Are we ever justified in believing p without sufficient evidence for p?

[variant]

So, the sufficiency of evidence is wholly subjective? I might have misunderstood what you mean. Do you mean so long as I am convinced of p, then I have sufficient evidence for p?

Evidence simply can't be wholly subjective, otherwise the mere fact that someone is convinced becomes evidence.

Since all observers are not equal, neither is their being convinced equal evidence.

The best evidence is going expand your power to accurately model and make predictions about what other observations you will likely observe in the future.

The problem with religious thought is that most religious propositions only allow for predictions that have no effect any likely observations.

 

[zippy2006]

Surely, there was an easier way for him to say this.

Help me understand. I take it he is saying that our certitude should be in proportion to the strength of an assemblage of convergent probabilities in relation the subject in question. So, the subject may not readily give certainty in a logical or scientific sense, but given this convergence of probabilities our subjective certitude is justified (relative to the circumstances we are under)?

Yes, I think that is what he is saying, lol. Certitude varies, and ought to vary, with different beliefs. So you need sufficient evidence for a certain level of certitude.

 

[public hermit]

Yes, I think that is what he is saying, lol. Certitude varies, and ought to vary, with different beliefs. So you need sufficient evidence for a certain level of certitude.

Well, that was easy.

 

[FireDragon76]

Everyone believes something that they can't substantiate, whether they want to admit it or not.

1) That's a sweeping generalization.

2) Even if true, that just means people tend to be unethical in holding to unjustifiable beliefs. Which isn't surprising. It doesn't justify your crazy beliefs.

 

[zippy2006]

Well, that was easy.

The only other thought I had on the OP is that Christian faith is not belief in a static object of knowledge per se. It is relational and dynamic, both because your belief terminates in a personal reality (God) and because you are "taking your stand" in a fundamental reality and way of being in and seeing the world. Everyday belief always requires a framework with which to reference the belief, but there is no framework that could properly encompass theism or God. For this reason faith in God seems to be more of an act and movement than commonplace belief, which is understood only as a kind of reaction or recognition. So it's not altogether clear to what extent Clifford's claim applies to something like Christian faith.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Everyone believes something that they can't substantiate, whether they want to admit it or not.

Apparently.

 

[public hermit]

Evidence simply can't be wholly subjective, otherwise the mere fact that someone is convinced becomes evidence.

I agree.

Since all observers are not equal, neither is their being convinced equal evidence.

This is why it helps to have a public element, or significant intersubjective agreement. It's not just that the best evidence can model and predict, but that a large number of observers agree (some predictions are theoretical, and some evidence looks backwards into history). Then, that consensus view becomes the standard for "sufficient evidence."

The best evidence is going expand your power to accurately model and make predictions about what other observations you will likely observe in the future.

The striking thing, to me, about Clifford's principle is it's moral aspect. I have a moral obligation to track down sufficient evidence for any and every belief I hold, whatsoever.

“It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

He's not referring only to beliefs that allow us to model and predict. There are some contexts where we just don't have time, but can only go on what we believe at that moment. In those cases I am believing and acting without time to gather "sufficient evidence." Unless we want to say that sufficient simply means "what I can gather." Am I responsible for evidence I don't have access to or was time constrained in gathering?

William James argued that sometimes the evidence points to more than one "live hypothesis" or live option. If I am obligated to act and there are more than one live option, I do so under the conditions of insufficient evidence due to the plural options not being resolved. Have I failed my duty?

Or think about relationships. I have a good friend who I've known for a long, long time. I have always known him to be trustworthy. He is accused of theft and the evidence is stacked against him. What is my moral obligation here? Stacks of evidence can be wrong. I have a defeater for that stack of evidence, and it is my history with my trustworthy friend.

Do I have to gather evidence on what I had for breakfast this morning? Can't I just remember it? Are sense impressions and memories sufficient evidence?

