Where is the hope in atheism?

[bhsmte]

Science based its methods of acquiring knowledge on Religious beliefs - the belief of an ordered, systematic, intellible world. It is not coincidence that Science arose in Christendom and somewhat in Islam, on the back of Aristotleanism. It didn't do so in India, or amongst Buddhists, with their Sunyata or the less perceptible nature of reality. A religious assumption lies at Science's core.

Further, it does alter how it interprets data and evidence based on societal beliefs, of which religion is a major part. I gave many examples above, such as Mind/Body Dualism. Read any medical study and you'll find many different interpretations based on the background or discipline of the reader. This is why Bias is such a problem, confirmational or otherwise, and why EBM has tried to get around this. My religious background or lack thereof, will fundamentally alter my understanding of scientific facts. Look at all these debates around gender identity, for a clear example, where both sides claim Science is on their side. There is no reason to suppose one interpretation of Scientific data more valid than another's, which is why Science tries to minimise such bias via stressing falsification and not 'proving' anything.

This is a very rose-tinted view of human ability. For Science is deeply fallible, as it is constructed by the foibbles and squabbles and biases of centuries of humans.

I cant add anything further to this thread without merely repeating myself. We just disagree and thats cool.

 

[gaara4158]

I cant add anything further to this thread without merely repeating myself. We just disagree and thats cool.

Way to leave me with all the work over here =P

 

[KCfromNC]

Well, there's the old saying: when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. This is why dogmatism is immediately imported whenever you argue that scientific knowledge be placed in some privileged position.

Yes, please use a world-wide connected network of computers to argue that anyone who thinks that [applied] scientific knowledge should have a privileged position in discussions about reality is being dogmatic.

 

[KCfromNC]

Way to leave me with all the work over here =P

A simple "no it isn't" would be enough to counter most of the baseless assertions that keep popping up.

 

[bhsmte]

Way to leave me with all the work over here =P

Sorry.

Just don't see any purpose, to keep saying the same thing.

You are doing quite well though.

 

[gaara4158]

There is no functional difference in such issues as you describe. A curse alleviated by washing hands, or an antiseptic procedure to stave off illness, is practically the same.
A secular ritual of hand washing prohibits a secular curse of infection, while in a religious context, a ritual stops a curse that manifests as infection. In fact, this can be argued to be in support of the religious belief, confirming it in this hypothetical, as some Jewish scholars have argued that the increase of Taenia Solium in pork and mercury and allergy in shellfish, confirms Kosher laws.

So you agree that the utility of information is in its applicability to make predictions, not in the stories we tell about why it is so. That's good, but you should note that religious explanations tend to be the ones with tacked-on stories about why things are so, not scientific ones. Kosher laws were useful before we knew how to cook pork safely and test shellfish for mercury, but you can't conclude that all of Judaism is true just because people were getting sick from tainted meat until someone told them to stop. A scientific approach is much more parsimonious, and science is what allows us to eat pork (relatively) safely today.

It actually doesn't address the religious claim that a divinity is ultimately responsible for the working of the world, who would preside as it were, over the pathogens, and told his followers how to overcome them. Germ theory corrected nothing, but previous theories of how illness was spread here. It did not invalidate any curse in your hypothetical. If we can show that the tides are moved by gravitational pull, that doesn't mean that the set-up of existence was not done in that way by a divine hand.

Either your religious claim makes a prediction we can test, or it is completely irrelevant. Seriously - if God is just the force behind every mechanism we don't quite understand, that's fine. Unless that information can be applied for some pragmatic purpose, I don't care at all. It makes no difference. It doesn't need to be addressed. I'm going to keep probing these mechanisms until there's nothing left to discover about them. If God's existence does make a difference, on the other hand, I would like to know what that difference is, what predictions it makes, and how I can apply that to my decisions.

As I explained with the Egyptians, there can be multiple explanation for phenomena within one religion or even within one thought, but as they don't invalidate each other, neither would a materialist one do so. The only reason someone would decide it does, is if they start with a axiomatic acceptance of materialist explanations as paramount for some reason, and therefore diminish other ones. That is merely a question of one's philosophy, not 'facts' as it were. What are facts? How are they determined? Why does one set of determinations predominate another?

