No one is able to come unto me, if the Father who sent me MAY NOT DRAW him

[GDL]

A lot of disciples were 'drawn to' Jesus, and followed Him ...
Most (or many) of the same disciples who followed Jesus, in the NT, left Him.

Yes, this was part of our discussion and for me a very important part of John6.

 

[Aaron112]

This work in logic required a fairly thorough read and some thought and leaves me with many questions

I saw the "logic", so-called, being used in one or more threads, and it was and is distressing to see it used when it appears to directly try to change the meaning of God's Word, and when the conclusions(of so-called 'logic') are directly contrary to God's Word also.

 

[GDL]

I saw the "logic", so-called, being used in one or more threads, and it was and is distressing to see it used when it appears to directly try to change the meaning of God's Word, and when the conclusions(of so-called 'logic') are directly contrary to God's Word also.

Many things are done poorly. I enjoyed the work done by @Dikaioumenoi. I'd like to see this discipline done well in other threads where there is virtually no logical reasoning being done. I think you know of some.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

My apologies as well for the delay. Life has gotten in the way.

...Math is ultimately a language. If symbolic representation cannot deal with the meaning of words, then the symbolism is insufficient and can only represent the language of words to the extent it can symbolize...

It's not that symbolic representation doesn't deal with the meaning of words. It's that not all words are relevant to a statement's structure. Δύναται ἐλθείν does not impact the structure of the verse, nor does it need to in order for the logic to be sufficient to demonstrate the conclusion I've offered. This is evident from the fact that there is no contradiction implied by the idea that all who are able to come might actually end up doing so. This is where I think you're missing things. It's not enough to simply argue for the existence of contingency, because contingency alone does not preclude the possibility that "all able to come" could equate to "those who actually do so."

In other words, even if we grant your point on contingency for the sake of argument and say that those who are drawn may or may not come, all that does is assert a possibility. Possibility in and of itself does not entail the actual realization of two different classes of people, viz. those who choose to come and those who choose not to. The possibility can logically exist, and yet the reality can still be that all those able to come actually do so. That is why the mere mention of an ability does not infer anything with respect to the logic of the verse. What we would need is a positive identification of both classes of people: (1) Some who are able to come, and do so, and (2) some who are able to come, and don't.

"Some S are P," and "Some S are not P," where S is "those able to come" and P is "those who choose to come."

All that is asserted by the mere mention of ability is "Some S are P" (we know that at least some do come). But "Some S are P" is not a contradiction of "All S are P." What "Some S are P" says is that at least one member of the class of S is also a member of the class of P. That does not deny that all members of the class of S may be members of the class of P. What needs to be shown is that "Some S are not P" is verifiably true, not just possible. Only then is "All S are P" contradicted, and only with that contradiction would δύναται offer any challenge to the argument that "those able to come" = "those who do come."

A final note on this point. I think it's important to remember that what's really being referred to in this verse is an impossibility - i.e. man's inability to come. It was from my own negation of the conditional in undergoing logical analysis that the affirmative language of "being able" arose. This may be worth keeping in mind because inability tells us more than ability. For instance, the statement "he doesn't come" is not as strong as "he is not able to come." The former could simply be an observation that says nothing of necessity, whereas the latter speaks of what isn't possible. But when it comes to ability, the opposite is true. "He comes" is stronger than "he is able to come." The former makes a definite assertion, while the latter only asserts a possibility. So could it be that the affirmative way of restating the verse doesn't necessarily capture the same force of the original idea? Possibility is a broader logical concept than impossibility. So it's worth pondering if δύναται would have appeared in the verse at all if the conditional had been positively stated to begin with, or if the statement would have simply mirrored verse 37, "all that the Father draws will come to me."

I've seen some of the instructional material showing the hundreds of variations on logical constructs and I'm left wondering.

Out of curiosity, what material? What variations? I've been dealing with syllogistic and propositional logic, which is pretty straightforward and universal in terms of its concepts, rules, and symbols.

This also brings me back to my broken record of wondering why dunatai is the factor we're looking at instead of erchomai that completes dunatai.

I really think you've answered this yourself. It's because ἔρχομαι completes δύναται, it does not replace it. The chiasm and context doesn't touch on the point here. The point is a grammatical one. We're discussing class relationship within the conditional statement.

The indicative is the mood of assertion. The basis of the assertion made in the statement δύναται ἐλθείν is δύναται. Yes the complementary infinitive completes the idea, but it functions like a noun adding content to the assertion. It is not the operative term in establishing that assertion. Δύναται is the only thing distinguishing between the two very different statements, "those who have the ability to come," and "those who come." That's why it's the factor that must be looked at when considering the logic of the conditional.

To put it another way, the critical element to the conditional statement is what the antecedent counters. The drawing of the Father is presented as an activity countering man's inability to come, not merely the fact of his not coming. What does the chiasm have to do with the logic of the conditional statement?

• Are all men God draws, trulydrawn?
  • Since we're dealing with a global "no man" turning into a specific "him", I'm left questioning.

Why do you view "him" as more specific than "no one"? Grammatically, they're both singular masculine. And logically, if anything, it would actually be the other way around.

To illustrate this, the conditional can be represented with the universal proposition, "All persons who are able to come are persons who have been drawn." All S are P. In a universal affirmative proposition, to use the language of syllogistic logic, S is distributed, P is not. That is, the statement asserts something about all members of the class of those able to come ("one"), but it does not assert something about all members of the class of those drawn ("him"). P is broader than S, not the other way around, because every S is a P, but not necessarily every P is an S.

It is logically possible, for instance (given no further considerations), that there exists some drawn ones who remain unable to come. This would make the class of those drawn a less specific category than the class of those able to come, not a more specific category. So our options are either that "one" and "him" refer one-to-one to the same individuals (my position), or that the class to which "him" refers is broader than the class to which "one" refers.

