No one is able to come unto me, if the Father who sent me MAY NOT DRAW him

[tonychanyt]

Not necessarily. There's nothing contradictory about the use of the subjunctive even if the Father's intention is to draw everyone (and even if he succeeds in that intention).

Right. I edited and softened my position in the OP. Thanks

 

[GDL]

Hi GDL, thanks for the comment. Don't miss my reply above; I just wanted to expand upon my argument, if it would be helpful (but feel free to ignore all this detail if not). I noticed you commented on my other post. The following is an additional piece of that post that I decided not to include there (it ventured a bit beyond the scope of the OP):

OK, I had some time to look at your detail, which I thank you for. Since we're new to one another, ignoring potentially important detail is not my strength. Looking briefly at some lengthy detail in an effort to spot time-wasting error is more and more my general practice on this forum. This work in logic required a fairly thorough read and some thought and leaves me with many questions, so I'll try to narrow them down to somewhat of an end game and come backwards if necessary:

• (Q --> P) ^ R, which reads: "If he is able to come to Jesus, then the Father draws him, and Jesus will raise him up."
• (P --> Q) ^ R, which reads: "If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up."

I'm posting these contrapositives since as I understand you've concluded they work with R - the added ending.

First questions:

• Based in logic, you're saying the first one works, correct?
  • So, you're saying the precondition has to work both ways?
    • IOW, God draws and gives the ability OR God sees the ability and draws?
      • This seems to switch the precondition, which I mentioned before.

Grammatically, the "him" whom Jesus raises is the one who is made able to come to Jesus by the Father's drawing. Strictly speaking, nothing is said here about who actually does come to Jesus.

Agreed re: "Strictly speaking". This was part of my point re: ability, but I'm reading on.

The drawing of the Father results in one obtaining the ability to come, and what is said here is that obtaining this ability is the grounds of being raised.

I agree with this, but it raises a couple points:

• The same point re: the logical switch of precondition I mentioned above.
  • The drawing of the Father results in man obtaining ability.
  • Does man having ability result in the Father drawing?
    • Again, my same question about the first contraposition above.
• Although we can see in this verse man's obtaining ability being the grounds of being raised, is it the only grounds or is there another or more we must see elsewhere?

There isn't any room here for the idea that one might have the ability to come, but does not "affirmatively use" that ability. While that is philosophically conceivable, it doesn't fit the grammar of the text.

I can see how you conclude this, but, again, do we need more Scripture to tell us the whole story? More in a moment.

If it's possible that one can have the ability but not "affirmatively use" it, then the "him" who is raised up and the "him" who is drawn must grammatically refer to different subjects (i.e. the "him" raised would encompass a sub-group of the "him" drawn). However, there's only one referent in the text for both pronouns - εὶς - the "one" who is given the ability to come.

Understood, but this is my questions raised just above. From this verse we may or may not see the possibility of a subgroup, or subgroups, but this is one verse of Scripture, so likely not the whole story. And it ultimately has to work with all Scripture re: this matter. If there's more to the story, then would this shade or better inform the interpretation of the logic?

With this said, how do you read John6:45 and compare it to John6:44?

• In John6:44 we have the man receiving ability to come to Jesus, the Father drawing, and Jesus raising.
• In John6:45 we have the man hearing & learning and coming to Jesus, and the Father teaching.
  • Would you venture to turn John6:45 into conditional structure?
  • Does it tell us anything about John6:44 that might help clarify it.

I've seen John6:65 being very important to this topic.

• Any thoughts about this verse in relation to the above two?

The third-class condition in John6:44 expresses an if A then B condition and nothing re: fulfillment, or other types of contingencies. Isn't this enough to say God may or may not draw some men? I posted Wallace earlier for @tonychanyt so it's there to pull from if desired.

Of course, there's also the parallelism of coming to Jesus and believing in Jesus that's in J6 that needs to be considered.

Again, I appreciate the lesson in logic and the effort you've put forth. John6 has been important for me for many years. It's a gift to be working through it some more.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

And thanks for all the detail! Not being formally trained in logic with symbols, it'll take me time to digest, so thank you for the translations which are helpful.

In light of my above acknowledgement, please bear with me. I'll add that I am trained in Greek.

Take your time!

Logically the contrapositive may be beneficial for something, but what good is it if it alters or can be construed to alter the actual precondition? This is likely my lack of training in logic asking, but asking it is.

It doesn't alter the precondition; apologies if I was unclear. The contrapositive of a conditional statement is logically equivalent to the conditional statement itself. Contraposition is when both sides of a condition are inverted, and then flipped. So "if P then Q" is equivalent to "if not Q then not P." Logically the result is the same - P is the precondition for Q. If we have to have P in order for Q to be true, then it is equally valid to say that if Q isn't true, we must not have P either.

"If this object is blue, then it has color" (P --> Q) is equivalent to "if this object does not have color, then it is not blue" (-Q --> -P)

The purpose of the contrapositive statement was simply to illustrate another way of expressing the idea of the verse, which might be more clear or straightforward than the way it's stated, given how the "then" clause comes before the "if" clause.

When I gave the contrapositive of "if the Father does not draw him, then he is not able to come to me," I just didn't bother changing the verb tense. But to be more precise, I should have. The logic is that P (the Father's drawing) is needed in order to have Q (the ability to come). No logically equivalent expression will change that, but verb tenses do change in order to reflect the reordering of conditions.

-Q <-- -P
"He cannot come to me if the Father does not draw him"
"He cannot buy food if his employer does not pay him money"

P <-- Q
"The Father has drawn him if he is able to come."
"His employer has paid him money if he can buy food."

He is not able to come if the Father does not draw him is the same as if the Father does not draw him, then he is not able to come.

Correct
-Q <-- -P
-P --> -Q

He is able to come if the Father draws him is the same as if the Father draws him, then he is able to come.

Correct
Q <-- P
P --> Q

The additional clause - R - is based upon the implied coming, which is really the key verb to the final clause.

Setting aside the meaning of ability for the sake of simple logic is hard to grasp. IOW, what good is the logic if linguistics is not included?

Isn't the ultimate reality of the verse that Jesus will raise those who come (again setting security matters aside)? It not only seems implied in the verse but it's the verse in context.

I'll see if I can work through your longer explanation.

I'm a little confused on what you mean. Which is the key verb? The only time "come" appears in the verse is in the opening clause, Q, and it's an infinitive; it's not the main verb. So the key idea, grammatically, for understanding the final clause, is "able," not "come."

"If the Father draws him..." then what? "He is able" to do something. How does the last clause relate to this condition? The pronouns are they key. "I will raise him up" identifies the object of the raising as grammatically the same as the object of the drawing.

So R assumes the fulfillment of the condition, not the fulfillment of some additional implication. For it to assume something additional, one would have to show that the two "hims" in the verse have different grammatical referents. When one reads the statement, "if his employer pays him money, then he is able to buy food, and I will cook him dinner," one would naturally understand the two "hims" in this sentence to refer to the same person.

Likewise, in the statement "if the Father draws him, then he is able to come, and Jesus will raise him up," it is natural to understand these two "hims" as the same person, not different groups of people (i.e. the latter being a subgroup of the former).

If one interprets the latter as referring to the one who actually does come (we agree it does) and the former as referring to more than that (I contend it doesn't) - e.g., both those who come as well as an additional group who are enabled but do not "affirmatively use" their ability - then there is a hidden theological assumption at play. And the assumption isn't simply that it is those who actually come who will be raised, because there's no disagreement on that. The assumption would be that the object of the Father's drawing includes a wider scope of people than the object of the Son's raising. But that's the very question we're discussing, is it not?

It is right to assume that the "him" who is raised up refers to those who actually do come, because we know that to be true theologically. But what justifies the view that this "him" represents a smaller group of people than the "him" drawn, other than the expectation of this, given a theological assumption? The grammar doesn't support it.

So the overall logic of the verse, simplified, is "if P then Q," and "if Q then R." Using these two statements as premises, we can construct the following argument:

1. "If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus." (P --> Q)
2. "If he is able to come to Jesus, then Jesus will raise him up." (Q --> R)
3. We know, theologically (and contextually; vv. 39-40), that it is only those who come who will be raised.
4. Therefore, the one drawn, the one enabled, the one who comes, are all descriptions of the same individual.

