Okay, thanks.
Now, your view is that strong foundationalism is unacceptable but moderate and weak are acceptable, correct?
No, that's not what I was getting at really. I'm only talking about the efficacy of each position as an identifiable descriptor of 'how' justification actually works. I'm not implying that foundationalism on the whole is utterly useless. No, it's useful as far as a generalized description goes about how epistemic structures can be modelled in our minds. I just don't think foundationalism of any sort really or fully conceptualizes the relations and flow of actual justification of beliefs where faith is the focus of concern.
If some person wants to conceptualize their epistemic praxis in foundationalist terms, and they think Moderate or Weak Foundationalism provides a reasonable structural description about 'how' justification works where their religious faith is concerned, then I have no felt impetus to reprove him/her for that choice: I'm not here to dominate other people who are attempting to walk a different, parallel, but still narrow, path through the same 100 acres that I am toward Jesus. (However, the caveat is that anyone who thinks they'll strong arm me with their "superior" theology, relying as they may with certain brands of ontology and epistemology in tow, should be prepared for me to shine a light on any fault lines running through their allegedly "superior" theology.)
One note of admission on my part here may be due in order to clear up some of what might be perceived by others as my own bias: I think I tend not to trust that Foundationalism is a clear, distinct and indubitable mode by which to conceptualize the structural integrity of reasons for the defense of the Christian Faith because,
1) I've read
Descartes' Discourse on Method, and knowing the skeptical "whys" involved in his methodology are persuasive to me even if they're not fully convincing; however, I also think he failed to prove his ontological saving pitch for theology that he attempted through his
Meditations, and
2) atheist philosopher,
Peter Boghossian, fully relies on Strong Foundationalism as the mode by which he thinks he proves the truth of atheism in his book,
A Manual for Creating Atheists (....of course, like Descartes before him, I think that even though he scores a few epistemic points, he still fails to prove that his epistemic approach using Foundationalism does what he claims it does on either the PRACTICAL level or even the META level.)
Epistemology became a kind of first philosophy around the time of Kant, and I don't follow that move, so I don't lead with epistemology. As far as the Christian faith is concerned, there are certain truths which must be epistemically accessible (e.g. Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person), and this will inform one's epistemology.
I get what you're saying, but in my case, not only do I lead with epistemology, I do so by way of a strong leaning toward more Naturalized Epistemology, one that is Realist rather than either Idealist or Anti-Realist, and at that, with an influence from Critical Realists rather than Direct Realists which allows me to have my cake and eat it too; I get to have my Wittgenstein and my Quine (and so many others) all at the same time.............because I "know" that where religious faith is concerned, no one philosopher, scientist or theologian has all of the "right answers." No, no one but God could have those answers, a fact that then takes on a completely different axis of epistemic conceptualization in our mental matrix, one that human reasoning will have to admit at the "beginning" is, and only can be, partial and fragmentary.
But yeah. Historical evaluation (and prayer) are the mode(s) by which I think Christianity is to be conceptually assessed. So, on that count, I think you and I have some epistemic commonality even though I know we'll land on different epistemic tracts that extend through the same 100 acres. I, too, "begin" with the idea that Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person, as were Peter, Paul and Mary and so many others ... but I don't assess these historical facts as being axiomatic in a way that is clearly demonstrable and sufficient for others to likewise accept or be involuntarily compelled by. Not that they need to be, really, or could be.
In other words, figuring out that Jesus is Lord and Savior is not a programming or engineering problem to be solved, and we confuse ourselves when we treat it as such in a 'Lockstep' fashion that should be expected in industries dealing with here and now
Techne.