As to your question, what do you mean by "truly" drawn? Do you mean to ask if all men God attempts to draw are truly drawn? Or perhaps if all men God draws are able to come?

Let's work through this. For starters, there's no question that the drawing is a necessary condition for being able to come. The conditional at least says that much. The only question is this: Is the drawing of the Father sufficient for enablement? Or is it possible that some who are drawn might in spite of that drawing still be unable to come? (Or, alternatively, can the Father's attempt to draw fail?)

Answering this question requires asking a further question: What is drawing? How do we define it? Is the drawing activity something that occurs prior to and apart from the enabling action, or is it the enabling action? And if it isn't the enabling action, then what is it? How do we define it?

If the drawing of the Father is an enabling act, then that seems to answer the question of sufficiency in terms of ability. It is not possible for one to be drawn and yet remain unable to come, if the drawing is itself what enables. In that case, both "All S are P" and "All P are S" are true, and we have a definitive proof that the class of those able to come and the class of those drawn are equivalent.

If on the other hand the drawing of the Father is not an enabling act, but is something that occurs in addition to whatever it is that makes one able to come, then what is it? What does the drawing do?

e.g. Jesus was drawing (with miracles) but some could/did not get passed the free food and physical & psychological healing. But all of His miracles were meant to draw people to Him.

Are you sure this idea is an adequate comparison to the drawing described in John 6:44? There, the Father is the subject doing the drawing, not Jesus, and it is framed as an inability-countering activity that affects a change of position (i.e. from a position of inability to ability). This doesn't fit the figurative use of ἔλκω ("attract"), even given the idea of a contingency with respect to what one does with his newly granted ability. The drawing simply succeeds. It succeeds in granting the object an ability to come (at the very least), but it is nevertheless successful in that it affects that change of position, from the state of inability to ability.

• Do all drawn men come?
  • We've been discussing this.
  • The question arises from the dunatai construct.

The question arises for sure, but it is not left unanswered, because the verse doesn't end with the conditional.

The drawing of the Father is a necessary condition for one to be able to come to Jesus. If one is not drawn, he cannot come. And unless you can provide a definition of drawing that is not itself descriptive of this enabling act, then as I've shown the drawing also must be understood as a sufficient condition for at least obtaining the ability to come to Jesus.

This means that the members of the class of those who are able to come ("one") are one-to-one the same members of the class of those who are drawn ("him"), and vice versa. They are equivalent in terms of class membership.

How, then, do you explain the identical use of the pronoun in the last clause, without the addition of a new grammatical subject? You've said you don't have a problem seeing this point (if I understand you correctly), but that really leaves me puzzled. If we can agree that the two "hims" make reference to the same individual, then it ought to be quite evident that the class of those drawn and the class of those raised are equivalent (in terms of class membership). That is, there is not a person who will be raised who has not been drawn, and there is not a person who has been drawn who will not be raised.

But does that not effectively conclude our discussion, when considering the further fact that those who aren't drawn are not able to come? There really seems to be no room here for a third category between those undrawn/unable, and those drawn/raised. All men are one or the other -- either (1) unable to come, or (2) actually coming, on account of the ability granted. And that fits the doctrines of total depravity and effectual calling, which respectively assert that no man is naturally capable (on account of his own heart's love for sin) to turn to Christ of his own accord (category 1), and the flip side to that being that if the Father so chooses to restrain that natural tendency and replace it with an equally powerful desire for righteousness, it will naturally result in one willfully and gladly throwing himself upon Christ (category 2).

I had a concern with your example that you ended up progressing out of. Water does not have free will.

But that's not relevant to the point that was being made with the analogy, which was simply to show that the language of "ability" doesn't necessarily indicate contingency, but that what actually seems to entail it, on your view, is a particular understanding of freedom; namely, one that presupposes (not argues) that the doctrine of effectual calling is false.

It presupposes this because, as I discussed earlier, the mere reality of a contingency is not an argument against effectual calling. An argument against effectual calling would have to involve the proof that some who are able will not come, not just the assertion of the logical possibility.

If we add the final clause, then it does look like irresistibility is being stated... If we're simply looking at structure, I have no argument with the logic...

Then what exactly are we disagreeing on? Logic, like language itself, is not freeform. It is governed by rules. (I'll take opportunity here to throw in my one-lined response to @Aaron112 : Logic is the grammar of argumentation; Scripture utilizes logic because all language utilizes logic in order to have meaning and communicate truth.) If a proposition contradicts some other truth, then it cannot also be true. So if you have no argument with the logic presented, then there is no basis for our disagreement. If you still have reservations about the conclusion because of δύναται and the chiasm and whatever else, yet at the same time you say you agree with me on the logic presented, then that suggests a willingness to simply live with the possibility of a contradiction in Scripture (or at least your theology). I hope I'm not understanding you correctly.

What the logic demonstrates is equivalence in class membership between all those drawn, enabled, and raised. From that conclusion, it takes but one simple step of further implication (i.e. our knowledge that those who will be raised = those who come) to arrive at the conclusion that all those enabled to come actually end up coming.

1. All those who will be raised are those who come. (All M are P)
2. All those whom the Father draws are those who will be raised. (All S are M)
C. Therefore, all those whom the Father draws are those who come. (All S are P)

This argument is valid. The only question is whether the premises are sound. But if you're agreeing with me on the logic presented, then that ship has sailed, because what the logic shows is that premise 2 is true. So again, if language is to have any meaning at all, I don't know what basis we have for disagreement at this point if you have no argument with the logic presented. But maybe I've misunderstood you.

Do you think 6:44 proves irresistibility?

I do, but I will say that when it comes to providing a comprehensive apologetic for effectual calling, there are many passages I would go to (and even in this text I wouldn't hang my hat on one verse). That's not because I don't think the logic and grammar of this verse is enough to make the case, but because I do believe it's all over Scripture, and because it only strengthens one's argument to treat Scripture as a whole.

