Are we ever justified in believing p without sufficient evidence for p?

[SkyWriting]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Then parenting wouldn't work. Fail.

 

[zippy2006]

I see what you're saying now, on both accounts. Are you referring to John Henry Newman? If so, I am not familiar. Any book recommendations?

Yeah. He wrote a book on this topic called An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, which I haven't yet finished. Apparently he also has a collection of sermons that deals with the topic, though I would have to dig up which ones they are. The book is something more like an approach to the psychology of belief than an epistemological project, but there are certainly overlaps into epistemology.

 

[public hermit]

Yeah. He wrote a book on this topic called An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, which I haven't yet finished. Apparently he also has a collection of sermons that deals with the topic, though I would have to dig up which ones they are. The book is something more like an approach to the psychology of belief than an epistemological project, but there are certainly overlaps into epistemology.

Sorry, I just realized that is who you quoted earlier. I found a copy. Oddly enough, I'm browsing through it and it doesn't look quite as befuddling as that one quote seemed to me. Thank you.

 

[keith99]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Do you agree? Why or why not?

Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?
2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?
3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?
4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

The Ethics of Belief (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia

Note: Let p in the title stand for any proposition one might believe.

Sufficient evidence is enough evidence for the believer to believe!

 

[Kylie]

Sufficient evidence is enough evidence for the believer to believe!

I would argue that what defines "sufficient evidence" she be determined beforehand. Otherwise it's just as simple as gathering evidence until you're convinced and then leave it at that.

For example, let's say I have the idea that every time I flip a coin it turns up heads. I can flip it five times and get heads every time. It's actually pretty common for that (or five tails) to happen. And I could do that, get the result I've figured is true, and then leave it there and say my idea is correct.

But if I said, "I will flip a coin one hundred times and record each result, and then see if the Heads result is similar (to within a reasonable margin of error) to the tails result," then that's a far better way to do it, because it means I can't just stop after getting a few heads in a row.

I mean, any idiot can score a bullseye if he paints the target around where the arrow hit.

 

[Clizby WampusCat]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Do you agree? Why or why not?

I would agree with this. I would also say that we cannot actually believe something without sufficient evidence. I don't think that is possible. We are convinced of something or not. How can we believe something that we are not convinced is true?

Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?

Sufficient evidence is subjective. When people say they believe something it is because they have become convinced by some evidence. That same evidence may not be sufficient for others. People have different standards for belief.

2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?

They have become convinced.

3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?

Yes, but not all beliefs require the same standard of evidence for belief. If my wife says she went to the grocery store today I would require no more evidence than that to believe her. If she said she was abducted by aliens, then more evidence would be required for belief.

4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

Can we know something is true with 100% confidence? I don't believe so. We don't actually 100% know if anything is true, but we can know with high confidence things are true with sufficient evidence and a high standard of evidence.

 

[public hermit]

Sufficient evidence is subjective. When people say they believe something it is because they have become convinced by some evidence. That same evidence may not be sufficient for others. People have different standards for belief.

Thank you for your thoughtful response. I have to say, I am surprised how many (more than one would have surprised me) on this thread have stated that sufficient evidence is subjective. And, that we know when we have reached sufficiency when we are convinced.

I think I understand why this is the case. What would an objective standard of "sufficient" be? Nonetheless, when I consider Clifford's principle, I assumed he meant that we should follow the evidence, and sufficiency would be achieved once all the evidence is in, so to speak. Which, again, raises the question of how one would know when all the evidence was in.

The reason I expected more objective approaches is because of the moral condition his principle entails. If I have a moral requirement to seek out the relevant evidence, then my moral obligation doesn't end simply when I become satisfied, but when the relevant evidence has been examined. At least, that was my first impression. But, the agreement among others that the condition of sufficiency is subjective has me wondering.

 

[Ophiolite]

the agreement among others that the condition of sufficiency is subjective has me wondering.

Let me muddy (?) the waters. I have made the following observation on multiple threads because it underpins my perception of and reaction to reality.

I don't believe anything, except in the colloquial sense. (I believe I shall have pizza for dinner.) Belief seems to me to be a form of self delusion, motivated by a compulsion to have no unanswered questions.
(That, by the way, is not itself a belief, but a hypothesis, or speculation to provisionally explain what seems to me peculiar and unjustified behaviour.)

