Dikaioumenoi
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- Jun 29, 2016
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No need to apologize, please take your time. I certainly understand being busy. And I'd pass you simply for being interested in having such a thoughtful conversation with me.
I'll offer a quick answer to your question concerning 1 John 2:23, then, if you don't mind, I wanted to offer some clarification on my prior reply (in hindsight I could have explained things better).
1 John 2:23 - πᾶς ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν υἱὸν :: everyone who denies the Son :: οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα ἔχει :: does not have the Father :: ὁ ὁμολογῶν τὸν υἱὸν :: the one who confesses the Son :: καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἔχει :: also has the Father
Four clauses:
- Everyone who denies the Son
- [he] does not have the Father
- the one who confesses the son
- [he] also has the Father
P = he denies the Son
Q = he has the Father
R = he confesses the Son
The verse could be represented in one of two ways:
(P --> ~Q) ^ (R --> Q)
(P <--> ~Q) ^ (R <--> Q)
The first says that P is sufficient but not necessary for ~Q, and R is sufficient but not necessary for Q, and the second says P is both sufficient and necessary for ~Q, and R is both sufficient and necessary for Q.
The difference is that sufficiency only (the first option) leaves open the possibility that there could be some neutral ground between denying and confessing the Son. In this case it would be logically possible that there could be someone who has neither denied Christ, nor confessed Him, but nevertheless has the Father by some other means (maybe on account of one's ignorance of the Son's existence, for example). In other words, there would potentially exist three categories of people: (1) those who deny the Son, (2) those who confess the Son, and (3) those who do neither.
This doesn't seem like the best option, for at least this reason:
The contrapositive of P --> ~Q is Q --> ~P, which reads, "if he has the Father, then he has not denied the Son." This tells us that having the Father is sufficient for concluding that one has not denied the Son. But it would follow from this that both categories 2 and 3 (from above) would have the Father, merely on account of the fact that neither denies the Son, making the latter half of the verse redundant. In other words, what it would mean is that it doesn't matter if one confesses the Son or not, so long as they haven't consciously denied Him. That would not seem to fit the message of Scripture at all.
Thus, it is best to understand P and R as mutually exclusive. To not deny the Son is to confess Him, and to not confess the son is to deny Him. In other words, there is no neutrality between the two. So the verse would be best represented with biconditionals (as in John 6:44):
(P <--> ~Q) ^ (R <--> Q)
A biconditional, <-->, represents equivalence. It means that one proposition is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of the other. Thus, we can simply restate the expression in the more readable way,
(~Q <--> P) ^ (Q <--> R)
This translates to, "he does not have the Father if and only if he has denied the Son, and he has the Father if and only if he has confessed the Son."
This expresses the mutual exclusivity between R and P, and thus the equivalence of R and ~P (as well as the equivalence of P and ~R).
All that the verse tells us logically is that if the condition is met (i.e. one does not deny the Son, but confesses Him), then he has the Father. This is silent on the question of the why and how of the condition's fulfillment.
Sure. But in the context of our discussion I would clarify that the contingency of his obedience is with respect to proximate (secondary) causation only, not with respect to God's decree, which necessitates the obedience/belief of those who come.
In other words, contingency and necessity are not mutually exclusive. An act can be both, in different respects. There are different kinds of necessity (see my above chart). There is intrinsic necessity, for instance, which is a physical or logical necessity (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4), but there is also extrinsic necessity, which is when something that is contingent in its mode of production is nevertheless made necessary as a consequence of God's decree.
In hindsight, I probably could have been a little more clear in my prior reply about what I'm actually objecting to when you say "ability implies contingency." Ability does imply contingency, just not to the degree that you're wanting to argue for, I contend. You seem to be wanting to suggest that if a thing is contingent it cannot in any sense be necessary. But this simply isn't the case. Contingent things are not intrinsically necessary. But that does not mean their occurrence cannot be made certain by some extrinsic necessity of consequence.
The distinction between ultimate and proximate causation demonstrates this. An ultimate (or first) cause is the primary, more indirect cause of a thing. The proximate (or second) cause is the more direct cause which is most closely related to the effect. For example, when the sun shines and warms the earth, we could describe the cause of that warmth in two senses. As to the ultimate cause, we would say it is God who causes the sun to shine, in that His decree governs the fact that it should happen. Yet in the more "immediate" sense of thinking about sunshine, we would refer to the sun itself as the agent which properly performs the action of warming the earth. God Himself is not the agent of things. Rather, He works through means to bring about His purposes.
The decree of God is the ultimate cause of all created things, and in that sense all created things are made necessary, because God's decree is immutable. The things themselves are contingent in their mode of production (i.e. they are not intrinsically necessary in the way that 2 + 2 = 4 is), yet as they relate to their ultimate cause they are made extrinsically necessary. When we speak of the sun warming the earth in the sense of the agency which properly performs the action, we speak of contingency. But when we speak of the sun warming the earth in the sense of the ultimate cause of sunshine, we speak of necessity - not an intrinsic necessity, but an extrinsic necessity of consequence, following from God's decree. Again, God Himself is not the agent. God is not performing the act of shining upon the earth. And therefore He does not bear direct responsibility for it. The sun performs this act. And yet it does so by necessity of consequence, following the decree.