You're basically asking how to build a good epistemology, and I've already stated that the only kind of epistemology I find useful is one that follows the pragmatic maxim. The "truth value" or "factuality" of any given statement is in its ability to produce predictable results.
To make this a little more clear, consider this thought experiment. Imagine a possible world where everything I believe about the universe is categorically false. However, every decision I make based on my false beliefs turns out maximally predictable and desirable for me anyway. Likewise, every decision I make based on "true" beliefs yields unpredictable and undesirable results. Is it really meaningful to say that anything I believed was "false?" I don't think so. I think it's best to calibrate our beliefs to the one thing we can actually be sure of, and that's our direct sensory experience. Even if our experience is not an accurate representation of reality, whatever happens inside our existential bubble is an objective fact. This is the only way I know of that an epistemology can even come close to bridging the gap between objective reality and subjective experience; no matter what's ultimately causing our subjective experience, the results we observe are objective.

Religion answers question from within a religious paradigm, which is not arbitrary, but stepwise, in spite of atheist ideas to the contrary. A Trinitarian cannot deny the Incarnation, nor a Muslim Mohammed. Great Intelectual systems were created by Religions, by very intelligent men, and these aren't just rationalisations of inconvenient facts or ideas, in spite of the vain modern attempts to write them off as such.

I'm just seeing bare assertions here. You say the religious paradigm is stepwise, let's see the steps. I don't deny that religious men have had very good ideas or that religion has paved the way for some very important philosophical ideas. I'm just not seeing the value in a religion itself that doesn't make a difference whether it's true or not. It's like simulation hypothesis or Last Thursdayism. There's nothing you can really do with that information. I don't mind that you hold this belief, but I find it pretty silly to insist that it's true.

This is where Materialism cannot confirm materialism by its own rules. Any such attempt is a Petitio Principii, for any appeal to material reality assumes the primacy thereof. This means the relativity of the value structure is laid bare, and this is why Materialism tends to Nihilism. Nothing can be established if Materialism cannot establish itself. A line in the sand needs to be drawn somewhere for meaning to exist, something acknowledged as fundamentally true. The Atheist has to do so arbitrarily, knowingly arbitrary.

I don't find the bedrock of direct sensory experience (or empiricism) to be at all arbitrary. I do agree it can't confirm materialism, but that's why I'm not exactly a materialist. I'll say that if my sensory perceptions accurately reflect reality, materialism is almost certainly true, but there's no way to actually confirm that. I'm a pragmatist, not an omniscient being.

The religious usually anchor their beliefs on a Divinity, usually a Ground of Being, that needs to be taken on faith. This gives bedrock though. It is how value can be ascribed. This is seen as fundamental Reality, as opposed to merely a human 'line' or assertion.

Yeah, the problem with that is it's just empiricism with an extra step. Instead of taking your experience at face value, you take the existence of God on faith and then go on to take your experience at face value and claim to be more justified in doing so because you just assumed you were, axiomatically. In the end, you're taking the same things for granted that an empiricist is, but you're also taking God's existence for granted on top of that. Again, religion is less parsimonious here.

So the religious can use Scientific Method to answer any and all questions an Atheist can. But he can place more trust philosophically, perhaps, in them, than an Atheist would be able to. Further, he can investigate the teleological questions that lie beyond Scientific Method. So it is not that religion cannot answer certain questions - it certainly can, utilising Scientific Method if need be, for they are not about the same things. It is the non-religious that has a more limited armamentarium to investigate and interact with his world.

As I've stated above, your supposed advantage in religion is nothing but a failure to exercise parsimony. It contributes nothing to a predictive model of reality and takes a synthetic proposition axiomatically, making it useless and arbitrary.

 

[gaara4158]

Well, there's the old saying: when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. This is why dogmatism is immediately imported whenever you argue that scientific knowledge be placed in some privileged position. All the tools of science become metaphysical claims rather than methodological choices, and dogma builds without anyone even noticing that this is what it is.

I find it interesting that religious scientists are accused of compartmentalizing, since they're simultaneously capable of adhering to scientific methodology in the lab while believing in God and perhaps other religious claims outside of that. This is a simplification presupposing that science conflicts with religion, but it's not entirely false. There's a lot of cultural baggage that scientifically inclined religious people are aware of that the average atheist is not. So I would say that the real danger lies with those who don't have the tools or perspective to separate methodology from ontology, whether they be ID theorists or hard materialists. Unfortunately, only one of these two things is publically recognized as a problem.