So rather than believe anything, I accept certain things. I accept things as the best, current explanation for any suite of observations. Such acceptance is always provisional. In some cases there is no obvious, best explanation, in which case I accept that I don't know. For me, not currently knowing something, while disappointing, is not uncomfortable.

With this approach the sufficiency of evidence is objective, since the evidence is not used to confirm that the explanation is the explanation, but rather to determine if it is currently the best explanation.

In summary, my answer to the opening question is - We are never justified in believing anything*.

*This, of course, is a provisional explanation, subject to change upon the presentation of new evidence, or reinterpretation of existing evidence.

 

[grasping the after wind]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Do you agree? Why or why not?

Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?
2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?
3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?
4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

The Ethics of Belief (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia

Note: Let p in the title stand for any proposition one might believe.

Almost every if not every belief of any kind is taken with insufficient evidence in the opinion of others that do not believe it. There is nothing I can think of in the realm of belief that one can say has sufficient evidence to convince all. Most people will believe things based upon zero evidence if they trust the source that tells them a thing is so. For instance, how many people have actually seen evidence that shows them the speed of light in a vacuum is 299792458 meters per second? Where does one even find a vacuum where one can test that?

 

[public hermit]

So rather than believe anything, I accept certain things. I accept things as the best, current explanation for any suite of observations. Such acceptance is always provisional. In some cases there is no obvious, best explanation, in which case I accept that I don't know. For me, not currently knowing something, while disappointing, is not uncomfortable.

This is such an interesting position and I appreciate your willingness to share it again. It reminds me of Pyrrhonian skepticism, except instead of always withholding judgment (which seems near impossible) it is a constant series of acceptances, tentatively held. In fact, the willingness to accept a particular position tentatively as the best explanation seems to bypass the problem of being able to actually withhold judgment in all cases.

I am under the impression that many of our beliefs are held unconsciously, or without much reflection. I mean, who can go through the entire litany of what they believe to ensure that each one is properly grounded (accepted) on sufficient evidence? So, when you say you don't believe anything, but accept things as the best, current explanation are you referring only to those acceptances you have consciously considered, or to every possible "belief-like" attitude that you might hold? Aren't there (possibly) just some things you believe without refection?

Correct me if I am wrong, but this approach seems more like a skill that you have developed, instead of a propositional attitude (which is how some would describe a belief). On the other hand, if it is a propositional attitude, then why wouldn't this approach simply mean you believe things with a consciously chosen credence value of say, .7 or something? If beliefs come in degrees, then why not say you believe things, but refrain from asserting too much confidence?

With this approach the sufficiency of evidence is objective, since the evidence is not used to confirm that the explanation is the explanation, but rather to determine if it is currently the best explanation.

So it is objective in the sense that you are always open to further evidence?

In summary, my answer to the opening question is - We are never justified in believing anything*.

*This, of course, is a provisional explanation, subject to change upon the presentation of new evidence, or reinterpretation of existing evidence.

Nicely done. This is such a unique position, to me. How did you come upon this approach? Is there some reading you can direct me towards. Or, do you tentatively accept that it originated with you?

 

[public hermit]

Most people will believe things based upon zero evidence if they trust the source that tells them a thing is so. For instance, how many people have actually seen evidence that shows them the speed of light in a vacuum is 299792458 meters per second? Where does one even find a vacuum where one can test that?

This is a really good point. There is so much I believe is true because I accept what the experts say. It's simply not practical to ensure, through personal investigation, that all of my beliefs, even as concerns the sciences, are grounded in sufficient evidence. Appeal to authority is not always a fallacy. It's simply inescapable.

 

[Clizby WampusCat]

Thank you for your thoughtful response. I have to say, I am surprised how many (more than one would have surprised me) on this thread have stated that sufficient evidence is subjective. And, that we know when we have reached sufficiency when we are convinced.

I think I understand why this is the case. What would an objective standard of "sufficient" be? Nonetheless, when I consider Clifford's principle, I assumed he meant that we should follow the evidence, and sufficiency would be achieved once all the evidence is in, so to speak. Which, again, raises the question of how one would know when all the evidence was in.

I don't think that is possible. There always could be evidence we don't have access to.