So it is reasonable to say the verse does not recognize a distinction between the one drawn/enabled and the one who affirmatively acts upon that enablement to come to Jesus. Those who are enabled by the Father's drawing come, and those who are not enabled by the Father's drawing don't.

One thing I would clarify is Ἐάν + the subjunctive is the marker and μὴ is simply negating (if vs. if not).

Yes, correct, thank you for catching that!

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Sorry, I didn't see your most recent reply before I posted the above. I'll read and try to get to it shortly.

 

[GDL]

When I gave the contrapositive of "if the Father does not draw him, then he is not able to come to me," I just didn't bother changing the verb tense. But to be more precise, I should have. The logic is that P (the Father's drawing) is needed in order to have Q (the ability to come). No logically equivalent expression will change that, but verb tenses do change in order to reflect the reordering of conditions.

-Q <-- -P
"He cannot come to me if the Father does not draw him"
"He cannot buy food if his employer does not pay him money"

P <-- Q
"The Father has drawn him if he is able to come."
"His employer has paid him money if he can buy food."

The day's about over for me and I'll need a fresh mind for this. A couple quick observations since you mentioned you may look at my other post.

This change of verb tense is something I brought up before. In an important way, I think it affects one of the contrapositions you see working with R.

I'm a little confused on what you mean. Which is the key verb? The only time "come" appears in the verse is in the opening clause, Q, and it's an infinitive; it's not the main verb. So the key idea, grammatically, for understanding the final clause, is "able," not "come."

I think this is important. We're dealing with a complementary infinitive to finish the thought of the verb. If we don't focus on the infinitive, then we don't have the complete thought. It's not just receiving an ability but receiving an ability to come [to Jesus]. Coming to Jesus is the goal of the ability from God's drawing. It's this ability to come vs. the actual coming that I was questioning before.

The question I see hanging in the apodosis is whether or not the ability is used to come, which is to believe. As a stand-alone verse I see the connection between ability to come/believe and Jesus raising. But the ability to believe in itself does not say believe. The man has been given an ability, but does he use it to complete what's required - to come to/believe in Jesus Christ?

Stated more succinctly with this in mind, don't we really have something like: No man believes in Jesus Christ if the Father does not draw Him to Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ will raise him in the last day? The next verse effectively says; No man hears and learns from the Father and believes in Jesus Christ if the Father does not teach him.

Ability is not the goal. Belief is the goal.

 

[GDL]

Sorry, I didn't see your most recent reply before I posted the above. I'll read and try to get to it shortly.

No problem. Thanks again for your work.

 

[GDL]

@Dikaioumenoi

Just wanted to add a thought this morning that I forgot last night. Starting here re: John6:44:

Stated more succinctly with this in mind, don't we really have something like: No man believes in Jesus Christ if the Father does not draw Him to Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ will raise him in the last day? The next verse effectively says; No man hears and learns from the Father and believes in Jesus Christ if the Father does not teach him.

My thinking is that not only is the complementary infinitive important to the complete thought and logic of John6:44 but I don't see John6:44 as standing alone apart from John6:45. I think they're chiastic:

No one can come to Jesus Christ

if the Father does not draw him​

and Jesus Christ will raise him in the last day​

As Isaiah says, they will all be taught by God (actually says they will all be learned men of God)​

All who hear from God and learn will come to Jesus Christ

So, if we want a complete thought to form a logical construct, then it needs not only the complementary infinitive - to come - but also this parallelism to make sure we know the full thought. It also helps us see that erchomai is the main verb (complementary infinitive then verb) - the main point. Besides this, we also need John6:47 to parallel belief in Jesus Christ with come to Jesus Christ. IOW, what's the purpose of the logic apart from the full thought?

The interesting part is that Christ resurrecting the man is the center & main point of the chiasm. It also parallels eternal life in John6:47.

Thoughts?

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

I'm combining my comments here on your last several posts that I haven't gotten to yet.

First questions:

• Based in logic, you're saying the first one works, correct?
  • So, you're saying the precondition has to work both ways?
    • IOW, God draws and gives the ability OR God sees the ability and draws?
      • This seems to switch the precondition, which I mentioned before.

Again, sorry for the confusion. Hopefully my above reply clarifies. I made the mistake of not altering the verb tenses as necessary. It would be better to say, "if he is able to come to Jesus, then the Father has drawn him, and Jesus will raise him up."

• Although we can see in this verse man's obtaining ability being the grounds of being raised, is it the only grounds or is there another or more we must see elsewhere?

This would be a logical possibility if we didn't have the identical pronouns, but as it is I don't think it fits the grammar of the verse, for reasons I explained in my previous reply.

Understood, but this is my questions raised just above. From this verse we may or may not see the possibility of a subgroup, or subgroups, but this is one verse of Scripture, so likely not the whole story. And it ultimately has to work with all Scripture re: this matter. If there's more to the story, then would this shade or better inform the interpretation of the logic?

It's not simply that we may not see the possibility of a subgroup in this verse; my argument has been that the logic of the verse precludes that as a possibility. I agree that context - both immediate, and the overall witness of Scripture - is vital to the interpretation of any given verse. Nevertheless, when it comes to grammar and logic, there are some things that no amount of context will change. Just as no contextual consideration will change the fact that in the statement, "the dog wags his tail," the dog is the subject doing the wagging, and not the tail, so it is also true that no contextual consideration will change how pronouns function.

I suggest that the only way it makes sense to recognize the possibility of a subgroup in light of this verse is if there is an additional grammatical referent (i.e. in addition to οὐδείς, negated of course) for the second "him" that does not apply to the first. There isn't one in John 6:44. Is there one in the prior context? What would it be, and what would be the grammatical argument for looking back there when we have a perfectly acceptable referent in the current verse? The last subject describing believers is πιστεύων in verse 40. While there is a clear theological connection between the two verses (they both end with the same clause), I don't see how we could say πιστεύων is the grammatical referent of αὐτὸν in verse 44. It seems it would have to be εἷς (οὐδείς without the negation), meaning the referent of the "him" drawn and the "him" raised is grammatically the same.

With this said, how do you read John6:45 and compare it to John6:44?

• In John6:44 we have the man receiving ability to come to Jesus, the Father drawing, and Jesus raising.
• In John6:45 we have the man hearing & learning and coming to Jesus, and the Father teaching.
  • Would you venture to turn John6:45 into conditional structure?
  • Does it tell us anything about John6:44 that might help clarify it.

Sure, there's an implied condition in John 6:45: "If he has heard and learned from the Father, he comes to me."
I would suggest this parallels: "If he has been taught of God, he comes to me."
And: "If he is given by the Father, he will come to me" (vs. 37)
And: "If the Father draws him, he comes to me" (implication)

What does hearing and learning from the Father refer to? This seems explanatory of the prior phrase, "they will all be taught by God."

One might suggest (I often hear it) that the "all" who are taught represents a larger group, of whom those who "hear and learn" are but a subgroup. The problem I have with that interpretation is the genitive expression, διδακτοὶ θεοῦ, "taught of God." Διδακτός, which is not a common term, conveys the idea of having received the effects of teaching/instruction. It's descriptive of something true of the individual, not of God's action. In other words, this isn't describing an education offered by God; it's characterizing the recipients as educated. "Learned of God" or "God-instructed" is the sense. Thus, I'd suggest "hear and learn" is best taken to be a parallel description of "taught," and not a reference to a subgroup. They're two ways of referring to the same group of people. And this seems to best fit the context in Isaiah 54:11ff that Jesus is quoting from, which is all about what God is going to do to his people.

I've seen John6:65 being very important to this topic.

• Any thoughts about this verse in relation to the above two?

The conditional from verse 44 is almost restated verbatim here, with the exception of the verb in the protasis. Interestingly, we have the sentence structure from verse 44, with the verb from verse 37.

37: "All that the Father gives (δίδωσίν) me will come to me"
44: "No one can come to me unless the Father draws (ἑλκύσῃ) him"
65: "No one can come to me unless it is granted (δεδομένον) him by the Father"

Verse 37, unlike 44, does directly tell us something about the ones who come. Those defined as the given ones come, surely, as a result of their being given.