However many dogmas are imported from a scientific perspective, I don't see how a religious perspective can avoid operating under the same ones on top of its own peculiar dogmas.

I'd say the opposite. An epistemology that automatically rules out theism is a bad epistemology.

Theistic ideas are by their nature in the realm of metaphysics rather than empirical science, so they can't really be investigated empirically. It'd be like trying to empirically determine which theory of quantum physics is best. The problem is that there is no neutral framework, and if you try to build one, it'll just morph into a form of positivism with its own unexamined presuppositions.

I think a proposition that can't be investigated empirically is an irrelevant one. Maybe there's a God. Maybe we're in a simulation. If it doesn't make a difference, who cares? I don't even need to rule out theism. I can dismiss it.

Just out of curiosity, though, how exactly do you go about separating the true metaphysical claims from the false ones?

Either suffering is redeemable and the Problem of Evil fails, or suffering is not redeemable and we must accept that reality is for all intents and purposes terrible, if only from the subjective human perspective. You can't have it both ways. Every evidentiary argument in favor of the Problem of Evil is also an argument in favor of pessimism, and at some point that has moral consequences.

Interesting. I never was a fan of the Argument from Evil against the existence of God, so this is something more to chew on. I'm not sure if reality being terrible necessarily follows from the existence of irredeemable suffering, although I do feel strongly that some people do suffer irredeemably. Reality is terrible for those people, but that doesn't carry over to everyone whose suffering is at least somewhat tolerable. I'm not seeing too much of a logical or moral problem here, just a grim reality.

I would contest this. I suspect that often enough we seek knowledge for its own sake, not for practical reasons. If someone tells you they have a secret, is your main concern whether or not there could be any practical application of knowing what it might be?

I don't think that's the case. It may be true that the utility of a secret isn't in the information itself but the exclusive nature thereof, but the information still constitutes the secret. Secrets create vulnerability, trust, and intimacy, all of which have their uses, and you can't have that without the information. The same can be said for seemingly useless trivia; we learn little bits of information we'll never be able to practically apply, but commit to memory anyway not as instructional data, but as the accepted response to a given query. Much of what we learn in school is this type of knowledge, and in some cases (like Columbus discovering America) that knowledge is a very doctored narrative rather than an accurate portrayal of events. Knowing what the tallest building in San Francisco is might never influence a single decision you make in your life, but it might win you free drinks at trivia night. I don't think we ever commit anything to memory if we don't think we'll ever use that information in some way later on, even it it's just to appear knowledgeable in conversation.

I think a pragmatic approach to knowledge could land us in a situation where education is only as important as someone's personal circumstances, and nobody has any reason to know more than the basics about things outside of their field of expertise, since there is no practical application.

If you can think of a reason why people should know more than the basics about things outside of their field of expertise, it's probably a practical one.

Besides that, I think that it's worth pointing out that we cannot live our lives treating everything like it must be falsifiable. Are people going to start spying on their spouses to make sure they're not being cheated on? That would be madness. Are we going to do away with the concept of moral responsibility until we can scientifically determine whether or not free will actually exists? I certainly hope not. If you are not making major life decisions on incomplete and unfalsiable information, you are probably not making any major life decisions at all.

Being falsifiable doesn't mean you have to categorically falsify everything before you make a decision. Often we act on hunches based perhaps on data we've subconsciously detected. It's still data. Surely you'd grow suspicious if your spouse suddenly disappeared for two weeks, didn't contact you at all, then came back and refused to talk about what had happened? You might not have confirmed any wrongdoing on their part, but other data suggests something fishy. This is what I mean. If we want our knowledge-claim to mean anything, it should have actual consequences in the world.

I can't find it now, but I was reading an article over at Strange Notions the other day that discussed the difference between scientific problems and genuine mysteries, the second not referring to something science hasn't figured out yet, but questions about reality that necessarily include us as a part of the puzzle. "Why are we here?" is a different question than "What quirk of fate led to the evolution of homo sapiens?" Science can answer the second question, but if you're going to wait around for it to come up with a meaningful answer to the first one, you're going to be waiting a very long time. Religion at its best is about the mysteries of existence, not necessarily about providing explanations for phenomena, and that is what often gets overlooked.

