No one is able to come unto me, if the Father who sent me MAY NOT DRAW him

[tonychanyt]

​

Why do you think that "unless/except the Father" is (far and away) the principal translation, even among the so called "literal translations"? Could the use of except/unless the Father, by 49 of the 51 translations and paraphrases at Bible Hub, have something to do with the verse/passage context?

Sorry, I don't know. Try No one can come to me UNLESS the Father who sent me draws him.

So, my question is this, what does the Young's "literal" translation above actually mean (or mean to you .. when taken as written)?

The subjunctive affirms that the Father draws some people and does not draw some people.

 

[St_Worm2]

Sorry, I don't know. Try No one can come to me UNLESS the Father who sent me draws him.

I will. Thanks

The subjunctive affirms that the Father draws some people and does not draw some people.

Thus the reason that the VAST majority of our translations/paraphrases use "except/unless the Father", as it makes the meaning of v44 considerably and immediately clearer for us.

Thank you for explaining that

God bless you!!

--David

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

The subjunctive affirms that the Father draws some people and does not draw some people.

Not necessarily. There's nothing contradictory about the use of the subjunctive even if the Father's intention is to draw everyone (and even if he succeeds in that intention).

What ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive communicates is (in most cases) a hypothetical future probability, which, true, may or may not happen, but is seen as likely to happen, and again, could happen fully.

But in the case of John 6:44, this isn't a hypothetical future probability. It's a proverbial statement. This is an example of a present general third class condition (ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive with a present tense [δύναται] in the apodosis). The meaning is simply that it is axiomatically, universally, proverbially the case that people are only able to come to Jesus on account of the Father's drawing.

Does that mean that the Father draws some and not others? It could mean that, but it doesn't have to.

What limits the scope of the Father's drawing in John 6:44 is the implication made by the final clause, "and I will raise him up." Who is "him"? The "him" who is raised is grammatically the same "him" who is drawn. Thus, if not all are being raised, then by implication we know not all are being drawn.

 

[St_Worm2]

Does that mean that the Father draws some and not others? It could mean that, but it doesn't have to.

What ~limits the scope~ of the Father's drawing in John 6:44 is the implication made by the final clause, "and I will raise him up." Who is "him"? The "him" who is raised is grammatically the same "him" who is drawn. Thus, if not all are being raised, then by implication we know not all are being drawn.

Hello Dikaioumenoi, as does the broader context in which v44 is found, yes .. e.g. John 6:37-40, (limits the scope of the Father's drawing of us, that is), unless our universalist friends are correct

John 6:37-40 (excerpt) ​

All that the Father gives Me will come to Me, and .. of all that He has given Me, I LOSE NOTHING, but raise it up on the last day.​

​

The specific kind, type or way of "drawing" that the Father employs here (expressed by the meaning of ἑλκύω in v44), is His "drawing/leading/impelling" of us "by an inward (irresistible) power", yes?

God bless you!!

--David

 

[GDL]

What limits the scope of the Father's drawing in John 6:44 is the implication made by the final clause, "and I will raise him up." Who is "him"? The "him" who is raised is grammatically the same "him" who is drawn. Thus, if not all are being raised, then by implication we know not all are being drawn.

For your consideration:

But we don't know by the final clause whether or not all are being drawn, because the verse is dealing with God giving ability by drawing. One can lead a horse to water...

All we know from the last clause is that Jesus will raise the one who has come (not dealing with abiding here) and the one who has come has been given ability to come and the one who has been given ability to come has been drawn by God.

Due to dunamis, there is really more than one condition here:

If we come to Jesus, then God has given us ability to come to Jesus.
If God has given us ability to come to Jesus, then God has drawn us to Jesus.
If we affirmatively use the ability God has given to us to come to Jesus by drawing us to Jesus, then we will come to Jesus.

By "affirmatively use" I'm attempting to represent a decision to come to Jesus.

Your thoughts?

 

[GDL]

The specific kind, type or way of "drawing" that the Father employs here (expressed by the meaning of ἑλκύω in v44), is His "drawing/leading/impelling" of us "by an inward (irresistible) power", yes?

