What Creates Consciousness?

[mindlight]

I finally gave up and looked it up. (Nature of existence, that sort of thing.) Yeah, that's completely useless to me professionally.

Stuff exists. I don't know why it exists. I study it. End of story.

Stuff exists and there is no scientific explanation for how your consciousness of that existence came to be nor what it means to exist. Yet despite this acceptance of the limitation of the scientific method you refuse to contemplate an alternate way of seeing. Your job is to be blind?

 

[mindlight]

I have two quite disparate points to make in reaction to this.

1. Ontology has considerable relevance to the observation of the practice of science and the validation of its methodology. When actually practicing science it is largely, arguably completely, irrelevant. This is an opinion that may be blighted by Dunning-Kruger effect.

2. I am leaning towards the conclusion that the difficulty of conducting a coherent exchange with @stevevw is down to this: Steve thinks that the very act of raising questions in the framework of ontology somehow provides some form of validation for the wildest and least unsubstantiated of speculations. It doesn't. Ontology demands precision, not extra-large helpings of word salad and Gish Gallops. (Again Dunning-Kruger may apply to this viewpoint.)

The miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others

In this case professional scientists have nothing helpful to say about consciousness and how it is formed and yet cannot accept that theologians, poets and philosophers may be better equipped to answer the question.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Stuff exists and there is no scientific explanation for how your consciousness of that existence came to be nor what it means to exist. Yet despite this acceptance of the limitation of the scientific method you refuse to contemplate an alternate way of seeing. Your job is to be blind?

The supernatural is outside my purview. As for consciousness, look into the science of neurobiology and psychology. Those aren't my areas so I can't walk you through them and what they know about consciousness. From what I have seen, there is not panic going on in those fields.

 

[mindlight]

The supernatural is outside my purview. As for consciousness, look into the science of neurobiology and psychology. Those aren't my areas so I can't walk you through them and what they know about consciousness. From what I have seen, there is not panic going on in those fields.

While the brain is a necessary condition of every aspect of consciousness, from the slightest tingle of sensation to the most exquisitely constructed sense of self, neural activity is not sufficient by itself to explain consciousness.

Einstein Forum – Why Neuroscience Will Never Explain Consciousness

Why Neuroscience Will Never Explain Consciousness

www.einsteinforum.de

 

[Hans Blaster]

While the brain is a necessary condition of every aspect of consciousness, from the slightest tingle of sensation to the most exquisitely constructed sense of self, neural activity is not sufficient by itself to explain consciousness.

Einstein Forum – Why Neuroscience Will Never Explain Consciousness

Why Neuroscience Will Never Explain Consciousness

www.einsteinforum.de

If only your source was a neurobiologist instead of a geriatric doctor and self proclaimed "philosopher" as for his claim what neuroscience will ever accomplish ...

 

[mindlight]

If only your source was a neurobiologist instead of a geriatric doctor and self proclaimed "philosopher" as for his claim what neuroscience will ever accomplish ...

There is a lot of waffle in what you might consider more authoritative sources investigating the generic and specific forms of consciousness that neuroscience hopes to map. At the end of the day however neuroscience relies on introspective reporting of subjects inner landscapes and indeed a variety of philosophical models dominate speculation about the link between neuroscience and consciousness. The hard problem remains that an empirical mapping of a subjective state is impossible. This is especially so with all higher states of consciousness.

Chalmers argues that there is an inherent limitation to empirical explanations of phenomenal consciousness in that empirical explanations will be fundamentally either structural or functional, yet phenomenal consciousness is not reducible to either.

The Neuroscience of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Hans Blaster]

There is a lot of waffle in what you might consider more authoritative sources investigating the generic and specific forms of consciousness that neuroscience hopes to map. At the end of the day however neuroscience relies on introspective reporting of subjects inner landscapes and indeed a variety of philosophical models dominate speculation about the link between neuroscience and consciousness. The hard problem remains that an empirical mapping of a subjective state is impossible. This is especially so with all higher states of consciousness.