Verse 65 tells us that no one can come unless the Father grants it. Verse 37 tells us that those whom the Father gives (same verb) will come. This seems to affirm the argument I've made previously; namely, that no one can come to Jesus unless the Father draws him, but, if the Father does draw him, he will come. Remember the contrapositive of verse 44:

• "If the Father draws him, then he can come to me, and I will raise him up." Compare to:
• "If the Father grants it to him, then he can come to me (contrapositive of verse 65), and he will come to me (verse 37)."

- or -

• "If he can come to me, then the Father has drawn him, and I will raise him up." Compare to:
• "If he can come to me, then the Father has granted it to him (contrapositive of verse 65), and he will come to me (verse 37)."

The implication of verse 44 is that if one has the ability to come, he will exercise it, because the one characterized as having the ability (i.e. the one drawn) is grammatically the same one who is being raised, and yet only those who actually come will be raised. But when we pull verses 37 and 65 into this, it's no longer just an implication. It seems to be directly stated. Unless the giving of verse 37 is not the granting of verse 65? But I don't see a contextual reason for that conclusion.

I think this is important. We're dealing with a complementary infinitive to finish the thought of the verb. If we don't focus on the infinitive, then we don't have the complete thought. It's not just receiving an ability but receiving an ability to come [to Jesus]. Coming to Jesus is the goal of the ability from God's drawing. It's this ability to come vs. the actual coming that I was questioning before.

The incompleteness of the thought doesn't have any effect on the logic of the sentence, though. We could take the infinitive out entirely and the logic is the same:

"No one is able unless the Father draws him, and I will raise him up."

This is still represented as (-Q <-- -P) ^ R. Though the natural question arises, "able to do what?" the logic of the sentence doesn't change. The conclusion is the same: Whatever it is that he is "able" to do, the point is that it is this ability that is the logical grounds of his being raised (or better put theologically, since we know his actual coming is the true grounds of his being raised, the implication from the logic of the verse is that there is not a meaningful distinction between the two; if one is enabled by the Father's drawing, that enablement results infallibly in coming and being raised; it is an effectual enablement; an act upon the heart that instills the desire upon which to act).

You see a distinction between the ability to come vs. the actual coming. I understand the desire to do that theologically. The problem, I contend, is that the logic and grammar (re: the pronouns) of the verse doesn't permit it.

The question I see hanging in the apodosis is whether or not the ability is used to come, which is to believe. As a stand-alone verse I see the connection between ability to come/believe and Jesus raising. But the ability to believe in itself does not say believe. The man has been given an ability, but does he use it to complete what's required - to come to/believe in Jesus Christ?

Again, I don't think the grammar leaves this as a question. Grammatically, who is the "him" who is raised, in the following statement?

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to me, and I will raise him up on the last day."

The "him" raised = the "him" drawn. I understand (and agree) that Scripture needs to interpret Scripture, but again, there are certain things about logic and grammar that no amount of context is going to change. There isn't a grammatical reason to understand these two "hims" are referring to different groups of people. There might be the desire to understand them as such, given certain theological assumptions, but first of all that begs the question: are those assumptions accurate? (I don't see anything in Scripture that poses a problem with the idea that all those enabled to come will do so), and secondly, it still doesn't warrant postulating that the referent of the second "him" is understood, and not given to us, when we have a clear candidate right here in the text in εἷς.

So, if we want a complete thought to form a logical construct, then it needs not only the complementary infinitive - to come - but also this parallelism to make sure we know the full thought. It also helps us see that erchomai is the main verb (complementary infinitive then verb) - the main point. Besides this, we also need John6:47 to parallel belief in Jesus Christ with come to Jesus Christ. IOW, what's the purpose of the logic apart from the full thought?

See my above comments on verse 45; I agree with a lot of this. But I think we're using the phrase "main verb" differently. Ἔρχομαι is the main verb of the final clause in verse 45; that doesn't make an infinitive form of it the main verb in verse 44a. A complementary infinitive can't be a main verb, for precisely the reason that it's completing the thought of the main action/state.

I don't disagree that coming is the "goal." That doesn't change the logic of what's being said in verse 44. We don't need the complete thought to see the underlying logical structure of a sentence. The following three statements, for instance, all mean different things, but they have the same logical structure:

"No one can come unless the Father draws him, and I will raise him up."
"No one can sing unless the Father gives him voice, and I will raise him up."
"No one can run unless the Father gives him endurance, and I will raise him up."

In all three statements, we have the same logical conclusion: Jesus promises to raise up the one whom the Father grants some ability to. That's the grammatical conclusion, given the pronouns and sentence structure. Does Jesus raise only those who use the "voice" or "endurance" that the Father gives them? Strictly speaking we're not told here. If further context tells us that (as it does in the case of coming), that's fine. But all that means is that these statements assume that being given the ability entails subsequently acting upon it.

In sum, I think we assume too much if we take "I will raise him up" to be a reference to those who actually come in contrast to those who have been given the ability but don't exercise it. That requires not only further argument demonstrating that the distinction exists, but it also requires a grammatical argument that the two αὐτόν's have different grammatical referents. And I don't see any grounds for that.

 

[GDL]

"No one can come unless the Father draws him, and I will raise him up."
"No one can sing unless the Father gives him voice, and I will raise him up."
"No one can run unless the Father gives him endurance, and I will raise him up."

I'm on my way out for a bit and glanced through your post. I'm picking this out just to get back to you relatively briefly.

I do see your point about not going beyond what's stated in 6:44 and as I said earlier, I do see the logic, and better now that you have changed the verb forms (which is something I think I brought up very early on).

I'm still not settled on the infinitive. Yes, I am referring to it in a way that may seem irregular, but it's to make the point that there is no complete thought in dunamai without the infinitive that completes the verb here. In essence, the main verb is a verb + a complementary infinitive. Wallace calls dunamai as used here a "helper verb"** which seems to conceptually detract from it being a main verb. I'm sure you know this but I'm questioning why you're not giving it more weight. Maybe this can be our focus to make this more brief.

In your examples above with some loose paraphrasing:

1. No one can unless the Father gives him a voice - can what? Can sing. Voice and sing go together. Can is empty.
2. No one can unless the Father gives him endurance - can what? Can run [distance]. Same principle. Can is empty.
3. No one can unless the Father draws him - can what? Can come. Same principle. Can is empty.
   1. I suppose we could look at elko and speculate what the Father's drawing or dragging is for or where He is drawing/dragging us, but that seems to beg many questions even if we use the last clause to speculate.
4. Dunamis is one of the if not the most used words with a complementary infinitive per Wallace..
   1. You have ability. That's nice. Ability to do what?

This is also why I brought out the chiasm. It supplies erchomai as the main verb clarifying dunamai + infinitive erchomai.

Again, I see the logic of 6:44 but as a standalone looking at dunamai without it's complement, does the logic not leave us wanting? It does me. Sure, we can show the logic but it's not informative. Jesus will raise the one the Father has drawn giving him ability. Ability to be raised, sure. But the infinitive completes the thought - ability to come to Jesus and Jesus will raise him.

Again, I see no reason to not complete the thought of the main helper verb dunamai (dunamai is helping erchomai) which very frequently takes a complementary infinitive in our Text.


**Infinitive per Wallace (my highlighting):

F. Complementary (Supplementary)

1. Definition

The infinitive is very frequently used with “helper” verbs to complete their thought. Such verbs rarely occur without the infinitive. This finds a parallel in English.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

I'm on my way out for a bit and glanced through your post. I'm picking this out just to get back to you relatively briefly.

I do see your point about not going beyond what's stated in 6:44 and as I said earlier, I do see the logic, and better now that you have changed the verb forms (which is something I think I brought up very early on).

I'm still not settled on the infinitive. Yes, I am referring to it in a way that may seem irregular, but it's to make the point that there is no complete thought in dunamai without the infinitive that completes the verb here. In essence, the main verb is a verb + a complementary infinitive. Wallace calls dunamai as used here a "helper verb"** which seems to conceptually detract from it being a main verb. I'm sure you know this but I'm questioning why you're not giving it more weight. Maybe this can be our focus to make this more brief.