 

[public hermit]

The only other thought I had on the OP is that Christian faith is not belief in a static object of knowledge per se. It is relational and dynamic, both because your belief terminates in a personal reality (God) and because you are "taking your stand" in a fundamental reality and way of being in and seeing the world. Everyday belief always requires a framework with which to reference the belief, but there is no framework that could properly encompass theism or God. For this reason faith in God seems to be more of an act and movement than commonplace belief, which is understood only as a kind of reaction or recognition. So it's not altogether clear to what extent Clifford's claim applies to something like Christian faith.

What did Kant say? The noumenon is a limiting concept, beyond the bounds of our phenomenal understanding. It "limits the objective validity of sensible knowledge."

I think we all take this stand, and do so without sufficient (objective) evidence. Who doesn't have a fundamental way of being in and seeing the word? Who has sufficient evidence for the way they see and live in the world? I'm skeptical of any takers.

Noumenon - Wikipedia

 

[variant]

The striking thing, to me, about Clifford's principle is it's moral aspect. I have a moral obligation to track down sufficient evidence for any and every belief I hold, whatsoever.

I'm not sure I would promote it to a moral obligation. Or, rather, my moral obligations are what I find I want to DO with evidence. Sufficient evidence for knowledge often requires considerable resources, so I should be obligated only to track sufficient evidence down to justify the beliefs I feel important enough to share and champion. Or, that evidence that helps me most in whatever my aims are.

To those questions I feel are difficult to answer and also lacking in sufficient consequence, what would obligate me?

He's not referring only to beliefs that allow us to model and predict. There are some contexts where we just don't have time, but can only go on what we believe at that moment. In those cases I am believing and acting without time to gather "sufficient evidence." Unless we want to say that sufficient simply means "what I can gather." Am I responsible for evidence I don't have access to or was time constrained in gathering?

We are always modeling and predicting regardless, it's what brains do, it is a question of how well we do that.

This is again a question of using resources effectively. What helps me model what I need to model the most is the most important evidence I need for my purposes.

The rest of your questions seem to follow suit. You should actively seek evidence as justification of your beliefs, for the sake of having your beliefs serve to further your aims.

Morality is about what you do and why, not merely what you believe.

 

[variant]

What did Kant say? The noumenon is a limiting concept, beyond the bounds of our phenomenal understanding. It "limits the objective validity of sensible knowledge."

I think we all take this stand, and do so without sufficient (objective) evidence. Who doesn't have a fundamental way of being in and seeing the word? Who has sufficient evidence for the way they see and live in the world? I'm skeptical of any takers.

Noumenon - Wikipedia

An appeal to transcendence like Zippy and Kant make is the admission that we don't know something, not an excuse to believe whatever we desire.

 

[public hermit]

An appeal to transcendence like Zippy and Kant make is the admission that we don't know something, not an excuse to believe whatever we desire.

I agree. I don't believe whatever I desire. Do you?

 

[variant]

I agree. I don't believe whatever I desire. Do you?

No, but I think that is where that line of thought generally leads.

Why should the supposed transcendent nature of God lead us to believe that it is an exception to the rules we might propose for our other beliefs?

 

[public hermit]

Why should the supposed transcendent nature of God lead us to believe that it is an exception to the rules we might propose for our other beliefs?

I have no idea. I'm still surprised that I believe in a transcendent God.

 

[variant]

I have no idea. I'm still surprised that I believe in a transcendent God.

Then why do you? Or, am I misreading you?

 

[zippy2006]

I think we all take this stand, and do so without sufficient (objective) evidence. Who doesn't have a fundamental way of being in and seeing the word? Who has sufficient evidence for the way they see and live in the world? I'm skeptical of any takers.

I would say there is a difference between having a fundamental belief structure that follows the status quo and "swimming upstream." In practice justification follows upon contrariety, so justifying a belief in theism is not parallel to justifying a belief in materialism in today's world. Perhaps strictly speaking the materialist should have to justify his belief just as much as the theist, but in reality he simply doesn't have to.

There are some contexts where we just don't have time, but can only go on what we believe at that moment.

