God's Ability To Save

[Reformationist]

He cannot change -

Thanks,
Ed

Strange. In this thread you deny the possibility that God could change, yet in our other discussion, your very foundation is that, due to the sacrifice of Christ, God's entire relationship with humanity as a whole has changed.

That is interesting.

 

[msortwell]

Post 2

You've loaded the question . . . Instead of asking if God is able to do something, perhaps you should ask if God chooses to do that which God is able to do.

In your initial response you recommend retooling the question to include the concept of God choosing and its relationship to his ability to do.

Post 8

I do not agree that God "chooses" to save some and not save others. As I said in response to the original OP, to phrase the question in terms of "choice" is to determine the outcome before the answer is even given.

Oddly enough your first response to the original OP included a recommended adjustment to the terminology being used, but the recommendation included the word “chooses.” It is not clear to me how your recommendation is consistent with the deficiency that you are now focusing upon. Your recommendation seems to perpetuate the same 'problem."

Post 17

I think the primal question must be "Does God's 'ability' have anything to do with salvation?"

Now you are recommending an approach that's a bit different from your original response. However, it offers little help. Certainly an appropriate response (if it's what you believe) could introduce the possibility that the salvation of man was not related to God’s ability. In which case many would point to the following verse (and others with similar implications). “Surely the arm of the LORD is not too short to save, nor his ear too dull to hear (ISA 59:1).” Still it would be a point about which some substantive discussion might be had.

I think the line of questioning assumes a lot about God that may or may not be pertinent to the issues involved. I really don't think God's "ability" has anything to do with salvation. If it did, the impetus of salvation would be that of power, not of grace.

Here I would have to disagree with you. Discussing someone’s ‘ability’ to accomplish a task has little to do with whether or not they would ‘choose’ to attempt the task. God’s grace has to do with his disposition toward his creation and various elements therein. One might desire to exercise favor to another but lack the ability to do so. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the ‘ability’ of God to save. Moreover, the previously cited Scripture makes it clear that God has ability that relates to a salvific act.

Posts 19 & 24

Are you really trying to ask, "Is grace something that God chooses to bestow upon all equally?

Again, you use words like "exercising" which latently imply "choice." Therefore, your question is still be cast as I reinterpreted it in my last post.

Post 32

I am simply trying to get you and others to understand that the questions might not be valid, as the object of the question might not even be pertinent to the conclusion you are wishing to reach. Until you define what "choice" and "ability" mean for God, and if they are actually relevant to human salvation, I hardly see why your criticism of my approach is valid. To not define the nature of the problem (i.e., what it actually means for God to "choose" or to be "able" to do something) is like using a map of North Dakota to navigate the Sahara. Sure, the map provides a guide, but the guide is not applicable to environment which one seeks to explore.

‘Choice’ and ‘ability’ have widely recognized meanings. The questions I have asked intend to apply those definitions. It seems (correct me if I am wrong) that you reject the notion that the recipient of a written or spoken message can have any confidence that the message sent by a sender/initiator has been understood. That is, unless great lengths are taken to articulate specific, and nuanced meanings for each term used in the discussion. And perhaps not even then.

Well, this definitely depends upon what you mean by "passive." As this word, much less its antonymn, has yet to be accurately defined in relation to God, you may certainly be right about my position. However, it would be difficult for either of us to know that until we arrive at an appropriate definition.

And here we see that you seek to develop unique meanings of words, dependent upon the subject to which they are being applied. While this might make for interesting philosophical exercises, it completely undermines any attempt to have meaningful discourse. And the application of this philosophy would have profoundly destructive effects upon our ability to understand the Scriptures. Perhaps this is why you seem to have so little regard for what they say.

I appreciate that you put "choices" in quotation marks. However, we still have not yet arrived at a definition of what "choice" means for God, and whether or not it has any salvific importance.

'Choice' for God, within the context of my inquiry has the meaning that I intended it to mean, and barring any ‘clarification’ on my part, you can be assured that it means one of the generally accepted meanings within the English language.

In response to the OP, I offered what I felt was a more appropriate question to ask to clarify the issues which you raised in the OP.

Well, lets look at the more appropriate question that you offered.

Post 2

You've loaded the question . . . Instead of asking if God is able to do something, perhaps you should ask if God chooses to do that which God is able to do.

What you offered included essentially the same terminology against which you continue to object. Your ‘improved’ question would include the concept of a God who “chooses” and require that we consider what God is “able to do.” You are writing in circles.

But perhaps YOUR ‘choose’ is different from my ‘choose’ which would make your question valid whereas mine was not. And your question relating to God being “able” can be readily understood because your definition of ability is universal whereas mine is clearly a trip-wire.

It seems that you enjoy writing but indicate little desire, or perhaps little ability, to communicate.

 

[depthdeception]

This is nothing more than playing word games. Your real problem is that you can't abide any Calvinist actually making a clear and definitive statement about anything.

No, I do not have a problem with someone making "clear and definitive statements." However, this very notion about making "clear and definitive statements" first requires that the terms of the statement are properly presented (i.e., word meanings, anthropomorphisms explained, etc.). My contention from the start is that this fundamental requisite has not been met.

Your problem is not with the words, it's with Calvinists. That much is crystal clear.

Well, at least I've made one of your "clear and definitive statements," eh?

And that makes your ruminations biased, of necessity. You are not objective, at all.