Chalmers argues that there is an inherent limitation to empirical explanations of phenomenal consciousness in that empirical explanations will be fundamentally either structural or functional, yet phenomenal consciousness is not reducible to either.

The Neuroscience of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

It's weird how often this philosopher gets mentioned on the science of consciousness. I wonder why it is never someone like this guy that gets referenced.

My actual interaction with this thread has been largely on the notion that electrons have a consciousness property intrinsically or there is a universe-spanning "consciousness field", neither of which come anywhere near plausible or detected in physics.

 

[mindlight]

It's weird how often this philosopher gets mentioned on the science of consciousness. I wonder why it is never someone like this guy that gets referenced.

My actual interaction with this thread has been largely on the notion that electrons have a consciousness property intrinsically or there is a universe-spanning "consciousness field", neither of which come anywhere near plausible or detected in physics.

Koch takes a naturalistic approach which fits your ideological faith position also even if he goes too far in suggesting consciousness to everything. His panpsychism was a little wierd. But I guess it fits the idea that consciousness is somehow a product of complicated networks of matter and mechanisms.

Even if consciousness is something that emerges from the material structures of the brain it is clear that neurologists do not understand it yet nor has this approach translated into anything that useful. In practice, in trying to resolve damage or imbalance physical medical solutions exist via surgery in the clear-cut cases of tumors for example. Drugs can correct imbalances or moderate the rollercoaster of hormones. In both cases, it is deviations from the normal pattern which inform the reason for the treatment. It seems the main method of dealing with damaged consciousness is a conversation with a psychologist or indeed a friend - the success of which is highly variable. Even the people who sound clever when they talk about neurology and consciousness are just beginners.

Koch lost the bet with Chalmers because consciousness is far more complex than he envisaged and his approach clearly does not explain it.

In 2023, Koch lost a 25-year bet to philosopher David Chalmers. Koch bet that the neural underpinnings of consciousness will be well-understood by 2023, while Chalmers bet the contrary. Upon losing, Koch gifted Chalmers a case of fine wine

 

[Hans Blaster]

Koch takes a naturalistic approach which fits your ideological faith position also even if he goes too far in suggesting consciousness to everything. His panpsychism was a little wierd. But I guess it fits the idea that consciousness is somehow a product of complicated networks of matter and mechanisms.

You make a small error there. I have no faith and find faith to be a bad methodology for anything. My problem with Steve's claims are the stark lack of evidence.

I didn't notice his semi-panpsychism before posting, but I left it after I noticed. I don't think physics permits panspychism, but I don't expect a neurobiologist to know that.

Even if consciousness is something that emerges from the material structures of the brain it is clear that neurologists do not understand it yet nor has this approach translated into anything that useful. In practice, in trying to resolve damage or imbalance physical medical solutions exist via surgery in the clear-cut cases of tumors for example. Drugs can correct imbalances or moderate the rollercoaster of hormones. In both cases, it is deviations from the normal pattern which inform the reason for the treatment.

These things are fairly good evidence for the idea of an emergent, physical nature of consciousness in brains. Combined with the physical impossibility of the kinds of things the philosophers and theologians propose, I see no reason to suspect it is anything other than an emergent brain property.

It seems the main method of dealing with damaged consciousness is a conversation with a psychologist or indeed a friend - the success of which is highly variable. Even the people who sound clever when they talk about neurology and consciousness are just beginners.

A "damaged consciousness" is unconsciousness or death. I think you are talking about mental disorders or psychological problems. Consciousness is clearly complex which is why I don't put much into claims that...

Koch lost the bet with Chalmers because consciousness is far more complex than he envisaged and his approach clearly does not explain it.