So when we look at John 6:44 (or 1 John 2:23 or any other text dealing with choice), we are right to see contingency insofar as we are considering the proximate cause (i.e. the agent properly performing the act of choosing), but this contingency isn't really what we're discussing, because its existence does not pose any contradiction to the hypothesis that contingent choices are also necessary in another respect. The bigger question in our discussion has to do with whether or not an individual's choice to come (or not come) is made extrinsically necessary by God's immutable decree. Do those who contingently choose to exercise their ability to come to Christ do so by necessity of consequence of God's decree? An affirmative answer would explain the identity in class membership between the "him" drawn and the "him" raised. And I contend we have examples in Scripture of this harmonious relationship between ultimate necessity and proximate contingency even as it relates to human choices.
The most elaborate example is with Pharaoh and the hardening of his heart. On the one hand, Pharaoh was judged for hardening his heart and not letting the Israelites go. That is a contingent decision on his part, and he is thus held responsible for it. Yet we also see in the Exodus narrative that God had an eternal purpose in this hardening. It was not merely a response to a contingent choice. Before Moses ever confronted Pharaoh, God promised in Ex. 4:21 that he would harden Pharaoh's heart, "so that" he would not let the people go. Then six times in the narrative - Ex. 7:13, 22, 8:15, 19, 9:12, 35 - we have the repeated statement that Pharaoh's heart was hardened, "just as the Lord had said," referencing the fulfillment of promise. Then in Ex. 11:9 Pharaoh's contingent refusal to listen is directly connected again with a purpose clause, thus referencing God's eternal purpose in glorifying Himself as the underlying, ultimate cause behind the actions of the whole narrative:
"Then the LORD said to Moses, 'Pharaoh will not listen to you, that my wonders may be multiplied in the land of Egypt.'"
Here we are told why Pharaoh would not listen. It is because God had a purpose in his disobedience. There is necessity to Pharaoh's disobedience for the fulfillment of God's purpose. And yet at the same time we see the contingency of that disobedience with respect to the proximate cause which falls out under God's decree. Thus, when we say that the decree of God extrinsically necessitates that Pharaoh would not listen, that's not to say that God is "doing the choosing for him." God is not the agent of the action, and therefore does not bear moral responsibility. Since the effect flows directly from the proximate cause and not the ultimate, the responsibility falls on the individual who properly performs the act. Pharaoh, after all, was merely following his heart's desire. His choices were entirely willful. Yet in terms of the ultimate cause of those choices, the disposition of Pharaoh's heart which governs the direction in which he would willfully act is a consequence of the divine decree.
Men choose willingly according to their heart's desire, its disposition, be it disposed toward the flesh or the Spirit (cf. Rom. 8:1-11). If the drawing of the Father affects the heart of man in such a way that the disposition of that heart is changed, we have both the necessity of the choice to come with respect to its ultimate cause (John 6:37a, 39), as well as the contingency and liberty of the choice with respect to its proximate cause (John 6:37b, 40). The individual willingly chooses in one sense what the decree of God necessitates in another. And the identity of class membership in verse 44 between the "him" drawn and the "him" raised fits this perfectly, without taking away the liberty of choice (our ability to wrap our minds around "what this looks like" is not a requisite to our acknowledgement of the existence of these categories in Scripture, much like our acceptance of Scripture's teachings on the Trinity and hypostatic union). The ultimate cause governs the necessity of the purposed outcome (that all those drawn by the Father out of their sin-loving inability will infallibly turn to Christ and be raised, to the end that Christ's purpose in coming to earth will be perfectly fulfilled; John 6:37a, 38, 39, 44), and yet in terms of how proximate causes fall out under this decree (i.e. in terms of the means God works through to accomplish His purposes), these individuals willingly choose according to this renewed desire of their hearts.
A few other quick examples of the relationship between proximate contingency and ultimate necessity:
"And now do not be distressed or angry with yourselves because you sold me here, for God sent me before you to preserve life." - Genesis 45:5
"The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it wherever he will." - Proverbs 21:1
"And they kept the Feast of Unleavened Bread seven days with joy, for the LORD had made them joyful and had turned the heart of the king of Assyria to them, so that he aided them in the work of the house of God, the God of Israel." - Ezra 6:22
Very briefly (I didn't intend for this to turn into another essay!): How can we say that the decree of God necessitates that some come and others do not, if Scripture is filled (and indeed it is) with commands and pleas for all men to repent and turn in faith? Would such a decree make God's revealed will for men disingenuous? For starters, I'd point to Acts 2:23 in answering this:
"This Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men."
The death of Christ follows from the purpose established in God's decree. At the same time, the consequent death of Christ flows directly from the sinful choices of men, and thus they are regarded as guilty, even though their actions carry out the eternal decree. Again, this verse serves as demonstration of the harmony that exists between ultimate necessity and proximate contingency without doing away with personal liberty and responsibility. But it also makes another point: the decree of God can at times appear to be in conflict with his precepts (e.g. thou shalt not kill). Of course, there can be no true conflict implied within God's will. Rather, we must conclude that there are different respects or senses to God's will as it pertains to His decree (hidden will) and to His precepts (revealed will).
The latter reflects the moral character of God and how men ought to therefore imitate it; the former speaks to God's ultimate purposes for creation, which, as we've seen in the examples above, can involve the ultimate necessity of disobedient acts to accomplish His purposes (i.e. the use of means), without Himself denying His precepts (see Isaiah 10:5-13, where God purposes to use the disobedience of the Assyrians to punish Israel, and then turns right around and punishes Assyria for the very sinfulness which carried out the decree; in other words, God doesn't punish Assyria for doing what it was He Himself purposed, but rather for their sinfulness, even though that sinfulness was necessary to the fulfillment of the purpose). This brings harmony to God's universal commands and pleas for repentance and faith, with Scripture's more determinative statements about God's purpose to redeem some and not others.
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