I frequently see this despite NO evidence that this security is ineffectual (and there are news stories where the TSA chief has shown contraband that's been confiscated thanks to the scanners).
Oh! Don't misunderstand. I know they find lots of stuff. They found lots of stuff with the traditional metal detectors, too. Occasionally they find stuff on me that I didn't know I had! More often, they don't. Whatever. It hasn't stopped a single terrorist from getting through. Ever. The only terrorists who have been stopped in the U.S. have been stopped by other passengers. We are vigilant since 911. _We_ are making our planes secure because the TSA isn't. The problem with the TSA's system is that they are looking in the wrong place for danger. And until they change, they will always be at least a step behind the terrorists.
Although Adam Savage's case is a bit extreme, it will serve as a good example: suppose somebody had actually been doing their job and looking at the scan when he went through it, and had seen the two 12" blades. They would have been taken away. Security, right? Well, Adam Savage wasn't going to hold anybody hostage or blow up a plane. They could claim it as a victory ("look at these two twelve inch blades we confiscated"), but the simple truth is that he isn't a terrorist. So even though they didn't find the blades, it didn't matter in his case. Note: they _would_ have found the blades in a traditional metal detector. Now, the metal detectors wouldn't find the underwear bomber's bomb, but... neither will the new scanners! They aren't designed for that.
Ultimately, detecting peoples' water bottles and nail files isn't security. _I_ discovered a set of nail clippers on Wednesday in my backpack (while I was packing) that I had been taking on flights since I finished grad school! But even if TSA were reliable, it wouldn't be security. We aren't safer because they find contraband on normal people. The reason is that normal people aren't a security risk, with or without the things they have labeled as contraband.
Consider that El Al, the Israeli airline, actually distributes metal knives with its meals. Can you guess how many hijackings they've had in the last half-century? TSA is looking at the wrong things. It is looking at the things common people bring on board the plane. The terrorists know what TSA is looking for, and they will simply bring something else. Or they will acquire what they need in the shops behind security.
The list of dangerous items can grow arbitrarily long. And although TSA may (or may not) confiscate those items from us when they (and we) discover that they are on our persons or in our bags, the terrorists are undeterred. Further, when TSA finally gets around to buying a scanner that will detect a bomb like the underwear bomb, will the next bomb be carried in a body cavity? How will TSA change its methods then?
Out of curiousity, what would you acknowledge as "real security" and not "security theatre"?
This is a good question. And if we really want our government to protect us, it needs to ask this question, too.
I would cite the Israelis as knowing something about airline security. Therefore, it would be advisable to analyze their model. Now, it would be exceedingly expensive to implement the Israeli system in the U.S. (they do background checks on everyone who flies and then a 5-minute interview of each passenger by a trained interviewer). If we really wanted our government to guarantee our security on airlines, we would do it. It's political suicide for the party that proposes it because of the cost, of course. But the Israeli model is much more along the lines of identifying dangerous people than creating an ever-growing list of dangerous items. Perhaps there is something we could do that adheres more to that model than the list of contraband.
At any rate, the Israelis say the TSA's current model give passengers
the illusion of security without giving us real security. But you know this from personal experience if you've ever flown. You discover something in your bag or on your person that they missed. You have seen the security procedures applied inconsistently when lines get long (and they get long every day of the year in every major airport in the country). Real security does not come by seeing what the terrorists do and then patching that hole and waiting for them to make the next move. There is an endless sea of holes when you look at security in that way. No! You look at the people. You profile indiscriminately. We don't need to be protected from Adam Savage's blades. The danger comes from John Doe Terrorist who has a device that we haven't considered hidden in a place we aren't (yet) willing to look. There may be an endless list of dangerous items, but there is a definite (and exhaustible) list of people who will show up at the airport today.