A Malebranche Quote for Consideration

[zippy2006]

But, do you really think PH is being evasive?

Yes. I asked how he would answer the question Malebranche is answering and he said, "Christian faith and philosophy differ primarily because [philosophical schools differ]." This is evasive; he is misconstruing the question at hand into something vacuous. After that he started speaking about change instead of difference, which he hasn't yet recognized are two different things.

Analogously, if I had asked, "What is the difference between the United States and Europe?," the answer would have been, "The United States and Europe differ primarily because European countries differ."

If he has not been evasive then what is his answer to the obvious and straightforward question I posed to him? Has he given a clear answer that I have overlooked?

Mmmmmmmmmmmmm............................. It's time to leave Aristotle and Ptolemy over in the shadows, mainly because there is such a thing as obscuration in regard to one's own "actual objectivity."

"There is such a thing as obscuration in regard to one's own 'actual objectivity,' therefore it's time to leave Aristotle and Ptolemy over in the shadows." I don't follow this argument at all.

I mean, we're talking about the man who taught Alexander the Great. I don't necessarily see that as a "plus of virtue."

Is this not straightforward ad hominem? It is casting aspersions, this time with respect to Aristotle.

I realize this is only CF, but I'm hoping that every once in awhile there can be a thread where serious thinking takes place.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes. I asked how he would answer the question Malebranche is answering and he said, "Christian faith and philosophy differ primarily because [philosophical schools differ]." This is evasive; he is misconstruing the question at hand into something vacuous. After that he started speaking about change instead of difference, which he hasn't yet recognized are two different things.

Analogously, if I had asked, "What is the difference between the United States and Europe?," the answer would have been, "The United States and Europe differ primarily because European countries differ."

If he has not been evasive then what is his answer to the obvious and straightforward question I posed to him? Has he given a clear answer that I have overlooked?

I'm sure PH could give a more explicit answer if he was so inclined to do so. As it stands now, I thought he was generally clear enough as to what he was getting at in regard to assessing the essence of "blind faith" in his first post. Neither he, nor I, think Christian faith is "blind." If anything, faith is a reasonable response to the Kerygma of the Church, buoyed about and lead by the Holy Spirit. That's not blind, rather it's a full person fidelity to the revelation that has been presented. In this vein, I don't think PH is saying much that's all that different than what I'd say.

Was there something specific you'd like him to say in reflection upon the two questions he had about two of Malebranche's cited statements?

"There is such a thing as obscuration in regard to one's own 'actual objectivity,' therefore it's time to leave Aristotle and Ptolemy over in the shadows." I don't follow this argument at all.

Is this not straightforward ad hominem? It is casting aspersions, this time with respect to Aristotle.

I realize this is only CF, but I'm hoping that every once in awhile there can be a thread where serious thinking takes place.

That's alright. This thread is about Malebranche's views, so we don't have to get into Aristotle or Ptolemy. In fact, right now, I'd prefer we didn't. Not because I couldn't handle it if given enough time to study and ruminate, but because I have other things to do and Aristotle and Ptolemy bore me to tears as anything other than figures of historical interest.

 

[zippy2006]

I'm sure PH could give a more explicit answer if he was so inclined to do so.

One would certainly hope so.

Was there something specific you'd like him to say in reflection upon the two questions he had about two of Malebranche's cited statements?

Yes, see post #4.

Neither he, nor I, think Christian faith is "blind."

And of course neither does Malebranche, if we but read beyond a single sentence. I think some are having apologetics withdrawals after that forum was closed, and because of this a Richard Dawkins' quote was plucked out of Nicolas Malebranche and interpreted as if it were Dawkins speaking.

 

[dzheremi]

I had to take some philosophy and rhetoric classes as part of my getting my degree in college (which is sort of interesting looking back on it, since my degree is in linguistics, not philosophy), and I don't remember anything in them that really shook my faith. Granted, I strongly suspect that the utility of these courses for someone in my field is more in learning how to properly structure an argument (no matter what it's about) than in "destroying ____ with facts and logic", or whatever some people might think philosophy does/ought to do to Christianity, but I suppose that's neither here nor there. Bottom line: No, I don't believe that all Christians "believe blindly" (though some likely do), and I don't believe that all philosophers "see evidently" (though, again, some likely do). This is a pithy quote to get silk-screened onto a box of 500 mousepads or something similar to help pay for your next Freedom From Religion Foundation conference or whatever, but I don't think it expresses some kind of timeless or essential truth about anything.

