A Malebranche Quote for Consideration

[public hermit]

A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Search After Truth)

Nicolas Malebranche - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly? Must a philosopher "see evidently."
(I take the second claim to be an epistemic one requiring an evidenced foundation, i.e., clear and distinct ideas in the Cartesian fashion. Of course, for Malebranche, this includes God's extra-experiential guarantee)

For me, both claims are too strong, regardless of context. I don't see Christian faith as being without reason, which I take "blind faith" to entail. If blind faith simply means *lack of certainty,* which it likely did for Malebranche, then the claim tells its age, imo.

Malebranch was a convinced believer, and he was also a Cartesian. Like Descartes, he was enamored with the idea of certainty and securing everything down to a certain foundation. If a belief couldn't be secured in some way to certainty, it was not knowledge- strictly speaking. I don't have that kind of epistemic standard. I'm not sure it's possible, and I certainly don't see philosophy as needing a certain foundation in that sense. I'm happy if things are reasonable and not obviously false. We know all kinds of things that can be doubted.

As an aside, Malebranche's occasionalism seems unnecessary and only exacerbates the dualism, but I would agree God guarantees veracity. It just think the divine guarantee is through the created order and not in spite of it or along with it. His occasionalism seems very ad hoc and unhelpful.

I do think both Christian faith and philosophy should proceed in the light of the available evidence, whatever that may be. There has to be some coherence between the availble evidence and my faith. If it is certain, then it must be included. And I think our degree of credulity in the evidence should track its evidentiary value. For instance, if the evidence is strong, I should have a similar credence of belief. But all veritable/credible evidence to which I have access should be a viable aspect of my faith and/or philosophy. Depending on the level of credulity required, I can't simply reject evidence as false because it doesn't seem to fit.

Of course, I see things that way because of my faith, i.e., all truth has one Source. Does that article of faith make it blind, then? I don't think so. First, I have reasons for thinking one Source makes sense. But I also don't think any of us can escape making ontological claims/commitments on the world, i.e. large assumptions about reality, and I don't think we can be certain of the ontological claims we make. No matter how one sees the world, a step of faith is being made somewhere epistemically important. I don't think that's all blind faith. I mean, we all have our reasons. And, I think many people today can live with a lack of certainty. That's where I think many have moved beyond the Cartesian obsession with certainty as an epistemic requirement. Since the time of Malebranche, we have a new physical account that allows for uncertainty. A lot has changed. Certainly for me, I think we can have reasonable faith and a less than certain philosophy.

 

[Mark Quayle]

A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Seach After Truth)

Nicolas Malebranche - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly? Must a philosopher "see evidently."
(I take the second claim to be an epistemic one requiring an evidenced foundation, i.e., clear and distinct ideas in the Cartesian fashion. Of course, for Malebranche, this includes God's extra-experiential guarantee)

For me, both claims are too strong, regardless of context. I don't see Christian faith as being without reason, which I take "blind faith" to entail. If blind faith simply means *lack of certainty,* which it likely did for Malebranche, then the claim tells its age, imo.

Malebranch was a convinced believer, and he was also a Cartesian. Like Descartes, he was enamored with the idea of certainty and securing everything down to a certain foundation. If a belief couldn't be secured in some way to certainty, it was not knowledge- strictly speaking. I don't have that kind of epistemic standard. I'm not sure it's possible, and I certainly don't see philosophy as needing a certain foundation in that sense. I'm happy if things are reasonable and not obviously false. We know all kinds of things that can be doubted.

As an aside, Malebranche's occasionalism seems unnecessary and only exacerbates the dualism, but I would agree God guarantees veracity. It just think the divine guarantee is through the created order and not in spite of it or along with it. His occasionalism seems very ad hoc and unhelpful.

I do think both Christian faith and philosophy should proceed in the light of the available evidence, whatever that may be. There has to be some coherence between the availble evidence and my faith. If it is certain, then it must be included. And I think our degree of credulity in the evidence should track its evidentiary value. For instance, if the evidence is strong, I should have a similar credence of belief. But all veritable/credible evidence to which I have access should be a viable aspect of my faith and/or philosophy. Depending on the level of credulity required, I can't simply reject evidence as false because it doesn't seem to fit.

