Are we ever justified in believing p without sufficient evidence for p?

[public hermit]

That's all rather rambling and I apologise for any lack of clarity, but I hope it addresses your questions adequately.

It does. I appreciate you willingness to expand. I'm fascinated and will give these thoughts more consideration.

 

[zippy2006]

Secondly, by choosing a belief on increases the danger that one will hold that belief regardless of changing circumstances and evidence.

My questions would be similar to Public Hermit's. You say that you only hold hypotheses rather than beliefs, and that you accept propositions provisionally rather than believe them.

But why can't tentative beliefs exist? And what is the difference between a tentative belief and something accepted provisionally? PH's question about the practical, non-technical sense of 'belief' is also relevant, but since he already raised it I won't be redundant.

With this approach the sufficiency of evidence is objective, since the evidence is not used to confirm that the explanation is the explanation, but rather to determine if it is currently the best explanation.

Regarding the topic of the OP, I'm not sure provisional acceptance solves the problem of subjective sufficiency of evidence. Clifford believes belief requires sufficient evidence. You believe inference to the best explanation requires (sufficient) evidence. I don't see why the approach of inference to the best explanation or the subjective disposition of provisionality would solve the subjective/objective problem of the sufficiency of evidence. In each case the conclusion in question requires evidence, and presumably sufficient evidence, and thus the problem of "How much and what kind?" of evidence inevitably comes up.

And finally I come to a more foundational problem. Your approach is a form of probabilism (which relates to ancient skepticism, as PH pointed out). But probabilism cannot totally dispense with what you call "beliefs," for it requires firm premises and these are a kind of belief. This is because in order to form a probabilistic estimate one must have firm beliefs about the underlying processes, even if they are very deep. For example, an actuarian deals almost exclusively in probabilities, and yet if she did not believe certain foundational mathematical premises (such as the basic facts of addition, subtraction, multiplication, etc.) then she could in no way arrive at a firm probability at the higher level at which she works. In other words, probabilities need to be determined by something.

 

[public hermit]

Just because something is inescapable does not mean it is not fallacious.

I am wondering about this statement. I don't think the informal fallacy (appeal to authority) applies to simply trusting the expert. I think it pertains to arguing something is true solely on account of an expert opinion. It's the sole appeal to authority that makes it fallacious. But, maybe simply trusting authority for the sake of their claim to authority is a problem as well? I can't get my mind clear on it, yet.

 

[Petros2015]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”
Do you agree? Why or why not?
Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?
2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?
3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?
4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

Well, once you start holding a belief based on insufficient evidence, further evidence you gather (or are presented with and choose to accept as valid) will be subject to confirmation bias. Evidence to the contrary will be likely be discarded, incorrectly by the same bias.

Theoretically, if the belief is true, practically all evidence will point towards it and there will be very little contradictory evidence. Unless of course there is a massive conspiracy theory or deliberate deception involved. Self deception seems to be an option as well, speaking from personal experience.

>>Should one always believe what is true?

I would highly recommend it, if you think you have a honest Creator
And especially if you think He's the Creator of honesty Himself.

 

[public hermit]

Well, once you start holding a belief based on insufficient evidence, further evidence you gather (or are presented with and choose to accept as valid) will be subject to confirmation bias. Evidence to the contrary will be likely be discarded, incorrectly by the same bias.

This seems to me intuitively correct. The problem I keep coming up against is how one is to know if one's evidence gathering has been sufficient? I think in the sciences you have the benefit of consensus. Without significant intersubjective agreement, two scientists could come to different conclusions regarding the same evidence. In some cases (not all) it seems that significant intersubjective agreement helps to ensure the consensus that the evidence supports X. All that being said, who is not subject to the possibility of confirmation bias? Whole groups are not immune to the possibility.

There is currently a replication crisis in both psychology and sociology, which I would say is relevant to this discussion of how we determine whether or not we have sufficient evidence. Our intuitions about sufficient evidence, and avoiding biases, can be hard to pin down in practice.

Psychology’s Replication Crisis - Areo
Beyond the 'replication crisis,' does research face an 'inference crisis'? Researchers test expert inferences against known data, find inconsistency

 

[grasping the after wind]

I am wondering about this statement. I don't think the informal fallacy (appeal to authority) applies to simply trusting the expert. I think it pertains to arguing something is true solely on account of an expert opinion. It's the sole appeal to authority that makes it fallacious. But, maybe simply trusting authority for the sake of their claim to authority is a problem as well? I can't get my mind clear on it, yet.