 

[GDL]

It's not that symbolic representation doesn't deal with the meaning of words. It's that not all words are relevant to a statement's structure. Δύναται ἐλθείν does not impact the structure of the verse, nor does it need to in order for the logic to be sufficient to demonstrate the conclusion I've offered. This is evident from the fact that there is no contradiction implied by the idea that all who are able to come might actually end up doing so. This is where I think you're missing things. It's not enough to simply argue for the existence of contingency, because contingency alone does not preclude the possibility that "all able to come" could equate to "those who actually do so."

The words I've highlighted are all words of contingency. If there were no contingency in the language, then there would be no need to use words of contingency to describe what the verse says.

In other words, (A) even if we grant your point on contingency for the sake of argument and say that those who are drawn may or may not come, all that does is assert a possibility. (B) Possibility in and of itself does not entail the actual realization of two different classes of people, viz. those who choose to come and those who choose not to. The possibility can logically exist, and (C) yet the reality can still be that all those able to come actually do so. That is why the mere mention of an ability does not infer anything with respect to the logic of the verse. (D) What we would need is a positive identification of both classes of people: (1) Some who are able to come, and do so, and (2) some who are able to come, and don't.

"Some S are P," and "Some S are not P," where S is "those able to come" and P is "those who choose to come."

(A) I'll stand on the meaning of dunatai leaving us with only the possibility (contingency) and there being no need to grant for sake of argument what's already contained in the word itself.

(B) Nor does possibility preclude the possibility of two different classes of people.

(C) And the reality can be that some or none of those able to come actually do so. Thus, we have three possible groups: None, Some and All.

(D) Which is why I early in this discussion opened up other verses in the context. And now that I've identified three classes of people, I'd modify "both classes of people", but will use it for now.

All that is asserted by the mere mention of ability is "Some S are P" (A) (we know that at least some do come). But "Some S are P" is not a contradiction of "All S are P." What "Some S are P" says is that at least one member of the class of S is also a member of the class of P. That does not deny that all members of the class of S may be members of the class of P. What needs to be shown is that "Some S are not P" is verifiably true, not just possible. Only then is "All S are P" contradicted, and only with that contradiction would δύναται offer any challenge to the argument that "those able to come" = "those who do come."

(A) How do we know from the verse itself that at least some do come - that "Some S are P"?

(B) "Some" is not the same as "All".

What ultimately needs to be shown is that Some, All or None come. This is the tension in this verse that I've been presenting. On the one hand, I agree with the simple logic, the two "hims" you've been presenting. On the other hand, I retain the "flag" re: dunatai elthein from a semantic consideration and knowing the importance of context and potential for elaboration, which in Scripture is reality.

A final note on this point. I think it's important to remember that what's really being referred to in this verse is an impossibility - i.e. man's inability to come. It was from my own negation of the conditional in undergoing logical analysis that the affirmative language of "being able" arose. This may be worth keeping in mind because inability tells us more than ability. For instance, the statement "he doesn't come" is not as strong as "he is not able to come." The former could simply be an observation that says nothing of necessity, whereas the latter speaks of what isn't possible. But when it comes to ability, the opposite is true. "He comes" is stronger than "he is able to come." The former makes a definite assertion, while the latter only asserts a possibility. So could it be that the affirmative way of restating the verse doesn't necessarily capture the same force of the original idea? Possibility is a broader logical concept than impossibility. So it's worth pondering if δύναται would have appeared in the verse at all if the conditional had been positively stated to begin with, or if the statement would have simply mirrored verse 37, "all that the Father draws will come to me."

Yes. Why not attempt the logic remaining strictly with the language? What are the basic truths?

Verse 37 does not use the word "draws" but the word "gives". There is very likely a big difference between the two words in John 6. If you'd like to ponder something, if you haven't already done so, see if you can separate at minimum the Father giving and the man choosing to believe.

Out of curiosity, what material? What variations? I've been dealing with syllogistic and propositional logic, which is pretty straightforward and universal in terms of its concepts, rules, and symbols.

As I said before, I'm not trained in logic, so I'm doing what most do these days and asking a search engine. Some of the articles I looked at I did not save. Here is one I did: Logicinaction article.

I really think you've answered this yourself. It's because ἔρχομαι completes δύναται, it does not replace it. The chiasm and context doesn't touch on the point here. The point is a grammatical one. We're discussing class relationship within the conditional statement.

The indicative is the mood of assertion. The basis of the assertion made in the statement δύναται ἐλθείν is δύναται. Yes the complementary infinitive completes the idea, but it functions like a noun adding content to the assertion. It is not the operative term in establishing that assertion. Δύναται is the only thing distinguishing between the two very different statements, "those who have the ability to come," and "those who come." That's why it's the factor that must be looked at when considering the logic of the conditional.

To put it another way, the critical element to the conditional statement is what the antecedent counters. The drawing of the Father is presented as an activity countering man's inability to come, not merely the fact of his not coming. What does the chiasm have to do with the logic of the conditional statement?

Although I agree that the Father's drawing provides ability, coming to Jesus (contextually meaning believing in Jesus) is the ultimate point of the verse, not to mention the chapter, not to mention the NC Writings. Even if I work to set aside the knowledge of the last two "not to mention" points, I can see the importance of elthein in the verse.

Closely branching out from there, the chiasm substantiates the importance of elthein.

Why do you view "him" as more specific than "no one"? Grammatically, they're both singular masculine. And logically, if anything, it would actually be the other way around.

Because "no man" as I said is a global phrase, i.e., no man among men. "auton" would be the man among men who is drawn.

To illustrate this, the conditional can be represented with the universal proposition, "All persons who are able to come are persons who have been drawn." All S are P. In a universal affirmative proposition, to use the language of syllogistic logic, S is distributed, P is not. That is, the statement asserts something about all members of the class of those able to come ("one"), but it does not assert something about all members of the class of those drawn ("him"). P is broader than S, not the other way around, because every S is a P, but not necessarily every P is an S.

