Are we ever justified in believing p without sufficient evidence for p?

[Tinker Grey]

Very nice summary! Well done.

If memory serves, Plantinga opts for the term "warrant" instead of "justified" because he rejects the moral implications of the latter term. I believe he brings up Clifford's principle in that discussion in Warranted Christian Belief. At any rate, thank you for this observation.

Do you accept the idea of "properly basic"? I find it a blatant attempt to justify not having justify one's belief ala TAG/presup.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

You are conflating the specific category of appeal to false authority with the more general category of appeal to authority. The traditional definition of the appeal to authority fallacy is that it applies when the authority is speaking within that authority figure's field. One is fallacious in arguing something is correct simply because "X says so." no matter the level of expertise within or without X's field of expertise. If one is reduced to appealing to the authority of an expert in the field , it is reasonable to assume that one has no logical, well thought out, fact based argument to put forward and one's belief that Z is the case is simply based upon faith in an authority figure i.e. one is basing one's argument upon appealing to authority.

Let me appeal to authority on this and see if you will concede that I must therefore be right.


From logically fallacious.com

Appeal to Authority



argumentum ad verecundiam

(also known as: argument from authority, ipse dixit)

Description: Insisting that a claim is true simply because a valid authority or expert on the issue said it was true, without any other supporting evidence offered. Also see the appeal to false
authority.

From SoftSchools.com
Appeal to Authority Examples

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to authority is a common type of fallacy, or an argument based on unsound logic.


When writers or speakers use appeal to authority, they are claiming that something must be true because it is believed by someone who said to be an "authority" on the subject. Whether the person is actually an authority or not, the logic is unsound. Instead of presenting actual evidence, the argument just relies on the credibility of the "authority."


Examples of Appeal to Authority:


1. A commercial claims that a specific brand of cereal is the best way to start the day because athlete Michael Jordan says that it is what he eats every day for breakfast.


2. A book argues that global warming is not actually happening, and cites the research of one environmental scientist who has been studying climate change for several years.


3. Someone argues that drinking is morally wrong and cites a sermon from her pastor at church.


4. A little boy says that his friends should not go swimming in a river because his Mama said there were germs in the river.


5. A commercial claims that 3 out of 4 dentists would choose this particular brand of toothpaste for their own families to use.


6. My sister-in-law, who is a teacher, said that this school is not somewhere that I would want to send my children.​

I think we're talking past each other here. What I 'mean' by an expert "speaking" is that I'm assuming the expert in question isn't just blurting out a superficial answer on some random question or topic.

Anyway, thanks for the quote and the citation to your source. I appreciate it.

 

[public hermit]

I find it a blatant attempt to justify not having justify one's belief ala TAG/presup.

I understand why you say that.

I find the concept of "properly basic" beliefs to be compelling. I take it you are familiar with Plantinga's work. One thing he does is ask what we are to do with those who have considered the relevant, possible defeaters for belief in God, and yet still believe. That has been my experience. I feel fairly confident that I am familiar with many of the arguments against the existence of God, and yet I still believe. I'm not sure what to do with that. I know some would say I have shirked my epistemic responsibility, but is that right? If I consider the arguments and still believe, have I been irresponsible? That would be like me saying to an atheist, if you just did x, y, and z you would have faith. Well, I know many an atheist has done just that and still has not believed. I don't consider them as having shirked their doxastic responsibilities, or of not having the right kind of faith, etc. But, then again, I'm not one to argue that we can simply pull ourselves up by the bootstraps and believe just any old thing.

Is it a blatant attempt to justify not having to justify one's belief ala TAG/presup.? I don't think that would be a generous account. It's in a similar vein as arguing that atheists don't believe in God because they want to indulge in immoral behavior. Plantinga says at the outset that he wants to offer a model to defend religious (and Christian) belief. Religious belief is a reality. We could say that those who believe are epistemically irresponsible, or possibly have a cognitive defect. Ironically, Plantinga's employment of the sensus divinitatis implies that atheists are suffering a kind of cognitive malfunction, which I find to be an unfortunate addition to his argument. At any rate, all I think he is trying to do is give a model or an account to show how Christian belief can be warranted. As for myself, I take it as that, a possible account.

Belief or non-belief to the side, I do think we need some account of how we believe some things that we neither seek nor (possibly) need justification for. You and I have had this discussion before, so I have sense of where you will come down on this. We believe a good many things without justification. In particular, many of our beliefs related to memory and sense perception are accepted without justification. And that, despite the fact that we have had false memories and faulty sense perceptions. The foundationalist has to have a stopping point, and reliance on simple coherence isn't going to do the trick.

I won't go over intuitions such as math and logical principles that we somehow know to be true. You argue they are empirically grounded and I disagree. Are either one of us shirking our epistemic responsibility in holding our respective positions? I don't think so.

 

[Kaon]

.

 

[zippy2006]

That has been my experience. I feel fairly confident that I am familiar with many of the arguments against the existence of God, and yet I still believe. I'm not sure what to do with that.