An expert in any field can believe something fallacious as easily as a non expert. As a matter of fact an expert can , just as a non expert, simply believe something because someone else who is considered an expert says it is so. From what I have seen, there are those considered experts that will trust other experts on faith in those other expert's expertise alone. So if one has two experts that say something is so one does not know if either has actually been convinced by hard evidence. They may both have been told by someone they trust as an expert that something is so. The peer review, done correctly, is the best way to check a physical science expert's work. When it comes to expertise in other fields for example political philosophy, religion, educational theory , social sciences in general, ,there is much less of a check to purely faith based belief as refutation is much harder to achieve than in the physical sciences.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

An expert in any field can believe something fallacious as easily as a non expert. As a matter of fact an expert can , just as a non expert, simply believe something because someone else who is considered an expert says it is so. From what I have seen, there are those considered experts that will trust other experts on faith in those other expert's expertise alone. So if one has two experts that say something is so one does not know if either has actually been convinced by hard evidence. They may both have been told by someone they trust as an expert that something is so. The peer review, done correctly, is the best way to check a physical science expert's work. When it comes to expertise in other fields for example political philosophy, religion, educational theory , social sciences in general, ,there is much less of a check to purely faith based belief as refutation is much harder to achieve than in the physical sciences.

The fallacy of appealing to an authority is only a fallacy, more or less, when a plebeian (like me) attempts to buttress his own statements with an authority who speaks outside of her own field of expertise.

 

[grasping the after wind]

The fallacy of appealing to an authority is only a fallacy, more or less, when a plebeian (like me) attempts to buttress his own statements with an authority who speaks outside of her own field of expertise.

You are conflating the specific category of appeal to false authority with the more general category of appeal to authority. The traditional definition of the appeal to authority fallacy is that it applies when the authority is speaking within that authority figure's field. One is fallacious in arguing something is correct simply because "X says so." no matter the level of expertise within or without X's field of expertise. If one is reduced to appealing to the authority of an expert in the field , it is reasonable to assume that one has no logical, well thought out, fact based argument to put forward and one's belief that Z is the case is simply based upon faith in an authority figure i.e. one is basing one's argument upon appealing to authority.

Let me appeal to authority on this and see if you will concede that I must therefore be right.


From logically fallacious.com

Appeal to Authority



argumentum ad verecundiam

(also known as: argument from authority, ipse dixit)

Description: Insisting that a claim is true simply because a valid authority or expert on the issue said it was true, without any other supporting evidence offered. Also see the appeal to false
authority.

From SoftSchools.com
Appeal to Authority Examples

Appeal to Authority

Appeal to authority is a common type of fallacy, or an argument based on unsound logic.


When writers or speakers use appeal to authority, they are claiming that something must be true because it is believed by someone who said to be an "authority" on the subject. Whether the person is actually an authority or not, the logic is unsound. Instead of presenting actual evidence, the argument just relies on the credibility of the "authority."


Examples of Appeal to Authority:


1. A commercial claims that a specific brand of cereal is the best way to start the day because athlete Michael Jordan says that it is what he eats every day for breakfast.


2. A book argues that global warming is not actually happening, and cites the research of one environmental scientist who has been studying climate change for several years.


3. Someone argues that drinking is morally wrong and cites a sermon from her pastor at church.


4. A little boy says that his friends should not go swimming in a river because his Mama said there were germs in the river.


5. A commercial claims that 3 out of 4 dentists would choose this particular brand of toothpaste for their own families to use.


6. My sister-in-law, who is a teacher, said that this school is not somewhere that I would want to send my children.​

 

[Dave Ellis]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Do you agree? Why or why not?

Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?
2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?
3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?
4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

The Ethics of Belief (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia

Note: Let p in the title stand for any proposition one might believe.

By definition if you don't have the evidence to justify belief, then you are unjustified in accepting that belief.

That doesn't mean that the idea you have is wrong, it means you need to do the work to gather more evidence. That way you can either confirm or deny the thing in question.

 

[grasping the after wind]

By definition if you don't have the evidence to justify belief, then you are unjustified in accepting that belief.