In 2023, Koch lost a 25-year bet to philosopher David Chalmers. Koch bet that the neural underpinnings of consciousness will be well-understood by 2023, while Chalmers bet the contrary. Upon losing, Koch gifted Chalmers a case of fine wine

... the failure to have worked it all out by now is a victory for immaterial spirits or non-brain consciousness.

 

[expos4ever]

I have read David Chalmers seminal 1996 book. To me, his arguments are clear and compelling.

 

[expos4ever]

In my opinion, one can believe that the phenomenology of consciousness - what it is actually like to experience the color red for example - derives fully from the brain, and yet there remains a mystery.

This mystery is, for want of a better word, conceptual in nature. All of our scientific models are functional and structural in nature - their "explanations" are couched fully in these terms.

But, I submit, the first person phenomenology of consciousness is self-evidently not something that is explanatorily exhausted by functional and structural considerations.

In other words, and by way of example, you could know everything about the structure and function of the experience of seeing the color red, but there remains definitely something that remains unexplained.

I believe this intuition, whether correct or not, is at the heart of disagreements between reasonable people about this issue. I happen to think the intuition is correct, and that something deeply fundamental is missing from our explanation of the phenomena of human consciousness.

This is why, to my understanding, David Chalmers posits that consciousness is a kind of fundamental property of reality that needs to be added to our descriptions of nature. This is not, of course, to say that the brain does not fully give rise to consciousness - it is perfectly coherent to argue that the brain is necessary and fully sufficient for consciousness, but that categories of explanation that are limited to structure and function are not adequate.

 

[dlamberth]

This is why, to my understanding, David Chalmers posits that consciousness is a kind of fundamental property of reality that needs to be added to our descriptions of nature. This is not, of course, to say that the brain does not fully give rise to consciousness - it is perfectly coherent to argue that the brain is necessary and fully sufficient for consciousness, but that categories of explanation that are limited to structure and function are not adequate.

Well said.
I would also suggest that what the brain does is to give meaning and understanding to consciousness awareness experiences. It could be my training, I don't know for sure, but because the reach of conscious awareness is not limited like my arm or fingers, it sure seems to me like there's more going on than a brain centered event.

Where I keep having trouble with this thread is a common understanding of what consciousness is. For instance a plant whose leaves are following the track of the sun to my mind is a sort of basic conscious awareness. But others here disagree.

 

[Hans Blaster]

In my opinion, one can believe that the phenomenology of consciousness - what it is actually like to experience the color red for example - derives fully from the brain, and yet there remains a mystery.

This mystery is, for want of a better word, conceptual in nature. All of our scientific models are functional and structural in nature - their "explanations" are couched fully in these terms.

Generally speaking, that's how *all* scientific models of everything are, not just brain stuff.

But, I submit, the first person phenomenology of consciousness is self-evidently not something that is explanatorily exhausted by functional and structural considerations.
In other words, and by way of example, you could know everything about the structure and function of the experience of seeing the color red, but there remains definitely something that remains unexplained.

I believe this intuition, whether correct or not, is at the heart of disagreements between reasonable people about this issue. I happen to think the intuition is correct, and that something deeply fundamental is missing from our explanation of the phenomena of human consciousness.

I don't think anyone would say that our model of consciousness is anywhere near complete.

This is why, to my understanding, David Chalmers posits that consciousness is a kind of fundamental property of reality that needs to be added to our descriptions of nature. This is not, of course, to say that the brain does not fully give rise to consciousness - it is perfectly coherent to argue that the brain is necessary and fully sufficient for consciousness, but that categories of explanation that are limited to structure and function are not adequate.

This is where I must strongly depart. Those who do know of the "fundamental properties of reality" would not, nor could not characterize consciousness as anything even close to resembling something fundamental. Consciousness is a property limited to certain animals of the more complex variety and certainly not found in the "inanimate objects".

 

[mindlight]

You make a small error there. I have no faith and find faith to be a bad methodology for anything. My problem with Steve's claims are the stark lack of evidence.

