A Malebranche Quote for Consideration

[2PhiloVoid]

But we're back to that same question of certitude, which is different from foundationalism. Foundationalism pertains to structure, not certitude. An uncertain person is not by that fact a non-foundationalist. Foundationalism does implicate certitude in various ways given that the nature of argumentation moves from the more certain to the less certain, but part of Nagel's point is that to give up Descartes' axiom(s) is not to give up foundationalism.

Right. Can you guess why I'm agreeing with you all the while still holding to my stance?

Nagel is thinking of hard science, but also things like logic, ethics, language, and perhaps even aesthetics. I take it that the logical conclusion of this idea is that any structured body of knowledge will ultimately be foundationalist.

I know who Nagel is. I've read some of him already in the past. The problem here is, based on my angle of philosophy, or rather, THAT of the various sources informing my viewpoint, is that to say that 'any' body of knowledge will end up being foundationalist doesn't say a whole lot about guaranteeing the level of "Justified True Belief."

I suppose the question is: What is the alternative to foundationalism for Christian theology or any other body of knowledge?

That's a good question. For me, Epistemology isn't fully decided upon which of several positions or frameworks one might choose to label his/her approach to beliefs and truth (or ultimately "knowledge," really).

The base metaphor here is mathematics, and you can find it in Descartes and Plato as well as many others.

Of course you can find in in Descartes, but when he ends up applying his Meditations, he opens himself up to critique where Christianity is concerned. Pascal saw that, but didn't unfortunately live long enough to detail it. Others after him have, though.

When I studied epistemology we focused heavily on Laurence BonJour, a dyed in the wool coherentist who eventually jumped ship and embraced foundationalism.

When I studied epistemology, it covered a wide spectrum of competing systems and theories. It wasn't focused upon Coherentism and Foundationalism. Obviously what works in Engineering isn't what's working in Theology.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

The base metaphor here is mathematics, and you can find it in Descartes and Plato as well as many others.

When I studied epistemology we focused heavily on Laurence BonJour, a dyed in the wool coherentist who eventually jumped ship and embraced foundationalism.

And as for Laurence BonJour, I'd just suggest that none of us put all of our epistemic eggs into any one single philosopher's (or theologian's) basket. I have my own reasons as to why not to... actually, hundreds of reasons, all of which pour into why I also can't sign onto the dotted line with any one, single existing denomination of our common Christian faith, or even with any other human ideology or meta-level worldview.

On the other hand, my lack of signing on doesn't imply I don't feel at least some moderate level of solidarity with most other Trinitarians.

 

[zippy2006]

The problem here is, based on my angle of philosophy, or rather, THAT of the various sources informing my viewpoint, is that to say that 'any' body of knowledge will end up being foundationalist doesn't say a whole lot about guaranteeing the level of "Justified True Belief."

In #28 I noted that your critique of foundationalism has everything to do with certitude, and I asked whether you are really speaking about certitude. You said that you are not, but nowhere have you offered any critique of foundationalism that departs from a critique pertaining to certitude.

That's a good question. For me, Epistemology isn't fully decided upon which of several positions or frameworks one might choose to label his/her approach to beliefs and truth (or ultimately "knowledge," really).

It sounds like you don't have an alternative to foundationalism.

When I studied epistemology, it covered a wide spectrum of competing systems and theories. It wasn't focused upon Coherentism and Foundationalism.

We had a survey textbook and a textbook by BonJour, but foundationalism and coherentism are the main ideas in current epistemology. SEP is not the be all end all for philosophy, but it doesn't even list any other options for structuring epistemology.

So yeah, I think Nagel is correct. I think foundationalism is inevitable. I have seen folks around here throw shade at foundationalism, but I have never seen real arguments offered against that position. It seems that foundationalism is usually associated with something else, such as Cartesian certainty, and then that something else is dismissed. The problem is that foundationalism doesn't go away when Cartesian certainty goes away. They are two different things.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

In #28 I noted that your critique of foundationalism has everything to do with certitude, and I asked whether you are really speaking about certitude. You said that you are not, but nowhere have you offered any critique of foundationalism that departs from a critique pertaining to certitude.