That doesn't mean that the idea you have is wrong, it means you need to do the work to gather more evidence. That way you can either confirm or deny the thing in question.

Or, as with a number of things, be a unable to do either.

 

[usexpat97]

Mathematics has the concept of an ansatz. Essentially, you reach a point where you "believe" in a particular outcome without sufficient evidence, then you use that to work toward a mathematical solution. If you are able to do so, then it's possible that your belief was right.

 

[grasping the after wind]

Mathematics has the concept of an ansatz. Essentially, you reach a point where you "believe" in a particular outcome without sufficient evidence, then you use that to work toward a mathematical solution. If you are able to do so, then it's possible that your belief was right.

One must first believe in mathematics on faith alone.

 

[public hermit]

Mathematics has the concept of an ansatz. Essentially, you reach a point where you "believe" in a particular outcome without sufficient evidence, then you use that to work toward a mathematical solution. If you are able to do so, then it's possible that your belief was right.

Thank you for sharing this. I had never heard of ansatz. But, it makes sense. How many great discoveries started with an intuition or an assumption? A good many, I would guess.

 

[durangodawood]

....When writers or speakers use appeal to authority, they are claiming that something must be true because it is believed by someone who said to be an "authority" on the subject. Whether the person is actually an authority or not, the logic is unsound. Instead of presenting actual evidence, the argument just relies on the credibility of the "authority."...

I dont think the typical appeal to authority is really a fallacy, because typically we dont reason from the authority-opinion to a necessary conclusion. Instead, authority is just invoked as one more piece of evidence, with value assigned based on reasonable criteria, like qualifications.

 

[Ana the Ist]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Do you agree? Why or why not?

Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?
2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?
3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?
4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

The Ethics of Belief (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia

Note: Let p in the title stand for any proposition one might believe.

I think it's more useful to say that people should require a reasonable amount of evidence relative to a claim.

If a police officer is blocking a road you're driving on at night...and tells you to take a detour because there is a car accident down the road out of sight....it's reasonable to believe that claim without much evidence at all. It's a fairly common occurrence...and the circumstances surrounding the claim are commonly associated with it.

If your friend were to stop by your house and tell you that he can magically levitate off the ground with nothing more than the power of his mind...that's going to require more evidence. Even if your friend has never lied to you, what he's claiming defies several things you already believe, and is not a claim anyone has ever provided evidence for.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Almost every if not every belief of any kind is taken with insufficient evidence in the opinion of others that do not believe it. There is nothing I can think of in the realm of belief that one can say has sufficient evidence to convince all. Most people will believe things based upon zero evidence if they trust the source that tells them a thing is so. For instance, how many people have actually seen evidence that shows them the speed of light in a vacuum is 299792458 meters per second? Where does one even find a vacuum where one can test that?

I agree that the overwhelming majority of us either don't know or don't understand the math behind that particular claim....and we are accepting it upon authority. You're right about that.

The methodology behind the evidence of a claim matters though. Let's imagine we have 3 historians....

1. One historian makes his claims about history based on an oral tradition, passed down as a set of stories, told from one person to another generation after generation.
2. The second historian is part of a literary tradition, an expert on a written set of stories, of which we have physical examples of various versions throughout history.
3. The third tries to piece together an explanation of past events, based upon physical evidence and written accounts, from various sources of varying reliability, taking into account individual motives and perspectives, to try an come up with an objective and unbiased accounting of the past.

Let's imagine now that all three speak of the same time and place about 1000 years ago...

Obviously, I can never really have direct evidence of what happened there in history. I wasn't there...I'm going to have to rely upon authority. I would say, because I know it's unlikely that stories will pass from one generation to the next unchanged, the first historian is the least reliable. The second is more reliable...and because I can see possible changes in the written stories over time, there's probably more I can understand about the past from the second historian.

However the third is by far the most reliable. He's comparing written accounts against physical evidence. He's weighing the perspective of one account against another. He's disregarding less reliable accounts in favor of more reliable sources. His methodology is more sound....because he considers more factors than either of the other two historians.

Methodology matters.

 

[grasping the after wind]

I agree that the overwhelming majority of us either don't know or don't understand the math behind that particular claim....and we are accepting it upon authority. You're right about that.

The methodology behind the evidence of a claim matters though. Let's imagine we have 3 historians....

