faulty interpretation will give you false information, which doesn't represent objective truth. For example, the light from Venus is data about the planet Venus, and can be considered to be aspects of the objective truth about Venus in that context. However, if it is interpreted as a nearby UFO (as has often happened), that is false information and doesn't represent objective truth about Venus (although it does represent objective truth about that interpretation of the light from Venus).
Data just is information by definition.
There are various definitions, according to context. I'm using what wikipedia refers to as a '
common view':
"According to a common view, data is collected and analyzed; data only becomes information suitable for making decisions once it has been analyzed in some fashion.
...
Data is often assumed to be the least abstract concept, information the next least, and knowledge the most abstract. In this view, data becomes information by interpretation..."
Real being used in abstract objects to refer to occurring in fact.
Abstract objects don't occur in fact; only
concrete objects occur in fact. Abstract objects are, in this respect, generalizations of concrete objects. We may commonly refer to objects in the abstract, e.g. 'my car' or 'your vehicle', but these are generic descriptors or placeholders for concrete (particular) instances.
There is no computer out there that can beat a chess player on it's own. Their 'thinking' is merely a reflection of a person or a team of person's refined thoughts.
A learning chess or Go computer can start with only the rules and definition of a win, and learn to play better than any human. Such systems are being generalised to learn to play any board game, given the rules and a win definition. They learn from example, from playing the game and evaluating the outcomes. This 'tabula-rasa' characteristic is what is notable about the ANNABELLE language learning system.
Computers can't interpret data because they don't apprehend anything.
A question of semantics. By interpret, I mean 'to translate for a given context', i.e. turning data into context-specific information. You could call identifying the data and matching it with the appropriate context 'apprehension' or 'understanding', but this can be done even by trivially simple mechanisms, so I don't think it's appropriate usage. For example, a pressure gauge interprets the force exerted on its sensor in terms of a pressure measurement; a thermometer interprets the influence of environmental heat on a bimetallic strip in terms of a temperature measurement. The 'apprehension' in these devices is implicit in their construction; but you may feel that's not an appropriate usage. It becomes more ambiguous with complex devices like your mobile phone - does it 'apprehend' the difference between a phone call and a text message in the radio data stream? When you get to learning systems that have learned to distinguish the appropriate contexts for the interpretation of input data without being explicitly structured, or instructed how, to do so, we can say they have learned the difference - does that mean they 'know' or 'apprehend' the difference?
Can other animals apprehend? if so, below what level of animal complexity does 'apprehension' cease to be applicable, and why?
As I said in my first post, using ill-defined conceptual abstractions commonly associated with human activities can lead to begging the question as to whether artificial systems can satisfy those concepts - you may end up denying it because the usage you have in mind is one only associated with humans.
Just saying 'evolution' doesn't explain how matter without consciousness can result in matter with intentional states like goals.
Goals aren't 'intentional states' - as I said previously, intentional states are about representation, not intent:
"Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs." - John Searle.
"If I think about a piano, something in my thought picks out a piano. If I talk about cigars, something in my speech refers to cigars. This feature of thoughts and words, whereby they pick out, refer to, or are about things, is intentionality. In a word, intentionality is aboutness.
Many mental states exhibit intentionality. If I believe that the weather is rainy today, this belief of mine is about today’s weather—that it is rainy. Desires are similarly directed at, or about things: if I desire a mosquito to buzz off, my desire is directed at the mosquito, and the possibility that it depart. Imaginings seem to be directed at particular imaginary scenarios, while regrets are directed at events or objects in the past, as are memories. And perceptions seem to be, similarly, directed at or about the objects we perceptually encounter in our environment. We call mental states that are directed at things in this way ‘intentional states’. - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Evolution merely explains it's refinement not it's ontological origin.
I gave a brief systems-level explanation of goal-oriented behaviour - you can find more at these links:
Principles of goal-directed decision making
The why, what, where, when and how of goal-directed choice: neuronal and computational principles
Evolution simply orients our behavior. The statement 'Evolution Programs us' is not an appropriate description.