 

[com7fy8]

A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Search After Truth)

Nicolas Malebranche - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly? Must a philosopher "see evidently."

Do Christians believe blindly? There are Christians that do. But there was "Doubting Thomas" who believed by sight, of physical proof that Jesus rose from the dead. And yet, I suppose someone could say his belief was spiritually blind, if it depended on outward evidence.

How about Romans 5:5? >

"Now hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who was given to us." (Romans 5:5)

To me, it looks like Paul is saying our faith has us in actual sharing with God in His own love in us > "faith working through love" (in Galatians 5:6) actually works inside of us > God is proving Himself inside of us, spiritually, not only with outward wonders or historical and logical evidence.

This love has us knowing there is God who is love, plus we experience how He is, in this love. So, we are seeing, then, spiritually, deeper than words and reason. And we are discovering how this love affects our character and how we share with God and relate with people.

So, faith by reason or outward proof might be limited or even blind, compared with personally sharing with God in this love "in our hearts".

As for if philosophy needs to base itself on evidence - - - if we have experienced how God in His love affects us inside of us, curing our character to become gentle and humble and compassionate and generously forgiving like Jesus, this will affect how we see and understand things, philosophically. So, it would depend on what sort of evidence is being considered.

If Nicolas thinks faith is simply belief of certain ideas about God, that would not be "faith working through love", possibly. And his evidence would not be actual experience of God in our hearts sharing His own love with us. It would be theoretical faith, maybe.

So, I might need to actually get to know him so I could understand what he really means, in any case.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Search After Truth)

Nicolas Malebranche - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly? Must a philosopher "see evidently."
(I take the second claim to be an epistemic one requiring an evidenced foundation, i.e., clear and distinct ideas in the Cartesian fashion. Of course, for Malebranche, this includes God's extra-experiential guarantee)

For me, both claims are too strong, regardless of context. I don't see Christian faith as being without reason, which I take "blind faith" to entail. If blind faith simply means *lack of certainty,* which it likely did for Malebranche, then the claim tells its age, imo.

Malebranch was a convinced believer, and he was also a Cartesian. Like Descartes, he was enamored with the idea of certainty and securing everything down to a certain foundation. If a belief couldn't be secured in some way to certainty, it was not knowledge- strictly speaking. I don't have that kind of epistemic standard. I'm not sure it's possible, and I certainly don't see philosophy as needing a certain foundation in that sense. I'm happy if things are reasonable and not obviously false. We know all kinds of things that can be doubted.

As an aside, Malebranche's occasionalism seems unnecessary and only exacerbates the dualism, but I would agree God guarantees veracity. It just think the divine guarantee is through the created order and not in spite of it or along with it. His occasionalism seems very ad hoc and unhelpful.

I do think both Christian faith and philosophy should proceed in the light of the available evidence, whatever that may be. There has to be some coherence between the availble evidence and my faith. If it is certain, then it must be included. And I think our degree of credulity in the evidence should track its evidentiary value. For instance, if the evidence is strong, I should have a similar credence of belief. But all veritable/credible evidence to which I have access should be a viable aspect of my faith and/or philosophy. Depending on the level of credulity required, I can't simply reject evidence as false because it doesn't seem to fit.

Of course, I see things that way because of my faith, i.e., all truth has one Source. Does that article of faith make it blind, then? I don't think so. First, I have reasons for thinking one Source makes sense. But I also don't think any of us can escape making ontological claims/commitments on the world, i.e. large assumptions about reality, and I don't think we can be certain of the ontological claims we make. No matter how one sees the world, a step of faith is being made somewhere epistemically important. I don't think that's all blind faith. I mean, we all have our reasons. And, I think many people today can live with a lack of certainty. That's where I think many have moved beyond the Cartesian obsession with certainty as an epistemic requirement. Since the time of Malebranche, we have a new physical account that allows for uncertainty. A lot has changed. Certainly for me, I think we can have reasonable faith and a less than certain philosophy.