The reason I expected more objective approaches is because of the moral condition his principle entails. If I have a moral requirement to seek out the relevant evidence, then my moral obligation doesn't end simply when I become satisfied, but when the relevant evidence has been examined. At least, that was my first impression. But, the agreement among others that the condition of sufficiency is subjective has me wondering.

This seems to be a problem with standards of evidence. People disagree on beliefs because their standards of evidence for belief are different. God is a good example, some think there is sufficient evidence for god and some don't because their standard to be convinced is different.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

In his landmark essay "The Ethics of Belief" William Clifford argued, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

Do you agree? Why or why not?

Questions to consider:
1. What constitutes sufficient evidence?
2. How does one know when one has acquired sufficient evidence?
3. Can all beliefs be based on evidence?
4. Should one always believe what is true? If so, does that violate the supposed is/ought distinction that Hume gifted us with?

The Ethics of Belief (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia

Note: Let p in the title stand for any proposition one might believe.

Clifford is/was wrong ... !

Man, it feels SO GOOD to be able to say that!

 

[public hermit]

Clifford is/was wrong ... !

Man, it feels SO GOOD to be able to say that!

I agree. His standard is too stringent. It's just not practical. But, I do believe I should always consider available evidence, especially when it goes against my current belief. Any possible defeater for a cherished belief should be seriously considered.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I agree. His standard is too stringent. It's just not practical. But, I do believe I should always consider available evidence, especially when it goes against my current belief. Any possible defeater for a cherished belief should be seriously considered.

True, but in stating that Clifford was incorrect, I was intending to imply that he was wrong for other reasons. Of course, we should all look at various relevant evidences widely and as diversely as we can when considering just about any important issue, but I think that different fields of human endeavor require the application of different epistemological structures with different accompanying expectations.

Otherwise, we'd spend all day having a laugh over the extent to which the inhabitants of the plain of Shinar "should" have applied measures of Quality Control to their building of their ancient Tower of Babel ...

 

[public hermit]

True, but in stating that Clifford was incorrect, I was intending to imply that he was wrong for other reasons. Of course, we should all look at various relevant evidences widely and as diversely as we can when considering just about any important issue, but I think that different fields of human endeavor require the application of different epistemological structures with different accompanying expectations.

Otherwise, we'd spend all day having a laugh over the extent to which the inhabitants of the plain of Shinar "should" have applied measures of Quality Control to their building of their ancient Tower of Babel ...

Right. Above, I gave the hypothetical example of a friend who I know well, and know to be trustworthy. He is accused of theft and the evidence is stacked against him. What is my moral obligation? If I stick with the evidence of the case, I should conclude he is guilty. But, my experience of his trustworthiness functions as a possible defeater. Don't I also have a moral obligation to conclude he is still trustworthy?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Right. Above, I gave the hypothetical example of a friend who I know well, and know to be trustworthy. He is accused of theft and the evidence is stacked against him. What is my moral obligation? If I stick with the evidence of the case, I should conclude he is guilty. But, my experience of his trustworthiness functions as a possible defeater. Don't I also have a moral obligation to conclude he is still trustworthy?

In the case of your friend, this will depend not only upon which combinations of epistemology and ontology are thought to be involved but also which Ethical frame will be chosen to evaluate your friend. Moreover, there's an ontological difference between, for instance:

a) Building a sea-worthy ship for passengers (as Clifford averred) [and I think we need to keep in mind that a ship is an inanimate object, even though we know the passengers who will board it will not be ...!]

b) Giving your friend the fullest opportunity to become morally exonerated by you, especially if he is alive now and considered to be a fellow human being rather than an inanimate object.

c) Proving that Jesus Christ is not only the Jewish Messiah, but also the Living, Resurrected Son of God (and in this 3rd case, we aren't epistemically handling either an inanimate object or a living, finite human being, but a Transcendental Person who is not measurable or controllable or testable, as far as I know, by us in clearly scientific ways). [By the way, did I mention I'm a Methodological Naturalist? ]​

These are all different kinds of epistemological projects, with different ontologies, and variable axiological considerations; yet we see the Skeptics insisting that these scenarios should be assessed in nearly identical ways (some of them would even say it all has to go through a frame of Evidentialism, structured via, and only through, Foundationalism, a premise to which I can but chuckle in response).

So, sure! There can be defeaters, but any defeater will have to be recognized as being essentially different in nature as we work to gain a sense of confidence and trust in the conclusions that may come out of our assessments for each of the three scenarios above.