I never claimed objectivity, so the point is moot. Striving for clarity in language utilization is not equivalent to a claim for objectivity.

It is your assumption that the words are being hijacked. You are ascribing all sorts of nefarious motives to the OP's author, and to those who respond in any way you deem to be Calvinist, so you base your opposition on what you assume that all Calvinists must be doing all the time.

Hmmm... Am I sensing opposition to "clear and definitive statements?" Of course it is an assumption. I would never suggest that it was something else. Nonetheless, I do not necessarily assume that Calvinists hijack word meanings with wrong intentions. However, the quality of intention does not excuse the act.

Seeing that we are made in the image of God, there are bound to be some common points of reference with regard to actions, and "choices".

I hardly see why this is necessary. In a Calvinistic conception of the imago dei, I think this is antithetical to an understanding of God's "absolute" sovereignty. If God is sovereign in the way in which Calvinists envision God, it would be impossible, on the basis of an anthropic definition of "choice," to even countenance the possibility that God can or does "choose." After all, if God could "choose" in the classical sense of the term, such would mean that God is in fact subservient to infinite contingency, and that this--not God in Godself--would be the sovereign power of the universe. Therefore, if one is going to speak of God "choosing" while at the same time maintaining the Calvinistic conception of divine sovereignty, one must necessarily and completely revise the definition of "choice" when applied to God. However, this redefinition will unavoidably move the conversation well beyond any potential consonance with the same term when applied to humans, so much so that it would be more advantageous to simply use different vocabulary altogether.

If you wish to push this point, you're going to have to come up with and defend a workable alternative to what is commonly meant by the word "choice", a definition that demonstrably applies to God. Personally, I don't think you can do so.

Which is why I suggested that the concept not even be applied to God. It can potentially work within other theological frameworks, but definitely not within Calvinism.

If you want to consider logical discussion of concepts as "laying traps", then be prepared to be perceived as paranoid by other posters. If we cannot use the words you object to because YOU feel they are biased, inaccurate, or in some other way not suitable, then understand that we also have the choice (there's that word again) to tell you to keep your peace, and go play somewhere else. You're not going to hi-jack this discussion just because you have a problem with the Calvinist world-view.

Instead of "paranoid" I would see myself as attempting to be linguistically cautious and responsible. Words are powerful vehicles of meaning, and it is often easy to communicate a world of meaning that is not necessarily intended while concomitantly destroying other realms of meaning, simply by the usage of one word and its corrolary assumed meanings. Moreover, the hegenomy of theological systems are often based upon the usage of various words (and their latent ideas) which become the "watchword and song" of said systems' adherents. THerefore, the only way in which to strike at the base of this conglomorate is to deconstruct and replace the words and meanings which shape and hold together the theological matrix.

Me? I'm cool as a cucumber, calm as can be. I actually find your sophistry and convoluted meanderings funny, in a sick sort of way. They are not worthy of serious consideration beyond simply pointing out the underlying motivation for them, and the weak attempts to pass yourself off as a deep thinker...you're not.

Thank you for the assessment.

 

[depthdeception]

So, for my own edification, if you do not approve of the way the word "choice" or "power" or "ability" are being employed in a discussion about God, could you at least offer something productive and enlighten us as to how they are properly defined when discussing God?

I do not necessarily think that these terms can be defined in relation to God, and if they are, I would suppose they could only be defined apophatically. My entire point of responding to the OP was to draw attention to the fact that the uncritical use of language can often obscure the intended meaning that is sought. After all, if the questions which one asks about God are linguistically loaded with certain words that carry a litany of assumed theological meanings, then one has already determined the conclusion which the question seeks to explore.

So again, my point in responding is not so much to provide different definitions, but to highlight how all theological perspectives utilize language in their own specialized way, ways which often preclude meaningful interaction with others of different theological traditions. After all, it is quite obvious that "choice" means something entirely different for a Calvinist than it does for an Arminian. So if the word "choice" is simply thrown out there, the meaning is assumed (perhaps unconciously) by the OP but is probably not shared by all who will interact with it.

I ask because, if I go by your posts, it would not appear that I could ever understand a single thing about God, for words, or at least how we apply their meanings in our finite method of communicating about people, are simply not an adequate basis for discussion about the nature of God.

If by "understand" you are speaking about knowledge that can be quantified and precisely explicated, I would agree--there is very little that one can "know" about God in this way.

 

[depthdeception]

In your initial response you recommend retooling the question to include the concept of God choosing and its relationship to his ability to do.

Oddly enough your first response to the original OP included a recommended adjustment to the terminology being used, but the recommendation included the word “chooses.” It is not clear to me how your recommendation is consistent with the deficiency that you are now focusing upon. Your recommendation seems to perpetuate the same 'problem."

Yes, I agree that my post was a bit inconsistent. However, in all fairness, the original response was meant more as a play on the Calvinistic conception of the relationship between God's "choice" and God' "ability." Apparently I didn't convey the meaning which I intended, and this is admittedly part of the problem which I have spent the rest of this thread attempting to address.

Now you are recommending an approach that's a bit different from your original response. However, it offers little help. Certainly an appropriate response (if it's what you believe) could introduce the possibility that the salvation of man was not related to God’s ability. In which case many would point to the following verse (and others with similar implications). “Surely the arm of the LORD is not too short to save, nor his ear too dull to hear (ISA 59:1).” Still it would be a point about which some substantive discussion might be had.