Although you are more practiced and thus free to be altering language here, and although I might agree with what you're doing in this instance, I'd prefer to stay tight to the Text. Whether or not it makes any difference I can't say at this point. With that said, "A man who is able to come is a man who has been drawn." S is P.

The statement asserts something about the man who is able to come. It asserts something only about the man who is drawn. It asserts that the man is able to come because he is drawn. It does not assert that he comes.

It is logically possible, for instance (given no further considerations), that there exists some drawn ones who remain unable to come.

Maybe so, but why add more complexity at this time? I think the S is P from just above is the point being made.

This would make the class of those drawn a less specific category than the class of those able to come, not a more specific category. So our options are either that "one" and "him" refer one-to-one to the same individuals (my position), or that the class to which "him" refers is broader than the class to which "one" refers.

Based upon what I said just above. I'm bypassing this for now.

As to your question, what do you mean by "truly" drawn? Do you mean to ask if all men God attempts to draw are truly drawn? Or perhaps if all men God draws are able to come?

Good question. Remembering my flow of thought from 2 weeks ago on simple things is taxing enough! For now, I'll stick with what I said above - S is P.

Let's work through this. For starters, there's no question that the drawing is a necessary condition for being able to come. The conditional at least says that much.

Agree.

The only question is this: Is the drawing of the Father sufficient for enablement? Or is it possible that some who are drawn might in spite of that drawing still be unable to come? (Or, alternatively, can the Father's attempt to draw fail?)

Answering this question requires asking a further question: What is drawing? How do we define it? Is the drawing activity something that occurs prior to and apart from the enabling action, or is it the enabling action? And if it isn't the enabling action, then what is it? How do we define it?

If the drawing of the Father is an enabling act, then that seems to answer the question of sufficiency in terms of ability. It is not possible for one to be drawn and yet remain unable to come, if the drawing is itself what enables. In that case, both "All S are P" and "All P are S" are true, and we have a definitive proof that the class of those able to come and the class of those drawn are equivalent.

If on the other hand the drawing of the Father is not an enabling act, but is something that occurs in addition to whatever it is that makes one able to come, then what is it? What does the drawing do?

It's probably best to just stick with S is P. Going beyond the meaning of "able" and the importance of "to come" at this point seems unnecessary but I appreciate your willingness to delve into more semantics.

Are you sure this idea is an adequate comparison to the drawing described in John 6:44? There, the Father is the subject doing the drawing, not Jesus, and it is framed as an inability-countering activity that affects a change of position (i.e. from a position of inability to ability). This doesn't fit the figurative use of ἔλκω ("attract"), even given the idea of a contingency with respect to what one does with his newly granted ability. The drawing simply succeeds. It succeeds in granting the object an ability to come (at the very least), but it is nevertheless successful in that it affects that change of position, from the state of inability to ability.

In regard to the drawing, I don't think we can separate Jesus from the Father. What the Father was doing to draw, He was doing through Jesus unless we want to add another dimension of activity into this.

Again, S is P (A man who is able to come is a man who has been drawn).

The question arises for sure, but it is not left unanswered, because the verse doesn't end with the conditional.

The drawing of the Father is a necessary condition for one to be able to come to Jesus. If one is not drawn, he cannot come. And unless you can provide a definition of drawing that is not itself descriptive of this enabling act, then as I've shown the drawing also must be understood as a sufficient condition for at least obtaining the ability to come to Jesus.


This means that the members of the class of those who are able to come ("one") are one-to-one the same members of the class of those who are drawn ("him"), and vice versa. They are equivalent in terms of class membership.

S is P (A man who is able to come is a man who has been drawn).

How, then, do you explain the identical use of the pronoun in the last clause, without the addition of a new grammatical subject? You've said you don't have a problem seeing this point (if I understand you correctly), but that really leaves me puzzled. If we can agree that the two "hims" make reference to the same individual, then it ought to be quite evident that the class of those drawn and the class of those raised are equivalent (in terms of class membership). That is, there is not a person who will be raised who has not been drawn,

Agreed. If raised, then [came and] was drawn.

and there is not a person who has been drawn who will not be raised.

Maybe and maybe not due to dunatai + elthein. If drawn and if came, then will be raised.

But does that not effectively conclude our discussion, when considering the further fact that those who aren't drawn are not able to come?

I don't think we've ever disagreed on this.

There really seems to be no room here for a third category between those undrawn/unable, and those drawn/raised.

But this is simply a continuation of not considering elthein.

Cont'd below.

 

[GDL]

All men are one or the other -- either (1) unable to come, or (2) actually coming, on account of the ability granted.

Same issue: unable to come vs. able to come is the first and main point of the verse. For me, "actually coming" is a leap considering the meaning of dunatai. If we want to work at the basic level of propositional logic, then maybe we make that leap. But, as the article I posted for you above says somewhere within, this could well be an example of why the disciplines of logic and linguistics have been working together. I've looked at other articles that speak of the depths of where propositional logic goes when considering even the semantics of connectives are considered regarding establishing truth statements.

And that fits the doctrines of total depravity and effectual calling, which respectively assert that no man is naturally capable (on account of his own heart's love for sin) to turn to Christ of his own accord (category 1), and the flip side to that being that if the Father so chooses to restrain that natural tendency and replace it with an equally powerful desire for righteousness, it will naturally result in one willfully and gladly throwing himself upon Christ (category 2).

I'd rather attempt to remain detached from doctrinal presuppositions at this juncture. I flagged Jesus bringing in election at the end of John 6 and I mentioned in passing eternal security. All of these must eventually enter into discussion.