I didn't notice his semi-panpsychism before posting, but I left it after I noticed. I don't think physics permits panspychism, but I don't expect a neurobiologist to know that.

These things are fairly good evidence for the idea of an emergent, physical nature of consciousness in brains. Combined with the physical impossibility of the kinds of things the philosophers and theologians propose, I see no reason to suspect it is anything other than an emergent brain property.

A "damaged consciousness" is unconsciousness or death. I think you are talking about mental disorders or psychological problems. Consciousness is clearly complex which is why I don't put much into claims that...

... the failure to have worked it all out by now is a victory for immaterial spirits or non-brain consciousness.

Naturalism is a faith position. Methodological adherence to it cannot be verified by natural means.

 

[Bradskii]

Where I keep having trouble with this thread is a common understanding of what consciousness is. For instance a plant whose leaves are following the track of the sun to my mind is a sort of basic conscious awareness. But others here disagree.

Me included. Saying that would be the same as saying that my diaphragm has a basic consciousness when it causes me to cough. Or my eyelids have some sort of consciousness when they close when a bright light is shone into my eyes.

One works to clear my throat of something that might be harmful. The other to protect my eyes from damage. They are evolutionary beneficial. Which is exactly why we have a sense of morality. It's doing nothing more than doing what works.

There's an argument that we don't do anything consciously. It's all instinctive. And we make up a story that we're in control to convince ourselves that 'we decided' to do it.

 

[Bradskii]

Naturalism is a faith position.

Yeah. You have faith that the experiment is telling you something about the world. You have faith that your investigation is getting you a little closer to the truth.

Methodological adherence to it cannot be verified by natural means.

If by verified you mean 'proved to be true' (which is pretty much the definition of the word), then yes again.

 

[Ophiolite]

There's an argument that we don't do anything consciously. It's all instinctive. And we make up a story that we're in control to convince ourselves that 'we decided' to do it.

I feel compelled to agree with you.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Naturalism is a faith position.

That the Universe is made of stuff we call "natural" is a conclusion brought about by exaimination of the evidence contained within the Universe. Finding that there is natural stuff in the Universe does not discard the notion of non-natural stuff.

(I don't think I have asserted naturalism in this thread. I continue to reject faith as a poor path to the understanding of reality.)

Methodological adherence to it cannot be verified by natural means.

Counter: Prove the fundamental assumptions of logic (A=A, etc.). Using methodological naturalism is the same thing for science. It is part of the definition of what science is fundamentally.

 

[mindlight]

Yeah. You have faith that the experiment is telling you something about the world. You have faith that your investigation is getting you a little closer to the truth.

If by verified you mean 'proved to be true' (which is pretty much the definition of the word), then yes again.

Exactly,we hold to what is axiomatic by faith but cannot justify either the empirical method or rules of logic by reference to themselves. You appear to accept that there may be non- natural stuff that cannot be quantified in these terms. In the case of consciousness this is especially so. Thus the task of identifying or creating consciousness in an AI is an impossible one using such tools.

 

[Bradskii]

Exactly,we hold to what is axiomatic by faith...

No, something that is axiomatic is a given. As being self evident. You don't need have to refer to anything to prove it because there is no proof. So in Euclidean geometry 'Things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another'. No faith required. No proof available.

...but cannot justify either the empirical method or rules of logic by reference to themselves.

As it is self evident, you haven't used any method to make the claim. So it can't be self referential.

You appear to accept that there may be non- natural stuff that cannot be quantified in these terms.

I can't recall accepting anything non natural. I'm not a believer in the supernatural.

In the case of consciousness this is especially so. Thus the task of identifying or creating consciousness in an AI is an impossible one using such tools.

I can't recall suggesting that consciousness isn't natural either. And as I can't definitely say that anyone is conscious apart from myself, I certainly would have a problem with AI. Someone would need to define some parameters for it and if we agreed...move on from there.