Irresistible? Then God absolutely does not draw all. But can this be determined by this verse? Elkuo has some range. You've noted some of it. Irresistible would seem to have to take us further into the range of force for elkuo. Interestingly, I'm OK with a sense of force. I'm glad He dragged me kicking and screaming and gave me the ability to see where I was headed. Maybe a slap in the face to shock me into seeing. I guess there are several illustrations I could use. I also guess there is a semantics issue in language, huh?

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

For your consideration:

But we don't know by the final clause whether or not all are being drawn, because the verse is dealing with God giving ability by drawing. One can lead a horse to water...

All we know from the last clause is that Jesus will raise the one who has come (not dealing with abiding here) and the one who has come has been given ability to come and the one who has been given ability to come has been drawn by God.

Due to dunamis, there is really more than one condition here:

If we come to Jesus, then God has given us ability to come to Jesus.
If God has given us ability to come to Jesus, then God has drawn us to Jesus.
If we affirmatively use the ability God has given to us to come to Jesus by drawing us to Jesus, then we will come to Jesus.

By "affirmatively use" I'm attempting to represent a decision to come to Jesus.

Your thoughts?

The final clause tells us that all who are drawn will be raised. While we know theologically (and contextually; vv. 39-40) that it is those who actually come who will be raised, grammatically what the final clause of vs. 44 tells us is that it is those who are drawn who will be raised. This implies an equivalence between the two. Those being drawn = those who actually come, implying that not all are drawn.

You are right to say that the verse is dealing with God giving the ability by drawing. But the idea that one can be given this ability, yet not act upon it in coming, is a theological assumption, not an implication of the text. I contend the grammar actually does not leave room for that possibility.

If we consider a contrapositive of the verse (in order to state the condition in a positive way), this is made more clear:

"If he is able to come to me, then the Father draws [has drawn] him, and I will raise him up on the last day."

In this statement, who is the "him" who is raised? This statement is logically equivalent to what we have in John 6:44. The "him" who is raised is one-to-one the same "him" who is drawn.

 

[tonychanyt]

What ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive communicates is (in most cases) a hypothetical future probability

reference? Note the bold.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

For your consideration:

But we don't know by the final clause whether or not all are being drawn, because the verse is dealing with God giving ability by drawing. One can lead a horse to water...

All we know from the last clause is that Jesus will raise the one who has come (not dealing with abiding here) and the one who has come has been given ability to come and the one who has been given ability to come has been drawn by God.

Due to dunamis, there is really more than one condition here:

If we come to Jesus, then God has given us ability to come to Jesus.
If God has given us ability to come to Jesus, then God has drawn us to Jesus.
If we affirmatively use the ability God has given to us to come to Jesus by drawing us to Jesus, then we will come to Jesus.

By "affirmatively use" I'm attempting to represent a decision to come to Jesus.

Your thoughts?

Hi GDL, thanks for the comment. Don't miss my reply above; I just wanted to expand upon my argument, if it would be helpful (but feel free to ignore all this detail if not). I noticed you commented on my other post. The following is an additional piece of that post that I decided not to include there (it ventured a bit beyond the scope of the OP):

---

For the following discussion...
Let P = "the Father draws him"
Let Q = "he is able to come to Jesus"
Let R = "Jesus will raise him up"

I am choosing to represent John 6:44 as (-Q <--> -P) ^ R, which reads, "Not Q if and only if not P, and R." The verse could alternatively be represented as (-Q <-- -P) ^ R, which reads, "Not Q if not P, and R," but as I explained in my other post, all this would entail is that it is not possible for one to come without having been drawn, not that the drawing of the Father is sufficient in making one able to come. For the purposes of this argument I'm assuming that we all agree that the drawing of the Father is not only necessary, but also sufficient at least for enabling one to come. (In other words, the drawing of the Father doesn't fail in its intent to enable.)

(-Q <--> -P) ^ R is logically equivalent to all of these statements:

• (-P --> -Q) ^ R, which reads: "[If the Father does not drawn him, then he is not able to come to Jesus], and Jesus will raise him up."
• (-Q --> -P) ^ R, which reads: "[If he is not able to come to Jesus, then the Father does not draw him], and Jesus will raise him up."
• (Q --> P) ^ R, which reads: "If he is able to come to Jesus, then the Father draws him, and Jesus will raise him up."
• (P --> Q) ^ R, which reads: "If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up."