This is a good example of a time when Newman's nuance becomes important. Action and belief are not the same thing, and the kind of necessary action you are referring to need not presuppose any strong underlying belief. It could even be a blind guess.

The moral nature of the obligation is interesting and true, but belief is not a binary operation.

 

[public hermit]

Then why do you? Or, am I misreading you?

You're not misreading me. It's hard to explain. Faith has been good to me. The way I see the world and the God I love, and who I believe loves us, is working. If anything, my approach towards these kinds of beliefs is something like what William James was talking about. Do I know that everything I believe is beyond a reasonable doubt? By no means. Reasonable people doubt what I believe.

On the other hand, many reasonable people agree with me. Does what I believe have a function and work. Yes. And I have considered the defeaters that are available for the evidence I have looked at. But, that evidence includes so much, including my experience of worshipping and loving God, and my experience of God being faithful. Many others have shared that experience. At any rate, I can't simply decide not to have the faith I have. As I said, I'm still surprised. I tried hard not be a Christian. What can I say?

 

[variant]

You're not misreading me. It's hard to explain. Faith has been good to me. The way I see the world and the God I love, and who I believe loves us, is working. If anything, my approach towards these kinds of beliefs is something like what William James was talking about. Do I know that everything I believe is beyond a reasonable doubt? By no means. Reasonable people doubt what I believe.

On the other hand, many reasonable people agree with me. Does what I believe have a function and work. Yes. And I have considered the defeaters that are available for the evidence I have looked at. But, that evidence includes so much, including my experience of worshipping and loving God, and my experience of God being faithful. Many others have shared that experience. At any rate, I can't simply decide not to have the faith I have. As I said, I'm still surprised. I tried hard not be a Christian. What can I say?

Fair enough.

I've never thought belief was a light switch.

Religion to me never held up to much if any scrutiny, but the people who end up on the other side of things have always been at least a little fascinating to me. So, thanks for indulging me.

 

[public hermit]

This is a good example of a time when Newman's nuance becomes important. Action and belief are not the same thing, and the kind of necessary action you are referring to need not presuppose any strong underlying belief. It could even be a blind guess.

So, (let's assume) I am gathering evidence for some act (decision) I have to make, under time constraint. It is a significant moral decision. At some point, presumably right before time runs out, I have to make a decision. Isn't that decision based on what I believe to be the case at that moment? It could be a blind guess, especially if I have more than one live option that both appear equally viable. Nonetheless, I am making a decision based on a belief under insufficient evidence. I don't know, I just think Clifford is asking way too much, haha.

The moral nature of the obligation is interesting and true, but belief is not a binary operation.

So, what do you think? When you say belief is not a binary operation, you mean it is not both epistemic and moral?

 

[zippy2006]

So, (let's assume) I am gathering evidence for some act (decision) I have to make, under time constraint. It is a significant moral decision. At some point, presumably right before time runs out, I have to make a decision. Isn't that decision based on what I believe to be the case at that moment? It could be a blind guess, especially if I have more than one live option that both appear equally viable. Nonetheless, I am making a decision based on a belief under insufficient evidence. I don't know, I just think Clifford is asking way too much, haha.

Following Newman I would say that you lessen the strength of your belief. You seem to be saying that in order to act you have to believe something with full certitude. I would say that if you don't have enough evidence for full certitude, then you should not give full certitude. Oftentimes we have to act without full certitude.

So, what do you think? When you say belief is not a binary operation, you mean it is not both epistemic and moral?

I mean that it's not on/off, believe/disbelieve. There is a spectrum. We believe and disbelieve things with different degrees of strength.

 

[public hermit]

Following Newman I would say that you lessen the strength of your belief. You seem to be saying that in order to act you have to believe something with full certitude. I would say that if you don't have enough evidence for full certitude, then you should not give full certitude. Oftentimes we have to act without full certitude.

I mean that it's not on/off, believe/disbelieve. There is a spectrum. We believe and disbelieve things with different degrees of strength.

I see what you're saying now, on both accounts. Are you referring to John Henry Newman? If so, I am not familiar. Any book recommendations?