Of course, I see things that way because of my faith, i.e., all truth has one Source. Does that article of faith make it blind, then? I don't think so. First, I have reasons for thinking one Source makes sense. But I also don't think any of us can escape making ontological claims/commitments on the world, i.e. large assumptions about reality, and I don't think we can be certain of the ontological claims we make. No matter how one sees the world, a step of faith is being made somewhere epistemically important. I don't think that's all blind faith. I mean, we all have our reasons. And, I think many people today can live with a lack of certainty. That's where I think many have moved beyond the Cartesian obsession with certainty as an epistemic requirement. Since the time of Malebranche, we have a new physical account that allows for uncertainty. A lot has changed. Certainly for me, I think we can have reasonable faith and a less than certain philosophy.

I disagree. A philosopher can reason concerning the unseen. And a believer that abandons reason (not that Malebranche equates believing blindly to abandoning reason, but close enough) is worshiping abstractions, and not God. Faith is the expectation of what is not seen —not of what has no meaning. The fact that we cannot know the depth of what is not empirical doesn't mean we can't know enough. In fact, even what is empirical, we don't know the depth of.

 

[zippy2006]

Citations, context, links:

But Before I conclude this Chapter, 'tis necessary to observe three Things. The First is, That I speak not here of things of Faith, which have no Evidence attending them, as have Natural Sciences: The Reason of which seems to be this, That we can have no Perception of Things but from the Idea's we have of them. Now the Idea's we have, are only given us by God, according to our Exigencies and the need we have of them to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things, according to which he has Created us. So that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Or∣der, we need not wonder if we want that Evidence, since we want the Idea's of them; because our Souls were Created by vertue of a General Decree, through which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us,* but the Mysteries of Faith have receiv'd their Establishment only from an Order of Grace; which, in our ordinary way of Conception, is a Decree posteriour to this Order of Nature.

Mysteries then of Faith must be distinguish'd from things of Nature: We ought equally to submit to Faith and to Evidence; but in the concernments of Faith, we must not look for Evidence; as in those of Nature, we ought not to take up with Faith: That is, with the Authority of Philosophers. In a word, to be a Believer, 'tis requir'd to Assent blindly, but to be a Philosopher, it is necessary to See plainly.

'Tis not however to be deny'd but there are some Truths besides those of Faith, for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations, as are those which relate to Matter of Fact in History, and other things which have their dependence on the Will of Men. For there are two kinds of Truth; the one Necessary, the other Contingent. . .

-Treatise Concerning the Search After Truth, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 8

Which obliges me to make some Reflexions upon what he has borrowed from Faith to add to Reasons Philosophical, which is what we may look upon as his third Supposition.

After having prov'd that we must yield only to Evidence, except in matters of Faith, which are not submitted to the disquisition of Reason; I conclude with these words.*

Mysteries then of Faith must be distinguished from things of Nature: we ought equally to submit to Faith and to Evidence, but in the concernments of Faith we must not look for Evidence, as in those of Nature we ought not to take up with Faith; that is, with the Authority of Philosophers. In a word, to be a Believer 'tis required to assent blindly, but to be a Philosopher it is necessary to see plainly.​

Mysteries of Faith must be distinguished from things of Nature. Thus judiciously speaks the Author, and concludes with these words, which might even pass for a Proverb: To be a Believer 'tis requir'd to assent blindly, but to be a Philosopher 'tis necessary to see plainly. Mean while I wonder he observes not in his Book the Resolution he made of not mingling the concerns of Religion with the decisions of Philosophy: for it's too visible that one half of his Book is nothing but Reflexions upon original Sin, deprav'd Manners, and corrupt Inclinations, which Christian Morality is to correct.

I blame not his Piety in this, nor believe it a thing unbecoming a Christian to labour upon these Subjects. But that ought to be reserv'd for Sermons.

Or if he had design'd to take the occasion of insinuating these Morals, as knowing that the true way of moving the Heart pathetically is to do it by discovering to the Mind the Truths that are of nearest concernment to it; he might have satisfied that laudable desire, but should have contriv'd for that purpose particular Chapters, which he has done too in some places. But once more, a very little thing will serve to confound the Light we begin to receive in the Search after Truth.