In your examples above with some loose paraphrasing:

1. No one can unless the Father gives him a voice - can what? Can sing. Voice and sing go together. Can is empty.
2. No one can unless the Father gives him endurance - can what? Can run [distance]. Same principle. Can is empty.
3. No one can unless the Father draws him - can what? Can come. Same principle. Can is empty.
   1. I suppose we could look at elko and speculate what the Father's drawing or dragging is for or where He is drawing/dragging us, but that seems to beg many questions even if we use the last clause to speculate.
4. Dunamis is one of the if not the most used words with a complementary infinitive per Wallace..
   1. You have ability. That's nice. Ability to do what?

This is also why I brought out the chiasm. It supplies erchomai as the main verb clarifying dunamai + infinitive erchomai.

Again, I see the logic of 6:44 but as a standalone looking at dunamai without it's complement, does the logic not leave us wanting? It does me. Sure, we can show the logic but it's not informative. Jesus will raise the one the Father has drawn giving him ability. Ability to be raised, sure. But the infinitive completes the thought - ability to come to Jesus and Jesus will raise him.

Again, I see no reason to not complete the thought of the main helper verb dunamai (dunamai is helping erchomai) which very frequently takes a complementary infinitive in our Text.


**Infinitive per Wallace (my highlighting):

F. Complementary (Supplementary)

1. Definition

The infinitive is very frequently used with “helper” verbs to complete their thought. Such verbs rarely occur without the infinitive. This finds a parallel in English.

What exactly is your argument here? We can't just dismiss δύναται from the conversation, so even with this emphasis on the infinitive the fact remains that we're talking about the ability to come, and not necessarily actually coming. Respectfully, this line of discussion seems like a bit of a red herring, especially since the most critical point of my argument hasn't been addressed yet: What do we do with the pronouns?

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up on the last day."

Who is "him"? Are these two "hims" different people? Does the first refer to a larger group than the latter? This is a grammatical question. If these pronouns do not have identical referents, we need a grammatical argument demonstrating what the referent is for the latter.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Let P = the Father draws
Let Q = able to come to Jesus
Let R = Jesus will raise up
Let x = him/he

(Px --> xQ) ^ Rx

(I'm letting x after a variable identify an object, and before a variable identify a subject)

The expression says this:

"[If the Father draws (him), then (he) is able to come to Jesus], and Jesus will raise up (him)."

Will every single person who is drawn by the Father also be raised by the Son? Or might some be drawn (i.e. enabled to come) who are not ultimately raised (i.e. don't actually come)?

If the latter is the case, then the above logical expression is false. This would actually be the correct expression:

(Px --> xQ) ^ Ry

...where x is "him1" and y is "him2," the latter making up a subgroup of the former. Is there a grammatical basis for this?

 

[GDL]

What exactly is your argument here? We can't just dismiss δύναται from the conversation, so even with this emphasis on the infinitive the fact remains that we're talking about the ability to come, and not necessarily actually coming. Respectfully, this line of discussion seems like a bit of a red herring, especially since the most critical point of my argument hasn't been addressed yet: What do we do with the pronouns?

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up on the last day."

Who is "him"? Are these two "hims" different people? Does the first refer to a larger group than the latter? This is a grammatical question. If these pronouns do not have identical referents, we need a grammatical argument demonstrating what the referent is for the latter.

What are you not clear about? We've had some long posts. Maybe there's been some misunderstanding, or we've gotten sidetracked a bit. Part of the issue I recall coming up when we were talking about subgroups.

Surely the ability is important. It's part of what the verse says. But it's not the entire verbal construct. The way I understood you, you were saying dunatai being the main verb, the infinitive was thus not as important. I saw just the opposite.

You and I both know that "come to Jesus" is the real message - the real point. It's the goal of the drawing and the goal of the ability. As you pointed out, the conditional clause is reversed to make the point in context that coming to Jesus is the emphasis. Then, the chiasm makes this point perfectly clear. It's also very clear in the apodosis because the infinitive is actually the ultimate point of the verb. And, in truth, we know the final clause makes no ultimate sense apart from coming to Jesus. A naked dunatai is virtually meaningless.

As far as I'm concerned, if we want to reduce the point in this or these verses, it ends up here: if a man comes to Jesus, then Jesus will raise him. But there's obviously more to the lesson.

So, sure, as I've acknowledged, the logic in the verse itself leaves some openings to consider because ability to come eventuates in Jesus will raise. No argument there. But the chiastic structure completes the thought and makes it clear that the one who Jesus will raise (per these verses at least) is the one who actually comes.

FWIW, I'd also clarify this because the way you're presenting this there are 3 referents: "If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up on the last day." he [who] is able to come is the emphasis based upon first placement at minimum.

 

[GDL]

Let P = the Father draws
Let Q = able to come to Jesus
Let R = Jesus will raise up
Let x = him/he

(Px --> xQ) ^ Rx

(I'm letting x after a variable identify an object, and before a variable identify a subject)

The expression says this:

"[If the Father draws (him), then (he) is able to come to Jesus], and Jesus will raise up (him)."

Will every single person who is drawn by the Father also be raised by the Son?

Maybe. But not certain due to the word "able".

Setting aside other issues not contained in this verse, my answer would be, yes, if it said, "[If the Father draws (him), then (he) is able to will come to Jesus], and Jesus will raise up (him)."

Or might some be drawn (i.e. enabled to come) who are not ultimately raised (i.e. don't actually come)?

Yes, because if they do not exercise the ability, then they will not be raised.

If the latter is the case, then the above logical expression is false. This would actually be the correct expression:

(Px --> xQ) ^ Ry

...where x is "him1" and y is "him2," the latter making up a subgroup of the former. Is there a grammatical basis for this?

Yes, the word "able" is the grammatical reason. Linguistics is part of logic.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Yes, the word "able" is the grammatical reason. Linguistics is part of logic.

You've mentioned this a few times, "linguistics is a part of logic." Can you elaborate on what you mean by that?

My question pertained to sentence structure and pronoun function; you're offering an answer related to the meaning of a verb. The meaning of words does not alter how pronouns function in a sentence. How does the word "able" argue for a distinction in referent between the two "hims"? You would have to be importing a theological assumption about what this ability entails (i.e. that it must be resistible). Nothing about the grammar of the text itself suggests a distinction. We have identical pronouns. So are you assuming that the latter "him" must be a subgroup because the nature of the Father's enabling is resistible?

Backtracking a bit, I also am interested if you have further comments on verse 65. That portion of the discussion kind of died out. Do you disagree that verse 65 suggests a paradigmatic relationship between δίδωμι and ἔλκω? The terms seem interchangeable in this context. And if that's the case, then verse 37 has already equated the giving/drawing of the Father with the subsequent guarantee that those so given/drawn will come. That too would identify the "him" drawn and the "him" raised of verse 44 as the same person.

 

[GDL]

You've mentioned this a few times, "linguistics is a part of logic." Can you elaborate on what you mean by that?

Firstly, I read it in some logic basics material, so credit where credit is due.

You dealt with this when you determined to change a verb tense to maintain the logic when you were working on some equivalencies.

Simply put, words are crucial, which seems an obvious statement. I'm including "able" in this. IMO, "able" in itself leaves contingency; able to come does not have to mean will/does come. If ability is all that's required, which is the case that I, rightly or wrongly, saw you making, then this has to play out somewhere. Within the structure of the more complete statement, I don't think it does.

My question pertained to sentence structure and pronoun function; you're offering an answer related to the meaning of a verb. The meaning of words does not alter how pronouns function in a sentence. How does the word "able" argue for a distinction in referent between the two "hims"?

Firstly, to clarify as I did using your wording, you showed 3 referents in one of your statements. If it's simply about referents, then I said I have no problem with what you're saying about them. But it's not just about referents. For the logic to work we have to look at all the words in the argument and this includes the verb and it's complement in this case. If verbs were not important, then why would it be necessary to change a verb tense to maintain the logic? If verbs were not important, then do we have a complete thought to test logically? If we don't use all the words to test the logic, then are we truly testing what's being said?

