GEMARA: We were taught (Shebuoth, IV. 2): "The acts
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of transfer on the Sabbath are two, respectively four." Why is this teaching here specified as two
respectively four on the inside, and two respectively four on the outside, and there no such
specification was made? Said R. Papa: Here the special subject of treatment is the Sabbath, and
the Mishna enumerated the cases which involve guilt and those which do not involve guilt;
while there the principal subject of treatment is a different one, and he mentions only the cases
that involve guilt, leaving the cases that do not involve guilt untouched. But the cases that
involve guilt are those by which acts of transfer are committed, and such are only two? Nay,
there are two acts of transfer from within and two from without. But the Mishna says,
"Yetziath" (which in a literal sense means transfer from within)? Said R. Ashi: The Tana calls
transfer from without by the same term. And for what reason? Because every act of removing a
thing from its place is called Yetziah. Said Rabbina: The Mishna also bears out this sense; for it
speaks of Yetziath and immediately illustrates its remark by citing a case from without. This
bears it out. Rabha, however, says: He (the Tana) speaks about divided premises (whose line of
division is crossed), and in this case there are only two (in each of which there may be four acts
of transfer).
Said R. Mathna to Abayi: Are there not eight, even twelve (instances of transfer over the line of
division)? 1 And he rejoined: Such transfers as involve the obligation of a sin-offering are
counted; but those that do not involve such an obligation are not counted.
"They are both free." Was not the act (of transfer) committed by both? Said R. Hyya bar Gamda:
The act of removing the thing was committed by the joint efforts of both, and they (the rabbis)
said: "It is written in the law, when a person did it" 2--i.e., when one person commits the act he
is culpable, but when an act is committed by the joint efforts of two persons, they are both free.
Rabh questioned Rabbi: If one were laden by his friend with eatables and beverages and carried
them outside (of the house), how is the law? Is the removing of his body tantamount to the
removing of a thing from its place, and therefore he is culpable, or is it not so?
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Said Rabbi to him: He is culpable. And this case is not like the case of removing his hand. Why
so? Because (in the latter case) the hand was not at rest, while (in the former) the body (before
and after removal) was entirely at rest. 1
Said Rabbi Hyya to Rabh: Descendant of nobles! Did I not tell thee that when Rabbi is engaged
with a certain tract ask him not about a subject (that is treated) in another tract, for he may not
have that subject in his mind! And if Rabbi were not a great man thou mightest cause him
shame, for he would give thee an answer which might not be right. In this instance, however, he
gave thee a correct answer; as we have learned in the following Boraitha: If one was laden with
eatables and beverages while it was yet light on the eve of Sabbath, and he carried them outside
after dark, he is culpable; for his case is not like that of removing the hand mentioned above.
Abayi said: From all that was said above it is certain to me that the hand of a man (standing on
the street) is not treated as public ground. 2 And I also see that (if a man stands on private
ground) his hand is not to be treated a-, private ground. Would it be correct, then, to regard the
hand as unclaimed ground? If so, would the penalty imposed by the rabbis in such a case,
namely, that one should not move his hand (containing a movable thing) back (during the
Sabbath day), apply in this case or not?
Come and hear the following Boraitha: If a man has his hand filled with fruit and he extends it
outside (of the premises where he stands), one said he is not permitted to draw it back, and
another Boraitha says he is allowed to do so. May we not assume that this is their point of
dispute: the former holds that the hand is treated as unclaimed ground, and the latter thinks that
it is not like unclaimed ground? Nay, it may be that both agree that the hand (as spoken of in our
Mishna) is like unclaimed ground, and yet it presents no difficulty. One of the Boraithas treats
of a man who had extended his hand unintentionally, and the other one treats of a man who had
put forth his hand intentionally.