But that's not relevant to the point that was being made with the analogy, which was simply to show that the language of "ability" doesn't necessarily indicate contingency,

It is relevant to me. The ability of the flow of water via gravity is not the same as the ability of a man and his choice to flow or self-restrict. If there is any presupposition to be considered in this verse, it's that man is a rational creature. It's either this or we have to define "man". Defining "ability" is enough work at this juncture.

but that what actually seems to entail it, on your view, is a particular understanding of freedom; namely, one that presupposes (not argues) that the doctrine of effectual calling is false.

Again, I'm not going there. I'm simply dealing with a rational man having an ability that he uses or does not use.

It presupposes this because, as I discussed earlier, the mere reality of a contingency is not an argument against effectual calling. An argument against effectual calling would have to involve the proof that some who are able will not come, not just the assertion of the logical possibility.

Same comment.

Then what exactly are we disagreeing on?

I think it's clear what our disagreement is. It is and has been how to deal with the verbal construct "dunatai elthein" and my questioning as to the level of logic being considered. I also think that some of the disagreement was clarified in the continuation of the summary list you drew from; the part where I showed Jesus dealing with men's will.

Logic, like language itself, is not freeform. It is governed by rules. (I'll take opportunity here to throw in my one-lined response to @Aaron112 : Logic is the grammar of argumentation; you utilize logic every time you reason with others, so I'd recommend you don't knock it.) If a proposition contradicts some other truth, then it cannot also be true.

Fine.

So if you have no argument with the logic presented, then there is no basis for our disagreement.

I have no disagreement with the seemingly very basic logic presented but have clearly stated from what I've read on logic, that it seems likely there is more advanced logic to deal with dunatai in this verse.

If you still have reservations about the conclusion because of δύναται and the chiasm and whatever else, yet at the same time you say you agree with me on the logic presented, then that suggests a willingness to simply live with the possibility of a contradiction in Scripture (or at least your theology). I hope I'm not understanding you correctly.

I think you are misunderstanding me and hope I have resolved some of this hereinabove.

What the logic demonstrates is equivalence in class membership between all those drawn, enabled, and raised.

Disagree. There is an equivalence in the man who is drawn, enabled to come, and raised, but this does not in itself have to be the full story. If the man does not use the ability to come, then he will not be raised.

From that conclusion, it takes but one simple step of further implication (i.e. our knowledge that those who will be raised = those who come) to arrive at the conclusion that all those enabled to come actually end up coming.

1. All those who will be raised are those who come. (All M are P)
2. All those whom the Father draws are those who will be raised. (All S are M)
C. Therefore, all those whom the Father draws are those who come. (All S are P)

This argument is valid. The only question is whether the premises are sound. But if you're agreeing with me on the logic presented, then that ship has sailed, because what the logic shows is that premise 2 is true. So again, if language is to have any meaning at all, I don't know what basis we have for disagreement at this point if you have no argument with the logic presented. But maybe I've misunderstood you.

Implication is subjective. Although I have no argument with the content of your implication, as soon as you conclude that "all those enabled to come actually end up coming" I part ways with you and keep reading the Scripture for its conclusion. So, your 2nd premise may well be False and I again, would keep looking to Scripture for confirmation, because I don't think Scripture does contradict itself, but we do.

I do, but I will say that when it comes to providing a comprehensive apologetic for effectual calling, there are many passages I would go to (and even in this text I wouldn't hang my hat on one verse). That's not because I don't think the logic and grammar of this verse is enough to make the case, but because I do believe it's all over Scripture, and because it only strengthens one's argument to treat Scripture as a whole.

Thank you for your answer.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

The words I've highlighted are all words of contingency. If there were no contingency in the language, then there would be no need to use words of contingency to describe what the verse says.

The words you highlighted (as well as "ability") are words of possibility, not contingency. The two are not the same. Possibility just means that it is not necessary that a proposition be false. Contingency is a subcategory of this which says it is not necessary that a proposition be false or true.

To illustrate the difference, think about the category of that which is "not possibly true," i.e. the impossible. The opposite of this is that which is "possibly true." These categories are contradictory (not just contrary), meaning they are exhaustive. Therefore, if it is not the case that a proposition is "not possibly true," then it must be the case that it is "possibly true." But that means "possible truth" is descriptive of all truth (i.e. all that is not impossible), which includes both the contingent and the necessary.

We see this in possible worlds language. For instance, there is a possible world in which the proposition "there are no square circles" is true, but there is no possible world in which it is false. Thus, we would say that "there are no square circles" is a possible truth, but not a contingent truth. The conclusion of this thought experiment is that this possible truth must be a necessary truth (i.e. by virtue of not being contingent). But the appeal is first made to the language of what is possible.

So both continency and necessity are described in terms of possibility. Indeed, all truth is. No truth is an impossible truth. Every truth is a possible truth. The difference between contingency and necessity, therefore, has little if anything to do with the language used. The difference, rather, is a question of propositional analysis; that is, it has to do with whether there is any possible world in which a proposition may be false.

The argument I have presented has focused upon analyzing propositions and their relationships to one another. It has sought to define terms in light of the way they are used in those propositions, not in light of some assumption made about what those terms must supposedly imply on their own. The statement, "he can come to me if he is drawn," does not by any means of necessity imply that it must be possible for the drawn one to choose not to come. It is fully consistent with the idea that such a one is compelled to come by God's immutable decree. Since that is a meaningful possibility, and since I have argued for that conclusion, if you wish to challenge it you must do more than simply assert that ability implies contingency. It does not.

The assumption that words like "ability," "possible," or "might," somehow imply that it must be the case that a proposition may not be true demonstrates a wrong understanding of the language of possibility, hence the confusion with contingency. (Apologies if I'm being repetitive here; I'm just wanting to be clear.) "Possibly true" is the antithesis to impossibility. Yet in the absence of impossibility we have two options: contingency, and necessity. To equate the antithesis of impossibility (e.g. inability, ability) with contingency, therefore, is to suggest that there is no such thing as necessary truth. Your options at this point are to either argue that view, or retract the assertion that ability implies contingency. The implication simply is not there. It must be argued for.