This I can agree with, and my only problem is when people try to say that certain scientific mysteries are "genuine mysteries." I haven't necessarily seen that here in this thread, but it's all over the place in the creation vs. evolution forum.

 

[Silmarien]

I already explained this. Evolution doesn't lie entirely within the subjective realm. One can disagree with the facts, but they are facts regardless.

You seem very confused. If I say that a subjective conception of morality logically entails moral nihilism, that also does not lie entirely in the subjective realm. My claim is that it can be demonstrated that subjective morality is an incoherent concept, and that moral nihilism is therefore an inevitable consequence of it. This doesn't mean that moral nihilism isn't true, of course.

Frankly, it's hard to believe you're struggling with this. You're pulling my leg, right?

I'm not struggling with anything except taking you seriously. You haven't given me any reason to think you're looking for anything but a fight, so if you can't state your position clearly enough that it doesn't look like an incoherent mess, I'm not really inclined to give you the benefit of the doubt.

Well that's an argument about the utility of information. Do you wanna have that argument? Because I'll be arguing that knowing facts is more useful than opinions.

I'm sure there would be some utility in teaching Creationism as well. Stronger religious communities leading to stronger social ties and a more productive nation, or something of the sort. You may subjectively value information more highly than other factors, but there seems to be no compelling objective reason to do so. And as you pointed out yourself, everyone is going to value information for different reasons and with greater or lesser intensity, so by your own rules, it's utterly subjective.

Again, this is a different conversation. If you and I were to agree on what an "inch" is, arguably it's objective to us...even if no one else agrees.

There's no way to do that with morality though. There's no way to even describe such a measurement to my knowledge. You and I could agree an action is bad...but we could probably never consistently agree on how bad it is.

That's another big clue that it's entirely subjective.

And everyone probably experiences the color green slightly differently, but that doesn't mean there's no objective reality giving rise to such perceptions.

Conception isn't the problem. You can pretend it's objective all you want, but it isn't.

I don't recall actually saying I thought it was objective at all. I am a moral realist, but that may not mean what you think it means. I don't really see the point in discussing it further, though, since I get tired of positions I don't hold being attributed to me over and over again.

 

[Silmarien]

However many dogmas are imported from a scientific perspective, I don't see how a religious perspective can avoid operating under the same ones on top of its own peculiar dogmas.

How a religious perspective can avoid operating under the metaphysical presuppositions of a scientific worldview, you mean? It automatically disqualifies naturalism, since you cannot be a theist and a naturalist at the same time. It usually (though not always) conflicts with materialism as well.

For a couple of examples, there's a neuroscientist over at Quora who views the mind through the framework of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism: https://www.quora.com/profile/Paul-Bush-4.

Another one you can find online is a quantum physicist who's convinced that Aquinas's philosophy holds the key to understanding modern physics: The Quantum Thomist

Just out of curiosity, though, how exactly do you go about separating the true metaphysical claims from the false ones?

It's a matter of argumentation. What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of a particular view, are there any deep problems associated with it? Materialism faces the challenge of explaining how unconscious processes can combine to produce conscious ones, substance dualism cannot properly explain how the immaterial mind could affect the material body, naturalism cannot explain why there is a universe and why it seems to behave in an orderly fashion at all, and the various theistic traditions tend to end up with very complicated houses of cards.

Honestly it's a matter of trying to figure out what makes the most sense of all the information available. Science is definitely an important tool--I reject pantheism, for example, primarily because of special relativity. When it comes to metaphysics, there are really two options: either you openly engage in it, recognizing the difficulty inherent in the task, or you ignore it and unconsciously engage in it anyway, conflating evidence with presupposition. Everyone's a metaphysicist; it's the people who don't realize it who are the dangerous ones.

I don't think we ever commit anything to memory if we don't think we'll ever use that information in some way later on, even it it's just to appear knowledgeable in conversation.

Oh, I absolutely do. I memorize things because they interest me, no practical use required. It seems that information for its own sake has to come before information for the sake of winning at trivia, since you're not going to be specialized in a specific branch of random useless knowledge if it doesn't actually interest you.