As I said before, If words are not important, then I'll just change them and say, If God draws a man to Jesus, then that man will come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him. Now it's easy. But there is no proof that this is what's being said unless an assumption is made.

Where are we talking past one another? This is not just about referents. There is more being stated and all words in the statements are part of the statements being tested.

You would have to be importing a theological assumption about what this ability entails (i.e. that it must be resistible).

But I can turn this back to you and say you have to be importing an assumption that it's not resistible. And this is where we have to deal with the meaning of "able" and what the completed verb actually says; "able to come".

Nothing about the grammar of the text itself suggests a distinction.

But it does suggest a distinction. The question is whether or not the distinction can be concluded one way or another, but it's there.
So, we must try to remain neutral and not import resistible or irresistible. If I approach this verse with no theological presupposition, and just look at referents, then the logic is clear. But the minute I see "able to come" it raises the question as to whether or not ability is sufficient. So, resistible and irresistible are on the table.

In your last post asking for a choice between two equations, I chose the second mainly because there is this question on the table IMO. If I were to choose the first one due solely to referents, IMO I'm making the choice that ability is all that's required. So, I chose resistible as a possibility, which means irresistibility is also a possibility, which means I can't choose the first formula. IOW maybe I should have asked for more choices to see what other formulas you could come up with.

We have identical pronouns. So are you assuming that the latter "him" must be a subgroup because the nature of the Father's enabling is resistible?

Yes, because "able to come" does not automatically mean "will come". So, the way I see it, we have to go with an assumption that it may not be irresistible. Resistible is thus a factor. Irresistible is conclusive. Resistible can go other way. In my current view the better read is to allow "able" to mean "able" and not force it beyond being given the ability.

Backtracking a bit, I also am interested if you have further comments on verse 65. That portion of the discussion kind of died out.

To begin, I'm interested in knowing what you think of the chiastic structure I presented. Do you disagree that it's there?

Do you disagree that verse 65 suggests a paradigmatic relationship between δίδομι and ἔλκω? The terms seem interchangeable in this context. And if that's the case, then verse 37 has already equated the giving/drawing of the Father with the subsequent guarantee that those so given/drawn will come. That too would identify the "him" drawn and the "him" raised of verse 44 as the same person.

So, you're taking me to v.37 to pick up didomi. Certainly, there's a relationship between didomi and elko (please pardon my laziness on the fonts and verb markings) but I wouldn't go so far as to say they're necessarily interchangeable and this gets back to dunatai. Since we're now getting into a broader interpretation of how 6:44 works, I'll take it further.

I think didomi in 6:37 is interchangeable with didomi in 6:65 and I'd add zoiopoeo in 6:63 into the mix (I'm not looking further at the moment although I might go back to 6:27 and bring that in). The entire Godhead is involved here. I'll not take us down a rabbit trail about faith & works, but I normally do.

It's as we proceed into the 6:65 area that I think it gets more interesting and more informative. Beginning back in 6:45 I see Jesus equating God's teaching about His Son - earlier seen as Jesus teaching about Himself and what He's there to give to men - as the detail re: elko; God draws by [at minimum] teaching the Gospel, which gives men the ability to come to Jesus. In 6:45 the men must hear and learn [the Gospel] to come to Jesus. But I'm still left with a question; does ability to come mean will hear and learn and come? It seems it should, or is it still "could" (ability)? Jesus is doing an awful lot of work to get these people to shift perspective from a physical to a spiritual paradigm.

In 6:53 Jesus gives us another 'ean me' lesson using an eating and drinking analogy. So, still having a question about dunatai, we have been given food (spiritual food as Jesus says - so His words - so the Gospel again), so we have the ability to eat because the food is there, but do we eat & drink or is it forced down our throat or hooked into our veins apart from our will? And for the next 5 verses Jesus repeats the theme of "whoever" so it's back to some contingency again as was there in "able" in 6:44. I think this is narrowing down on the resistible vs. irresistible question to some degree.

IMO, now it gets very interesting; In 6:60-61 we see that there are disciples of Jesus there and He has been pushing into some offensive language and some very direct questions that will do some sorting out of disciples. The fair assumption to say the least is that these disciples have heard the Gospel and are following Jesus. But if something He tells them offends them, He raises the ante from believe what He (and the Father) says about Him (what they hear), to what if you see Him ascending back to Heaven where He comes from?

He's been speaking words that are spirit and life that the Spirit uses to give life. Have you truly heard and learned and come? Jesus knew some of His disciples had not. IMO they'd heard but not really heard (no ears to hear) and learned and had not truly come. They had not believed. The Father had not given them to Jesus and they left Him at this point. So, does this answer the dunatai, didomi, elko question. Maybe yes, maybe no.

But what does Jesus do to wrap this up (beside even opening up election at the very end)? In 6:67-69 He asks those who remained for a decision, a choice. Peter says it all. Where else do we go, Jesus? You have the words of eternal life and we have come to believe and know that You are the Christ, the Son of God. The message got through or was accepted to/by some. Was it forced or was it presented? Were they drawn or were they dragged. Does drawn mean attract? What range in the meaning of elko do we select for translation? If elko means attract, then why does the Gospel attract, and does it attract some or all?

So, where are we? Resistible or irresistible? I'm not 100% sure here but human will is involved, so I side with resistible because it leaves options I'm not seeing taken off the table. You can put free food in front of me (drawing me) but if it's cauliflower or I'm not hungry, then I may pass. Then again, if I'm starving (dragging me), I may well eat. In either case, I may just eat and follow you around for free meals and some social life until I see or hear something that offends me to the point where I'll go back to where I came from and look for the next situation. The old adage, you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink the water that gives eternal life.

That's my answer for now unless you can convince me of irresistible grace. I chose you (pl) and one of you is a devil.

One thing I do conclude is that our Father is the final decider, so elko and didomi are not necessarily equative because of dunatai which seems to involve human choice. If you take off, then the Father hasn't given you to Me.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Forgive me for the lengthy reply, but I had a lot to comment on. I want to express again my appreciation for your time. I don't usually encounter people who are interested in going into such depth with me in discussion. I've really enjoyed this, and even if neither of us ultimately convinces the other, this has been helpful for me in thinking through how to better articulate my views and concerns. So again, thank you for that.

You dealt with this when you determined to change a verb tense to maintain the logic when you were working on some equivalencies.

Yes, but a change in verb tense and the lexical meaning of a word are different issues. Grammatical issues like verb tense do have an impact logical structure, but we can fill that structure with all sorts of lexemes and it's not going to alter the logic of the verse. If the meaning of δύναται with its compliment had any impact on logical structure, it would have to show up in the symbolic representation. But it won't because it doesn't define a new clause or negate anything.

I think you may be confusing the contingency you see in "able" with the contingency implied by -Q <--> -P. They are not the same. -Q <--> -P reads, "He is not able to come to me unless (i.e. if and only if not) the Father draws him." The contingency here is with respect to whether or not the Father's drawing is sufficient in making one able to come, not whether the ability to come is sufficient for actually coming. What you seem to be talking about is an additional contingency that you suggest exists in order for R to be true. You might want to argue for that contextually, but my point was this is not something that shows up in the logical structure of the way the verse is stated.

IMO, "able" in itself leaves contingency...

I don't think it's actually the verb "able" that implies this in your argument, but rather a certain understanding of the agency of the subject. This can be demonstrated by the fact that "able" can be meaningfully used with inanimate subjects. For instance, the statement, "water is able to flow if and only if all obstacles to its course are removed," is a meaningful statement. If all obstacles are removed, such that water is then able to flow, that does not entail that the flow of water remains a matter of some contingency.

In other words, the use of the word "able" could simply be necessary given the statement of the condition. If we weren't talking about obstacles, it would suffice to just say, "water flows." But when talking about obstacles to water's natural course, it is meaningful to speak of water not being able to travel along that course. It is this context of discussion about obstacles that introduces the terminology of ability, and not necessarily an intention by the author to inform the reader of some further contingency. Given more information about the subject, it could be that some additional contingency exists, but it isn't necessary. Hence, the term "able" isn't what argues this.

"Water is not able to flow unless all obstacles to its course are removed, and I will irrigate my field with it."