The first two are entailed (-Q <--> -P is equivalent to both -P --> -Q and -Q --> -P), and the latter two are the contrapositives of the first two.

Two important things to note about these statements:

First, note that R is not a part of the conditional statement.

It can't be part of the protasis (the "if" clause), because ἀναστήσω is indicative. Since the condition is a third class (ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive), for R to be part of the protasis, it would also require a subjunctive verb. So we can rule that out.

It is extremely unlikely, however, that R would be part of the apodosis (the "then" clause), because that would result in the condition distributing to both Q and R, with the awkward conclusion being that Jesus is saving unbelievers. If R were part of the apodosis, we might represent the verse as (-Q ^ R) <--> -P, which is equivalent to (-Q <--> -P) ^ (R <--> -P). This reads, "[He is not able to come to Jesus, unless the Father draws him] AND [Jesus will raise him up, unless the Father draws him]. This is surely not the meaning of the verse.

So, R is not a part of the conditional statement. It's an additional statement appended to the end of the condition.

The reason this is relevant is because when representing the verse in symbolic logic, no matter how we choose to represent the condition (negatively, positively, as its contrapositive, etc.), the placement of R will not change. It remains at the end of the verse as an additional clause appended to the conditional.

Second, notice the brackets in the first two statements. I've put the conditionals in brackets because of their negative expression. As an appended clause, R assumes the fulfillment of the condition. It really only makes sense either when the condition is expressed positively (as in the latter two statements), or when the protasis and apodosis are reversed (as in the wording of John 6:44). When the condition is stated negatively, the emphasis is upon what isn't true of the subject. R is out of place with such emphasis.

Therefore, even though the first two statements are technically logically equivalent to John 6:44, the wording changes the emphasis of the verse in a way that kind of undermines the purpose of that final clause. That's why I've included the contrapositive statements.

As a bit of an aside, why are the protasis and apodosis reversed in John 6:44? Well consider the context. Jesus is addressing a crowd of unbelievers who are grumbling amongst themselves about his words. He's telling them to stop grumbling (vs. 43). Why? Why not help them to understand what they don't understand, instead of essentially just telling them to knock it off? Because... "no one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him," the implication apparently being, they haven't been. In other words, it's useless to reason with them because unless the Father draws them, they will not hear truth. That, I would argue, is the point of this verse; it's the explanatory value of this verse in context. Jesus is explaining why the crowd before him do not believe his words.

Given this context, it is appropriate to lead with the consequent clause - "No one is able to do this" - and then finish with the antecedent, the condition, the explanation of the remedy to the problem - "unless the Father who sent me draws him." The final clause, then, is an additional statement continuing the thought about the one whom the Father draws. In other words, it assumes the fulfillment of the condition.

All of this to say, a negative expression of the condition does not provide the appropriate emphasis for R to make sense, except when the protasis and apodosis are reversed, as in the text.

Returning to the above logical expressions, look carefully at the positive expressions. We can also see this in the actual text of John 6:44, but it is made even clearer by the contrapositives. Who is the "him" that Jesus raises up?

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up."

Grammatically, the "him" whom Jesus raises is the one who is made able to come to Jesus by the Father's drawing. Strictly speaking, nothing is said here about who actually does come to Jesus. The drawing of the Father results in one obtaining the ability to come, and what is said here is that obtaining this ability is the grounds of being raised. There isn't any room here for the idea that one might have the ability to come, but does not "affirmatively use" that ability. While that is philosophically conceivable, it doesn't fit the grammar of the text. If it's possible that one can have the ability but not "affirmatively use" it, then the "him" who is raised up and the "him" who is drawn must grammatically refer to different subjects (i.e. the "him" raised would encompass a sub-group of the "him" drawn). However, there's only one referent in the text for both pronouns - εὶς - the "one" who is given the ability to come.

This would seem to imply that the granting of the ability, the "drawing" of the Father, is a divine activity that is in some way effectual in motivating the individual actually to come, necessarily, which suggests ultimately that not all are drawn.