We cannot at the same time satisfie both Reason and Faith, since Reason obliges us to open our Eyes, and Faith commands us to shut them.

And yet I find he has so interwoven his principal Propositions with the Credenda of Religion, that he seems to talk more like a Divine than Philosopher. For example,* . . .

-Treatise Concerning the Search After Truth, Preface to Vol. 2

 

[zippy2006]

For me, both claims are too strong, regardless of context. I don't see Christian faith as being without reason, which I take "blind faith" to entail.

Do you see a difference between Christianity and philosophy? If there is a difference, and it is not what Malebranche says it is, then what is the real difference?

 

[public hermit]

Do you see a difference between Christianity and philosophy? If there is a difference, and it is not what Malebranche says it is, then what is the real difference?

I do see a difference, even though they share features. Malebranche's requirement for philosophy is too stringent and for faith too limited. Both faith and philosophy can lack demonstrable certainty while also being reasonable and commensurate with experience. Christian faith and philosophy differ primarily because the philosophical frameworks/positions (or just individuals doing philosophy) differ. Our frameworks/positions are often, for better or worse, insufficiently certain to avoid difference. Malebranche was much more confident in philosophy from his early modern pov than I am.

At any rate, philosophy is what makes the difference. Malebranche and Thomas Aquinas were both Christian philosophers, but one was Cartesian and the other Aristotelian. Same faith; different philosophies.

 

[zippy2006]

I do see a difference, even though they share features. Malebranche's requirement for philosophy is too stringent and for faith too limited. Both faith and philosophy can lack demonstrable certainty while also being reasonable and commensurate with experience.

Okay sure, but to be clear, these are predications of similarity.

Christian faith and philosophy differ primarily because the philosophical frameworks/positions (or just individuals doing philosophy) differ.

But is this an answer to the question? There are two possible answers here. The first is, "The position of Christianity and the position of philosophy differ because the two positions differ." The second is, "Christianity differs from philosophy because the individuals in each group differ; Christians differ from philosophers." Neither of these provides me with any understanding of the putative difference between Christianity and philosophy. Socrates would not be pleased.

To repeat my question: Do you see a difference between Christianity and philosophy? If there is a difference, and it is not what Malebranche says it is, then what is the real difference?

At any rate, philosophy is what makes the difference. Malebranche and Thomas Aquinas were both Christian philosophers, but one was Cartesian and the other Aristotelian. Same faith; different philosophies.

So the difference between Malebranche and Aquinas was a matter of philosophy because they were both Christian, but one was Cartesian and the other was Aristotelian? Could one say that the difference was theological/religious because they were both philosophers but one was an occasionalist and one was a concurrentist? (Regardless, to claim that Malebranche and Aquinas differ on the basis of philosophy does not elucidate the manner in which philosophy differs from Christianity. One could plausibly say that Christianity is merely one variety of philosophy, and that Malebranche and Aquinas are offering two contrasting philosophy hybrids.)

What I find is that for those who come from the tradition of liberal Protestantism (Schleiermacher et al.) there is no real or significant difference between Christianity and (a) philosophy. Given that Malebranche is positing a clear difference between Christianity and philosophy, and you are influenced by that Protestant tradition, I am curious to know how you would respond to Malebranche in a way that is constructive. Whatever else we might want say about Malebranche, the contrast he draws between a Christian and a philosopher is clear and accessible.

 

[public hermit]

But is this an answer to the question?

Yeah, it does as far as I'm concerned. Maybe you have a different position.

What I find is that for those who come from the tradition of liberal Protestantism (Schleiermacher et al.) there is no real or significant difference between Christianity and (a) philosophy. Given that Malebranche is positing a clear difference between Christianity and philosophy, and you are influenced by that Protestant tradition, I am curious to know how you would respond to Malebranche in a way that is constructive. Whatever else we might want say about Malebranche, the contrast he draws between a Christian and a philosopher is clear and accessible

If you want to contrast Schleiermacher and Malebranche, have at it. I'm not arguing that point.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Search After Truth)

Nicolas Malebranche - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly? Must a philosopher "see evidently."
(I take the second claim to be an epistemic one requiring an evidenced foundation, i.e., clear and distinct ideas in the Cartesian fashion. Of course, for Malebranche, this includes God's extra-experiential guarantee)

For me, both claims are too strong, regardless of context. I don't see Christian faith as being without reason, which I take "blind faith" to entail. If blind faith simply means *lack of certainty,* which it likely did for Malebranche, then the claim tells its age, imo.