... can I just say a small piece here? It's a very small one, really. With all of the surveying (reading/thinking) I've done within the field of Epistemology, I'm thinking that one of the main problems today, whether among Christians or Secularists, is that we often (but not always) have a difficult time discerning that different fields of study, or different fields, occupations/professions, require different Epistemological expectations or praxis (i.e. theory & practice).

What happens all too often, especially among Christians, is that a number of folks get "sure of themselves" because they think the epistemological framework known as "STRONG FOUNDATIONALISM" is somehow part and parcel of every single human endeavor. The problem is that engaging and implementing something like the Bible for the development of Christian faith really is not analogous to understanding the science and engineering that goes into, say, building and maintaining a passenger jet, or any other advanced product we build for ourselves and safely use. It's not like taking a set of Legos and building a house.

... and yes, yes, I know. Jesus said that we have to build our faith on a strong foundation, but our act of reading and understanding that, and then attempting to use it, not infrequently ends up being epistemically misapplied to various areas of life that, I'm pretty sure, He did not intend for it to be applied to. I think Jesus intended for His analogy to be a statement about personal Christian morality and life rather than one about how to view and evaluate the entire world.

Understanding and then trusting the Bible isn't a building project involving structured ideas and arguments using "strong foundationalism" as much as it is a journey of both discovery and discernment, collecting and assessing, where there is no precision of science in the methodology or in the measurements, or in all conceptual criteria, by which ANY of us attempts to do theology and/or live the Christian Life.

No, the best we can do in engaging and implementing the Christian Faith is to expect a diverse set of perspectives of the Bible, each resulting in approximations and ongoing attempts at making inferences to the "best explanation," whatever the best explanation [denomination?] could even be where Christianity is concerned on a limited human level.

 

[public hermit]

... can I just say a small piece here? It's a very small one, really. With all of the surveying (reading/thinking) I've done within the field of Epistemology, I'm thinking that one of the main problems today, whether among Christians or Secularists, is that we often (but not always) have a difficult time discerning that different fields of study, or different fields, occupations/professions, require different Epistemological expectations or praxis (i.e. theory & practice).

What happens all too often, especially among Christians, is that a number of folks get "sure of themselves" because they've think the epistemological framework known as "STRONG FOUNDATIONALISM" is somehow part and parcel of every single human endeavor. The problem is that engaging and implementing something like the Bible for the development of Christian faith really is not analogous to understanding the science and engineering that goes into, say, building and maintaining a passenger jet, or any other advanced product we build for ourselves and safely use. It's not like taking a set of Legos and building a house.

... and yes, yes, I know. Jesus said that we have to build our faith on a strong foundation, but our act of reading and understanding that, and then attempting to use it, not infrequently ends up being epistemically misapplied to various areas of life that, I'm pretty sure, He did not intend for it to be applied to. I think Jesus intended for His analogy to be a statement about personal Christian morality and life rather than one about how to view and evaluate the entire world.

Understanding and then trusting the Bible isn't a building project involving structured ideas and arguments using "strong foundationalism" as much as it is a journey of both discovery and discernment, collecting and assessing, where there is no precision of science in the methodology or in the measurements, or in all conceptual criteria, by which ANY of us attempts to do theology and/or live the Christian Life.

No, the best we can do in engaging and implementing the Christian Faith is to expect a diverse set of perspectives of the Bible, each resulting in approximations and ongoing attempts at making inferences to the "best explanation," whatever the best explanation [denomination?] could even be where Christianity is concerned on a limited human level.

I don't disagree. I don't think anything like strong foundationalism is possible for Christian faith. That's not to say we can't feel subjectively certain of our faith; I think it is possible for one to enjoy subjective certainty, and it's also okay if one does not, but the faith cannot be demonstrated to be certain by appeal to some indubitable foundation upon which it rests. I consider that to be a non-controversial position.

 

[zippy2006]

Understanding and then trusting the Bible isn't a building project involving structured ideas and arguments using "strong foundationalism" as much as it is a journey of both discovery and discernment, collecting and assessing...