Right, because I was referring specifically to the connotations that involve "Strong Foundationalism," which is more commonly what folks who are unfamiliar with the inroads of epistemic study default to when they encounter the term (assuming they've even heard about either the terms 'Foundationalism' or 'Epistemology.')

It sounds like you don't have an alternative to foundationalism.

I do, actually, but we just haven't gotten to that point yet. And rather than trying to slap a specified label upon the human project of identifying or producing Justifications for our various beliefs, whether they're religious, scientific, historical, or whatnot, I prefer to avoid placing myself into any singularly identified position. I think they all have their limited uses.

We had a survey textbook and a textbook by BonJour, but foundationalism and coherentism are the main ideas in current epistemology. SEP is not the be all end all for philosophy, but it doesn't even list any other options for structuring epistemology.

Well, I have several books on Epistemology and my main text is Ralph Baergin's, Contemporary Epistemology. In his text, he reflects upon the wider offerings that have developed in the field, even if not exhaustively, and in addition to Foundationalism, and Coherentism, we have Reliabalism, Scepticism, along with Pragmatism/Instrumentalism, plus all of the additional epistemic issues that come into play with human perception and neuro-science. However, since you're knowledeable, I don't think I need to keep on going with cataloging all that could be brought to the fore.

Oh, however, there is also the additional consideration of Michael Polanyi with his application of 'Tacit Knowledge,' along with the fringe (but still valuable) position of Critical Realism and Philosophical Hermeneutics.

So yeah, I think Nagel is correct. I think foundationalism is inevitable. I have seen folks around here throw shade at foundationalism, but I have never seen real arguments offered against that position. It seems that foundationalism is usually associated with something else, such as Cartesian certainty, and then that something else is dismissed. The problem is that foundationalism doesn't go away when Cartesian certainty goes away. They are two different things.

You make some good points here, clarifying points and I think you're right. Along with your insight here, we can still salvage Foundationalism if, I think, we let Baergen's analytic break-down be applied so we have a small resulting taxonomy of differentiated types of Foundationist structures, we can still subscribe to Foundationalism: i.e. between Strong, Moderate and Weak Foundationalist epistemic frameworks, each with their own levels of cogency and limitations upon our various acts of justification.

So yeah, I suppose that after it's all thrown into the wash, and if I can be allowed to draw upon Weak Foundationalism, we could get away from the idea of necessarily having to assume the presence of Descartes' "Clear and Distinct ideas" and dispense with expectations of absolute certainty in order to affirm the use of Foundationalism on a general level that doesn't simply dissolve into a Heuristic Fallacy.

 

[zippy2006]

You make some good points here, clarifying points and I think you're right. Along with your insight here, we can still salvage Foundationalism if, I think, we let Baergen's analytic break-down be applied so we have a small resulting taxonomy of differentiated types of Foundationist structures, we can still subscribe to Foundationalism: i.e. between Strong, Moderate and Weak Foundationalist epistemic frameworks, each with their own levels of cogency and limitations upon our various acts of justification.

So yeah, I suppose that after it's all thrown into the wash, and if I can be allowed to draw upon Weak Foundationalism, we could get away from the idea of necessarily having to assume the presence of Descartes' "Clear and Distinct ideas" and dispense with expectations of absolute certainty in order to affirm the use of Foundationalism on a general level that doesn't simply dissolve into a Heuristic Fallacy.

Okay, that makes sense and I think we are on the same page.

Well, I have several books on Epistemology and my main text is Ralph Baergin's, Contemporary Epistemology. In his text, he reflects upon the wider offerings that have developed in the field, even if not exhaustively, and in addition to Foundationalism, and Coherentism, we have Reliabalism, Scepticism, along with Pragmatism/Instrumentalism, plus all of the additional epistemic issues that come into play with human perception and neuro-science. However, since you're knowledeable, I don't think I need to keep on going with cataloging all that could be brought to the fore.