My contention that salvation may have nothing to do with God's "ability" is part of my point which I have been outlining throughout this thread. Does "ability," when applied to God, mean that that which God is "able" to do is necessarily that which God "does" or "will" do? Some might contend that God's ability is expressed in that which God does, while others might define it apophatically by that which God does not do. So which one is going to define God's "ability?" This is the difficulty I am trying to address in my responses, showing that just because one uses a certain word theologically does not mean that the meaning of that word will be consistently applied in consonance with the intention of its usage.

Here I would have to disagree with you. Discussing someone’s ‘ability’ to accomplish a task has little to do with whether or not they would ‘choose’ to attempt the task. God’s grace has to do with his disposition toward his creation and various elements therein. One might desire to exercise favor to another but lack the ability to do so. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the ‘ability’ of God to save. Moreover, the previously cited Scripture makes it clear that God has ability that relates to a salvific act.

But again, what is the nature of this "ability?" Does God's ability to do something absolutely require that that which God is able to do is actually and necessarily that which God does? Or does God sometimes resist doing that which God is able to do? If the latter is true, then it would seem that the potential of "choice" (still undefined) does have something to do with God's ability to do something. If the former is true, then God, it would seem, is potentially not able to do anything, but is actually compelled by God's own ability to do that which God is able to do. In this sense, God's ability would have nothing to do with whether God would "choose" to do the same. However, it would also preclude the Calvinistic conception of God's sovereignty, as God would be bound to necessarily do that which God is able to do.

‘Choice’ and ‘ability’ have widely recognized meanings. The questions I have asked intend to apply those definitions.

But in a Calvinistic theological framework, these meanings have no actual basis. After all, if humans have no actual "ability" or "choice" in salvation, upon what basis is our conception of God's "ability" and "choice" in salvation founded? If one wishes to define "choice" and "ability" for God in the way that Calvinism does, one cannot appeal to the "widely recognized meanings" of these words as the ways in which Calvinism construes these words has little or no relation to the "widely recognized meanings."

It seems (correct me if I am wrong) that you reject the notion that the recipient of a written or spoken message can have any confidence that the message sent by a sender/initiator has been understood.

Absolute confidence, no. There can be a measure of confidence if the message is communicated within a shared context between the communicator and receipient. As my point throughout this thread has been, theological discussion is often failed communication as very few in the discussion share the same context and resovoir of shared word meanings.

That is, unless great lengths are taken to articulate specific, and nuanced meanings for each term used in the discussion. And perhaps not even then.

Perhaps. However, this is the only way that the potential can even be realized.

And here we see that you seek to develop unique meanings of words, dependent upon the subject to which they are being applied. While this might make for interesting philosophical exercises, it completely undermines any attempt to have meaningful discourse. And the application of this philosophy would have profoundly destructive effects upon our ability to understand the Scriptures. Perhaps this is why you seem to have so little regard for what they say.

I am not necessarily seeking to develop "unique meanings of words." I am perfectly willing to operate within the normal usage of "passive." However, one can have no confidence in applying (or not applying) this word to God's role in salvation until one has determined the relationship of God's "ability" to that which God does. For example, "passive" would apply to God's role in salvation if God relents from doing something which God can/should/does do. However, if God's "ability" is defined by that which God does (as you said "choice" does not matter), then passivity is actually impossible, regardless of the phenomenological manifestation of God's "act."

'Choice' for God, within the context of my inquiry has the meaning that I intended it to mean, and barring any ‘clarification’ on my part, you can be assured that it means one of the generally accepted meanings within the English language.

And what is the meaning you intended?

 

[Edial]

Follow up.

It would seem inescapable then, that God chooses to exercise His ability to save some, but similarly opts against exercising that same ability leaving other persons in their lost condition.

Is this consistent with your understanding?

Yes.
But let me clarify.
God is able to save "his arm is not too short". Yet he does not.

But that does not mean he does not initiate salvation to all.
"Christ drew all men to himself".

And when men resist that - he opts not to save them.

Thanks,
Ed

 

[Edial]

Strange. In this thread you deny the possibility that God could change, yet in our other discussion, your very foundation is that, due to the sacrifice of Christ, God's entire relationship with humanity as a whole has changed.

That is interesting.

I also found out through our other conversations that it is not the first time you claim confusion conerning various matters.
Tell me what is the context of James? Shifting shadows?

Ed

 

[msortwell]

Yes.
But let me clarify.
God is able to save "his arm is not too short". Yet he does not.

But that does not mean he does not initiate salvation to all.
"Christ drew all men to himself".

And when men resist that - he opts not to save them.

Thanks,
Ed

Assuming for now that everything that you said is correct, I would point out that God, as you have described Him, is capable of saving everyone, but He does not.

Although you indicate that He may "initiate salvation" to all, He does not do everything that He COULD do to bring them to salvation. He allows them to go to hell.

The God that you describe chooses to allow many people to go to hell despite His love for the whole world, and His ability to prevent their torment.

Is that a reasonable summary of your understanding of the situation?

Mike

 

[msortwell]

Allow me to share with whosoever chooses to read this thread, why I started it.

As can be seen by the symbol under my name, I am a Calvinist. I recently started reading Dave Hunt's book, "What Love is This?" at the request of one of the gentlemen in my church.

The book is full of misconceptions regarding the calvinistic view. It has little to offer the serious Bible student or anyone that wants to understand either Calvinism or the "weaknesses" in the Calvinistic theological system.