I agree with you that Malebranche's epistemic appraisals. built as they were in continuance with his "occassionalism," seem to be too strong. As I've said here for years, and alluding to the philosophers that I particularly rely upon, I see Christian faith as a full mental response to, or toward, God and His Revelation in Christ into the World.

I would go on to say that there is no such thing as "blind faith." We, at minimum, on even a human level, have to cognitively wrestle with the content of the Trinitarian Tradition historically handed on by the Church. On a theological level, we then rationally apprehend (and accept) the further reasonable conclusion that, whether we sense God and His effects or not, or perceive indicia of His presence and work, or not, that He somehow has his Providence and His Spirit at work in our lives and minds, nevertheless.

Faith isn't blind. It's just misunderstood because all too often folks quote some favorite verse like Hebrews 11:1 out of context and run with it, injecting a confused definition of faith into the argument that no study of the original Greek N.T texts would support. Some Christians do this, and these days, a load of atheists (aka Ex-Christians) do it too.

Malebranch was a convinced believer, and he was also a Cartesian. Like Descartes, he was enamored with the idea of certainty and securing everything down to a certain foundation. If a belief couldn't be secured in some way to certainty, it was not knowledge- strictly speaking. I don't have that kind of epistemic standard. I'm not sure it's possible, and I certainly don't see philosophy as needing a certain foundation in that sense. I'm happy if things are reasonable and not obviously false. We know all kinds of things that can be doubted.

i agree. The problem is that certainty becomes a conceptual idol in a world in which there are very few guarantees anyway. Moreover, Foundationalism as an epistemic framework doesn't really deliver--or maintain-- the sort of certainty that so many people want. Not that I blame them for wanting it since cognitive dissonance is no fun when we're already stressed by life.

As an aside, Malebranche's occasionalism seems unnecessary and only exacerbates the dualism, but I would agree God guarantees veracity. It just think the divine guarantee is through the created order and not in spite of it or along with it. His occasionalism seems very ad hoc and unhelpful.

I do think both Christian faith and philosophy should proceed in the light of the available evidence, whatever that may be. There has to be some coherence between the availble evidence and my faith. If it is certain, then it must be included. And I think our degree of credulity in the evidence should track its evidentiary value. For instance, if the evidence is strong, I should have a similar credence of belief. But all veritable/credible evidence to which I have access should be a viable aspect of my faith and/or philosophy. Depending on the level of credulity required, I can't simply reject evidence as false because it doesn't seem to fit.

Agreed. But the caveat is that it's difficult to cite an exact criterion by which we 'should' concede our strength and vitality of belief to some appearance of credibility. Sure, we could pragmatically cite that if we feel compelled by evidence to respond in an involuntary way to what we think is true, that that count as "sufficiency," but then I'm going to ask: have we indeed accounted for all factors in that instance, or is it that the state of the momentary seemliness of evidence deceives us into feeling compelled?

On the other hand, we may fault in the other direction, as you've already mentioned, and end up rejecting evidence as false because we don't think it fits............or, worse, we just don't like the outcome or the answer.

Of course, I see things that way because of my faith, i.e., all truth has one Source. Does that article of faith make it blind, then? I don't think so. First, I have reasons for thinking one Source makes sense. But I also don't think any of us can escape making ontological claims/commitments on the world, i.e. large assumptions about reality, and I don't think we can be certain of the ontological claims we make. No matter how one sees the world, a step of faith is being made somewhere epistemically important. I don't think that's all blind faith. I mean, we all have our reasons. And, I think many people today can live with a lack of certainty. That's where I think many have moved beyond the Cartesian obsession with certainty as an epistemic requirement. Since the time of Malebranche, we have a new physical account that allows for uncertainty. A lot has changed. Certainly for me, I think we can have reasonable faith and a less than certain philosophy.

Yes, I think we can have a reasonable faith as well. In fact, I'm more of the sort who would go so far as to say that if a person's assent to Christianity isn't reasonable but merely emotional in nature, then it's probably not actually coherent or a grounded state of belief.