I would follow SEP in cataloguing foundationalism and coherentism as pertaining to, "The Structure of Knowledge and Justification;" and internalism, externalism, reliabilism, evidentialism, et al. as pertaining to justification itself. I would want to think of foundationalism as addressing a structural question in a way that is compatible with a number of different justificatory schemes. This is perhaps where we are talking past each other a bit.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Okay, that makes sense and I think we are on the same page.

More or less, yes.

I would follow SEP in cataloguing foundationalism and coherentism as pertaining to, "The Structure of Knowledge and Justification;" and internalism, externalism, reliabilism, evidentialism, et al. as pertaining to justification itself. I would want to think of foundationalism as addressing a structural question in a way that is compatible with a number of different justificatory schemes. This is perhaps where we are talking past each other a bit.

Baergen would agree with you about how Foundationalism is most often used as a general description, or framework, about the 'structure' of knowledge. Unfortunately, he would also say that its use is too general after certain considerations are taken into account. I have to side with him, I think.

Personally, I don't like to apply older schematic labels like a postage stamp to every envelope. Epistemology, through the various specified praxis of each specialized area among and within the sciences, has gone beyond what the the general concepts from a few hundred years ago can contain. There's also consideration about what the actual epistemic goal is; in this, some epistemic envelopes require not only more costly postage, but special care in handling.

Moreover, where Christian Theology is concerned, my additional studies indicate to me that the handling the Christian Faith on the human side of things, whether Empirically or Rationally, is epistemically piecemeal. You can build a computer program or a passenger jet with a firm notion of 'Foundationalism,' but you can't really do the same where the Christian Faith is the focus of conceptual engagement, even when implementing notions about Systematic Theology.

At best with Christianity, I think we can only subscribe to a general notion of Weak Foundationalism, which is nearly a form of Coherentism, since the logical structures aren't guaranteed and don't necessarily clearly logically entail, imply, or explain every other fragment [i.e. evidence, factors, conditions, counter-factuals, etc.] we may find in our world and have to account for and attempt to make sense of (or "justify").

 

[zippy2006]

You can build a computer program or a passenger jet with a firm notion of 'Foundationalism,' but you can't really do the same where the Christian Faith is the focus of conceptual engagement, even when implementing notions about Systematic Theology.

You seem to think that if a system isn't complete then it isn't foundationalist, no? The idea seems to be that if I have a system that is not intended to be complete, then it must not be foundationalist in structure.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

You seem to think that if a system isn't complete then it isn't foundationalist, no? The idea seems to be that if I have a system that is not intended to be complete, then it must not be foundationalist in structure.

It might depend on what we 'mean' by complete. I make a distinction between an open source system in contrast to one that is supposedly exhaustively structured and self contained, avoiding any Alice in Wonderland sorts of regresses.

If we're referring to computers, I can understand how it (a software learning system?) doesn't have to be complete; if we're talking about technological machines, I would hope that they are indeed complete, foundationally speaking, and in a Strong way rather than in only a Moderate or Weak way. For instance, such as we find in the following video, I'd like to think that the aircraft manufacturers have truly and fully justified every bit of their work, answering, "How do we know this thing will fly as intended?," from beginning to end before I step aboard and assume a safe and successful, and completed, flight:

And where theology is concerned, well................................I think the state of things as they are, epistemologically speaking, prevents any one denomination of thought in Christianity from achieving the full justification that it avers to claim for itself. Don't feel bad. This isn't a cheap shot at my RCC brethren; but it is an epistemic throwdown towards all other Christians everywhere and in all times. This includes myself, which is why I only really firmly advocate for one axiom: that no one human being knows everything ... and as such, this is why there is no such thing as a Christian Theological Airliner that flies. None of them can on their own, but we love to make those claims. [Hence, one reason folks will find a book like Christian Smith's, The Bible Made Impossible, on my CF reading list].

And pardon the pun, but that's just the Way it is.