A different, simpler way to address such a phenomenon is with William Rowe's "G.E. Moore Shift." He specifically applies the move to atheistic arguments in his chapter of The Problem of Evil. That said, I don't have large problems with properly basic beliefs, though I have never read Plantinga at length. Of course the sensus divinitatis would never be accepted by atheists.

 

[Tinker Grey]

I understand why you say that.

I'm at work right now and have plans this evening. I think your post is worthy of better than a one liner. If I haven't responded in a day (say, tomorrow evening US-CST), please feel free to send me a PM.

 

[public hermit]

A different, simpler way to address such a phenomenon is with William Rowe's "G.E. Moore Shift." He specifically applies the move to atheistic arguments in his chapter of The Problem of Evil.

I have always been a fan of Moore, not only because I am confident that this is a hand (as I wildly shake my right hand in the air). I wasn't familiar with Rowe's "G.E. Moore Shift" as it is nicely laid out in the IEP article you linked. Good stuff. I have always appreciated Rowe's "friendly atheism." Regardless of the fact that Rowe was an atheist, I have great respect for him and believe we lost a very talented philosopher when he died in 2015. Now, if we can just get more Christians and Atheists on CF to catch on to the Principle of Charity.

Principle of charity - Wikipedia

Of course the sensus divinitatis would never be accepted by atheists.

When I first read Plantinga's WCB, and came across his employment of the sensus divinitatis, I thought, "Why is he doing that? If anyone opposed to Christian belief has been with him up to this point, they've bailed by now." However, it's important to keep in mind that he is not trying to make a truth claim. He emphasizes this over and over. He is simply trying to give a model or an account as one possible explanation for the warrant of Christian belief. The model doesn't have to be true, it only has to offer a reasonable explanation. Going back to Rowe, unless someone reads Plantinga with the principle of charity, I doubt they are going to accept his model as reasonable or having any explanatory value.

Or, think about Plantinga's "free will" defense in regards to the logical problem of evil. I heard this account in college so it may be apocryphal, but when Jerry Walls was at Asbury Seminary (think Why I'm not a Calvinist) he criticized Plantinga's free will defense on the grounds that Plantinga is Reformed and (presumably) doesn't believe in free will. Plantinga responded that his purpose was not to argue for free will, but to come up with an argument that would function as a defeater for the logical problem of evil. Whether he believed in free will or not was beside the point.

I think his employment of the sensus should be read in a similar vein, whether it is true or not is beside the point. Does his model offer a satisfactory account of warranted Christian belief, if it were true? Some will complain that's not how models work. But, when it comes to God and belief in God (or lack thereof), no one knows the truth, in the strictest sense of "knows." So, in this instance that is exactly how models work. Presumably, an atheist who presents her model will be given the same allowance. Can she prove the non-existence of God? No. Does her model offer warrant for atheistic non-belief, if it were true? Possibly.

See, philosophy is fun!

 

[zippy2006]

I have always been a fan of Moore, not only because I am confident that this is a hand (as I wildly shake my right hand in the air). I wasn't familiar with Rowe's "G.E. Moore Shift" as it is nicely laid out in the IEP article you linked. Good stuff. I have always appreciated Rowe's "friendly atheism." Regardless of the fact that Rowe was an atheist, I have great respect for him and believe we lost a very talented philosopher when he died in 2015. Now, if we can just get more Christians and Atheists on CF to catch on to the Principle of Charity.

Principle of charity - Wikipedia

I like Moore and Rowe, too. The principle of charity would certainly be a welcome addition to discourse.

When I first read Plantinga's WCB, and came across his employment of the sensus divinitatis, I thought, "Why is he doing that? If anyone opposed to Christian belief has been with him up to this point, they've bailed by now." However, it's important to keep in mind that he is not trying to make a truth claim. He emphasizes this over and over. He is simply trying to give a model or an account as one possible explanation for the warrant of Christian belief. The model doesn't have to be true, it only has to offer a reasonable explanation. Going back to Rowe, unless someone reads Plantinga with the principle of charity, I doubt they are going to accept his model as reasonable or having any explanatory value.

Or, think about Plantinga's "free will" defense in regards to the logical problem of evil. I heard this account in college so it may be apocryphal, but when Jerry Walls was at Asbury Seminary (think Why I'm not a Calvinist) he criticized Plantinga's free will defense on the grounds that Plantinga is Reformed and (presumably) doesn't believe in free will. Plantinga responded that his purpose was not to argue for free will, but to come up with an argument that would function as a defeater for the logical problem of evil. Whether he believed in free will or not was beside the point.

I think his employment of the sensus should be read in a similar vein, whether it is true or not is beside the point. Does his model offer a satisfactory account of warranted Christian belief, if it were true? Some will complain that's not how models work. But, when it comes to God and belief in God (or lack thereof), no one knows the truth, in the strictest sense of "knows." So, in this instance that is exactly how models work. Presumably, an atheist who presents her model will be given the same allowance. Can she prove the non-existence of God? No. Does her model offer warrant for atheistic non-belief, if it were true? Possibly.