One thing it does do is to repeatedly express amazement that the Calvinistic view would have a God who does sovereignly save some to choose NOT to save others.

Hunt makes numerous statements similiar to the following. "That God would leave anyone to eternal torment who could be rescued, however, would demean God, since to do so would be repugnant to the conscience and compassion that God has place within all mankind!"

It seems to me that those who express such concern over Calvinistic theology must believe that their God is NOT able to save whosoever He desires to save. Otherwise would not their own theological system have this same truth buried within it?

. . . hence the question, "Is GOD ABLE to justify/save whosoever He chooses to justify/save?"

We really haven't seen many express their views. Why would that be?

Blessings,

Mike

 

[nobdysfool]

No, I do not have a problem with someone making "clear and definitive statements." However, this very notion about making "clear and definitive statements" first requires that the terms of the statement are properly presented (i.e., word meanings, anthropomorphisms explained, etc.). My contention from the start is that this fundamental requisite has not been met.

More likely, you are uncomfortable with the usual and generally accepted meanings of the terms, because of where they lead, so you want to re-write the terms and redefine them in such a way that you can manipulate them in a way that would lend support to whatever it is that you DO believe.

Well, at least I've made one of your "clear and definitive statements," eh?

Sometimes, it's unavoidable....

I never claimed objectivity, so the point is moot. Striving for clarity in language utilization is not equivalent to a claim for objectivity.

Ah, so having an obvious bias is not to be construed as having anything to do with how the terms are defined, as long as the definition agrees with your bias? And this would produce meaningful and productive discourse, how?

Hmmm... Am I sensing opposition to "clear and definitive statements?" Of course it is an assumption. I would never suggest that it was something else. Nonetheless, I do not necessarily assume that Calvinists hijack word meanings with wrong intentions. However, the quality of intention does not excuse the act.

Equivocating because I uncovered your root purpose? I'm not shying away from clear and definitive statements, DD. You are.

I hardly see why this is necessary. In a Calvinistic conception of the imago dei, I think this is antithetical to an understanding of God's "absolute" sovereignty. If God is sovereign in the way in which Calvinists envision God, it would be impossible, on the basis of an anthropic definition of "choice," to even countenance the possibility that God can or does "choose." After all, if God could "choose" in the classical sense of the term, such would mean that God is in fact subservient to infinite contingency, and that this--not God in Godself--would be the sovereign power of the universe. Therefore, if one is going to speak of God "choosing" while at the same time maintaining the Calvinistic conception of divine sovereignty, one must necessarily and completely revise the definition of "choice" when applied to God. However, this redefinition will unavoidably move the conversation well beyond any potential consonance with the same term when applied to humans, so much so that it would be more advantageous to simply use different vocabulary altogether.

Now you're trying to shift the subject. We're not talking about God's Sovereignty, at least not in the way you are trying to define it here. We're talking about God's ability, and God's choices, which while they may be of an order of magnitude and motivation many levels higher than our own understanding and abilities, yet there are some analogs which hold, simply because God has chosen to reveal Himself to mankind through these concepts and principles that we can understand. He refers to Himself as making choices, and as possessing abilities. So there is congruity and analogy inherent in His revelation of Himself to us. Radical redefinition of words is not necessary.

Which is why I suggested that the concept not even be applied to God. It can potentially work within other theological frameworks, but definitely not within Calvinism.

Maybe you ought to think on that a while, and ask yourself, "why is that?" You can't work within the Calvinistic framework, because it destroys too many of your beliefs that you don't want to modify or abandon.

Instead of "paranoid" I would see myself as attempting to be linguistically cautious and responsible. Words are powerful vehicles of meaning, and it is often easy to communicate a world of meaning that is not necessarily intended while concomitantly destroying other realms of meaning, simply by the usage of one word and its corrolary assumed meanings. Moreover, the hegenomy of theological systems are often based upon the usage of various words (and their latent ideas) which become the "watchword and song" of said systems' adherents. THerefore, the only way in which to strike at the base of this conglomorate is to deconstruct and replace the words and meanings which shape and hold together the theological matrix.

In short, redefine the words so that it appears to make the Calvinist say things he is not actually saying. We've all seen that many times on these forums. Several posters, one of them a senior moderator, regularly engage is such sophistry to undermine Calvinism, because they can't refute the doctrines directly or on a level playing field, so they attempt to skew the field in their favor by redefining the terms, and passing their definitions off as the real McCoy, when it is not. Yes, words are powerful, which is why Calvinists are very careful to be consistent in our usage of terminology, and definitions of terms, not to be biased, but to eliminate bias.

Thank you for the assessment.

Sauce for the goose, as it were.....

 

[depthdeception]

It seems to me that those who express such concern over Calvinistic theology must believe that their God is NOT able to save whosoever He desires to save.

Again, I go back to what I have been saying. WHen you phrase the issue in this way, you are assuming--for all sides of the argument--that the salvation of an individual human being is somehow contingent upon the "ability" or even "choice" (or both) of God to save them. However, I would still argue that the questions must be moved back to more primal ones: Does salvation even have anything to do with God's ability and/or choice? And if so, what is the relationship of this ability and/or choice to the ability and/or choice of the human person?

The critique of the Calvinist position does not come because some feel that God is unable or unwilling to save some. Rather, some of these perspectives bring the critique because they feel that Calvinism assumes an entire array of propositions about God and God's relationship to salvation that may potentially not even be applicable--at least not directly--to the conversation.