 

[zippy2006]

Yeah, it does as far as I'm concerned.

Anyone can see that "they differ because they differ" does not answer the question, "Why do they differ?" This does not even approximate a serious answer.

 

[public hermit]

Anyone can see that "they differ because they differ" does not answer the question, "Why do they differ?" This does not even approximate a serious answer.

You think Malebranche does, i.e., one is blind faith in authority and the other is evidentiary based? Is that how you see the difference between faith and philosophy?

I already stated why they differ: one remains the same and the other changes. If they both remained the same, there would be no difference; there would be one philosophy for Christian faith. You have to look at the specifics of particular philosophies to see why they differ from Christian faith.

 

[zippy2006]

You think Malebranche does...?

Malebranche answers the question, so that's something:

Q: What is the difference between Christianity and philosophy?​

Malebranche: The difference is one of blind assent vs. plain sight.​

​

Q: What is the difference between Christianity and philosophy?​

Public Hermit: They differ primarily because the positions differ.​

​

Do you think that these answers are on par with one another?

---

Responding to your edit:

I already stated why they differ: one remains the same and the other changes. If they both remained the same, there would be no difference; there would be one philosophy for Christian faith. You have to look at the specifics of particular philosophies to see why they differ from Christian faith.

Okay, then I misunderstood. In your first reply you were apparently saying that Christianity differs from philosophy because philosophies differ one from another. Maybe I didn't state my question clearly enough. Malebranche speaks about the difference between a faithful Christian and a philosopher, and perhaps that is the better way to phrase it. I was not asking about how the species of Christianity differs from the genus of philosophy, for of course in this case the difference is that the former is one and the latter contains many. I was trying to ask the question that Malebranche is attempting to answer, and this pertains to philosophy as a unified practice, not as a collection of varied and different philosophical systems. Malebranche is saying, "This is the difference between the faithful Christian and the philosopher." Your OP basically says, "That's not right." My question is, "Well, what do you say the difference between the faithful Christian and the philosopher is, if there is one?"

Now you give a different answer in your edit here, namely that one remains the same and the other changes. Again, I am wondering about the (contrary or contradictory) difference between Christian practice and philosophical practice, which is what Malebranche was speaking to.

 

[public hermit]

Malebranche answers the question, so that's something:

Q: What is the difference between Christianity and philosophy?​

Malebranche: The difference is one of blind assent vs. plain sight.​

​

Q: What is the difference between Christianity and philosophy?​

Public Hermit: They differ primarily because the positions differ.​

​

Do you think that these answers are on par with one another?

That's not quite accurate. I said Christian faith remains the same, the philosophies that have been used to frame it differ. For instance, you can see the same phenomena through different lenses (or same phenomenon that matches two different models). That's the analogy. Same phenomenon, different lenses. Forget Schleiermacher, think Wittgenstein. Same faith, different philosophical frameworks. If you're wanting me to accept his epistemic criteria for either, I don't. The reasons for that I've stated. I have to assume you buy his distinction. Okay, fine. That's not how I see the relation between Christian faith and philosophy.

 

[public hermit]

I was trying to ask the question that Malebranche is attempting to answer, and this pertains to philosophy as a unified practice, not as a collection of varied and different philosophical systems

Well, stop, because that is wrong-headed. His assumption that philosophy can be a unified practice is antiquated and based on an idea of certainty as a goal that doesn't work. It's an early modern assumption that is wrong.

 

[zippy2006]

That's the analogy. Same phenomenon, different lenses.

If you understand what Malebranche is doing, he is giving an argument for why the activity of the faithful Christian is incompatible with the activity of the philosopher (which in fact does not exclude the possibility of Christian philosophers). What you have done is said that Christianity is the "phenomenon" and philosophy is the "lens", such that the lenses are interchangeable. The difference is that your argument in no way implies an incompatibility between Christianity and philosophy, and thus it would seem that in responding to my original question you should rather have answered, "No, not necessarily."

How am I to identify the difference between a "phenomenon" and a "lens"? How am I to know that Christianity is not itself a philosophy? Or that Malebranche was a philosopher Christian and not a Christian philosopher? After all, there are also philosophies which are unified, just as there are also philosophies which do not change.