1. One historian makes his claims about history based on an oral tradition, passed down as a set of stories, told from one person to another generation after generation.
2. The second historian is part of a literary tradition, an expert on a written set of stories, of which we have physical examples of various versions throughout history.
3. The third tries to piece together an explanation of past events, based upon physical evidence and written accounts, from various sources of varying reliability, taking into account individual motives and perspectives, to try an come up with an objective and unbiased accounting of the past.

Let's imagine now that all three speak of the same time and place about 1000 years ago...

Obviously, I can never really have direct evidence of what happened there in history. I wasn't there...I'm going to have to rely upon authority. I would say, because I know it's unlikely that stories will pass from one generation to the next unchanged, the first historian is the least reliable. The second is more reliable...and because I can see possible changes in the written stories over time, there's probably more I can understand about the past from the second historian.

However the third is by far the most reliable. He's comparing written accounts against physical evidence. He's weighing the perspective of one account against another. He's disregarding less reliable accounts in favor of more reliable sources. His methodology is more sound....because he considers more factors than either of the other two historians.

Methodology matters.

I agree. How meticulous and fully informed a person is in studying the evidence will most likely make that person more likely to come to the correct conclusions in historical as well as other research. The problem arises when someone or ones not at all meticulous or fully informed, or someone or ones with an agenda that causes them to be prone to confirmation bias, is the expert or group of experts that one places one's faith in. Who among us actually has taken the time to research how meticulous and fully informed those we rely on for information are or examine those we trust to give us information as to what might motivate them to find conclusions that fit their preconceived ideas? We tend to trust those that tell us the things we wanted to hear and consider them to be reliable because what they tell us seems to be right in our opinion.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I agree. How meticulous and fully informed a person is in studying the evidence will most likely make that person more likely to come to the correct conclusions in historical as well as other research. The problem arises when someone or ones not at all meticulous or fully informed, or someone or ones with an agenda that causes them to be prone to confirmation bias, is the expert or group of experts that one places one's faith in. Who among us actually has taken the time to research how meticulous and fully informed those we rely on for information are or examine those we trust to give us information as to what might motivate them to find conclusions that fit their preconceived ideas? We tend to trust those that tell us the things we wanted to hear and consider them to be reliable because what they tell us seems to be right in our opinion.

Yeah...I see what you're saying. I'm just trying to point out the reliability of certain methodologies over others. If you understand the logical principles behind basic arithmetic....it's not as if those logical principles are suddenly abandoned when we talk about the upper echelons of higher mathematics.

You may not understand higher mathematics....but it has a much higher degree of reliability because of the methodology.

 

[AvisG]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned Alvin Plantinga, William Alston and Reformed Epistemology. Plantinga is recognized by even secular philosophers as one of the giants of the past century, and Reformed Epistemology has caused a major upheaval within epistemology.

The idea is that a belief in the existence of God can be "properly basic," meaning it can be rational and justified (or "warranted," in Plantinga's terminology) without any evidence or argument. Just as we implicitly believe in the existence of the past and the existence of other minds, we may simply believe in the existence of God.

In Plantinga’s version of Reformed Epistemology, a belief in the existence of God counts as actual knowledge because it’s produced by the operation of a special cognitive faculty designed to generate true beliefs about God. Plantinga calls this faulty the sensus divinitatis, borrowing the term from Calvin but not meaning exactly the same thing. Plantinga adds the wrinkle that one's cognitive faculties must be functioning properly.

Plantinga goes beyond mere theistic belief. Just as the sensus divinitatis generates a belief in the existence of God in a basic way, he says, the operation of the Holy Spirit makes the great truths of the Gospel directly known to the believer in a basic way. Voila, Christian belief may be rational and justified in a properly basic way, without any evidence or argument at all.

If this sounds silly and superficial the way I've described it - believe me, it isn't. Plantinga is a major, major force in philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology has generated massive amounts of discussion and debate over a period of many years.

The fact a belief in the existence of God may be warranted without evidence and argument doesn’t mean the belief is necessarily true, of course. The Reformed Epistemologists acknowledge this. Their point is simply that theistic belief may be rational and justified in a basic way, without all the evidence and argument we typically require when forming beliefs.