. . . hence the question, "Is GOD ABLE to justify/save whosoever He chooses to justify/save?"

God is able to do that which God is able to do. Anything that God is not "able" to do is not based on a real "inability," but rather upon a mischaracterization of an act or property that is not properly applicable to God. Therefore, as "saving" is assumed to be proper to that which God does (and therefore, is necessarily able to do), the first part of the question would seem to go without saying. This is not to say necessarily that salvation is based upon God's ability, only that if God saves, then God must necessarily be able to save.

However, if one assumes that saving is relevant to the category of that which God is "able" to do, one then runs into a horrific dilemma when encountering the second part of the question. After all, if it is posited that God is fully able to save, then there in no prohibitive factor which mitigates against God saving all. Therefore, if one relegates the lack of salvation of some to God's choice, it must be logically concluded that God is fully able to save all, but for whatever reason chooses to only save some (and necessarily chooses, negatively, not to save others). In classical ethical systems, such behavior is morally reprehensible. Calvinists, of course, will suggest that God is not bound to act "morally" as God is the very ground of morality (so it is assumed). However, if God is the ground of morality, it would be logically assumed that God's behavior (as the source of moral law) would be consonant with the very moral law to which God is ascribed authorship.

Therefore, if one wishes to say that God is able to save all, yet chooses not to save some, it can only be concluded that God is in fact a fiend. This has nothing to do with "fairness." Plain and simple, God is the ethical dilinquent who stands on the shore while the man drowns in broad sight, all the way possessing the ability to rescue the man from his death. Ethically, it would be wrong for God to save the man for wrong reasons (i.e., hope of recompense, etc.). However, to not do anything at all is the most ethically reprehensible act that God could commit. While one may wish to give God a pass on this moral assessment, such a "pass" would only serve to completely evacuate morality of any significant force of meaning.

We really haven't seen many express their views. Why would that be?

Again, this is not meant to be rude, but I truly think the reason very many haven't responded is because the question is framed in such a way that unavoidably reaches the conclusion which you intend to champion.

 

[msortwell]

DD,

I would offer an alternate explanation. Most people that give credence to God's Word place a high value upon the meaning of words and understand that for verbal communication to actually be a means for communicating ideas, common meanings of words must be sustained. This is the approach they generally use when interpreting the Scriptures.

You have consistently been correct. This thread was designed for the exact purpose that you seem to have deduced. It was designed to show that when the generally accepted meanings of words are employed, a fatal offense attributed to Calvinistic theology (i.e., an able God leaving persons that He could save unsaved - and therefore destined for hell) is shared by many, and I suspect most, Christians.

That is why I believe so many non-Calvinists remain silent. They agree with the position, but it is just too Calvinistic to acknowledge.

Blessings,

Mike

 

[lilmissmontana]

nd after all when all is said and done "If God be for us then who can be against us." God does not think like us. Truly we need to let go and let God. He tells us in scripture he will not let us down. Do we belive it or not? We know, also from scripture the truth prevails. If we are right then why are we worried about justification. Thank you. Belle

 

[depthdeception]

More likely, you are uncomfortable with the usual and generally accepted meanings of the terms, because of where they lead, so you want to re-write the terms and redefine them in such a way that you can manipulate them in a way that would lend support to whatever it is that you DO believe.

What do they say, "have lemons, make lemonade?" No, I am not wishing to redefine the terms simply for my own purposes. I am trying to arrive at a definition. "Redefining" assumes that an established definition is somehow being changed. However, as the terms we are using have yet to be defined in the scope of this discussion, I hardly see how I can be accused of "redefinition."

Equivocating because I uncovered your root purpose? I'm not shying away from clear and definitive statements, DD. You are.

My entire point is that perhaps you should shy away from "clear and definitive statements"...

Now you're trying to shift the subject. We're not talking about God's Sovereignty, at least not in the way you are trying to define it here. We're talking about God's ability, and God's choices, which while they may be of an order of magnitude and motivation many levels higher than our own understanding and abilities, yet there are some analogs which hold, simply because God has chosen to reveal Himself to mankind through these concepts and principles that we can understand. He refers to Himself as making choices, and as possessing abilities. So there is congruity and analogy inherent in His revelation of Himself to us. Radical redefinition of words is not necessary.

Actually, the question of God's sovereignty is extremely central to topic of God's ability and choices, for it is the catalyzing factor in explicating the relationship between God's ability and choices and that of humanity.

You say that there must be some analogs between God's choices and abilities and that of humanity. However, in Calvinism, it is absolutely impossible that this can be true. For instance, Calvinism's view of God's sovereignty makes the "choices" that God makes absolute and exclusively important in any consideration of human salvation. If this is true of God's choices, then there is no space in which an anagolous view of human "choice" can exist, for the exclusionary nature of the former precludes the very existence of the latter. Moreover, such a relationship is actually counterintuitive. This is true, for as you have said, what we understand of God's abilities and choices is in important ways mediated and shaped by our understanding of the nature of our own abilities and "choices." However, if God's ability and "choice" are exclusively important for salvaiton, then there is no basis of human ability or "choice" upon which the divine corrolary can be based or compared. As Calvinism's construal of God's sovereignty goes, humans are completely marked by an inability of power and choice in reference to salvation. Therefore, there is no bridge from the human to the divine upon which one might base an understanding of "ability" and "choice" that would be in any way anagolous to its human corrolary.