Well, stop, because that is wrong-headed. His assumption that philosophy can be a unified practice is antiquated...

Oh dear, it's "antiquated." So when you use the word "philosophy" you don't believe there is any unified sense between different predications? For example, that Stoic philosophy and Epicurean philosophy do not belong to any common genus, or possess any commonality vis-a-vis their both being philosophies?

 

[public hermit]

If you understand what Malebranche is doing, he is giving an argument for why the activity of the faithful Christian is incompatible with the activity of the philosopher (which in fact does not exclude the possibility of Christian philosophers). What you have done is said that Christianity is the "phenomenon" and philosophy is the "lens", such that the lenses are interchangeable. The difference is that your argument in no way implies an incompatibility between Christianity and philosophy, and thus it would seem that in responding to my original question you should rather have answered, "No, not necessarily."

How am I to identify the difference between a "phenomenon" and a "lens"? How am I to know that Christianity is not itself a philosophy? Or that Malebranche was a philosopher Christian and not a Christian philosopher? After all, there are also philosophies which are unified, just as there are also philosophies which do not change.


Oh dear, it's "antiquated." So when you use the word "philosophy" you don't believe there is any unified sense between different predications? For example, that Stoic philosophy and Epicurean philosophy do not belong to any common genus, or possess any commonality vis-a-vis their both being philosophies?

If you and Malebranche need to find an incompatibility between Christianity and philosophy, be my guest. You seem annoyed I'm not on board with the search. Oh well.

If you find an incompatible philosophy, that just means it's time to move on. If you can't tell the difference between your faith and your philosophy, that's on you. Is that what this is about? Do you think there is only one fitting philosophy? Are no philosophies fitting?

Maybe your desire for a certain, definable criteria is part of your philosophy? Is that necessary for Christian faith? You should speak for yourself instead of Malenbranche. You seem to want to avoid any personal commitments, while fully expecting mine, which makes this conversation even more boring. What say you?

 

[zippy2006]

If you and Malebranche need to find an incompatibility between Christianity and philosophy, be my guest. You seem annoyed I'm not on board with the search. Oh well.

Rather, the OP turned out to be little more than a bit of rock-throwing. You picked a sentence out of a 400,000 word work, gave some simplistic objections, and completely ignored the question that Malebranche was considering. I find it more interesting to engage seriously, abstaining from lobbing petty criticisms while simultaneously refusing to offer any alternative answer to the question at hand. If I can draw someone out of that sort of eristic into a serious conversation then it greenlights the thread. If not and the person remains unwilling to consider the question seriously, then the nuanced positions would only be pearls before swine.

Or in other words: this is apparently just another thread for throwing tomatoes, this time at Malebranche. Another riff on your "epistemic humility." How exciting. I had wondered if there could be more.

I think we can have reasonable faith and a less than certain philosophy.

I don't think you recognize any significant difference between Christianity and a philosophy. Everything you say in this thread converges towards that point.

 

[public hermit]

Rather, the OP turned out to be little more than a bit of rock-throwing. You picked a sentence out of a 400,000 word work, gave some simplistic objections, and completely ignored the question that Malebranche was considering. I find it more interesting to engage seriously, abstaining from lobbing petty criticisms while simultaneously refusing to offer any alternative answer to the question at hand. If I can draw someone out of that sort of eristic into a serious conversation then it greenlights the thread. If not and the person remains unwilling to consider the question seriously, then the nuanced positions would only be pearls before swine.

Or in other words: this is apparently just another thread for throwing tomatoes, this time at Malebranche. Another riff on your "epistemic humility." How exciting. I had wondered if there could be more.


I don't think you recognize any significant difference between Christianity and a philosophy. Everything you say in this thread converges towards that point.

Lol, the only thing that has turned badly is your psuedo- participation in this thread. You haven't come close to saying a word about the OP or the quote in question. You created a question no one is asking and then got hurt when I didn't go along.