 

[zippy2006]

Let me come back to this:

At best with Christianity, I think we can only subscribe to a general notion of Weak Foundationalism, which is nearly a form of Coherentism, since the logical structures aren't guaranteed and don't necessarily clearly logically entail, imply, or explain every other fragment [i.e. evidence, factors, conditions, counter-factuals, etc.] we may find in our world and have to account for and attempt to make sense of (or "justify").

It seems to me that foundationalism not only does not need to involve Cartesian certainty, but it also does not need to be complete. To use your word, it could be "piecemeal."

I would say the idea behind the foundationalist structure is that claims are justified by more foundational claims, and the most foundational claims are known in themselves. Perhaps I should review the literature, but I don't see that this must involve completeness.

Or to be more formal, your argument is something like this:

• Christian theology is piecemeal
• Foundationalism is never piecemeal
• Therefore, Foundationalism does not fit Christian theology

It seems to me that a child with a very piecemeal understanding of reality is a prima facie foundationalist:

• Zippy: What happened to your bike?!
• Child: A bird pooped on it!
• Zippy: How so? He must have been a very tall bird.
• Child: No, he was flying.
• Zippy: How so?
• Child: Birds can fly.

Birds can fly (foundation) -> a bird was flying -> that bird pooped from on high -> my bike needs to be cleaned

This is a foundationalist structure, where claims are explained in terms of more foundational claims, which eventually terminate in something that is known directly.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Let me come back to this:

It seems to me that foundationalism not only does not need to involve Cartesian certainty, but it also does not need to be complete. To use your word, it could be "piecemeal."

I would say the idea behind the foundationalist structure is that claims are justified by more foundational claims, and the most foundational claims are known in themselves. Perhaps I should review the literature, but I don't see that this must involve completeness.

Or to be more formal, your argument is something like this:

• Christian theology is piecemeal
• Foundationalism is never piecemeal
• Therefore, Foundationalism does not fit Christian theology

No, this would be a misrepresentation of what I think. Here's what I think, at present:

1) Christian theology is piecemeal; Foundationalism is an epistemic 'framework. One is cereal in a bowl; the other is the recognition of how some ideas (we epistemically may surmise) are fit together into a structure.​

​

2) Foundationalism expresses the 'way' in which truths are fit and flow, from the axiomatic level to those additional bits by inference. And these fittings are like the interlockings of Lego blocks, they can be brought together into completed masses or in incomplete chunks, depending on what the epistemic goal(s) is.​

​

3) Foundationalsim comes in three, Strong, Moderate and Weak. One of these levels is more appropriate than the others when deliberating about God---at least, I'll continue to aver for this until someone can show me otherwise.​

It seems to me that a child with a very piecemeal understanding of reality is a prima facie foundationalist:

• Zippy: What happened to your bike?!
• Child: A bird pooped on it!
• Zippy: How so? He must have been a very tall bird.
• Child: No, he was flying.
• Zippy: How so?
• Child: Birds can fly.

Birds can fly (foundation) -> a bird was flying -> that bird pooped from on high -> my bike needs to be cleaned

This is a foundationalist structure, where claims are explained in terms of more foundational claims, which eventually terminate in something that is known directly.

I wouldn't call a child's level of understanding a prima facie foundationalism. To say as such is to ignore the actual conceptual entities that are being identified as intrinsic and valuable in the overall recognition of the justification process. A child's ideas [and you haven't specified the age so we know where the pedagogy actually meets the road] don't typically get to this level. They're too simple and don't fully apply.

 

[zippy2006]

1) Christian theology is piecemeal; Foundationalism is an epistemic 'framework. One is cereal in a bowl; the other is the recognition of how some ideas (we epistemically may surmise) are fit together into a structure.

2) Foundationalism expresses the 'way' in which truths are fit and flow, from the axiomatic level to those additional bits by inference. And these fittings are like the interlockings of Lego blocks, they can be brought together into completed masses or in incomplete chunks, depending on what the epistemic goal(s) is.