Perhaps, but usually foundationalism is contrasted with something like coherentism. You are contrasting it with discovery and the uncertainty that discovery implies, and thus I wonder if by "foundationalism" you are speaking about certitude. (PH seems to make a similar inference)

I think there is a question of interpretive certitude, but there is also the larger question of the validity of the law of non-contradiction. Put most bluntly: does the law of non-contradiction apply to the Bible? This question persists even when it comes to the question of, "personal Christian morality and life rather than one about how to view and evaluate the entire world," for the moral demands of the Bible often conflict. And to be clear, I'm guessing that we do think non-contradiction applies to the Bible, but this larger question then becomes, "What do we do when the law of non-contradiction starts to give us the squeeze?"

(Of course, it may be that you really are thinking of applying coherentism to Biblical approaches.)

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Perhaps, but usually foundationalism is contrasted with something like coherentism. You are contrasting it with discovery and the uncertainty that discovery implies, and thus I wonder if by "foundationalism" you are speaking about certitude. (PH seems to make a similar inference)

Nope. I'm simply implicating the critical fault lines that run through any and every Foundationalistic framework used where Christian Theology is under consideration. It can be contrasted with Coherentism, and in a general way, I'd say that Coherentism is more or less the direction that Christian faith leans, although with a much more philosophically nuanced engagement with theory, analysis and application.

As for "certitude," I don't believe that we can have that level of cognitive and epistemological assurance where Christian Theology is under scrutiny. We can have, perhaps, high levels of confidence in various historically laden concepts (or truths), but these are fragmentary in nature rather than born out and built up from some sort of alledged definitive, or clear and distinct, foundations.

I think there is a question of interpretive certitude, but there is also the larger question of the validity of the law of non-contradiction. Put most bluntly: does the law of non-contradiction apply to the Bible? This question persists even when it comes to the question of, "personal Christian morality and life rather than one about how to view and evaluate the entire world," for the moral demands of the Bible often conflict. And to be clear, I'm guessing that we do think non-contradiction applies to the Bible, but this larger question then becomes, "What do we do when the law of non-contradiction starts to give us the squeeze?"

(Of course, it may be that you really are thinking of applying coherentism to Biblical approaches.)

No, even more bluntly::::: the law of non-contradiction doesn't apply to the Bible to the extent, or in the way, that so many generally aver that it does.

I will admit that on some low levels of epistemic consideration, the Law of Non-Contradiction can apply to some issues, but we need to know where the conceptual boundaries of it and its applications are so we don't extol it as a robust, umbrella like praxis. It's only a heuristic, at best, to be used on the most rudimentary of issues and topics.

In fact, I'd say that to apply that level of simple logic (ancient, moldy logic) is to miss the operative and, dare I say---very epistemologically complicated, not just complex, but complicated---nature of this thing we all like to affirm as "Christian Faith." We need to finally recognize this state of philosophy, as it sits existentially, and finally get over this hurdle. It's the 21st Century, by golly, and one would think the Church would have finally figured this all out by now after nearly 2,000 years...

The problem, overall, isn't that we are, these days, simply 'Double-Minded,' but rather we are epistemologically 'Double-Binded,' but many people, not just Christians, are simply unaware of the extent or the nature of the epistemic issues at hand which affects us every day and, also, when we engage the Bible.

 

[zippy2006]

In fact, I'd say that to apply that level of simple logic (ancient, moldy logic) is to miss the operative and, dare I say---very epistemologically complicated, not just complex, but complicated---nature of this thing we all like to affirm as "Christian Faith." We need to finally recognize this state of philosophy, as it sits existentially, and finally get over this hurdle. It's the 21st Century, by golly, and one would think the Church would have finally figured this all out by now after nearly 2,000 years...

No, I don't think the law of non-contradiction as applied to Christianity is "simple, ancient, moldy logic that 21st century people need to finally get over." I can't let that one pass unchallenged, because it seems a headlong dive into sophism.

But I do agree that complex realities (like, you know, God) cannot be easily grasped, and that epistemic humility is therefore required in approaching such mysteries. The idea that we can set boundaries on the law of non-contradiction will go nowhere fast (and it is probably self-defeating), but it is true that it is difficult and precarious to attempt to understand mysterious realities. I think this gets at something of the difference between Christianity and philosophy. The philosopher will not go where human reason fears to tread, and this signifies a remarkable limitation of philosophy. On the Continental side this is represented by immanentism rather than rationalism.