It's a figure of speech; the fundamental drivers of our behaviour and the means to elaborate them are the products of evolution. One can equally say that evolution programs our physical development. Both physical and mental development require appropriate environmental stimuli.
You use the prison system of Norway to show how determinism might be beneficial but the article you cite attributes it's success to the concept of rehabilitation which assumes they are not determined criminals and are provided knives and bar-less windows. Under determinism we should more likely see repeat offenders executed rather than rehabilitated.
You misunderstand the implications of determinism - the majority of offenders offend because they have 'the wrong ideas' - their learned behaviour is anti-social. The idea of rehabilitation is to get them to learn a revised set of behaviours; to change their view of the world, to 'reprogram' their reward system. Like cognitive behaviour therapy, this involves re-training their unconscious as much as, if not more than, their rational awareness. No everyone can be rehabilitated, so there is still a need for incarceration, but conditions are not punitive, the philosophy is that everyone should have as decent a life as is feasible.
Which parts of the wiki article on personhood correlates with your state of orientation on personhood?
The whole thing; I acknowledge the variety of meanings and usages, the difficulties of applying inflexible definitions to edge cases, whether animal sentience has relevance, etc. I don't have answers to all those questions, but I can consider some particular situation and give my current opinion on it - as I have here, on abortion/euthanasia.
... can you give me any logical or coherent justification for your state of orientation that determinism is true? So the reply should be 'Determinism is true because X'
You say you are not concerned with a system of justification, and yet claim to to think one thing is plausible over another. I am asking you why you find determinism plausible.
OK. I think macro-scale determinism is the most plausible hypothesis I've encountered because the physics of the macro-scale is
effectively deterministic; i.e. quantum randomness is not significantly apparent at everyday human scales. I accept quantum randomness (although there are interpretations that don't require it), but - judging from the predictability of the macro world, it isn't significant at macro scales.
The fundamental physics of everyday life is fully understood - we, and the world around us, are made of protons, neutrons, and electrons, whose behaviour in everyday regimes is well-understood. The only significant forces at human scales are gravity and electromagnetism, both of which are well-characterised. There are other known forces and particles, e.g. the strong and the weak nuclear force, neutrinos, muons, etc., and there are probably other unknown forces and particles, but they are all too weakly interacting and/or too short range to have significant influence at human scales.
This knowledge base is the result of literally billions of experiments over energies and scales from the sub-atomic to the cosmic, and our best physical theory of the world, quantum field theory - which is consistent with every experiment that has been done, and has predicted the results of many of them with unmatched precision, e.g. within ten parts in a billion.
I see no plausible alternative description of the world that has the anything like the testability, fruitfulness, explanatory scope, or parsimony.
Do you have any epistemological justification for the claim that we are determined.
See above.
Do you have any epistemological justification that dualism is false.
Lack of plausible evidence; far better alternative hypothesis.
Do you have any epistemological justification that the experience of aliens is a hallucination or identification.
Huh? what experience of aliens?
Do you have any epistemological justification that Elisha's experience of angels are an hallucination.
My reasoning in that case, other than a pragmatic argument from physics, would be statistical - florid hallucinations of that type are known to occur, and are common in some mental conditions, and there have been no verifiable instances of real events of the type described.
Having said that, my preferred explanation for that story is that it is wholly fictional; but, as I said, I've had that argument, and I thought the hallucination hypothesis (which doesn't really fit the broader story context) would provide an opportunity for an exercise in abduction. Unfortunately, no-one took it up.
Also will you meet the challenge I gave you to act like you are determined for a month?
I've already addressed that. What we feel and what we know to be the case are often very different - I know I'm going to die, but I continue to live as if I don't; I know the world is deterministic, but I continue to live as if it isn't; I know the 'commentator's curse' is a baseless superstition, and I'm familiar with the multitude of
cognitive biases, but they still influence my behaviour- it's a limitation of human thought; our rationalizations are behaviourally superficial.