So you agree that the utility of information is in its applicability to make predictions, not in the stories we tell about why it is so. That's good, but you should note that religious explanations tend to be the ones with tacked-on stories about why things are so, not scientific ones. Kosher laws were useful before we knew how to cook pork safely and test shellfish for mercury, but you can't conclude that all of Judaism is true just because people were getting sick from tainted meat until someone told them to stop. A scientific approach is much more parsimonious, and science is what allows us to eat pork (relatively) safely today.
Either your religious claim makes a prediction we can test, or it is completely irrelevant. Seriously - if God is just the force behind every mechanism we don't quite understand, that's fine. Unless that information can be applied for some pragmatic purpose, I don't care at all. It makes no difference. It doesn't need to be addressed. I'm going to keep probing these mechanisms until there's nothing left to discover about them. If God's existence does make a difference, on the other hand, I would like to know what that difference is, what predictions it makes, and how I can apply that to my decisions.
No, I disagree. Ideas' worth lies in its utility. Not necessarily to make predictions. If it had no utility, it would not have survived as a concept. This may be psychological, practical, for survival, but even soteriological utility. The latter being the one that often really matters to the religious, as I have been trying to stress, and you seem not to grasp, we are not trying to do the same things with science and religion. Ideas directed toward trying to save Man from Sin or such, a metaphysical conception, would never have predictive utility in quotidian ways, but to reject its value in entirety, is simply a philosophical judgement, little more. It is assuming what needs to be proved, therefore, on your part.
I was more pointing out the inadequacy and deep flaws of your example of handwashing, which fundamentally came down to the same thing either way, and therefore had no fundamental differentiation.
You're basically asking how to build a good epistemology, and I've already stated that the only kind of epistemology I find useful is one that follows the pragmatic maxim. The "truth value" or "factuality" of any given statement is in its ability to produce predictable results.
To make this a little more clear, consider this thought experiment. Imagine a possible world where everything I believe about the universe is categorically false. However, every decision I make based on my false beliefs turns out maximally predictable and desirable for me anyway. Likewise, every decision I make based on "true" beliefs yields unpredictable and undesirable results. Is it really meaningful to say that anything I believed was "false?" I don't think so. I think it's best to calibrate our beliefs to the one thing we can actually be sure of, and that's our direct sensory experience. Even if our experience is not an accurate representation of reality, whatever happens inside our existential bubble is an objective fact. This is the only way I know of that an epistemology can even come close to bridging the gap between objective reality and subjective experience; no matter what's ultimately causing our subjective experience, the results we observe are objective.
This is deeply flawed reasoning. Do you know any neurology? We do not perceive anything, but construct a simulacrum in our minds of our perceptions. This is pruned and secondarily controlled from within our nervous system. This is why not all sensation is perceived as pain or why sometimes something obviously painful, is not perceived at all. Or why with psychological effects, such as inattentional blindness, even obvious stimuli is categorical ignored by our sensorium. No observation is objective, nor can be, as long as it is perceived via our senses. Schizophrenics perceive a reality fully in accord with their senses, that happens to not be in accord with intersubjective experience.
Further, even correctly predicting things are nonsense. Have you heard of Galenic Physiology? It was believed for a 1000 years and correctly explains arterial wave form much better than our current beliefs on blood circulation. It even predicted treatments, that work, for certain diseases, like Haemosiderosis. It is patently wrong today though, but its predictive value remains.
Likewise Science used Newtonian mechanics to make predictions, which was ultimately wrong. Further, Quantum physics breaks down on the large scale and Relativity on the minuscule, hence the need for a Unified theory of everything. Fundamentally, we know our current theories used to make predictions can't be right and will need to be re-evaluated at some point. Positive predictive value is a weak criterion, as at some point most systems can do so. The Romans built aquaducts that worked for a thousand years, off incorrect ideas of flow and pressure. As an exclusionary Epistemology, it is very poor.