Being falsifiable doesn't mean you have to categorically falsify everything before you make a decision. Often we act on hunches based perhaps on data we've subconsciously detected. It's still data. Surely you'd grow suspicious if your spouse suddenly disappeared for two weeks, didn't contact you at all, then came back and refused to talk about what had happened? You might not have confirmed any wrongdoing on their part, but other data suggests something fishy. This is what I mean. If we want our knowledge-claim to mean anything, it should have actual consequences in the world.

I think most religious people would say that it does have actual real-world consequences, though. I stay at the edges of Christianity because I'm kind of afraid of the whole concept of personal relationship, but a lot of people do swear by it. Some of them seem like crazed fanatics, but for others it really does look authentic. If someone tells me that they know God exists because he's a reality in their life, and they act in a way consistent with this instead of being a hypocrite, that will give me pause. Their interpretation might be off, but it also might not be.

This I can agree with, and my only problem is when people try to say that certain scientific mysteries are "genuine mysteries." I haven't necessarily seen that here in this thread, but it's all over the place in the creation vs. evolution forum.

Yeahhh, I tend to stay out of there. I'm using the word "mystery" in more of a Catholic sense than a scientific one, though, so the same thing could simultaneously be both a genuine theological mystery and a solvable scientific one. Abiogenesis, for example. We might be able to explain how chemical evolution could occur, but the fact that it did occur would remain.

 

[Ana the Ist]

You seem very confused. If I say that a subjective conception of morality logically entails moral nihilism, that also does not lie entirely in the subjective realm.

I do consider logic a method for proving things, so if you can logically demonstrate that...I'll gladly admit I'm wrong.

Just keep in mind though that moral relativism and nihilism are not the same thing. Also, I don't keep a very close watch on the forum so it's possible others will point out flaws in your logic before I get the chance.

My claim is that it can be demonstrated that subjective morality is an incoherent concept, and that moral nihilism is therefore an inevitable consequence of it. This doesn't mean that moral nihilism isn't true, of course.

That's going to be tough to demonstrate. My position is quite simple, morals are value judgements and entirely opinion without any basis in fact. It's actually much more coherent than any form of objective morality I've ever come across and I've come across many arguments.

I'm not struggling with anything except taking you seriously. You haven't given me any reason to think you're looking for anything but a fight, so if you can't state your position clearly enough that it doesn't look like an incoherent mess, I'm not really inclined to give you the benefit of the doubt.

What part is incoherent to you? So far I've been pretty kind...we could be talking about your conception of morality and I could be pointing out all of it's flaws. I'm not "looking for a fight" as you put it...this is a discussion forum. If you thought you could get away with a set of baseless assertions and not have them challenged simply because you like to name drop philosophers, I'm sorry to disappoint you.

I'm sure there would be some utility in teaching Creationism as well. Stronger religious communities leading to stronger social ties and a more productive nation, or something of the sort.

You could make that argument, but it looks like you're avoiding doing so and I think you know why.

You may subjectively value information more highly than other factors, but there seems to be no compelling objective reason to do so.

Well sure there is, schools are created for a purpose after all...they aren't accidental. If teaching certain types of knowledge fulfills that purpose better than other types...then you've got yourself a compelling objective reason.

I've given you several opportunities to drop this line of argument. I'll give you one more, just let it go.

And everyone probably experiences the color green slightly differently, but that doesn't mean there's no objective reality giving rise to such perceptions.

We know the mechanism by which we experience "green". We also have a means of measuring the value of green.

By what mechanism do you experience "moral goodness "? Your feelings? Rational thought? Those would make fun arguments but you'll end up at a dead end.

If you're more inclined to say that you experience them through your soul or spirit or some other magical element, then you've buried yourself before you even started.

I don't recall actually saying I thought it was objective at all. I am a moral realist, but that may not mean what you think it means. I don't really see the point in discussing it further, though, since I get tired of positions I don't hold being attributed to me over and over again.

I was simply making a point. How you conceive morality doesn't really matter. I'm not asking you to defend your moral conception...that would actually be looking for a fight. I'm simply arguing against your earlier assertion.

 

[apogee]

Sorry to interrupt, I was just wondering if we had located the hope in Atheism yet.