Does zippy think faithful Christians believe blindly or philosophers see evidently? No one knows. I certainly don't care what you think even you were able to muster a thought actually related to the OP.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Rather, the OP turned out to be little more than a bit of rock-throwing. You picked a sentence out of a 400,000 word work, gave some simplistic objections, and completely ignored the question that Malebranche was considering. I find it more interesting to engage seriously, abstaining from lobbing petty criticisms while simultaneously refusing to offer any alternative answer to the question at hand. If I can draw someone out of that sort of eristic into a serious conversation then it greenlights the thread. If not and the person remains unwilling to consider the question seriously, then the nuanced positions would only be pearls before swine.

Or in other words: this is apparently just another thread for throwing tomatoes, this time at Malebranche. Another riff on your "epistemic humility." How exciting. I had wondered if there could be more.


I don't think you recognize any significant difference between Christianity and a philosophy. Everything you say in this thread converges towards that point.

I wish someone would try to draw me out ...

The thing is, Zippy, this thread doesn't upset me and I do agree to some extent with @public hermit, even if only partially.

And, why can't we criticize (or question, really) Malebranche if we want to? Personally, I go in for the findings of modern Neuro-science before I consider adopting some idea about "occasionalism" from the Baroque period. Maybe I'm just hood-winked by the practical effectiveness of modernity and have to struggle to get theological ideas to inhere to my confederation of fragmentary coherence where the philosophical "having" of religion (or faith) is concerned. That, and the fact that where "science" is relevant, I'll stick with Methodological Naturalism for the time being since I wrestle so deeply with Ontology.

The one thing that bothers me here is that someone like Pierre Bayle thought Malebranche "one of the greatest philosophers of this age" That's a head scratcher for me! More to the point, this whole piece from the OP article bothers the heck out of me:

Pierre Bayle regarded Malebranche as "one of the greatest philosophers of this age" (though, admittedly, not as the greatest, as is often reported).[4] In note H to his "Zeno of Elea" article, Bayle discussed Malebranche's views on material substance with particular approval. Occasionalism and the vision in God seem to make the real existence of material substance redundant. Not only is it unable to be directly perceived, but it cannot actually affect us or anything else in any way at all. Descartes had also maintained that matter was not directly perceivable, but he had argued that the veracity of God could support a proof of its certain existence. Malebranche, however, weakened Descartes' argument, concluding that, from a philosophical point of view, its existence could only be shown to be probable. Bayle pushed even further down this same path, thereby laying much of the ground work for the immaterialism of George Berkeley. Berkeley, influenced both by Bayle and directly by Malebranche himself, simply took the final step to a full denial of the existence of material substance. (Arthur Collier, who was also influenced directly by Malebranche, and by Norris, made the same move at around the same time as Berkeley did, but, it would appear, entirely independently of him.) Berkeley, admittedly, did reject the theory of vision in God. "It is evident", he insisted, "that the things I perceive are my own ideas."[5] But he was influenced by Malebranche's occasionalism, even though he excluded the activity of created minds from its domain. In addition, Berkeley agreed with Malebranche, against Descartes, that we could not achieve a clear idea of the mind itself. John Locke had also argued for this, but he had made no distinction between minds and bodies on this point, whereas both Berkeley and Malebranche maintained (each in his own way) that we could have ideas of bodies but not of minds.​

​

It's like, on the one hand, Malebranche and Berkeley, and the like almost presuppose lines of thought that eventuate into Methodological Naturalism, but in the process and for the sake of theology to save appearances, they then invert the realization and, so as not to leave theology out of it, stuff the Bible into the conceptual gaps and give a theological bow to something we can't know empirically but is rationally supposed, "occasionalism." ............... it MUST be God who animates us. What?!!!!!!!!!!!!!

40,000 words too much. Sometimes, less is more.

You see, it's in the midst of this sort of philosophical rambling that I bring in Basil Mitchell's ideas on "Theological Ping-Pong."

 

[zippy2006]

I wish someone would try to draw me out ...

I don't see a need, and your answer was more substantive. You distinguished, in the matter of faith, a "full mental response" from a limited or partial response.*

And, why can't we criticize (or question, really) Malebranche if we want to?