I'm just seeing bare assertions here. You say the religious paradigm is stepwise, let's see the steps. I don't deny that religious men have had very good ideas or that religion has paved the way for some very important philosophical ideas. I'm just not seeing the value in a religion itself that doesn't make a difference whether it's true or not. It's like simulation hypothesis or Last Thursdayism. There's nothing you can really do with that information. I don't mind that you hold this belief, but I find it pretty silly to insist that it's true.
What do you mean 'show the steps'? Read any book of theology and you will see systematic logical reasoning from axiomatic belief. A good example is Aquinas' Summa Theologia.
I can ask you the same weird broad question for the Sciences, as Baconian systems of New Philosophy are really not applicable anymore in Evolutionary Biology or any system that starts to use concepts of group selection or Prisoner's Dilemma-type concepts. I don't really understand what your objection is?
Anyway, Religion matters if true and doesn't, if not true. Whether something is true or not, matters nothing at all if Atheism is true, even the concept "Atheism is true" wouldn't matter. All that would matter would be the ascribed value given it, which has no value beyond what is ascribed to it. It has no intrinsic worth as it were, for even if useful, there is no teleological endpoint, beyond indefensible axiomatic statements like 'Life is better than non-life' or 'propagating the species' or Dialectic or Ideologies. All value remains ascribed and thus need to be willed so. Thus, religious value willed so is equally valid to all other ideas if false, and if true, the only real value, as it were. Sort of Paschal's wager.
I don't find the bedrock of direct sensory experience (or empiricism) to be at all arbitrary. I do agree it can't confirm materialism, but that's why I'm not exactly a materialist. I'll say that if my sensory perceptions accurately reflect reality, materialism is almost certainly true, but there's no way to actually confirm that. I'm a pragmatist, not an omniscient being.
As I said, this is seriously flawed. I made a thread about it a while ago, that deteriorated a bit. There is no way beyond either solipsism or incoherence, without creating a metaphysical superstructure outside such crass materialism.
Reality as Construct
Yeah, the problem with that is it's just empiricism with an extra step. Instead of taking your experience at face value, you take the existence of God on faith and then go on to take your experience at face value and claim to be more justified in doing so because you just assumed you were, axiomatically. In the end, you're taking the same things for granted that an empiricist is, but you're also taking God's existence for granted on top of that. Again, religion is less parsimonious here.
As I've stated above, your supposed advantage in religion is nothing but a failure to exercise parsimony. It contributes nothing to a predictive model of reality and takes a synthetic proposition axiomatically, making it useless and arbitrary.
Well no, the religious person would view it quite differently. If we start from an extreme point of scepticism, the religious person only makes one assumption: God, a ground of Being, exists. We may have to add a few points there, but broadly one concept. From that, the rest of our assumptions follow as consequences.
All of those assumptions; of a repeatable, ordered, perceptible world; needs to be made as individual assumptions, unsupported, by the Atheist. You should remember that William of Occam was a Franciscan monk and his ideas of heuristically using parsimony, was originally used in defense of religious ideas in this manner. The Scholastics even argued the statement 'God does not exist' to be illogical, where God was seen as the ground of Being itself. To my mind, an Atheistic model contributes nothing to our understanding of reality, as it precludes our ability to render anything valid at all, not to mention its lack of veridicality. It greatly increases statements that have to be taken at face value, for it cannot ground them on a singular concept. So I respectfully disagree, unless you can give a more succinct reason why order exists, perception may be trustworthy, intersubjectivity is valid, repeatable situations under the same factors would infinitely yield similar results, etc. than the ordered Cosmos of traditional Western culture - which is grounded on the conception of God as sustainer thereof. You have to import quite a lot of Metaphysics for your view and assume quite a lot. Materialism only works by surreptiously stirring in the intellectual heritage of Christendom and Greek Philosophy, and hoping it was spiced enough that no one notices it is there.