So when I made my water analogy and you responded by appealing to the fact that water doesn't have free will, you missed the point. All you did there was help my point that the reason you see contingency in "he is able to come" is not because of the language of ability (for that can be used of necessity or natural processes), but rather because of your anthropology. You've brought to the discussion a particular understanding of the nature of human choice. And not only is that understanding unnecessary as it has not yet been substantiated, but you have appealed to that understanding as your basis for dismissing my argument (not only in the insistence upon contingency, but also in neglecting the opportunity to discuss a definition of "drawing").

So as it stands, there has not yet been a satisfactory answer offered to my argument. The only thing implied by the proposition "he is able to come" is that it is not the case that it is necessarily false that he comes. That leaves open three possibilities for the proposition: contingently false, contingently true, or necessarily true. All that "he is able to come" tells us as a standalone proposition is that whether or not his coming is a matter of contingency or necessity is undetermined. The determination of it must come from additional information, which is precisely what my argument concerning equivalence in class membership attempts to answer. To rebut it, you must argue for contingency, not assume it. One must show the grammatical error in my argument pertaining to the equivalence of the two "hims," and/or demonstrate that "Some D are not R" is a verifiably true statement.

I've put together the following chart in an effort to give some visual aid to these categories, and others. I hope you find it helpful. Note a few things about it: (1) What is "possibly true" includes both the contingent and the necessary; possibility and contingency are not interchangeable categories. (2) There are various ways of thinking about necessity. When I speak of it being "necessarily" the case that those enabled by the Father's drawing come to Jesus, I am referring to necessity in God, under the category of His immutable will. I am not talking about logical necessity.

(A) I'll stand on the meaning of dunatai leaving us with only the possibility (contingency) and there being no need to grant for sake of argument what's already contained in the word itself.

See above.

(B) Nor does possibility preclude the possibility of two different classes of people.

It is not my burden to refute an assertion, but yours to argue for it. I have no need for possibility in itself to preclude the option of there being two classes. Possibility is consistent with my position. The lack of two classes (i.e. those able who (1) come and (2) do not come) is something I have argued for already by means of observing the grammatical equivalence between the "him" drawn and the "him" raised. What must be demonstrated in order to refute this is that two classes actually exist. The logical possibility of it is not a response to my argument.

(C) And the reality can be that some or none of those able to come actually do so. Thus, we have three possible groups: None, Some and All.

Again, what is logically possible is not the issue here. We're talking about what actually happens. My argument has already offered a conclusion regarding who comes, which has not been responded to apart from the offer of an assertion that begs the question of contingency.

(D) Which is why I early in this discussion opened up other verses in the context. And now that I've identified three classes of people, I'd modify "both classes of people", but will use it for now.

What verses do you believe make the case that there actually exists a class of people who (1) are able to come, and (2) choose not to do so?

(A) How do we know from the verse itself that at least some do come - that "Some S are P"?

Jesus' promise to raise some up.

(B) "Some" is not the same as "All".

"All" entails "some." If it is the case that every S is P, then it follows that at least one S is P. That's all that "Some S are P" says. "Some" is not a negation of "all" (just as "possible" is not a negation of "necessity"); it just says that the truth value of "all" is left undetermined by this particular proposition.

What ultimately needs to be shown is that Some, All or None come.

I believe I have already done this...

On the one hand, I agree with the simple logic, the two "hims" you've been presenting.

Do you really, though? Your position doesn't make sense if we are in agreement here. I'm not sure why you say this. In saying that the two "hims" are the same, I am speaking of the classes or groups of people that these pronouns refer to. To say that they are identical is to say they have the same referent in terms of class membership; i.e. both "the one drawn" and "the one raised" make equal reference to "the one able to come," such that class membership between all three is identical.

If this is a sound argument, then it follows that everyone drawn will come and be raised. I have not actually seen a response offered to this argument, except to insist upon the implication of contingency, which again is not a justified claim.

Yes. Why not attempt the logic remaining strictly with the language? What are the basic truths?

I'm not sure what you're asking here. The purpose of logical operations like contraposition is to demonstrate equivalence between statements, allowing for the rewording of propositions in a way that can help to clarify their meaning. "Remaining strictly with the language" of the verse would make it awfully difficult for a discussion to take place. After all, we don't disagree with what the language is, but with the meaning of that language.

What the contrapositive operations show is that the following statement is equivalent in meaning to what we have in John 6:44:

• "If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to me, and I will raise him up."

The two "hims" clearly refer to the same individual, equating the classes of those being drawn and those being raised. "I will raise him up" assumes the fulfillment of the condition, "if drawn, then able to come." It does not assume the fulfillment of some further, unspoken condition. It assumes the fulfillment of this condition, as that is its grammatical function in the sentence. It is giving us an additional piece of information about the one who has been drawn. I am confident that if it were not for the controversial subject matter, we would not dispute the meaning of the above statement if it were worded this way (but I suppose I could be wrong about that). And yet that wording has been demonstrated to be logically equivalent in meaning to what we have in John 6:44.

Verse 37 does not use the word "draws" but the word "gives". There is very likely a big difference between the two words in John 6.

What's your reasoning for this assertion? You've already agreed, have you not, that there is a syntagmatic-paradigmatic relationship between these two terms in John 6? It is the meaning of such a relationship that the terms can be used interchangeably.

Because "no man" as I said is a global phrase, i.e., no man among men. "auton" would be the man among men who is drawn.

"No man among men" is not the subject term of the proposition. The subject term is "he who is able." The predicate term is "he who is drawn." Then both are negated. So the logic of it is "All A are D." That proposition can mean one of two things: A and D are equivalent in terms of class membership, or D is larger.

In regard to the drawing, I don't think we can separate Jesus from the Father.