Furthermore, the same problem exists if one works backwards, attempting to define human "ability" and "choice" upon that of the divine. Again, a Calvinistic understanding of God's sovereignty leads one to the conclusion that humans are marked by inability in power and choice, a conclusion diametrically opposed to that which one assumes for the divine.

Therefore, the concept of sovereignty is completely central to the discussion and, as I have shown above, the Calvinistic conception of God's sovereignty precludes the possibility that one can speak of divine "ability" and "choice" in consonance with the "normal" meanings of the words. Per Calvinism's conception of God's sovereignty, one must either redefine these terms when speaking about God, or redefine them when speaking about humanity, for there is nothing analogous in the Calvinistic theological matrix about God's ability and choice and that of humanity. One would be deceptive to use the words synonymously.

Maybe you ought to think on that a while, and ask yourself, "why is that?" You can't work within the Calvinistic framework, because it destroys too many of your beliefs that you don't want to modify or abandon.

Yes, like reason...

In short, redefine the words so that it appears to make the Calvinist say things he is not actually saying. We've all seen that many times on these forums. Several posters, one of them a senior moderator, regularly engage is such sophistry to undermine Calvinism, because they can't refute the doctrines directly or on a level playing field, so they attempt to skew the field in their favor by redefining the terms, and passing their definitions off as the real McCoy, when it is not. Yes, words are powerful, which is why Calvinists are very careful to be consistent in our usage of terminology, and definitions of terms, not to be biased, but to eliminate bias.

As I have shown above, the redefinitions are necessary, based upon the Calvinistic conception of God's sovereignty. You do not like these conclusions, but they are linguistically necessary.


Sauce for the goose, as it were.....
[/QUOTE]

I think earlier you said, "And this would produce meaningful and productive discourse, how?"

Inconsistent, perhaps?

 

[nobdysfool]

Again, I go back to what I have been saying. WHen you phrase the issue in this way, you are assuming--for all sides of the argument--that the salvation of an individual human being is somehow contingent upon the "ability" or even "choice" (or both) of God to save them. However, I would still argue that the questions must be moved back to more primal ones: Does salvation even have anything to do with God's ability and/or choice? And if so, what is the relationship of this ability and/or choice to the ability and/or choice of the human person?

Actually the real root of all of this is whether or not man's willful rebellion in the Garden, which as the Word states, corrupted all men, is of such a nature that it renders man completely unable to save himself, and thereby makes him dependent on another for his salvation. Also, whether the corruption renders man uninterested in his own salvation, and by that corruption, has rendered himself, in Adam, incapable of turning and trusting in God's Salvation. Looking at it from God's side, it must be determined whether or not God's judgment for sin is such that if he chooses to do nothing in regard to saving any particular man, that He has committed a heinous moral act, as you put it.

There doesn't need to be any congruity between the ability of God, as God, to choose to save or not save, and the ability of man to choose to be saved or not be saved. They are not connected. The Word says salvation depends on God, not on man. Therefore, the red herring here is to bring up man's ability and power to choose salvation, as though it were of equal import and necessity with God's own revealed abilities and choices in that regard.

The critique of the Calvinist position does not come because some feel that God is unable or unwilling to save some. Rather, some of these perspectives bring the critique because they feel that Calvinism assumes an entire array of propositions about God and God's relationship to salvation that may potentially not even be applicable--at least not directly--to the conversation.

I disagree. Anyone who would truly study out the positions of Calvinism in this regard, and not swallow what other opponents of Calvinism say that Calvinism teaches, would realize that such reluctance is born of misunderstanding, not fact.

God is able to do that which God is able to do. Anything that God is not "able" to do is not based on a real "inability," but rather upon a mischaracterization of an act or property that is not properly applicable to God.

Those things which some say God "can't do" are really actions that would be inconsistent with the rest of His nature, hence He doesn't do them because He does not violate His own nature, rather than from any true inability.

Therefore, as "saving" is assumed to be proper to that which God does (and therefore, is necessarily able to do), the first part of the question would seem to go without saying. This is not to say necessarily that salvation is based upon God's ability, only that if God saves, then God must necessarily be able to save.

I think that's pretty much a "given", otherwise why are we even wasting time discussing it? We should all be able to agree that God saves, which implies ability to save in the very statement, if it is to be a true statement.

However, if one assumes that saving is relevant to the category of that which God is "able" to do, one then runs into a horrific dilemma when encountering the second part of the question. After all, if it is posited that God is fully able to save, then there in no prohibitive factor which mitigates against God saving all.

Faulty logic. Ability to save does not demand obligation to save, or necessity to save. There certainly is a mitigating factor: sin!

Therefore, if one relegates the lack of salvation of some to God's choice, it must be logically concluded that God is fully able to save all, but for whatever reason chooses to only save some (and necessarily chooses, negatively, not to save others). In classical ethical systems, such behavior is morally reprehensible.

If there were no mitigating factors, you might have a point. However, God's choice to save some does not rest within the confines of Justice, but of Mercy, which is able to be exercised because a legal transaction has taken place which mitigates the Just sentence for sin. Because of the Just sentence of God upon sin, all who are left in their natural state are not done an injustice, but rather receive perfect justice. There's nothing immoral about allowing a Just sentence to be carried out.