Is it true that even if all obstacles are removed, the mere presence of the verb "able" entails some additional contingency before I can irrigate my field? Or is it the case that the removal of obstacles is both necessary and sufficient for the flow of water, such that the final clause, "I will irrigate my field with it," assumes the fulfillment of the condition, and not merely its fulfillment plus some other unspoken contingency?

What I'm getting at is, "able" is not the key to understanding this verse. The key to understanding the verse is the nature of the Father's drawing. What is it? What does it do? Answers to these questions will inform the meaning of δύναται in this context, not vice versa. The drawing of the Father is the condition. What it means to be "enabled" in this context is therefore dependent upon what the drawing is. Is it merely an attraction that may be resisted, or is it an effectual divine act that alters the nature of the individual's heart, thus leading to a particular choice?

While one might point out that in the above analogy there is no agency at all in the subject (let alone free will), this is only a flaw if assumptions have already been made about the nature of the Father's drawing and the human will. If it is the case that the Father does not draw everyone, then we have a contradiction to the "ability entails contingency" principle in the very clause, "no one is able to come to me" (hence the question-begging nature of the principle). If not everyone is drawn, this would be descriptive of unbelievers (and I've suggested, and argue the point again a little later in this reply, that this best fits the context). And yet surely unbelievers choose not to believe. So why would unbelief be described in terms of an inability? Does this entail that violence is done to the will, as if some outside force is coerces people not to choose what they might otherwise? Or could it be that this "inability to come" is descriptive of some aspect of nature? - that is, it is the natural course of the undrawn one to choose unbelief, given the desires which characterize the condition of his heart?

To put it another way, if one has not been drawn, we could say he irresistibly chooses the sin that he naturally loves. That's not a denial of choice itself; it's simply an affirmation that creatures choose according to the desires of their hearts (Matt 7:17-18?). There is no need here to see ability as necessarily entailing contingency with respect to choosing against one's natural desires. Hence, it's not merely the term "able" that implies the contingency you speak of. What implies it is a certain understanding of ability; namely, the ability to choose contrary to the desire of one's heart.

Firstly, to clarify as I did using your wording, you showed 3 referents in one of your statements.

Do you mean two objects of the same referent? By "referent" I meant what the two αὐτόνs refer to, i.e. they have the same grammatical subject.

If verbs were not important, then do we have a complete thought to test logically? If we don't use all the words to test the logic, then are we truly testing what's being said?

Maybe we're using the term "logic" differently? I don't know. When I speak of the logic of a verse, I'm simply talking about clause structure. "If P then Q, and R." The expression "if P then Q" remains "if P then Q" regardless of what we fill those variables with. Now, it is possible to fill those variables with something that makes the expression false, but the truth value of a statement is not in question when determining logical structure (re: validity vs soundness).

You seem to be confusing logical structure with other elements of meaning. As I argued previously, we don't need complete thoughts to determine a sentence's structure. For instance, the very presence of ἐὰν μὴ alone already tells us we're going to have some sort of negated conditional statement. In fact, that along with the markers of two other clauses (κἀγὼ and the fact that we have something before ἐὰν μὴ) gives us the whole structure of the verse before knowing anything else about it.

There is more being stated and all words in the statements are part of the statements being tested.

Sure. But there are different elements to what makes a statement a statement. Just because I chose to focus on a point of logic and grammar doesn't mean I'm ignoring lexical meaning. It just means that's not the focus of a question about logical or grammatical sentence structure. And while I agree that lexical meaning is important to an overall interpretation, that doesn't mean the grammatical structure of a verse is dependent upon it.

I'm not neglecting or denying that those other elements of meaning are important. The point of my original post was simply to make the case that the structure of the verse alone suggests a particular conclusion, in the absence of unnecessary theological assumptions. And I think the truth of that is now bearing itself out, given that it seems a particular assumption about the nature of man's ability has to be made to refute the argument offered.

But I can turn this back to you and say you have to be importing an assumption that it's not resistible.

But I haven't. The irresistibility of coming is an implication given the argument's conclusion; it is not a premise in the argument itself.

1. If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus.
2. There is a grammatical equivalence between the object of the Father's drawing and the object of the Son's raising.
3. Therefore, if he is able to come to Jesus, then he will also be raised.

Whether this argument is sound or not, neither premises 1 nor 2 take the idea of irresistibility for granted. Irresistibility would be an implication of the argument's conclusion. But compare to this:

1. If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus.
2. "Able" in itself implies contingency.
3. Therefore, if he is able to come to Jesus, then he might come to Jesus.

In this argument, an assumption about the resistible nature of the Father's drawing has already been made.

But it does suggest a distinction. The question is whether or not the distinction can be concluded one way or another, but it's there.

Not in terms of grammar, it doesn't. Both instances of αὐτὸν share the same grammatical subject. You're talking about lexical meaning, and more than that, a particular lexical meaning that restricts possible valid interpretations. "Able" does not in itself entail contingency, lest we conclude that "water is able to flow freely" means that it may or may not do so. "Able" is a valid descriptor of something that necessarily happens in relation to a discussion about the absence of obstacles. Contingency is a further question that relates to the nature of the subject.

Yes, because "able to come" does not automatically mean "will come".

In philosophy? Or in Scriptural discussions about the nature of the Father's drawing? I'll grant the former. In the statement, "no prisoner can leave his cell unless the guard leaves the door open for him," the ability to leave one's cell does not necessarily mean he will do so. But we can conclude this because the guard leaving the door open has nothing to do with the nature of the prisoner. The issue at hand is that we haven't determined precisely what the drawing of the Father entails. If the Father's drawing entails an effectual change of nature, then the above quoted statement is not necessarily true. And as I've demonstrated with the water analogy, it is perfectly acceptable to use the term "able" when describing a necessary outcome, especially in the context of a removal of obstacles.

So, the way I see it, we have to go with an assumption that it may not be irresistible.

But you seem to be doing the opposite. The statement, "'able' in itself implies contingency" is not "an assumption that it may not be irresistible"; rather, as shown with the above syllogisms, it's an assumption that precludes the very possibility of an interpretation of irresistibility. You're not actually leaving both avenues open. You're taking for granted the resistible nature of the Father's drawing as a premise. My argument actually does leave both avenues open, that is, until we get to the conclusion.

To begin, I'm interested in knowing what you think of the chiastic structure I presented. Do you disagree that it's there?

No, I think that makes sense.

So, you're taking me to v.37 to pick up didomi.

Speaking of, if I may ask (I know we're just adding more and more to this discussion), what is your understanding of "gives" there if it is not interchangeable with "draws"?

Certainly, there's a relationship between didomi and elko (please pardon my laziness on the fonts and verb markings) but I wouldn't go so far as to say they're necessarily interchangeable and this gets back to dunatai.

So you don't agree that the relationship between these two statements is paradigmatic? -

• "No one is able to come to me unless the Father ἑλκύσῃ him"
• "No one is able to come to me unless ᾗ δεδομένονι him by the Father"

I think didomi in 6:37 is interchangeable with didomi in 6:65

What is there to interchange here? It's the same verb. Moreover, how do you explain a paradigmatic relationship between 37 and 65, but not between 37 and 44?

But I'm still left with a question; does ability to come mean will hear and learn and come? It seems it should, or is it still "could" (ability)?

As argued previously I think the predicate adjective διδακτοὶ is informative here. That's not a term used of a teaching offered. That's descriptive of individuals as educated. Therefore, it seems best to take "hearing and learning" as another way of describing those "taught," and those "taught" are being described as recipients of the teaching, not as those who merely have the ability to receive it, but may or may not do so. Thus, I would suggest that both "they will all be taught" and "everyone who has heard and learned" are parallel statements to "the Father draws," as well as "all that the Father gives." They're descriptive of these actions. I think the context of the Isaiah passage from which verse 45 is quoted sheds light on this as well.

Jesus is doing an awful lot of work to get these people to shift perspective from a physical to a spiritual paradigm.

Do you really think that? Much of the discourse is characterized by parabolic language. The crowd consistently misunderstands the spiritual application of Jesus' words. Yet, rather than clarify their meaning (which he could easily have done in a more straightforward manner), Jesus simply continues on and tells them to stop grumbling. That's where the explanatory value of vv. 44-45 seems to come in. He's not putting in the effort to persuade them to believe; he's explaining why it is they won't. Namely, because they are not among those drawn/taught. What other contextual purpose would these verses serve here? Why even mention man's inability if Jesus' purpose is to persuade?

