You're not contradicting me here, you're contradicting yourself. I said that an idea's utility lies in its predictive power, and you said that its value lies in its utility. Yes, its value lies in its utility to produce predictable outcomes. If I believe pressing the space bar on my keyboard will move my cursor one space to the right on my screen, that is what my prediction will be. If I press the space bar and the results align with my prediction, then my belief about the space bar has been proven useful and thus valuable for any instance in which I want the cursor moved to the right. It doesn't matter if I think it's ghosts manipulating my cursor or just a complex electronic device doing its job, my idea is useful. You agreed with this when you recognized that hand-washing effectively prevented infection regardless of whether the cause was bacteria or demons.
Now, the difference between the demon explanation and the medical explanation isn't that back then, they would have been more correct to invent germ theory out of thin air by virtue of the fact that we know it's correct today. Rather, that a scientific approach to the correlation recognizes the correlation and leaves it at that, deeming it useful information while the religious approach creates a just-so story to explain the phenomenon. It's just as useful, it's just not as parsimonious.
I don't know what it means for an idea to be useful if it does not make any predictions that can be empirically tested. I'm not assuming your metaphysical claims are useless, I'm just struggling to find a practical use for them. You just said your metaphysical claims have value, and value comes from utility, so what utility do they have?
Empiricism cannot have any utility outside a metaphysical framework that accepts the value of Empiricism. If I followed Eleatic philosophy that consider motion and change impossible, then Empiric determinations mean nothing. It would not show any pragmatic value if my underlying view does not allow for it. The same is true for other modes, such as Soteriology. Religious claims have utility for the soul, with Salvation and Grace, but without the structure necessary to accept such utility, it would not be recognised. In the same way, ideas like the Trimurti have no utility to me.
Predictive power is not necessary for something to be useful, nor are outcomes always determinable. You do not seem to grasp what I mean, as you see everything, understandably, via your own philosophy. I point you again to the Host being the Blood and Body of Christ in Catholicism when blessed. Does this produce predictable outcomes or does it stay the same? Is its value diminished or enhanced by the idea to observants, who see it as metaphysical reality? Can you determine any change via Empiricism? Fundamentally, it is seen as Transubstantised reality, but that 'outcome' is hardly a verifiable one, nor need be. This says nothing as to the utility of the concept though.
As I have been at pains to explain, religion doesn't deal in Just So stories. That is Science's realm, that tries to explain how things work. Your hypothetical is flawed as it is based on a straw man conception of religious claims, that set up a superstititious hypothesis that can then be knocked down.. Religion is about teleology, as I have given a few examples above, where explicitly multiple contradictory 'explanations' are given - since explaining in mundane terms is not the aim at all.
You're not following what the goal of pragmatic epistemology is. It's not to finally apprehend the elusive objective, external reality everyone's clamoring to find. It's to observe and understand whatever we can about the subjective reality we find ourselves in. What's objective is what we observe within our subjective awareness. It is an objective fact that when I (perceived myself to have) pressed the space bar just now, (I perceived that) my cursor moved one space to the right. Notice how it remains factual whether you include what's in the parenthesis or not. This is what I mean by "results are objective."
I find it very strange that you should bring up old beliefs that were subsequently corrected by newer, better information. How do you think that new information was discovered? The same pragmatic process by which the old information was discovered, only with more precision.
If you define Subjectivity as Objective, sure. It is not though. Neurologically speaking, you have no way to know if the space was created or not, when that button was pressed. This opinion essentially invalidates Intersubjectivity as a real thing, so the fevered musings of a schizophrenic are objective to him, and therefore what he must be pragmatic about? It only makes sense by smuggling in external metaphysics, or it is either solipsistic or incoherent. This is just new wine in old wineskins.
Axioms should dictate definitions and the proper use of language to describe reality, not some predetermined set of beliefs about the external reality itself. You can't get to a religious belief axiomatically. Well, you can, but then your epistemology is making no effort to philosophically connect your beliefs with any sense of a mind-external reality. You're just taking your belief for granted, or on faith, and there's no proposition you can't do that with. That's a very big problem, so that's my objection.
This seems to me to be merely a bunch of statements that you seem to consider axiomatic itself. For instance, why can't a religiously axiomatic belief, such as a Ground of Being or an Unmoved Mover, not connect to a mind-external reality? However, your pragmatic approach presupposes a mind-external reality, without any way of acknowledging the thing. So people who live in glass houses should perhaps not throw stones?
All beliefs have to be taken on faith at some point, a line drawn that I accept something. You are assuming religion allows you to just accept infinite amount of propositions on this ground, but that is utter nonsense. Read any religious text and you will quickly see that there is an approach. Why do you think there are Creeds? Systematic Theology?
In like manner, the idea that empiric evidence has more worth than a priori reasoning, is likewise just a belief taken for granted by many.
You say that, but I'm waiting for you to explain what changes about my life if it turns out your God exists and your religion is true. What decision can I make based on the assumption that your religion is true that would yield different results on decisions I would make based on the assumption that it is false?
Here is the rub. You would only see the different results when the score sheets are tallied and the game wound up. It doesn't mean it isn't real though as much as it doesn't mean it is. If God exists, then this life is merely an chapter of something else entirely, and my actions would be drastically different if only this exists, or it is a preliminary. I would accept martyrdom if God exists, but would be a fool to do so if He did not.
That being said, a religious life has practical advantages, as multiple medical studies have shown consistently decreased morbidity and mortality amongst the religious - whether this is direct or via ancillary effects like moderation, pressure against risky behaviour; such as for instance sleeping around; and increased social support, is difficult to say.
As I've explained, it doesn't matter if I'm the only mind in existence experiencing a sophisticated simulation of life or I'm under a demon's spell. I'm still apprehending the rules by which my reality seems to operate. Anything you tell me either has use in my personal reality or it is utterly irrelevant, regardless of how "true" you insist it is.
Fair enough. But that renders your reality a solipsistic one only. So therefore your determinations are utterly irrelevant to me, as mine are to yours, if what you say is true. We are therefore both the Fox and Monkey walking through the graveyard in Aesop's fable.
Well, no. You also have to make a half-dozen assumptions about the God you're assuming exists. You can't just make all the necessary assumptions to function in your personal reality, roll them into one God-being, then look down at those who take each of those assumptions individually for taking "more" assumptions. That's cheating. You're making the same assumptions we are and you're putting a god on top. You can't escape that.
That is just your perspective. Take a look at classic theology, or even Aristotle's idea of a God. It starts with one or two basic assumptions, such as a ground of being. The rest is a priori reasoning from this or a posteriori application of observation back toward the concept. This is of course tempered by revelation to render specific religions, but this need not change the fundamental metaphysics much. For instance, a ground of Being would be the origin of existence, which thus means it precedes the latter or the latter proceeds from the former. It supposes many connections that give rise to ideas like atemporality, causality, etc. There is an apophatic tendency though.
You are entitled to your opinion, of course, but this holds as much water as the idea that Christians worship an invisible sky-man. It is a fairly ridiculous simplification, that says more about the person making it, than the subject he is making it on. Because you don't accept the proposition upon which I base my further propositions, does not mean I am just accepting them as you are, "with a God on top". If we both hold 1 + 1 = 2, but I support Russell's attempted proof thereof, then I am no longer assuming it, as you are, but assuming the validity of the proof. Just because you reject the proof, does not mean I am therefore also assuming 1 and 1 to be 2 in addition. This is fallacious reasoning.
You'd be surprised at some of the strange combinations of these things, though--lots of non-materialist naturalists out there, and I've even seen some theists in the materialist camp, oddly enough.