 

[GDL]

If we consider a contrapositive of the verse (in order to state the condition in a positive way), this is made more clear:

"If he is able to come to me, then the Father draws [has drawn] him, and I will raise him up on the last day."

'If he is able to come, then the Father draws him' puts the ability before the drawing.
'If he is able to come, then the Father has drawn him' puts the drawing before the ability.
Draws and has drawn are not the same thing.
If the Father draws, then he is able to come - ability provides another contingency.
Ability to come does not mean will come - this is not 'if the Father draws him, then he will come'.
Inherently there are 2 conditions here.
Linguistics is part of logic.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

reference? Note the bold.

Any Greek grammar. See Wallace or Mounce on conditional sentences. Ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive is the marker of a third class condition, also commonly referred to as "future more probable" conditions. Fulfillment is uncertain, but likely. Most third class conditions have this sense, though there is also the present general variety (axiomatic statements), which I would argue John 6:44 is an example of.

'If he is able to come, then the Father draws him' puts the ability before the drawing.
'If he is able to come, then the Father has drawn him' puts the drawing before the ability.
Draws and has drawn are not the same thing.
If the Father draws, then he is able to come - ability provides another contingency.
Ability to come does not mean will come - this is not 'if the Father draws him, then he will come'.
Inherently there are 2 conditions here.
Linguistics is part of logic.

"If he is able to come, then the Father draws him" is simply a contrapositive representation of the conditional in John 6:44 without altering the wording. The change to "has drawn" would be necessary if actually stating the verse that way, because the logic of the verse states that the drawing is the precondition for having the ability.

Ultimately it's a moot point, however, because the following statement is also logically equivalent, as I argued in my more elaborate reply that I just posted above:

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come"

 

[tonychanyt]

Any Greek grammar. See Wallace or Mounce on conditional sentences. Ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive is the marker of a third class condition,

Can you quote the reference?

 

[GDL]

Hi GDL, thanks for the comment.

And thanks for all the detail! Not being formally trained in logic with symbols, it'll take me time to digest, so thank you for the translations which are helpful.

"If he is able to come, then the Father draws him" is simply a contrapositive representation of the conditional in John 6:44 without altering the wording. The change to "has drawn" would be necessary if actually stating the verse that way, because the logic of the verse states that the drawing is the precondition for having the ability.

Ultimately it's a moot point, however, because the following statement is also logically equivalent, as I argued in my more elaborate reply that I just posted above:

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come"

In light of my above acknowledgement, please bear with me. I'll add that I am trained in Greek.

Logically the contrapositive may be beneficial for something, but what good is it if it alters or can be construed to alter the actual precondition? This is likely my lack of training in logic asking, but asking it is.

He is not able to come if the Father does not draw him is the same as if the Father does not draw him, then he is not able to come.

He is able to come if the Father draws him is the same as if the Father draws him, then he is able to come.

I agree with you that the order is there because of the work Jesus is doing among the unbelievers.

The additional clause - R - is based upon the implied coming, which is really the key verb to the final clause. Setting aside the meaning of ability for the sake of simple logic is hard to grasp. IOW, what good is the logic if linguistics is not included?

Isn't the ultimate reality of the verse that Jesus will raise those who come (again setting security matters aside)? It not only seems implied in the verse but it's the verse in context.

I'll see if I can work through your longer explanation.

 

[GDL]

Can you quote the reference?

One thing I would clarify is Ἐάν + the subjunctive is the marker and μὴ is simply negating (if vs. if not).

This is Greek Beyond the Basics by Daniel Wallace:

Conditional Clauses
► 3. Third Class Condition


a. Definition


The third class condition often presents the condition as uncertain of fulfillment, but still likely. There are, however, many exceptions to this. It is difficult to give one semantic label to this structure, especially in Hellenistic Greek (note the discussion below). The structure of the protasis involves the particle ἐάν followed by a subjunctive mood in any tense. Both the particle (a combination of εἰ and the particle ἄν) and the subjunctive give the condition a sense of contingency. The apodosis can have any tense and any mood.27 This is a common category of conditional clauses, occurring nearly 300 times in the NT.28


b. Clarification and Semantics


The third class condition encompasses a broad semantic range: (a) a logical connection (if A, then B) in the present time (sometimes called present general condition), indicating nothing as to the fulfillment of the protasis; (b) a mere hypothetical situation or one that probably will not be fulfilled; and (c) a more probable future occurrence.29


Technically, the subjunctive is used in the third class condition as well as the fifth class condition. Structurally, these two are virtually identical: The fifth class condition requires a present indicative in the apodosis, while the third class can take virtually any mood-tense combination, including the present indicative.