Calvinists, of course, will suggest that God is not bound to act "morally" as God is the very ground of morality (so it is assumed). However, if God is the ground of morality, it would be logically assumed that God's behavior (as the source of moral law) would be consonant with the very moral law to which God is ascribed authorship.

Actually no Calvinist would suggest what you have suggested. While it is true that God's Behavior, as the very definition of moral law, would be consistent with that law, where you err is in implying that the saving of all men is the requirement, the only logical way to satisfy the application of that moral standard. That completely ignores the responsibility of man with regard to sin, and the breaking of God's Law.

Therefore, if one wishes to say that God is able to save all, yet chooses not to save some, it can only be concluded that God is in fact a fiend. This has nothing to do with "fairness." Plain and simple, God is the ethical dilinquent who stands on the shore while the man drowns in broad sight, all the way possessing the ability to rescue the man from his death.

Again, ability does not demand all-emcompassing action. You are making a false moral dilemna out this.

Ethically, it would be wrong for God to save the man for wrong reasons (i.e., hope of recompense, etc.). However, to not do anything at all is the most ethically reprehensible act that God could commit. While one may wish to give God a pass on this moral assessment, such a "pass" would only serve to completely evacuate morality of any significant force of meaning.

Again, you set up a false moral dilemna. In order for your scenario to be true, man must be completely innocent of any moral lapse toward God, and man's inability to save himself must arise from an inherent quality created in man by God from the beginning, with no mitigating factor of the Fall, or of sin.

That is not the case. Man is guilty before God, and God is not obligated to save any man, because all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God. There is none righteous; no, not one. For God to not save any man is not a morally reprehensible act, but rather a Just act, because all men deserve hell, they deserve reprobation, because they have sinned and are sinners by nature. If God saves any, it is by Mercy and Grace, which are only and always granted by God, and find their source in God.

Again, this is not meant to be rude, but I truly think the reason very many haven't responded is because the question is framed in such a way that unavoidably reaches the conclusion which you intend to champion.

Yes, many don't like where such questions lead, because they serve to strip man of his pride and his confidence in himself (free will, etc.) and show that Salvation is of the Lord, from beginning to end.

 

[depthdeception]

Actually the real root of all of this is whether or not man's willful rebellion in the Garden, which as the Word states, corrupted all men, is of such a nature that it renders man completely unable to save himself, and thereby makes him dependent on another for his salvation. Also, whether the corruption renders man uninterested in his own salvation, and by that corruption, has rendered himself, in Adam, incapable of turning and trusting in God's Salvation. Looking at it from God's side, it must be determined whether or not God's judgment for sin is such that if he chooses to do nothing in regard to saving any particular man, that He has committed a heinous moral act, as you put it.

From a purely ethical perspective, the circumstances of the "drowning" man do not dictate whether or not the drowning person should be saved or not. It would be equally heinous to allow a murderer to drown as it would be to allow a "just" person to drown.

There doesn't need to be any congruity between the ability of God, as God, to choose to save or not save, and the ability of man to choose to be saved or not be saved. They are not connected.

This is not what you said in your last post, and I quote:

We're talking about God's ability, and God's choices, which while they may be of an order of magnitude and motivation many levels higher than our own understanding and abilities, yet there are some analogs which hold, simply because God has chosen to reveal Himself to mankind through these concepts and principles that we can understand. He refers to Himself as making choices, and as possessing abilities. So there is congruity and analogy inherent in His revelation of Himself to us.

Now I realize you out will be that earlier you were talking about general ideas, and here you are talking about specifics, i.e., the role of God's ability and choice in salvation. However, if you point about the necessity of analogy is to stand, then it must apply also in salvation. After all, if the way we understand God's "ability" and "choice" is in some ways analogous to human "ability" and "choice," then it would not be proper to suddenly redefine "ability" and "choice" in reference to God in the realm of soteriology. And if one does, then one is either devoiding the concepts of "ability" and "choice" of any reasonable correlation betweent the divine and human, or one is being inconsistent in application. So which is it? If God's "ability" and "choice" are in some way analogous, then one cannot maintain the Calvinistic definitions. ANd if they are analogous in any reasonable way, then one must necessarily use a different array of meanings when talking about the divine than when one speaks of the human. If this is so, then you have conceeded the point which I have been making all along.

The Word says salvation depends on God, not on man. Therefore, the red herring here is to bring up man's ability and power to choose salvation, as though it were of equal import and necessity with God's own revealed abilities and choices in that regard.

You are making a false assumption that I have suggested that human and divine choice and ability must share "equally" in the process of salvation.

Those things which some say God "can't do" are really actions that would be inconsistent with the rest of His nature, hence He doesn't do them because He does not violate His own nature, rather than from any true inability.

No, they are a true "inability." One can only do that which belongs to one's nature, and this is true of God as well as of humans.

Faulty logic. Ability to save does not demand obligation to save, or necessity to save. There certainly is a mitigating factor: sin!

In the quote to which you are responding, I did not say that there was a necessity, only that any obstructions to saving all is removed. Sin does not prevent God from saving anyone. Sin merely prevents humans from being reconciled to God. THe problem is with humanity, not God. God does not have to be induced to save anyone--to save is the nature of God's divine nature.

If there were no mitigating factors, you might have a point. However, God's choice to save some does not rest within the confines of Justice, but of Mercy, which is able to be exercised because a legal transaction has taken place which mitigates the Just sentence for sin.