I suppose there are some Reformed theologians who want to throw out the law of non-contradiction entirely when it comes to the Bible. That seems crazy and incoherent to me. Maybe it is my own fault for provoking that sort of response, but my point was that Christianity wrestles with irrationality in a way that philosophy does not. I would agree that the law of non-contradiction does not apply to the Bible "...in the way that so many generally aver that it does." Similarly, the law of non-contradiction does not apply to the Earth in the way that flat-earthers generally aver that it does.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

No, I don't think the law of non-contradiction as applied to Christianity is "simple, ancient, moldy logic that 21st century people need to finally get over." I can't let that one pass unchallenged, because it seems a headlong dive into sophism.

I see your point, but in this I think we are unfortunately talking past each. What I mean in responding to your prior comment about "non-contradiction" is that I think it is elementary and tautological. In other words, just knowing about the Three "Laws of Thought" 1) The Principle of Identity, 2) The Principle of Contradiction and 3) The Principle of the Excluded Middle, doesn't sufficiently help us explain the essence of the actual entities we think we're working with when we make base claims. In other words, I'm not saying these laws are false, rather I'm saying they don't necessarily bake us the bread of truth on a material level where Christianity is concerned. No, more analysis is needed beyond the merely conceptual.

But I do agree that complex realities (like, you know, God) cannot be easily grasped, and that epistemic humility is therefore required in approaching such mysteries. The idea that we can set boundaries on the law of non-contradiction will go nowhere fast (and it is probably self-defeating), but it is true that it is difficult and precarious to attempt to understand mysterious realities. I think this gets at something of the difference between Christianity and philosophy. The philosopher will not go where human reason fears to tread, and this signifies a remarkable limitation of philosophy. On the Continental side this is represented by immanentism rather than rationalism.

I agree with our comments about complex realities, but I don't see why a philosopher, especially an existential philosopher, is necessarily going to fear to tread where Christians go alone. Ratzinger (1993) seems to see Christ as the perfect philosopher who brings unity to theology and philosophy and brings about the significance of the "Christian Philosopher," or those who, like myself, as philosophers do "not seek hypotheses but to win possession of life by overcoming death" (p. 14).

Razinger, Joseph C. (1993). The Nature of and Mission of Theology. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press.

I suppose there are some Reformed theologians who want to throw out the law of non-contradiction entirely when it comes to the Bible. That seems crazy and incoherent to me.

There may be some, but since I'm not Reformed or Anti-Realist, and since I'm looking at one of Ronald N. Nash's books right now in front of my face, and being I'm aware of a few others who take the Law of Non-Contradiction at least as seriously as you do, I'm thinking you don't have to feel countered in any real way here.

To some degree, we're on the same page (even if , where Logic is applicable, I'm sure you're superior).

Maybe it is my own fault for provoking that sort of response, but my point was that Christianity wrestles with irrationality in a way that philosophy does not. I would agree that the law of non-contradiction does not apply to the Bible "...in the way that so many generally aver that it does." Similarly, the law of non-contradiction does not apply to the Earth in the way that flat-earthers generally aver that it does.

No, it's probably for the fact that I'm coming from another school of Philosophy than you do ---or a fusion of more than a couple--- and when we get to logical considerations of language usage and self-reflective thought, as well as analysis of the tensions and dynamics between Objectivity and Subjectivity, Mind and Being, that transcend the merely 1st Order of thought, going into the 2nd or even a 3rd, then the clarity of distinctions diminishes as we attempt apply finer degrees of distinction...which can't always be had in the final analysis.

 

[zippy2006]

I see your point, but in this I think we unfortunately talking past each. What I mean in responding to your prior comment about "non-contradiction" is that I think it is elementary and tautological. In other words, just knowing about the Three "Laws of Thought" 1) The Principle of Identity, 2) The Principle of Contradiction and 3) The Principle of the Excluded Middle, don't sufficiently help us explain the essence of the actual entities we think we're working with when we make base claims. In other words, I'm not saying these laws are false, rather I'm saying they don't necessarily bake us the bread of truth on a material level where Christianity is concerned. No, more analysis is needed beyond the merely conceptual.

Sure, but however we wish to think about the Bible epistemologically (foundationalism, coherentism, etc.) at the end of the day the difficulty is that the Bible is an unwieldy text in various ways, and over the centuries this has led to internal wrestling, schism, and criticisms from secular philosophy. In different ways we are coming up against the law of non-contradiction, and this is where the stories about "canons within the canon" come from. For instance, if Luther becomes suspicious that James contradicts Paul on justification by faith, he is tempted to throw out or downgrade the letter of James.