To Plantinga's notion of the sensus divinitatis, Alston adds the possibility that theistic or specifically Christian belief may be warranted on the basis of a profound mystical experience. Such an experience, of course, is a species of exceptionally powerful "evidence," at least for the experiencer.

Along the same lines, virtually all of the great sages and mystics of all religions and traditions have said that the divine may be approached only through intuition, which is regarded as an avenue to higher truths than can be reached through rational, dualistic thinking. Along the lines of what Plantinga says, they stress that what is gained through intuition is actual knowledge of the higher truths. Intuition operates most effectively through silent communion. In this circumstance, it may be difficult to distinguish between intuition and revelation.

A Christian classic along these lines is THE CLOUD OF UNKNOWING by an unknown 14th century mystic. His technique is to allow a "cloud of forgetting" to close the rational, dualistic mind and to enter silently and contemplatively into the "cloud of unknowing" where God can be approached.

I have said numerous times that I believe a well-founded belief system is the product of experience, observation, study, reflection and intuition. My approach has been to allow the "evidentiary" portion - experience, observation, study and reflection - to take me as far as it can, and then allow intuition through prayer and communion to confirm or disaffirm the positions I've reached through rational analysis. I thus do regard intuition as providing the higher knowledge.

 

[public hermit]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned Alvin Plantinga, William Alston and Reformed Epistemology. Plantinga is recognized by even secular philosophers as one of the giants of the past century, and Reformed Epistemology has caused a major upheaval within epistemology.

The idea is that a belief in the existence of God can be "properly basic," meaning it can be rational and justified (or "warranted," in Plantinga's terminology) without any evidence or argument. Just as we implicitly believe in the existence of the past and the existence of other minds, we may simply believe in the existence of God.

In Plantinga’s version of Reformed Epistemology, a belief in the existence of God counts as actual knowledge because it’s produced by the operation of a special cognitive faculty designed to generate true beliefs about God. Plantinga calls this faulty the sensus divinitatis, borrowing the term from Calvin but not meaning exactly the same thing. Plantinga adds the wrinkle that one's cognitive faculties must be functioning properly.

Plantinga goes beyond mere theistic belief. Just as the sensus divinitatis generates a belief in the existence of God in a basic way, he says, the operation of the Holy Spirit makes the great truths of the Gospel directly known to the believer in a basic way. Voila, Christian belief may be rational and justified in a properly basic way, without any evidence or argument at all.

If this sounds silly and superficial the way I've described it - believe me, it isn't. Plantinga is a major, major force in philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology has generated massive amounts of discussion and debate over a period of many years.

The fact a belief in the existence of God may be warranted without evidence and argument doesn’t mean the belief is necessarily true, of course. The Reformed Epistemologists acknowledge this. Their point is simply that theistic belief may be rational and justified in a basic way, without all the evidence and argument we typically require when forming beliefs.

To Plantinga's notion of the sensus divinitatis, Alston adds the possibility that theistic or specifically Christian belief may be warranted on the basis of a profound mystical experience. Such an experience, of course, is a species of exceptionally powerful "evidence," at least for the experiencer.

Along the same lines, virtually all of the great sages and mystics of all religions and traditions have said that the divine may be approached only through intuition, which is regarded as an avenue to higher truths than can be reached through rational, dualistic thinking. Along the lines of what Plantinga says, they stress that what is gained through intuition is actual knowledge of the higher truths. Intuition operates most effectively through silent communion. In this circumstance, it may be difficult to distinguish between intuition and revelation.

A Christian classic along these lines is THE CLOUD OF UNKNOWING by an unknown 14th century mystic. His technique is to allow a "cloud of forgetting" to close the rational, dualistic mind and to enter silently and contemplatively into the "cloud of unknowing" where God can be approached.

I have said numerous times that I believe a well-founded belief system is the product of experience, observation, study, reflection and intuition. My approach has been to allow the "evidentiary" portion - experience, observation, study and reflection - to take me as far as it can, and then allow intuition through prayer and communion to confirm or disaffirm the positions I've reached through rational analysis. I thus do regard intuition as providing the higher knowledge.

Very nice summary! Well done.

If memory serves, Plantinga opts for the term "warrant" instead of "justified" because he rejects the moral implications of the latter term. I believe he brings up Clifford's principle in that discussion in Warranted Christian Belief. At any rate, thank you for this observation.