See, philosophy is fun!

I tend to think that something like the sensus divinitatis does exist, but it doesn't seem to be a tool that is able to mediate dialogue between believers and nonbelievers. Unless I misunderstand, the sensus divinitatis presupposes God's existence and also offers a kind of unmediated knowledge of God. If someone rejects God's existence they will also reject the sensus divinitatis.

What is your opinion? It seems to me that Reformed apologetics are largely defensive in that they attempt to rationally justify the believer's position without making a rational critique of the nonbeliever's position. It seems somewhat fideistic in that reason follows upon faith and that religious disputes cannot be adjudicated by reason apart from a grounding in faith.

 

[public hermit]

What is your opinion? It seems to me that Reformed apologetics are largely defensive in that they attempt to rationally justify the believer's position without making a rational critique of the nonbeliever's position. It seems somewhat fideistic in that reason follows upon faith and that religious disputes cannot be adjudicated by reason apart from a grounding in faith.

My familiarity is only with some aspects of Reformed epistemology, and from what I am familiar with I believe you're right. It is along the lines of Anselm's credo ut intelligam. That being said, Plantinga's Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism is not only a defense of Christian belief and its compatibility with science, but a clear critique of the compatibility of naturalism and science. Is that considered Reformed apologetics? I really don't know.

Credo ut intelligam - Wikipedia
https://www.amazon.com/Where-Conflict-Really-Lies-Naturalism/dp/0199812098

 

[NBB]

If we needed sufficient evidence to become christians and believe, then the number of believers would be a lot smaller. But this does not mean you cannot get evidence especially after believing.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Do you accept the idea of "properly basic"? I find it a blatant attempt to justify not having justify one's belief ala TAG/presup.

Personally, I don't accept the idea. But then again, I don't accept the idea that the whole process of "justification"--- of any epistemological sort --- is as easy as some folks like to make it out to be, either, especially where religion is concerned.

 

[KCfromNC]

I understand why you say that.

I find the concept of "properly basic" beliefs to be compelling. I take it you are familiar with Plantinga's work. One thing he does is ask what we are to do with those who have considered the relevant, possible defeaters for belief in God, and yet still believe.

Same thing Christians do for people who have a "properly basic" belief in Allah, Buddhism, or crystal healing.

 

[KCfromNC]

Of course the sensus divinitatis would never be accepted by atheists.

Why not? atheists accept lots of things. What's different about this particular assertion that makes it totally unacceptable to non-believers?

 

[public hermit]

Same thing Christians do for people who have a "properly basic" belief in Allah, Buddhism, or crystal healing.

And what do all Christians do in those instances? What do I do?

 

[zippy2006]

My familiarity is only with some aspects of Reformed epistemology, and from what I am familiar with I believe you're right. It is along the lines of Anselm's credo ut intelligam. That being said, Plantinga's Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism is not only a defense of Christian belief and its compatibility with science, but a clear critique of the compatibility of naturalism and science. Is that considered Reformed apologetics? I really don't know.

Credo ut intelligam - Wikipedia
https://www.amazon.com/Where-Conflict-Really-Lies-Naturalism/dp/0199812098

Thanks, that makes sense. That book is certainly an exception to the kind of methodology I am familiar with. I'll have to keep the title in mind.

 

[muichimotsu]

If we needed sufficient evidence to become christians and believe, then the number of believers would be a lot smaller. But this does not mean you cannot get evidence especially after believing.

Sufficient evidence is arguably based on a weaker epistemological standard or relative to that versus something more like conclusive evidence (not absolute evidence, but something more solid and justified by a rigorous epistemology

 

[muichimotsu]

Personally, I don't accept the idea. But then again, I don't accept the idea that the whole process of "justification"--- of any epistemological sort --- is as easy as some folks like to make it out to be, either, especially where religion is concerned.

Obviously, it would require a more thorough epistemological standard, though there's always the existential route which gets into prickly territory of fideism, etc. If that becomes the standard, it seems like you could justify anything based on that, since the sufficient evidence of the experience is all you require in regards to taking the leap of faith, etc.

 

[KCfromNC]

And what do all Christians do in those instances? What do I do?

Well, if it were me I'd realize that a process which led to people being warranted in believing mutually contradictory things about reality might be less that useful when put into practice.

I can't hope to speak for all Christians, though. Do any of them have a way to sort out this particular issue?

 

[public hermit]

Do any of them have a way to sort out this particular issue?

I don't know. I try to approach all people's positions, whether they be religious or not, with humility. You may disagree, but I don't think one belief (or non-belief) is obvious and the rest obviously mistaken. I think belief or non-belief is a risk we all must take, simply because we don't have enough information to be certain beyond a shadow of a doubt. Add to that, I don't think we can just change our minds on these kinds of things on a whim. It is a human predicament, and I try to respect that across the board.

 

[durangodawood]

....I tend to think that something like the sensus divinitatis does exist....

Same here. But I dont agree that what it senses is necessarily the biblical God. It could just as well be the awakening of a dormant aspect of our own minds as far as I can tell.