Or more succinctly: if the charge against Christians is that their religion is self-contradictory or fundamentally irrational, then revising foundationalism won't do the trick. And this charge creates internal problems as well, such as schism, neo-Marcionism, and revisionist approaches to the Bible or to Christian tradition.

I agree with our comments about complex realities, but I don't see why a philosopher, especially an existential philosopher, is necessarily going to fear to tread where Christians go alone. Ratzinger (1993) seems to see Christ as the perfect philosopher who brings unity to theology and philosophy and brings about the significance of the "Christian Philosopher," or those who, like myself, as philosophers do" not seek hypotheses but to win possession of life by overcoming death" (p. 14).

By and large I think the disjunction Malebranche sees between Christianity and philosophy did not begin in earnest until the late Middle Ages. Neoplatonism has much more in common with Christianity than logical positivism. Certain forms of existentialism may be another place were this gap narrows, and it may be that the Christian existentialist doesn't have to switch hats when they move from one sphere to the other (although I still suspect that some differentiation occurs).

There may be some, but since I'm not Reformed or Anti-Realist, and since I'm looking at one of Ronald N. Nash's books right now in front of my face, and being I'm aware of a few others who take the Law of Non-Contradiction at least as seriously as you do, I'm thinking you don't have to feel countered in any real way here.

If I recall correctly, Nash was one of the strident opponents of the sort of theologians I am thinking of, such as Cornelius Van Til (at least on this matter).

No, it's probably for the fact that I'm coming from another school of Philosophy than you do ---or a fusion of more than a couple--- and when we get to logical considerations of language usage and self-reflective thought, as well as analysis of the tensions and dynamics between Objectivity and Subjectivity, Mind and Being, that transcend the merely 1st Order of thought, going into the 2nd or even a 3rd, then the clarity of distinctions diminishes as we attempt apply finer degrees of distinction...which can't always be had in the final analysis.

Yes, that could be. I don't want to belabor this topic of the law of non-contradiction too much, so I will leave these questions for another day.

 

[FireDragon76]

A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Search After Truth)

Nicolas Malebranche - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly? Must a philosopher "see evidently."
(I take the second claim to be an epistemic one requiring an evidenced foundation, i.e., clear and distinct ideas in the Cartesian fashion. Of course, for Malebranche, this includes God's extra-experiential guarantee)

For me, both claims are too strong, regardless of context. I don't see Christian faith as being without reason, which I take "blind faith" to entail. If blind faith simply means *lack of certainty,* which it likely did for Malebranche, then the claim tells its age, imo.

Malebranch was a convinced believer, and he was also a Cartesian. Like Descartes, he was enamored with the idea of certainty and securing everything down to a certain foundation. If a belief couldn't be secured in some way to certainty, it was not knowledge- strictly speaking. I don't have that kind of epistemic standard. I'm not sure it's possible, and I certainly don't see philosophy as needing a certain foundation in that sense. I'm happy if things are reasonable and not obviously false. We know all kinds of things that can be doubted.

As an aside, Malebranche's occasionalism seems unnecessary and only exacerbates the dualism, but I would agree God guarantees veracity. It just think the divine guarantee is through the created order and not in spite of it or along with it. His occasionalism seems very ad hoc and unhelpful.

I do think both Christian faith and philosophy should proceed in the light of the available evidence, whatever that may be. There has to be some coherence between the availble evidence and my faith. If it is certain, then it must be included. And I think our degree of credulity in the evidence should track its evidentiary value. For instance, if the evidence is strong, I should have a similar credence of belief. But all veritable/credible evidence to which I have access should be a viable aspect of my faith and/or philosophy. Depending on the level of credulity required, I can't simply reject evidence as false because it doesn't seem to fit.

Of course, I see things that way because of my faith, i.e., all truth has one Source. Does that article of faith make it blind, then? I don't think so. First, I have reasons for thinking one Source makes sense. But I also don't think any of us can escape making ontological claims/commitments on the world, i.e. large assumptions about reality, and I don't think we can be certain of the ontological claims we make. No matter how one sees the world, a step of faith is being made somewhere epistemically important. I don't think that's all blind faith. I mean, we all have our reasons. And, I think many people today can live with a lack of certainty. That's where I think many have moved beyond the Cartesian obsession with certainty as an epistemic requirement. Since the time of Malebranche, we have a new physical account that allows for uncertainty. A lot has changed. Certainly for me, I think we can have reasonable faith and a less than certain philosophy.