 

[keith99]

Sorry to interrupt, I was just wondering if we had located the hope in Atheism yet?

The kind it seems some Christians need? Nope, not in atheism proper. However some of the nastier communist states do offer up that sort of hope.

 

[Silmarien]

Just keep in mind though that moral relativism and nihilism are not the same thing. Also, I don't keep a very close watch on the forum so it's possible others will point out flaws in your logic before I get the chance.

What do we mean by morality? You said earlier that there was a difference between "In my opinion, it is not good to judge others" and "In my opinion, watermelon tastes good." While I would agree that these are ultimately describing different types of preferences, at the end of the day, that is all they seem to be. Preferences. Subjective morality collapses into emotivism: expressions of what we like and dislike, nothing more.

What's interesting here is that most people aren't going to get upset if someone else doesn't agree that watermelon tastes good. If someone were to assert that it is good to judge others, however, most people are going to try to contest that. If we drop all notions of moral realism, arguing over who is right and wrong ultimately turns into a contest of who has the most power (rhetorical, political, you name it), so we're stuck in a situation where might makes right.

On the other hand, if you're inclined to say that in your opinion, it is not good to judge others, but reasonable people can disagree, we're left in a very different situation. For a much more extreme example, in my opinion, genocide is bad. In a war-mongering dictator's opinion, genocide might be good, so can I condemn him if I do not think that his actions are objectively wrong? And if I do not think his actions are objectively wrong, do I genuinely believe that genocide is bad?

Either we hold that our subjective moral judgments are binding universally, even if they only our own opinions, or we do not truly hold them at all. Both results are troubling, though the first is of more interest to me from an Absurdist perspective, since it involves seeking binding obligations that can never actually exist. Morality in this sense becomes illusory. If anyone is comfortable with either of these outcomes, I would wonder if they actually cared about morality at all.

Well sure there is, schools are created for a purpose after all...they aren't accidental. If teaching certain types of knowledge fulfills that purpose better than other types...then you've got yourself a compelling objective reason.

There's nothing objective about the purpose they're built for. If the culture as a whole decides that schools would serve the society's needs better as centers for indoctrination, then the purpose of the school changes. If the fundamentalists took control of the country, why would it be inappropriate for them to decide that a different direction would better suit their goals?

By what mechanism do you experience "moral goodness "? Your feelings? Rational thought? Those would make fun arguments but you'll end up at a dead end.

Evolutionary psychology, cultural evolution, and rational thought. I don't see what's controversial in the idea that certain behaviors work out better, both for the individual and the society, than others.

If you're literally talking about the specific mental states associated with moral reasoning--joy, surprise, horror, whatever--that's an entirely separate question.

I was simply making a point. How you conceive morality doesn't really matter. I'm not asking you to defend your moral conception...that would actually be looking for a fight. I'm simply arguing against your earlier assertion.

What earlier assertion? I've just been arguing that relativism collapses into nihilism, nothing more. You're the one mixing objectivity and subjectivity in increasingly strange ways.

 

[apogee]

The kind it seems some Christians need? Nope, not in atheism proper. However some of the nastier communist states do offer up that sort of hope.

Fair enough, thanks for the reply Keith

 

[Silmarien]

I don't find the bedrock of direct sensory experience (or empiricism) to be at all arbitrary. I do agree it can't confirm materialism, but that's why I'm not exactly a materialist. I'll say that if my sensory perceptions accurately reflect reality, materialism is almost certainly true, but there's no way to actually confirm that. I'm a pragmatist, not an omniscient being.

Just wanted to point out that our sensory perception of reality actively conflicts with the scientific picture of it. Is the candle in front of me actually green or is it the light reflecting against it in a specific way that makes my brain register the color green? Is it solid, or does the structure of the atom mean that it and everything else is mostly empty space? Do fundamental particles actually "exist" in the same way that atoms and molecules do at all?

The big problem with the materialist label is that nobody actually can explain what it means anymore. Once upon a time, it was associated with mechanism and the view that the universe worked like a machine and could be broken down into its fundamental parts, but that ontology is almost certainly false. The more you try to break it down, the stranger and more entangled the whole thing becomes, and let's not forget that matter is convertible with energy. Kind of makes the concept of materialism meaningless.