Explain to me how this choice--which you suggest is possible because a "legal transaction" has taken place--does not "rest within the confines of Justice. If mercy is only possible because a legal transaction has taken place, then Justice is the "arena" in which God's choice occurs!

Because of the Just sentence of God upon sin, all who are left in their natural state are not done an injustice, but rather receive perfect justice. There's nothing immoral about allowing a Just sentence to be carried out.

This is only true if one can show that humanity being left to die in its sin is actually a "just sentence" being carried out. As the Scriptures reveal that God's justice is ultimately restorative, I hardly see that your assertion is accurate.

Actually no Calvinist would suggest what you have suggested. While it is true that God's Behavior, as the very definition of moral law, would be consistent with that law, where you err is in implying that the saving of all men is the requirement, the only logical way to satisfy the application of that moral standard.

No, the moral standard allows that one can still function entirely ethically if one chooses not to be saved. No one would condemn the rescurer for failing to save a drowning man who deliberately resisted rescue. As humanity's sin is characterized by "rebellion" (resistance to God's salvific intentions), it is entirely possible to speak of a God who pursues all of humanity with the intention of saving all, while concomitantly affirming that many will not be saved. However, the failure of salvation occurs not because of God's inability, but rather because of a resistance to be saved.

That completely ignores the responsibility of man with regard to sin, and the breaking of God's Law.

If salvation has nothing to do at all with humanity's ability and choice, then one has effectively removed the concept of "reponsibility" as being of any moral force.

Again, ability does not demand all-emcompassing action. You are making a false moral dilemna out this.

It is true that God is not constrained to save all. However, the nature of God's grace an mercy is such that God desires to save all. THefefore, on the basis of GOd's charcter, it is necessary that God's mercy and act of grace in Christ be considered an cosmos-encompassing act.

Again, you set up a false moral dilemna. In order for your scenario to be true, man must be completely innocent of any moral lapse toward God, and man's inability to save himself must arise from an inherent quality created in man by God from the beginning, with no mitigating factor of the Fall, or of sin.

No, again the ethical force of mercy and grace is that the saving act is not directed towards individuals of a certain moral character. Rather, the act is done towards the sinner and saint alike because such is the nature of mercy and grace. The same force of grace would be present in Christ even if the Fall had never occured.

That is not the case. Man is guilty before God, and God is not obligated to save any man, because all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God. There is none righteous; no, not one. For God to not save any man is not a morally reprehensible act, but rather a Just act, because all men deserve hell, they deserve reprobation, because they have sinned and are sinners by nature.

But hell, death, etc. are all natural consequences of being separated from God. They occur because relationship is severed and humans are cut off from the life-giving power of God. How, then, is this passive consequentialism an "act" of justice? The point is that hell, death, etc. are not "acts" of justice at all. Therefore, the question must be raised as to what the "acts" of God's justice are.

If God saves any, it is by Mercy and Grace, which are only and always granted by God, and find their source in God.

True, but as God's grace and mercy are infinite and universal, it must be acknowledged that all of creation is the object of God's mercy and grace.

Yes, many don't like where such questions lead, because they serve to strip man of his pride and his confidence in himself (free will, etc.) and show that Salvation is of the Lord, from beginning to end.

I agree with the last statement entirely. However, this still does not have anything to do with who God chooses and does not choose to save.

 

[Reformationist]

Yes.
But let me clarify.
God is able to save "his arm is not too short". Yet he does not.

Okay. So, we all appear to agree (except maybe dd, not quite sure) that God has the "ability" to save whomsoever He chooses.

But that does not mean he does not initiate salvation to all.
"Christ drew all men to himself".

And in what manner does God "initiate salvation to all?"

And when men resist that - he opts not to save them.

Can I then conclude that you also espouse the opposite of this, i.e., when man does not resist God opts to save them?

God bless

 

[Reformationist]

I also found out through our other conversations that it is not the first time you claim confusion conerning various matters.
Tell me what is the context of James? Shifting shadows?

Ed

Forgive me. I've been out of the discussion for a few days. I don't quite understand either of these statements/questions. Can you clarify?

Thanks,
God bless

 

[stabalizer]

Well i haven't read all the post here but it sure seems to be getting complicated.

I think God's ability to save is reflected in the price He paid to absolve the debt of sin. He bought the whole field. He gave it all.

What about God's will;

It's God's will that ALL men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.

Jesus said, " I am the way, I am the truth, and I am life"

It's a personal invitation which is answered out of this question;

Who do you say that I am?

Sallvation is a gift. What you do with a gift is a choice.

It's my prayer that God might open your understanding to receive it.

 

[msortwell]

Well i haven't read all the post here but it sure seems to be getting complicated.

I think God's ability to save is reflected in the price He paid to absolve the debt of sin. He bought the whole field. He gave it all.

What about God's will;

It's God's will that ALL men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.

Jesus said, " I am the way, I am the truth, and I am life"

It's a personal invitation which is answered out of this question;

Who do you say that I am?

Sallvation is a gift. What you do with a gift is a choice.

It's my prayer that God might open your understanding to receive it.

It only appears complicated when people work hard to avoid answering the question in the original post.

It is important, when viewing God's plan for, and execution of, His redemptive plan to keep clear within our thoughts IF there are any limitations (stated or intimated in Scripture, upon God's ability to bring any particular man to redemption.

You have not voiced a position on the question posed. Is God able to save whosoever He intends to save, or is there an aspect of the salvation process that is beyond His capability?