I think it's pretty obvious that Cartesianism grew out of Roman Catholic thought, especially the polemics circulating at the time against Protestantism, that it was without sufficient epistemic foundation.

 

[zippy2006]

I think it's pretty obvious that Cartesianism grew out of Roman Catholic thought, especially the polemics circulating at the time against Protestantism, that it was without sufficient epistemic foundation.

"Protestantism doesn't have sufficient epistemic foundation -> We need a sufficient epistemic foundation -> Philosophy needs a sufficient epistemic foundation -> Cartesianism" ?

I would say that Protestantism does lack epistemic foundation, but that Cartesianism isn't merely a response to this. The problems of epistemology in the Late Medieval period preceded Protestantism, and in many ways gave birth to Protestantism. Protestantism, Cartesianism, the Enlightenment, and Modernity are all riding the same wave of rupture with the past due to dissatisfaction with the tradition that was inherited from the past. Fideism and rationalism are twin brothers, mutually dependent. Both are a consequence of Roman Catholicism to one extent or another, but Cartesianism would still have occurred even if the Reformation had not.

 

[FireDragon76]

"Protestantism doesn't have sufficient epistemic foundation -> We need a sufficient epistemic foundation -> Philosophy needs a sufficient epistemic foundation -> Cartesianism" ?

I would say that Protestantism does lack epistemic foundation, but that Cartesianism isn't merely a response to this. The problems of epistemology in the Late Medieval period preceded Protestantism, and in many ways gave birth to Protestantism. Protestantism, Cartesianism, the Enlightenment, and Modernity are all riding the same wave of rupture with the past due to dissatisfaction with the tradition that was inherited from the past. Fideism and rationalism are twin brothers, mutually dependent. Both are a consequence of Roman Catholicism to one extent or another, but Cartesianism would still have occurred even if the Reformation had not.

I actually think some strains of Protestant thought, beginning with the Reformed tradition, are not best understood as fideism, but are rooted in a mysticism based on the sensus divinitatis.

 

[public hermit]

I think it's pretty obvious that Cartesianism grew out of Roman Catholic thought, especially the polemics circulating at the time against Protestantism, that it was without sufficient epistemic foundation.

Honestly, I have not thought much about Cartesianism being a product of that setting/tension. Do you mind saying more? That's probably a piece of the puzzle I'm missing. Descartes was Catholic, but I'm not familiar with his thoughts about Protestants.

There is certainly an epistemological turn with Descartes. I think Cartesianism also makes a pretty clear rejection of anything teleological in favor of mechanism, which was a rejection of scholasticism (Malebranche is peculiar in rejecting efficient causation in favor of occasionalism). I usually think of Cartesianism as growing out of advancements in maths/geometry. It's the recognition that a particular method can produce more certain results in terms of knowledge. Also, *everything can be doubted* was a pretty radical approach in that historical context.

 

[FireDragon76]

Also, *everything can be doubted* was a pretty radical approach in that historical context.

Other religious historians have noted that was a result of polemics against rival Christians.

Alect Ryre's lectures about the history of religious doubt are worth watching:

 

[zippy2006]

Nope. I'm simply implicating the critical fault lines that run through any and every Foundationalistic framework used where Christian Theology is under consideration. It can be contrasted with Coherentism, and in a general way, I'd say that Coherentism is more or less the direction that Christian faith leans, although with a much more philosophically nuanced engagement with theory, analysis and application.