In the case of the OP, what I'm getting at is that I'd say that some epistemic scenarios require the ethics Clifford asks for; BUT other scenarios, especially those scenarios involving a modern person's appropriation of Christianity, do not, or at least not in the same way.

I HAVE SPOKEN!!

(Just kidd'n on that last part! ..... I know there are other epistemic caveats that can apply to what I've stated thus far.)

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Right. Above, I gave the hypothetical example of a friend who I know well, and know to be trustworthy. He is accused of theft and the evidence is stacked against him. What is my moral obligation? If I stick with the evidence of the case, I should conclude he is guilty. But, my experience of his trustworthiness functions as a possible defeater. Don't I also have a moral obligation to conclude he is still trustworthy?

Sorry for my gibberish answer above. That's what happens when I try to write something and other family members insist on talking while I'm trying to articulate and write out my thoughts ...

Let's just say that 'theology' and 'philosophy' hold very little currency with others in my household.

 

[grasping the after wind]

This is a really good point. There is so much I believe is true because I accept what the experts say. It's simply not practical to ensure, through personal investigation, that all of my beliefs, even as concerns the sciences, are grounded in sufficient evidence. Appeal to authority is not always a fallacy. It's simply inescapable.

Just because something is inescapable does not mean it is not fallacious.

 

[Ophiolite]

In fact, the willingness to accept a particular position tentatively as the best explanation seems to bypass the problem of being able to actually withhold judgment in all cases.

No. In many instances there is no best explanation. In such cases judgement is withheld until enough evidence accumulates. My position is then "I don't know". In these case I am clear about my lack of clarity; certain of my uncertainty; and staunchly determined as to my indeterminate position.

So, when you say you don't believe anything, but accept things as the best, current explanation are referring only to those acceptances you have consciously considered, or to every possible "belief-like" attitude that you might hold? Aren't there (possibly) just some things you believe without refection?

An interesting question. I think (not believe, or accept) that my acceptance is, certainly now, automatic as it is a pragmatic choice.
For example, I have about fifteen large, mature trees flanking the driveway to my house. I am conscious that at some point one or more of these trees may fall across the driveway. (A large bough, some 10" in diameter, did fall at the end of last year.) One might say that it is my practice to believe all that one might reasonably believe about large old trees, strong winds and gravity. This is a practical position to take and minimises the risk that I shall be killed by a falling tree by moving down the drive. However, at the back of my mind is always the possibility that I am lying in a coma, experiencing a realistic dream, etc. Hence, I accept the physics of falling trees as the most likely explanation, but not more.

Correct me if I am wrong, but this approach seems more like a skill that you have developed, instead of a propositional attitude (which is how some would describe a belief). On the other hand, if it is a propositional attitude, then why wouldn't this approach simply mean you believe things with a consciously chosen credence value of say, .7 or something? If beliefs come in degrees, then why not say you believe things, but refrain from asserting too much confidence?

Why not? Because it strikes me as silly and precipitate. Off the top of my head I see two distinct negatives regarding beliefs.
Firstly, many people appear to attract beliefs like a woolen sweater attracts cat hairs in a kitten farm. Minimal discretion is applied to their selection. No systematic analysis is applied. The beliefs are often woolly, inconsistent and contradictory. That doesn't seem a sound basis for the elements of a personal philosophy.
Secondly, by choosing a belief on increases the danger that one will hold that belief regardless of changing circumstances and evidence.

So it is objective in the sense that you are always open to further evidence?

While that is true, the major objectivity lies in the fact that no concept is accepted (provisionally) until it emerges as a clear front runner.

Nicely done. This is such a unique position, to me. How did you come upon this approach? Is there some reading you can direct me towards. Or, do you tentatively accept that it originated with you?

I have not, to my recollection, seen or heard this idea espoused by others.
I don't keep a formal journal, but I know from random notes that many of my ideas precede my months, years, or even decades their everyday adoption. In the interim I quite forget about them. I suspect it first emerged here on CF in response to my perception of problems with the concept of belief. As I type that I do recall earlier partial expressions of the idea on other forums. Perhaps it has been present implicitly for some time, but interactions on this and other forums have pushed me to formalise and verbalise it.

That's all rather rambling and I apologise for any lack of clarity, but I hope it addresses your questions adequately.