Who's separating them? Their work is clearly united. Jesus came to accomplish the Father's will (vs. 38). That doesn't change the fact that they perform different roles. It is not grammatically insignificant that the Father is the subject of the drawing, and the Son the subject of the raising.

Again, I'm not going there. I'm simply dealing with a rational man having an ability that he uses or does not use.

You have gone there. You went there when you said ability implies contingency. That's not a mere assertion that man has the ability to make a choice. What you're asserting is more specific than that. This is easy to see, my friend. Consider my view, and how what you're suggesting precludes the very possibility of it being reasonably considered:

We know the reason the drawing is necessary is because apart from it man is in a state of inability. The verse explicitly says that much. Here's my understanding of this. What characterizes that inability is man's sin nature. The inability is not logically necessary, nor is there any external obstacle applied that would prevent one from choosing what he might otherwise choose. So this is an inability of nature. Surely the only candidate for such a thing is man's sinfulness.

So if this inability is a reference to man's sin nature and its effects on the will, then it is perfectly reasonable to say that if one is drawn out of this state, he will be compelled to act according to a renewed state which is characterized by righteousness. What exactly is it that one is being drawn to? The mere capacity to choose for or against Christ, where formerly one had only the capacity to choose against? What does that look like, in terms of heart alignment? Bad trees bear bad fruit. Good trees bear good fruit. Are there neutral trees that may determine whether to bear good or bad fruit? Or is it the whole point of that parable that man acts according to the alignment of his heart? What does the drawing do if not re-align the heart's inclination?

How does Scripture define freedom from sin? By a neutral ability to choose whether or not to remain in it? Or is it not defined by being in Christ? Reminder: I'm more sharing my thoughts on this, than asking you to answer (but feel free if you wish). My point is that the idea that those enabled by the Father's drawing are compelled by that drawing to necessarily come is completely consistent with the language of ability. Contingency is not implied by the word itself. You've drawn that inference on the basis of your anthropology - an anthropology which insists upon understanding the nature of the human will in a way that requires not just possibility of choice, but contingency of outcome, dismissing at the outset the very much valid (and argued for) possibility of a compatibilistic understanding of freedom that functions in harmony with a necessary truth established by the immutable decree of God.

If you don't want to go there in this discussion, that's fine. Respectfully, however, you don't get to dismiss it and expect an assertion about "simply dealing with the ability to choose" to be taken seriously. That's not what you're doing, because again you're not talking simply about possibility. You're talking about contingency, which assumes more than mere possibility.

Disagree. There is an equivalence in the man who is drawn, enabled to come, and raised, but this does not in itself have to be the full story. If the man does not use the ability to come, then he will not be raised.

I've responded already, but I quote this just to point out that here you're denying the equivalence of the two "hims." I don't understand why when directly asked you claim to agree with me on that, but when elaborating on the point and its implications you go back on it. Again, maybe you've not understood my argument there.

Implication is subjective.

Can you elaborate on this? A conditional statement is an implication. "If P then Q" is an implication. That's subjective?

 

[Peacemaker1]

A lot of disciples were 'drawn to' Jesus, and followed Him ...
Most (or many) of the same disciples who followed Jesus, in the NT, left Him.

Everybody chooses their own way, like for like, if a person is the opposite to meek, they go to the mighty, if they prefer lies, they go after the devil and claim that is god.

But some go to the meek Lord, because they hear what He says, to the ones who are heavy laden with this world, Jesus can give them rest, who also is lowly in heart, who gives an easier yoke, ( He is compassionate and kind) and gives the burden that is light.

That is the answer after all, of Peter, even though it was not interesting to many disciples who went away, it remained interesting to the apostles, because they did not seek lies, nor seek the heavy burdens in this life, or those who give them.



John 6:67 Then said Jesus unto the twelve, Will ye also go away?
68 Then Simon Peter answered him, Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life.
69 And we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God.


Matthew 11:25 At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.
26 Even so, Father: for so it seemed good in thy sight.
27 All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.
28 Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.
29 Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls.
30 For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.

 

[Peacemaker1]

Here is that continuance why the people having intellectual conversations/debates, cannot be drawn to Jesus Christ, and who is drawn, even though all men are drawn. ( it is the simplicity of Christ and the wisdom of God who made the world and all things in it)


These scriptures are the preaching of the cross that save ( all men) but the conversation of the thread was not about that, it was about questions/questions of words, where is the scripture when all we see is mens own wisdom/own words , which is entirely all you see looking through these four pages of this thread ?

That wisdom of the wise is DESTROYED and the understanding of the prudent is brought to nothing, not just because God says so, but it is done through belief in the power of God, which is unto us wisdom.

Seeking wisdom is not seeking Christ, preaching Christ crucified is seeking Christ, which is also foolishness to these same ones who seek the wisdom of this world that is foolishness with God.

So who is drawn ? It cant be the mighty, they draw after their own lust, own understanding, so it is to the foolish things of this world, which is Gods wisdom as that at the same time confounds those wise, and the weak things believing in the weakness in Christ, confound the mighty, no flesh can glory in the presence of the Lord, they do not control their tongues, they show no fear of the Lord, nothing but self glory.


1 Corinthians 1:18 For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God.
19 For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent.
20 Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?
21 For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe.
22 For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom:
23 But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness;
24 But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.
25 Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men.
26 For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called:
27 But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty;
28 And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are:
29 That no flesh should glory in his presence.
30 But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption:
31 That, according as it is written, He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord.

James 1:14 But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.
15 Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.

 

[Peacemaker1]

Anyone on this forum want to hear the truth of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, or want to hear those great swelling words of vanity instead.

James has told us every man is drawn away of his own lust, this is why they are not drawn to Christ, and why they also try to stop our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ drawing anyone to Him, why hear them any more ?

Read below for one time anyone on this thread, I wont be here for too long with such contradiction, how they walk after THEIR OWN LUSTS, ( every man drawn of their own lust) and they speak great swelling words ( of vanity) having mens persons in admiration because of advantage. ( over you.)