3) Foundationalsim comes in three, Strong, Moderate and Weak. One of these levels is more appropriate than the others when deliberating about God---at least, I'll continue to aver for this until someone can show me otherwise.

Okay thanks, that makes good sense. And do strong/moderate/weak refer to the certitude with which beliefs are held?

I wouldn't call a child's level of understanding a prima facie foundationalism. To say as such is to ignore the actual conceptual entities that are being identified as intrinsic and valuable in the overall recognition of the justification process. A child's ideas [and you haven't specified the age so we know where the pedagogy actually meets the road] don't typically get to this level. They're too simple and don't fully apply.

So why don't you think the child is engaged in prima facie foundationalism? Here is your argument:

• If conceptual entities are being identified as intrinsic and valuable in the overall recognition of the justification process, then this is not foundationalism.
• For the child, conceptual entities are being identified as intrinsic and valuable in the overall recognition of the justification process
• Therefore, the child is not engaged in foundationalism

I don't follow that first premise.

Now one might say that a child cannot be a realist, or a foundationalist, or a non-solipsist, because they do not hold to these beliefs in a way that is self-conscious and critical. I think this is mistaken. I think much of the force of positions like realism, foundationalism, or non-solipsism lies in the fact that they are so obvious as to require no prima facie justification. We might say that the child is not a critical realist, but we cannot say that they are not a realist. In any case, the child meets the definition I set out, "I would say the idea behind the foundationalist structure is that claims are justified by more foundational claims, and the most foundational claims are known in themselves."

2) Foundationalism expresses the 'way' in which truths are fit and flow, from the axiomatic level to those additional bits by inference. And these fittings are like the interlockings of Lego blocks, they can be brought together into completed masses or in incomplete chunks, depending on what the epistemic goal(s) is.

The other thing to note here is that the child's bike opposes another misconception about foundationalism. This is the idea that we begin with the foundation and build upwards. Namely, we begin with a set of complete or semi-complete foundational principles and build the edifice upon these. This is not how the child reasons, and it is not how humans reason. The ontological and the epistemic directions differ. Ontologically, the bird's pooping explains the poop on the bike. Epistemically, the poop on the bike leads us to infer that a bird pooped. The primacy is reversed. At least for Aristotelians we begin with what is better known to us, and this leads us to knowledge of what is more ontologically primary in causal and other senses.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Okay thanks, that makes good sense. And do strong/moderate/weak refer to the certitude with which beliefs are held?


So why don't you think the child is engaged in prima facie foundationalism? Here is your argument:

• If conceptual entities are being identified as intrinsic and valuable in the overall recognition of the justification process, then this is not foundationalism.
• For the child, conceptual entities are being identified as intrinsic and valuable in the overall recognition of the justification process
• Therefore, the child is not engaged in foundationalism

I don't follow that first premise.

Now one might say that a child cannot be a realist, or a foundationalist, or a non-solipsist, because they do not hold to these beliefs in a way that is self-conscious and critical. I think this is mistaken. I think much of the force of positions like realism, foundationalism, or non-solipsism lies in the fact that they are so obvious as to require no prima facie justification. We might say that the child is not a critical realist, but we cannot say that they are not a realist. In any case, the child meets the definition I set out, "I would say the idea behind the foundationalist structure is that claims are justified by more foundational claims, and the most foundational claims are known in themselves."


The other thing to note here is that the child's bike opposes another misconception about foundationalism. This is the idea that we begin with the foundation and build upwards. Namely, we begin with a set of complete or semi-complete foundational principles and build the edifice upon these. This is not how the child reasons, and it is not how humans reason. The ontological and the epistemic directions differ. Ontologically, the bird's pooping explains the poop on the bike. Epistemically, the poop on the bike leads us to infer that a bird pooped. The primacy is reversed. At least for Aristotelians we begin with what is better known to us, and this leads us to knowledge of what is more ontologically primary in causal and other senses.

ok. Let's just stop there before things become unnecessarily frictious between us, brother Zippy. Besides, somehow, we're not anywhere close to discussing Malebranche at this point anyway...