I think Nagel's points are relevant here:

It is customary to make a broad distinction between the Cartesian, foundationalist approach to the justification of knowledge and the much looser, more holist approach supposedly characteristic of actual science, which dispenses with self-evident, indubitable premises. But I think that this is a superficial distinction and that the ordinary methods of science are basically Cartesian. Where they depart from Descartes is in the relaxation of the requirement of certainty: Rational principles that play a foundational role at one stage may be superseded or revised as a result of rational criticism at a later stage. But the enterprise has a fundamentally rationalistic structure: It proceeds by the operation of methods that aspire to universal validity on empirical information, and it is an effort to construct a rational picture of the world, with ourselves in it, that makes sense of these data. However holistic the process, particular empirical observations can't oxerthrow general principles except in light of still other and superior general principles that give the observations the necessary leverage.​

​

The scientific project, like Descartes's, brackets or sets aside naive impressions as mere appearances until they can be reintroduced into an overall conception on a firmer foundation, and this foundation requires an analysis of how such impressions arise from our interaction with the world. . .​

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(Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, p. 22)​

​

I think theology works in a similar way. Opposition to foundationalism has become fashionable, but I am not convinced that it is actually sound.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I think Nagel's points are relevant here:

It is customary to make a broad distinction between the Cartesian, foundationalist approach to the justification of knowledge and the much looser, more holist approach supposedly characteristic of actual science, which dispenses with self-evident, indubitable premises. But I think that this is a superficial distinction and that the ordinary methods of science are basically Cartesian. Where they depart from Descartes is in the relaxation of the requirement of certainty: Rational principles that play a foundational role at one stage may be superseded or revised as a result of rational criticism at a later stage. But the enterprise has a fundamentally rationalistic structure: It proceeds by the operation of methods that aspire to universal validity on empirical information, and it is an effort to construct a rational picture of the world, with ourselves in it, that makes sense of these data. However holistic the process, particular empirical observations can't oxerthrow general principles except in light of still other and superior general principles that give the observations the necessary leverage.​

​

The scientific project, like Descartes's, brackets or sets aside naive impressions as mere appearances until they can be reintroduced into an overall conception on a firmer foundation, and this foundation requires an analysis of how such impressions arise from our interaction with the world. . .​

​

(Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, p. 22)​

​

I think theology works in a similar way. Opposition to foundationalism has become fashionable, but I am not convinced that it is actually sound.

Theology works in a "similar" way? How so? How similar do you mean for your comparison to be? I have to ask because I only see Foundationalism as a general framework in and of itself, one that doesn't by any necessity itself infer that a foundationalist structure to argumentation---even where theology is concerned---results in assured (certain) conclusions of Justified True Beliefs.

Surely, too, theology isn't really done by compounding sorite after sorite after sorite in order to give us absolute doctrines and dogmas to follow. More specifically, I don't think the use of deduction or even induction by themselves ever get us to ultimate truths where theology is concerned. And even where we think we have some absolute bit of theology to hold up like a crystal between our thumb and index finger, that in itself---that bit of Scripture or otherwise---doesn't offer an explanation of itself that leads to more comprehensive, let alone fuller inferences we can rely upon. Building doctrine from the Bible isn't similar to Engineering or programmers writing code.

From what I've studied, if we're not careful to tease out the limitations of the language we're using when describing foundationalism, or any other epistemological structure, we're on the cusp of descending into mass amphibolism, and maybe even end up pushing as assured what is really nothing more than a hueristic that is vulnerable to the Heuristic Fallacy.

 

[zippy2006]

I have to ask because I only see Foundationalism as a general framework in and of itself, one that doesn't by any necessity itself infer that a foundationalist structure to argumentation---even where theology is concerned---results in assured (certain) conclusions of Justified True Beliefs.

But we're back to that same question of certitude, which is different from foundationalism. Foundationalism pertains to structure, not certitude. An uncertain person is not by that fact a non-foundationalist. Foundationalism does implicate certitude in various ways given that the nature of argumentation moves from the more certain to the less certain, but part of Nagel's point is that to give up Descartes' axiom(s) is not to give up foundationalism.

Theology works in a "similar" way? How so? How similar do you mean for your comparison to be?

Nagel is thinking of hard science, but also things like logic, ethics, language, and perhaps even aesthetics. I take it that the logical conclusion of this idea is that any structured body of knowledge will ultimately be foundationalist.

I suppose the question is: What is the alternative to foundationalism for Christian theology or any other body of knowledge?

Building doctrine from the Bible isn't similar to Engineering or programmers writing code.

The base metaphor here is mathematics, and you can find it in Descartes and Plato as well as many others.

When I studied epistemology we focused heavily on Laurence BonJour, a dyed in the wool coherentist who eventually jumped ship and embraced foundationalism.