2 Timothy 4:4 And they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables.

2 Peter 2:18 For when they speak great swelling words of vanity, they allure through the lusts of the flesh, through much wantonness, those that were clean escaped from them who live in error.

Jude 1:16 These are murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts; and their mouth speaketh great swelling words, having men's persons in admiration because of advantage.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Here is that continuance why the people having intellectual conversations/debates, cannot be drawn to Jesus Christ, and who is drawn, even though all men are drawn.

Are they? I know you may not have been following the full exchange I've been having with GDL, but to summarize:

"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up on the last day."

This is equivalent in meaning to the following:

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to me, and I will raise him up."

It follows from this that the one who is drawn will be raised. Will all men be raised?

 

[Peacemaker1]

Are they? I know you may not have been following the full exchange I've been having with GDL, but to summarize:

"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up on the last day."

This is equivalent in meaning to the following:

"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to me, and I will raise him up."

It follows from this that the one who is drawn will be raised. Will all men be raised?

All men are drawn, either to God or to their own lust.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

All men are drawn, either to God or to their own lust.

Okay, but in the sense that Jesus means in John 6:44, the Father "drawing" those who are unable to come to Christ, that's not a reference to everybody.

 

[Peacemaker1]

all are commanded to repent but not all feel drawn,compelled to repent


Acts 17:30And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men every where to repent:

Matthew 11:20Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not:

Matthew 21:29He answered and said, I will not: but afterward he repented, and went.

Matthew 21:32For John came unto you in the way of righteousness, and ye believed him not: but the publicans and the harlots believed him: and ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterward, that ye might believe him.

2 Corinthians 12:21And lest, when I come again, my God will humble me among you, and that I shall bewail many which have sinned already, and have not repented of the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness which they have committed.

Revelation 2:21And I gave her space to repent of her fornication; and she repented not.

Revelation 9:20And the rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, and idols of gold, and silver, and brass, and stone, and of wood: which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk:

Revelation 16:9And men were scorched with great heat, and blasphemed the name of God, which hath power over these plagues: and they repented not to give him glory.

Revelation 16:11And blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds.

 

[GDL]

The words you highlighted (as well as "ability") are words of possibility, not contingency. The two are not the same. Possibility just means that it is not necessary that a proposition be false. Contingency is a subcategory of this which says it is not necessary that a proposition be false or true.

Apologies, but busy with other things and I'm not always seeing alerts enumerated on my page.

I'll read what you've written when I can. You've put forth quite a bit of effort and I should probably just ask you to consider being my instructor in logic. But you'd probably end up flunking or expelling me!

I'd like to ask you to give me a simple logical explanation of 1John2:23 if you'd care to. What does it say logically in regard to being given a command to believe? IOW, God has commanded men to believe, and a man believes, has that man also been obedient to God? (My answer is yes, but I'd be interested in seeing what you see).

Thanks!

 

[GDL]

All men are drawn, either to God or to their own lust.

As @Dikaioumenoi alluded, our discussion is specific (and extensive) and concerns precisely what we see is actually being said in John6:44 and some context. Please don't assume we do not understand and believe the Gospel or in any way are distracted from or have departed from it.

Re: what you say in the above quote: once again as @Dikaioumenoi has emphasized when he quoted "drawing" for you, this drawing in John6:44 is a specific word that I don't see being applied to being "drawn...to their own lust" as you say. Conceptually, I can see where you get this and why you do, but specific words are important in our Text. So are concepts like we have been discussing as they can provide details for many of the teachings of our faith. Some of us are intrigued by such details and some over millennia have been so intrigued.

 

[Peacemaker1]

i do not want to give any of my time to disputers.

this is either consented to, o r disputed, and where is the disputer of this world, the Lord has turned the wisdom of this world into foolishness

everyone can look at john12, and we immediately understand Jesus resurrecting is what draws all men, as this enables belief in the heart unto righteousness



John 12:32And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me.


now all men c an look with me and understand all men before the rising of Jesus Christ from being dead in the grave, were all drawn to the grave


Job 21:33The clods of the valley shall be sweet unto him, and every man shall draw after him, as there are innumerable before him.

Psalm 28:3Draw me not away with the wicked, and with the workers of iniquity, which speak peace to their neighbours, but mischief is in their hearts.

Psalm 73:28But it is good for me to draw near to God: I have put my trust in the Lord God, that I may declare all thy works.

Psalm 107:17 Fools because of their transgression, and because of their iniquities, are afflicted.18 Their soul abhorreth all manner of meat; and they draw near unto the gates of death.

Matthew 15:8This people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoureth me with their lips; but their heart is far from me.




the bringing in of a better hope of eternal life draws us to God, hear me perverse world, men arose speaking perverse things, how do they draw anyone to God by disputing against....



Acts 20:30Also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them.

Hebrews 7:19For the law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did; by the which we draw nigh unto God.

 

[Peacemaker1]

as Jesus tells John 12:32 , if He was lifted up, raised, this is the drawing to Him of all men, to raise him up the last day, risen with Him is drawn to Him, as Him being lifted up is us being raised up, risen with Him...


John 6:44No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.

Colossians 2:12Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of,God, who hath raised him from the dead.

 

[Peacemaker1]

disputers must love the preaching of the cross, it gives them an opportunity to show their better belief instead, on these forums for all these years telling their thoughts.



John 6:40And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.

John 6:54Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

i do not want to give any of my time to disputers.

"The one who states his case first seems right, until the other comes and examines him." - Prov. 18:17

"Whoever isolates himself seeks his own desire; he breaks out against all sound judgment. A fool takes no pleasure in understanding, but only in expressing his opinion." - Prov. 18:1-2

No person's understanding of Scripture is perfect, and therefore every person's understanding of Scripture is subject to constructive criticism. There is a time and place for dispute. To disagree with this is to neglect the wisdom of the above statements.