One can of course criticize in an entirely non-constructive manner. I call it unserious tomato-throwing. PH relies on evasion, "Malebranche's answer to the question is wrong and I refuse to offer my own answer." Thing is, wrongness is a relative idea. Ideas often act as counteracting poles, and the attempt to naively dismiss serious thinkers is also an attempt to avoid thinking seriously. If someone isn't willing to offer an answer to a question, then they do not understand the answer to the question; and if they do not understand the answer, then it's not clear why they would be so quick to claim to understand the faults of other answers. The OP is really just casting aspersions (e.g. proximity to Descartes, allusions to occasionalism, "antiquated therefore false," etc.). There is no substantive interaction occurring. There is no serious engagement occurring.

Personally, I go in for the findings of modern Neuro-science before I consider adopting some idea about "occasionalism" from the Baroque period.

What does occasionalism have to do with with the quote from the OP? It might have some relation, but there are scores of non-occasionalist thinkers who have made the same sort of claim. The danger here is falling into a simplistic trope or association between Malebranche and occasionalism, as if anything we don't like in his writings can automatically be dismissed on the charge of occasionalism.

Aristotle strikes me as a good model for serious thinking. When he encounters someone like Malebranche he says, "He was right about this. He was wrong about that. The correct answer to the question he was asking is such-and-such." A balance and objectivity is maintained.

* Edit: In fact I am currently having a discussion with an Orthodox theologian on a closely related matter, and what you say would also be the gist of my own approach. Nevertheless, the full/partial idea does not wholly undermine Malebranche's claim, especially if we understand him charitably as hyperbolically juxtaposing two different forms.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I don't see a need, and your answer was more substantive. You distinguished, in the matter of faith, a "full mental response" from a limited or partial response.


One can of course criticize in an entirely non-constructive manner. I call it unserious tomato-throwing. PH relies on evasion, "Malebranche's answer to the question is wrong and I refuse to offer my own answer." Thing is, wrongness is a relative idea. Ideas often act as counteracting poles, and the attempt to naively dismiss serious thinkers is also an attempt to avoid thinking seriously. If someone isn't willing to offer an answer to a question, then they do not understand the answer to the question; and if they do not understand the answer, then it's not clear why they would be so quick to claim to understand the faults of other answers. The OP is really just casting aspersions (e.g. proximity to Descartes, allusions to occasionalism, "antiquated therefore false," etc.). There is no substantive interaction occurring. There is no serious engagement occurring.

That's true. We can criticize in a non-constructive manner. But as for PH, at the moment, I'm not reading his responses as evasive in nature, but rather as generalized (?)

As for wrongness being relative, I'd say that it, itself, is relative to the chosen or defaulting frame of perception by which a phenomenon or concept [X] has been assessed... but I do agree firmly with you in citing that "the attempt to naively dismiss serious thinkers is also an attempt to avoid thinking seriously." That can't be too overly emphasized these days. But, do you really think PH is being evasive? I mean, I think all three of us can articulate a comparative list of aspects (conceptual taxonomies) between Philosophy and Christianity, and I think all three of us know they are in different analytic categories (as you've already previously cited). Of course, I'm sure you and PH might do a better job of it than I would, but regardless ...

As for casting aspersions upon Descartes, everyone since Pascal has been doing so...

I suppose, instead, we could take Ratzinger's approach in hand, but then I'd want to avoid conflating my own penchant for Modern and Post-Modern Philosophy with that of too much emphasis upon the Ancient Greeks.

What does occasionalism have to do with with the quote from the OP? It might have some relation, but there are scores of non-occasionalist thinkers who have made the same sort of claim. The danger here is falling into a simplistic trope or association between Malebranche and occasionalism, as if anything we don't like in his writings can automatically be dismissed on the charge of occasionalism.

Ok. I'll give you that point of clarification. I think can agree with you to some extent. But I'm not seeing the overall epistemological benefit of giving Malebranche too much credit. I don't do that for Pascal, or Descartes, or Kierkegaard. I won't do it for Malebranche either.

Aristotle strikes me as a good model for serious thinking. When he encounters someone like Malebranche he says, "He was right about this. He was wrong about that. The correct answer to the question he was asking is such-and-such." A balance and objectivity is maintained.

Mmmmmmmmmmmmm............................. It's time to leave Aristotle and Ptolemy over in the shadows, mainly because there is such a thing as obscuration in regard to one's own "actual objectivity." I mean, we're talking about the man who taught Alexander the Great. I don't necessarily see that as a "plus of virtue."