Semantically, their meaning is a bit different. The third class condition encompasses a broad range of potentialities in Koine Greek. It depicts what is likely to occur in the future, what could possibly occur, or even what is only hypothetical and will not occur. In classical Greek the third class condition was usually restricted to the first usage (known as more probable future), but with the subjunctive’s

697
encroaching on the domain of the optative in the Hellenistic era, this structural category has expanded accordingly.30 The context will always be of the greatest help in determining an author’s use of the third class condition.


The fifth class offers a condition the fulfillment of which is realized in the present time. This condition is known as the present general condition. For the most part this condition is a simple condition;31 that is, the speaker gives no indication about the likelihood of its fulfillment. His presentation is neutral: “If A, then B.”


Because of the broad range of the third class condition and the undefined nature of the fifth class, many conditional clauses are open to interpretation. But for the most part, the present general condition addresses a generic situation in the present time (broadly speaking), while the more probable future addresses a specific situation in the future time.32

 

[tonychanyt]

This is Greek Beyond the Basics by Daniel Wallace:

Dikaioumenoi said: What ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive communicates is (in most cases) a hypothetical future probability

Does Wallace affirm that? Note the bold.

 

[GDL]

Dikaioumenoi said: What ἐάν μὴ + the subjunctive communicates is (in most cases) a hypothetical future probability

Does Wallace affirm that? Note the bold.

Here's his footnote 29 re: the more probable future occurrence shown in the excerpt:

29 Boyer gives the third class condition eight semantic categories, from “fulfillment certain” and “fulfillment probable” to “fulfillment improbable” and “no indication of probability” (ibid., 168-69). His largest category is “no indication of fulfillment” (with 120), followed by “fulfillment probable” (63; in combination with “fulfillment certain” this comes to 82).

I'll leave the reading and interpretation to you.

 

[tonychanyt]

Here's his footnote 29 re: the more probable future occurrence shown in the excerpt:

29 Boyer gives the third class condition eight semantic categories, from “fulfillment certain” and “fulfillment probable” to “fulfillment improbable” and “no indication of probability” (ibid., 168-69). His largest category is “no indication of fulfillment” (with 120), followed by “fulfillment probable” (63; in combination with “fulfillment certain” this comes to 82).

I'll leave the reading and interpretation to you.

Your comments are helpful, brother

No one is able to come unto me, if the Father who sent me MAY NOT DRAW him

What makes you think that this is a 3rd class conditional statement?

 

[GDL]

What makes you think that this is a 3rd class conditional statement?

ean + the subjunctive verb. As I said, mē (pronounced may) is just negating turning if into if not (unless).

BTW, if you'd like my read or opinions on the reference or language, please feel free to ask once you've read the reference.

 

[tonychanyt]

ean + the subjunctive verb. As I said, mē (pronounced may) is just negating turning if into if not (unless).

BTW, if you'd like my read or opinions on the reference or language, please feel free to ask once you've read the reference.

Where in your reference that says ean + the subjunctive verb is the sign for 3rd class conditional?

 

[GDL]

Where in your reference that says ean + the subjunctive verb is the sign for 3rd class conditional?

a. Definition


The third class condition often presents the condition as uncertain of fulfillment, but still likely. There are, however, many exceptions to this. It is difficult to give one semantic label to this structure, especially in Hellenistic Greek (note the discussion below). The structure of the protasis involves the particle ἐάν followed by a subjunctive mood in any tense. Both the particle (a combination of εἰ and the particle ἄν) and the subjunctive give the condition a sense of contingency. The apodosis can have any tense and any mood.27 This is a common category of conditional clauses, occurring nearly 300 times in the NT.28