 

[zippy2006]

somehow, we're not anywhere close to discussing Malebranche at this point anyway...

Er, Philo, you are the one who brought up this issue of Foundationalism in post #8, in response to the OP's claims about "certain foundations." Do you think you were already moving the thread off-topic there? I don't think so, and the OP likely has more to do with Cartesian "foundationalism" than Malebranche. I noted a few times that the OP has nothing to do with Malebranche.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Er, Philo, you are the one who brought up this issue of Foundationalism in post #8, in response to the OP's claims about "certain foundations." Do you think you were already moving the thread off-topic there? I don't think so, and the OP likely has more to do with Cartesian "foundationalism" than Malebranche. I noted a few times that the OP has nothing to do with Malebranche.

You're right, I did bring up Foundationalism in post #8, but I think I qualified what I meant a time or two in other posts after that one. Where I addressed Foundationalism in relation to the specifically Cartesian epistemic tradition (such as Malebranche worked within), I assume that it is STRONG Foundationalism that is being implied. Of course, I could be incorrect about my qualification about this.

It can also be that when we appraise Foundationalism's use as a general framework for envisioning the structure of epistemic justification, we're not all on the same page about its conceptual formations and use. I also realize that some nuances of how we appraise the conceptual formations or even how we think about the efficacy of Foundationalism can vary depending on who we're speaking with at the moment or in accordance which different contexts we may be discussing.

Anyway, where this thread's focus lies, I think if we back up to the OP, we see @public hermit asking about two of Malebranche's propositions (and please tell me if you see it differently): "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently." And I then said that, with nuance, I disagree with Malebranche on these assertions, at least I do on the surface level. I readily admit that haven't read any Malebranche directly; I've only read about him from a few commentators so I'm sure I'm missing some possibly valuable things he had to say or additional contexts that would elucidate his intended message.

So, that's where it is at the moment, bro!

 

[zippy2006]

Where I addressed Foundationalism in relation to the specifically Cartesian epistemic tradition (such as Malebranche worked within), I assume that it is STRONG Foundationalism that is being implied.

Sure, but apparently by "strong foundationalism" you mean foundationalism with a high degree of certitude, and this is precisely where the conversation continued in posts #27 and 28.

As I said in post #28, I believe there is a plausible objection to undue certitude, but not to foundationalism. I think those two concepts need to be separated given that there have been no sustained objections to foundationalism per se.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Sure, but apparently by "strong foundationalism" you mean foundationalism with a high degree of certitude, and this is precisely where the conversation continued in posts #27 and 28.

As I said in post #28, I believe there is a plausible objection to undue certitude, but not to foundationalism. I think those two concepts need to be separated given that there have been no sustained objections to foundationalism per se.

Right. And that's why I said I didn't have any strong objections to Weak Foundationalism (where faith is concerned). It's just that Weak Foundationalism isn't of the epistemic sort that Foundationalists typically "mean" when they refer to Foundationalism.

Besides, my praxis for epistemology lies elsewhere, so I don't really care if folks want to consider themselves Foundationalist. They can do so if they want to. Every epistemic position has problems anyway, but if we're talking about Malebranche, and he's in the Cartesian tradition, then I'm thinking he thought he had some stronger epistemic ties than today's Foundationalists. Would I be incorrect in that surmisal?

 

[zippy2006]

Right. And that's why I said I didn't have any strong objections to Weak Foundationalism (where faith is concerned). It's just that Weak Foundationalism isn't of the epistemic sort that Foundationalists typically "mean" when they refer to Foundationalism.

I think foundationalism means foundationalism. I'm not sure what "weak" and "strong" are supposed to mean, and my inquiries on this point have not really been met. Again, I think the opposition here has more to do with modern "epistemic humility"/uncertainty/skepticism than structures of epistemology.

but if we're talking about Malebranche, and he's in the Cartesian tradition, then I'm thinking he thought he had some stronger epistemic ties than today's Foundationalists. Would I be incorrect in that surmisal?