The other problem is misunderstandings over what non-materialism entails, particularly versions that are compatible with naturalism. If you think that the mind is not reducible to the brain, you are probably a dualist of one variety or another, even if you think it emerges from the brain. Another interesting view is hylomorphism, the idea that the universe is not simply matter but a combination of matter and structure, and the fact that we can't find any building blocks of physical reality that aren't already structured might support this view. The mind would be better understood as a case of downward causation here--the structured "form" of the person giving rise to conscious experience rather than that somehow being the result of unconscious lower level processes.

So even if you want a common sense sort of naturalistic default position, I think there are better options out there than classical materialism.

 

[Ana the Ist]

What do we mean by morality? You said earlier that there was a difference between "In my opinion, it is not good to judge others" and "In my opinion, watermelon tastes good." While I would agree that these are ultimately describing different types of preferences, at the end of the day, that is all they seem to be. Preferences. Subjective morality collapses into emotivism: expressions of what we like and dislike, nothing more.

I can certainly understand why it would seem that way, it's at best a loose analogy. While they are both value judgements, that's really where the similarity ends. For example, the mechanism for the value judgement of watermelon is obvious and purely biological...essentially tastebuds. Unless one's tastebuds are vague and neutral towards watermelon, one knows rather quickly whether or not they like it or consider it good. That physical reaction can then result in an emotional judgement of watermelon.

There is no such mechanism for morals, and that's a rather important distinction. I'm not saying that emotions play no role in the formation of moral opinions, they obviously do. The thing is, emotions aren't the only factor in forming moral judgements. There's a whole set of external factors like the prevailing moral opinions of society, religion, family, friends, work environment, etc. There's also other internal factors like personal experience, not simply emotion.

This is all rather obvious as people can clearly want to do something because it's emotionally desirable or satisfying, yet not do it because of these external factors which cause them to form the opinion that it's bad...and vice versa.

So while these may just be two differences between moral judgements and taste judgements, they are rather important. Both the mechanisms and genesis of the value judgements are entirely different.

I wish there was another type of opinion that makes a good analogy, but none comes to mind.

What's interesting here is that most people aren't going to get upset if someone else doesn't agree that watermelon tastes good. If someone were to assert that it is good to judge others, however, most people are going to try to contest that.

People can contest your opinion on watermelon as well. I don't see your point.

If we drop all notions of moral realism, arguing over who is right and wrong ultimately turns into a contest of who has the most power (rhetorical, political, you name it), so we're stuck in a situation where might makes right.

I disagree. I have a very strong opinion on child molestation, for example, and even if the entire world thought it was good...I don't see that as being capable of changing my moral opinion that it's bad. It's odd to me that you would even make this argument. Are your morals so easily changed?

On the other hand, if you're inclined to say that in your opinion, it is not good to judge others, but reasonable people can disagree, we're left in a very different situation. For a much more extreme example, in my opinion, genocide is bad. In a war-mongering dictator's opinion, genocide might be good, so can I condemn him if I do not think that his actions are objectively wrong?

This is another odd argument. What's to stop you from arguing that genocide is wrong if that's your opinion?

And if I do not think his actions are objectively wrong, do I genuinely believe that genocide is bad?

I don't know how you expect me to answer to what you genuinely believe about anything. All I can really do is take your word for it or think that you're lying. That's all anyone can do.

Either we hold that our subjective moral judgments are binding universally, even if they only our own opinions, or we do not truly hold them at all.

There's a false dichotomy if I've ever seen one.

What exactly is stopping anyone from understanding that everyone holds different moral opinions for different reasons?

Both results are troubling, though the first is of more interest to me from an Absurdist perspective, since it involves seeking binding obligations that can never actually exist. Morality in this sense becomes illusory. If anyone is comfortable with either of these outcomes, I would wonder if they actually cared about morality at all.

I'll just disregard this since it follows your false dichotomy.

There's nothing objective about the purpose they're built for.

Why would you think this? Do you think nothing can be created for an objective purpose if it's possible to use it for some unintended purpose?

If the culture as a whole decides that schools would serve the society's needs better as centers for indoctrination, then the purpose of the school changes. If the fundamentalists took control of the country, why would it be inappropriate for them to decide that a different direction would better suit their goals?

If everyone decides to use hammers as weapons, does that change the fact they were created to pound nails?