In 6:53 Jesus gives us another 'ean me' lesson using an eating and drinking analogy. So, still having a question about dunatai, we have been given food (spiritual food as Jesus says - so His words - so the Gospel again), so we have the ability to eat because the food is there, but do we eat & drink or is it forced down our throat or hooked into our veins apart from our will?

This is a caricature of the position you're objecting to. An effectual motivation is not an act that goes against the will; it is an act that stimulates the will. It is an act that infuses new qualities into it, rendering a new desire upon which the will then proceeds. Surely you don't think I'm denying that mean choose to come to Christ? The issue is not whether the choice is present. No one disagrees that the choice is present. The issue is the motivation. Why do some choose and not others? Is it the effectual nature of the Father's drawing, or is it something in addition to that, which resides in differences that exist between the individuals?

And for the next 5 verses Jesus repeats the theme of "whoever" so it's back to some contingency again as was there in "able" in 6:44. I think this is narrowing down on the resistible vs. irresistible question to some degree.

Again, I think you're reading into this more than what is there. All four instances of the English word "whoever" in verses 54-58 are a part of the translation of the same participle, τρώγων. Literally, "the one who feeds/eats." The English translation of "whoever" does not imply anything about who can do this. There is no implied contingency. It doesn't say anything about ability. It literally means "the one who does this." That's just a simple statement of fact. It is silent on the question of who can or will.

"Whoever" only entails contingency in the event that we know it is possible that the one who does this might just as easily choose not to do it. But again, that already assumes an answer to the resistible/irresistible discussion. To necessarily see contingency in the terms "able" or "whoever" is not an argument against irresistibility, because the irresistible view is able to explain these terms; rather, it is an assumption at the outset that irresistibility is not an option.

For the remainder of your comments, I agree with a lot of what you say (I think you offered some mostly good insights on vv. 60-69), and where I disagree I think my comments here suffice as a response.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

In an effort to sum up the above reply, I've narrowed my concerns in that post down to three key issues:

1. The term "able" (as well as "whoever") does not in itself imply contingency; it seems there's an additional assumption being made here about the nature of human agency which precludes the very possibility of the resistible/irresistible discussion. It takes for granted that the nature of the human will must be described in terms of resistibility. I see two problems with this:
   1. The very clause, "no one is able to come," contradicts the notion of resistibility on the "other side" of things - i.e. those who are dead in their sins are not capable of resisting the sinful desires of their hearts.
   2. Apart from the assumption of resistibility, or a contextual (not philosophical) argument for the principle that ability entails contingency, there is no basis for a distinction between the two "hims" in verse 44. There certainly isn't a grammatical distinction, so we would need an argument for this principle from the context. I think it has been assumed, but not argued for.
      
2. I maintain that there is a clear syntagmatic-paradigmatic relationship in this context between ἕλκω and δίδωμι in verses 44 and 65, respectfully.
   1. In verse 65 Jesus says, "this is why I told you," and repeats the conditional of verse 44 almost verbatim. This indicates what lexicographers call a syntagmatic-paradigmatic sense relation between two terms in a given context. "Draws" and "gives" have been interchanged in the same phrase.
   2. The shift to δίδωμι, however, is not a new introduction to the context. It calls back to verse 37, where the concept of being "given" by the Father has already been discussed. And in that statement there is no mention of ability. Rather, there is the promise that the subject will indeed come to Jesus (the whole relative clause, "all that the Father gives me," i.e. the one given by the Father, makes up the grammatical subject).
      1. Even without recognizing the paradigmatic relationship, this raises the question, how can the coming of an individual be guaranteed, if contingency is a factor? But the paradigmatic relationship seems to answer this question.
         
3. Toward the end of your reply I get the sense that there's some misunderstanding of the "irresistible" position, and I can see this feeding back into the insistence that "able" must imply contingency.
   1. Choice is not at issue. No one disagrees that men make a choice. The issue in the resistible/irresistible debate pertains to the basis of one's choosing. The argument isn't that men are saved against their wills, but that they are saved by the renewal of their wills.
   2. This is why the term "effectual" is really a better choice than "irresistible."
   3. When I chose Christ, did I do so because I made good use of what was gifted to me (and is this to be contrasted against those who did not do the same, thus giving me grounds to boast in some personal quality; i.e., what is it that makes the difference between the believer and unbeliever - God's grace, or some quality about the individuals?), or was it because of the efficacy of regeneration, in which my heart was softened, and my will quickened? This could easily turn into a much larger debate, looking at countless other passages, and I'm genuinely not trying to go there in this thread. My point here is simply that the "irresistible" perspective does not argue against choice. It addresses the nature of choice and its motivations.

 

[GDL]

Forgive me for the lengthy reply, but I had a lot to comment on. I want to express again my appreciation for your time. I don't usually encounter people who are interested in going into such depth with me in discussion. I've really enjoyed this, and even if neither of us ultimately convinces the other, this has been helpful for me in thinking through how to better articulate my views and concerns. So again, thank you for that.

No forgiveness necessary. I've enjoyed this as well. Honestly, I've set out a few times to do some self-learning in logic but could not proceed for various reasons of life and time. Maybe I will do so. Maybe not at this point. I worked in the technical end of large computer systems before the PC came out. I was quite proficient in chasing 1's and 0's through cabinets of "logic boards" and componentry. It came quite natural to me, and I did it in person and on the phone using others around the country as my eyes and hands. I enjoy whatever processes are available for deeper thinking. I don't desire it, but if I had it to do over again, I'd probably pursue it into madness.

Yes, but a change in verb tense and the lexical meaning of a word are different issues. Grammatical issues like verb tense do have an impact logical structure, but we can fill that structure with all sorts of lexemes and it's not going to alter the logic of the verse. If the meaning of δύναται with its compliment had any impact on logical structure, it would have to show up in the symbolic representation. But it won't because it doesn't define a new clause or negate anything.

It may not seem like it, but I'm deferring to you more than you may realize.

I have an issue here to throw at you. Math is ultimately a language. If symbolic representation cannot deal with the meaning of words, then the symbolism is insufficient and can only represent the language of words to the extent it can symbolize. Not knowing enough of the symbology, I was in part wondering if you might come up with more.

I've been saying I can see the logic you're presenting but basically find it deficient. Unless and until it deals with the reality of the contingency in dunatai, I'm going to be left with a "yes, but" in mind, and honestly, with absolutely zero offense intended, wondering if we need another logic instructor to consult. I've seen some of the instructional material showing the hundreds of variations on logical constructs and I'm left wondering.

This also brings me back to my broken record of wondering why dunatai is the factor we're looking at instead of erchomai that completes dunatai. But that's a merry-go-round at this point.

I think you may be confusing the contingency you see in "able" with the contingency implied by -Q <--> -P. They are not the same. -Q <--> -P reads, "He is not able to come to me unless (i.e. if and only if not) the Father draws him." The contingency here is with respect to whether or not the Father's drawing is sufficient in making one able to come, not whether the ability to come is sufficient for actually coming. What you seem to be talking about is an additional contingency that you suggest exists in order for R to be true. You might want to argue for that contextually, but my point was this is not something that shows up in the logical structure of the way the verse is stated.