From what I gather, Malebranche thinks faith is far superior to reason, and that reason is always in large part untrustworthy. Wikipedia and SEP claim that Malebranche sought to synthesize Augustine and Descartes, and it also seems to me that to read him merely as a Cartesian is to miss the mark. His ideas are not straightforwardly Cartesian.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I think foundationalism means foundationalism. I'm not sure what "weak" and "strong" are supposed to mean, and my inquiries on this point have not really been met. Again, I think the opposition here has more to do with modern "epistemic humility"/uncertainty/skepticism than structures of epistemology.

That's ok if you think that. I'm not asking you to stop being either foundationalist or Aristotelian if those are your epistemic "thing." So, I'm not sure what further needs to be said other than that you and I draw from different theoretical springs. Either way, we both get to Christ regardless.

From what I gather, Malebranche thinks faith is far superior to reason, and that reason is always in large part untrustworthy. Wikipedia and SEP claim that Malebranche sought to synthesize Augustine and Descartes, and it also seems to me that to read him merely as a Cartesian is to miss the mark. His ideas are not straightforwardly Cartesian.

Ok. I'll take note of this distinction.

 

[zippy2006]

That's ok if you think that. I'm not asking you to stop being either foundationalist or Aristotelian if those are your epistemic "thing." So, I'm not sure what further needs to be said other than that you and I draw from different theoretical springs.

Well, I don't see this as a matter of preference, like our favorite ice cream flavor. You kept speaking about and opposing "strong foundationalism" as if that term had a relevant meaning, and then when I asked what the term meant you declined to continue. An important part of dialogue is being able to justify one's claims.

Talking about strong/weak foundationalism seems to me like talking about fast/slow cars. One claims to object to cars because cars are fast, but it turns out that cars are not the thing that is really being objected to. It turns out that slow cars are not objectionable, and other fast vehicles, like motorcycles, are also objectionable. So when the person says they object to cars, what they actually mean is that they object to fast vehicles.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well, I don't see this as a matter of preference, like our favorite ice cream flavor. You kept speaking about and opposing "strong foundationalism" as if that term had a relevant meaning, and then when I asked what the term meant you declined to continue. An important part of dialogue is being able to justify one's claims.

I agree, epistemology isn't like choosing our favorite ice cream flavor. At the same time, I'm of the mind that epistemology is inconclusive on most theoretical fronts. I could be wrong, but sometimes you make it sound as if knowing about knowing is a clearly sure and discernible thing where the Christian faith is concerned. For my part, I don't think it theologically rises above the level of 'fragmentary,' and being that the Lord declined from giving humanity a comprehensive view of His Will in Christ, I'm going to settle for the fragmentary and incomplete epistemic reality we're situated in and by which we each have to make the Journey.

Talking about strong/weak foundationalism seems to me like talking about fast/slow cars. One claims to object to cars because cars are fast, but it turns out that cars are not the thing that is really being objected to. It turns out that slow cars are not objectionable, and other fast vehicles, like motorcycles, are also objectionable. So when the person says they object to cars, what they actually mean is that they object to fast vehicles.

I can assure you that Ralph Baergen's explanation about how Strong, Moderate and Weak foundationalism differ from one another is anything but analogous to the comparative speed of cars. But since you don't seem to have is book at hand, and being that I don't really want to write it all out being that I neither have the time nor the inclination to do so, I'll just cite the following links for reference and, then, from these we can discuss finer points about the comparisons and contrasts if you wish and how any of this relates to Malebranche, for whatever it's actually worth:

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This first link discusses the structures of all three forms of Foundationalism​

Foundationalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

iep.utm.edu

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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

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Hauptli's Supplement on BonJour's Structure.... Part II

faculty.fiu.edu

​

P.S. Being that my wife is starting to give me the nudge to 'hop to' in my job search, I'm probably not going to be on CF more than once a week until I find a new job. So, I feel your frustration at not getting a 'well rounded' effort from me. Just know that I feel it too.