A couple comments:

• I do not see any contingency in the Father's drawing making a man who is actually drawn able to come.
  • This is what I've been saying in regard to seeing the logic you're presenting.
  • If this is the extent to what we can do here logically, then I would agree we're done - or as far as we can go in this verse.
• From there, I see issues. If these issues are not to be answered here, then, again, we can be done at the above and seek answers to the following elsewhere:
  • Are all men God draws, truly drawn?
    • Since we're dealing with a global "no man" turning into a specific "him", I'm left questioning.
    • e.g. Jesus was drawing (with miracles) but some could/did not get passed the free food and physical & psychological healing. But all of His miracles were meant to draw people to Him.
  • Do all drawn men come?
    • We've been discussing this.
    • The question arises from the dunatai construct.
• So, again, if the logic is unable to express or deal with these questions, then, for me, the logic is insufficient as a form of reasoning beyond a certain point. And I acknowledge I am unable to answer how extensive is the logic available to us. Call Socrates (or better, Jesus).
  • BTW, have you ever noticed that in the Greek of Heb11:1 are 2 words concerning faith that were used of the Socratic Method? I've been keeping my eyes and ears open for you philosophy guys. Since John for one takes a shot at the philosophers re: Jesus being the logos, I'm intrigued re: the Hebrews writer possible taking a shot at them re: biblical faith in God fulfilling the Socratic Method.
• So, again, although I see what you're saying including what you say about the contextual seeking related to R, I'm left with questions related to the meaning of words and how simplistic is the logic in assisting us. If it's limited, then I'm asking too much of it. If it's not, then are we asking enough of it?

To put it another way, if one has not been drawn, we could say he irresistibly chooses the sin that he naturally loves. That's not a denial of choice itself; it's simply an affirmation that creatures choose according to the desires of their hearts (Matt 7:17-18?). There is no need here to see ability as necessarily entailing contingency with respect to choosing against one's natural desires. Hence, it's not merely the term "able" that implies the contingency you speak of. What implies it is a certain understanding of ability; namely, the ability to choose contrary to the desire of one's heart.

I'm quoting in brief just to save space and the extent of your expressed thinking requires more energy than I currently have to ponder it all. So, a few highlights I noted reading through it on a first pass:

• I had a concern with your example that you ended up progressing out of. Water does not have free will. FWIW as an aside, I on the other hand with free will always enjoyed the instruction to flow like [unobstructed] water.
• Your comments re: Matt7 were good and in line with where my ponderings re: ability would go.

I'll go back with a fresh mind ASAP and pick up here. Your willingness and ability to provide such elaboration is a rarity in my experience, a refreshing one, for me requiring a fresh mind or a second wind which looks improbable this evening.

Thanks!

 

[GDL]

My apology for the delay. I had desired to get back to this but honestly it involves for me more thought than I normally need to put into this forum.

I'm going to bypass the balance of your previous post and see where we are with your summary. I hope the process of breaking it up will work for you. It looks like the outline numbering will not hold.

In an effort to sum up the above reply, I've narrowed my concerns in that post down to three key issues:

1. The term "able" (as well as "whoever") does not in itself imply contingency; it seems there's an additional assumption being made here about the nature of human agency which precludes the very possibility of the resistible/irresistible discussion. It takes for granted that the nature of the human will must be described in terms of resistibility. I see two problems with this:
   1. The very clause, "no one is able to come," contradicts the notion of resistibility on the "other side" of things - i.e. those who are dead in their sins are not capable of resisting the sinful desires of their hearts.

I still maintain that "able to come to Jesus" although it most certainly provides the flip-side of being unable to come to Jesus, does not in itself mean will or does come to Jesus, for whatever reasons not specified here a man is unable to come to Jesus. I'm also going to tighten up what I was saying before re: linguistics to being semantics, which includes meanings. From what I've seen there is an entire discussion on linguistic semantics within the topic of logic. In attempting to not have presuppositions in looking at 6:44, I cannot ignore the meaning of a word.

If the man who God draws means this man does come to Jesus, then we can better conclude that ability is irresistibility. Otherwise, we must conclude resistibility.

If we add the final clause, then it does look like irresistibility is being stated. I think I have said this in a few ways a few times. If we're simply looking at structure, I have no argument with the logic.

Do you think 6:44 proves irresistibility?

As a stand-alone verse apart from the entire chiastic statement and from other Scriptures and from any presuppositions as best I'm able, I do see the logic you've presented, even though I remain with my concern re: "able" due to the fact that we are talking about man with will and not about water. I see "able" as a flag to look for more (which I will play out below as it turns out). Thus, all I can do with this verse is go along with the logic you've presented but I'd be cataloging this verse as part of a process to come to a doctrinal conclusion on the matter of coming to faith in Jesus Christ.

1. 1. Apart from the assumption of resistibility, or a contextual (not philosophical) argument for the principle that ability entails contingency, there is no basis for a distinction between the two "hims" in verse 44. There certainly isn't a grammatical distinction, so we would need an argument for this principle from the context. I think it has been assumed, but not argued for.

Again, I have ultimately had no arguments regarding the 2 hims. (My mention of a third was because of your wording in one of your statements where I underlined your 3 pronouns. The 3rd was not a different him).

• I maintain that there is a clear syntagmatic-paradigmatic relationship in this context between ἕλκω and δίδωμι in verses 44 and 65, respectfully.
  1. In verse 65 Jesus says, "this is why I told you," and repeats the conditional of verse 44 almost verbatim. This indicates what lexicographers call a syntagmatic-paradigmatic sense relation between two terms in a given context. "Draws" and "gives" have been interchanged in the same phrase.
  2. The shift to δίδωμι, however, is not a new introduction to the context. It calls back to verse 37, where the concept of being "given" by the Father has already been discussed. And in that statement there is no mention of ability. Rather, there is the promise that the subject will indeed come to Jesus (the whole relative clause, "all that the Father gives me," i.e. the one given by the Father, makes up the grammatical subject).
     1. Even without recognizing the paradigmatic relationship, this raises the question, how can the coming of an individual be guaranteed, if contingency is a factor? But the paradigmatic relationship seems to answer this question.

I do see this point. However here on the fly is the process maintaining the meaning of ability I flagged for myself above:

1. The men have not believed in Jesus.
2. The men have not come to Jesus.
3. Jesus has drawn the parallel between believing in Him and coming to Him.
4. The Father has not given them to Jesus.
5. Jesus has drawn a seeming parallel between (1) the Father drawing and giving a man the ability to come to Jesus and (2) the Father giving a man to Jesus.
6. It seems my concern about ability in relation to man's will is not founded.
7. Then in John6:67 Jesus asks His remaining disciples to make a choice.
   1. Their choice confirms (as far as we know now) they were drawn, given ability to come, did come/believe, and were given to Jesus.
   2. It's this choice that I would then be cataloging along with everything else along the way and I would likely tie it back to the semantic flag I had re: ability.
   3. It looks to me like human will confirms the Father's granting.
   4. As long as we're looking at verses, we can't stop at 6:65.
   5. And after this, as I flagged earlier, then we have Jesus adding election into the mix at the end of the chapter.
   6. And none of this touches on eternal security.

• Toward the end of your reply I get the sense that there's some misunderstanding of the "irresistible" position, and I can see this feeding back into the insistence that "able" must imply contingency.
  1. Choice is not at issue. No one disagrees that men make a choice. The issue in the resistible/irresistible debate pertains to the basis of one's choosing. The argument isn't that men are saved against their wills, but that they are saved by the renewal of their wills.

Then there's the discussion as to whether God renews or doesn't renew whoever He chooses. So now we see why Jesus opened election at the end of John6.

• 1. This is why the term "effectual" is really a better choice than "irresistible."
  2. When I chose Christ, did I do so because I made good use of what was gifted to me (and is this to be contrasted against those who did not do the same, thus giving me grounds to boast in some personal quality; i.e., what is it that makes the difference between the believer and unbeliever - God's grace, or some quality about the individuals?), or was it because of the efficacy of regeneration, in which my heart was softened, and my will quickened? This could easily turn into a much larger debate, looking at countless other passages, and I'm genuinely not trying to go there in this thread. My point here is simply that the "irresistible" perspective does not argue against choice. It addresses the nature of choice and its motivations.

I'm not trying or desiring to go there either.

FWIW, when I get into such discussions, and it gets too strongly sided for free will, John the Baptist comes to mind as to whether or not he could have been different than who he was. Then I go to God's attributes and simply fall back to the easy way out, God can do whatever He chooses to do and I'm certain He never gets into conflict with who He is. Let God be true and every man a liar as I recall may be the first command in the NC Writings.

 

[Aaron112]

If the man who God draws means this man does come to Jesus, then we can better conclude that ability is irresistibility. Otherwise, we must conclude resistibility.

A lot of disciples were 'drawn to' Jesus, and followed Him ...
Most (or many) of the same disciples who followed Jesus, in the NT, left Him.