Or are you asking me for my personal opinion on what schools are for?

Evolutionary psychology, cultural evolution, and rational thought. I don't see what's controversial in the idea that certain behaviors work out better, both for the individual and the society, than others.

Better, in this context, is an entirely subjective notion. I could rationally argue that 49% of the population would be better off if the other 51% were killed off.

If you're literally talking about the specific mental states associated with moral reasoning--joy, surprise, horror, whatever--that's an entirely separate question.

Neither rationality nor emotion can entirely account for moral opinions by themselves. There's a great many factors involved and the weight of each factor varies from person to person. Again, this just shows the subjectivity of morality.

What earlier assertion? I've just been arguing that relativism collapses into nihilism, nothing more. You're the one mixing objectivity and subjectivity in increasingly strange ways.

This is the assertion and you're the one who introduced subjectivity (and objectivity if I take your Plato reference correctly)....


"If someone is a Platonist, then the discussion changes, but subjectively producing meaning is like subjectively producing morals--drop the transcendentals and it's sleight of hand, nothing more."

If however, you're now saying that morals and meaning are subjective...and I can understand why you would....then it's all rather easy for an atheist to decide on his own meaning to his existence.

 

[Silmarien]

So while these may just be two differences between moral judgements and taste judgements, they are rather important. Both the mechanisms and genesis of the value judgements are entirely different.

Alright. You seem to be saying that it's a bad analogy because "watermelon tastes good" as a statement has more content than "judging people is not good." That's fair enough, but not really helpful if you're trying to avoid nihilism.

People can contest your opinion on watermelon as well. I don't see your point.

Seriously? You think people are going to go to war over whether or not watermelon tastes good? Are you for real or just trolling now?

I disagree. I have a very strong opinion on child molestation, for example, and even if the entire world thought it was good...I don't see that as being capable of changing my moral opinion that it's bad. It's odd to me that you would even make this argument. Are your morals so easily changed?

I'm sorry. I treat morality as a much bigger concept than us and our feelings, and I assume (wrongly, perhaps) that other people are civically minded as well. If the society at large believes that genocide is evil, should they interfere and stop a genocide that is in progress? Would this not be a case of "might makes right" if it is merely their subjective opinion about genocide? If they do not, how strong can we say their principles really are?

Or to use your child molestation example. You live in a society that believes child molestation is good, but you view it as evil. Your neighbor is molesting a child under his care. Do you try to put an end to it or do you not have the right, as your view that this is evil is only your subjective opinion?

This is another odd argument. What's to stop you from arguing that genocide is wrong if that's your opinion?

If you think it is objectively wrong, you can. But how could you possibly argue that genocide is objectively wrong if you believe morality is inherently subjective?

Why would you think this? Do you think nothing can be created for an objective purpose if it's possible to use it for some unintended purpose?

Purposes are not objective. The society attributes purpose to an entity like a school intersubjectively; there's no divine mandate that says the school must continue to operate in such a fashion. The intersubjective understanding that the society has concerning the proper functioning of a school could change, unless you suddenly believe there's some sort of Platonic Form of a school out there.

If however, you're now saying that morals and meaning are subjective...and I can understand why you would....then it's all rather easy for an atheist to decide on his own meaning to his existence.

I suppose so, if you want to render the concept of meaning absolutely, well, meaningless.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Alright. You seem to be saying that it's a bad analogy because "watermelon tastes good" as a statement has more content than "judging people is not good." That's fair enough, but not really helpful if you're trying to avoid nihilism.

I can't tell if you're being deliberately obtuse or not. Nothing in my statement had anything to do with the "content" of the two opinions. Where did you get that from?

Seriously? You think people are going to go to war over whether or not watermelon tastes good? Are you for real or just trolling now?

Who is going to war over morality? I'm not going to say it never happened...but I'm struggling to come up with a clear example.

I'm sorry. I treat morality as a much bigger concept than us and our feelings, and I assume (wrongly, perhaps) that other people are civically minded as well.

I clearly stated several times that morality isn't just about emotions. I don't think I could've been more clear on that, and I can quote myself if you genuinely don't understand that. If you're down to mischaracterizing my position and out of logical/rational arguments, I'm not sure anything else needs to be said.

If the society at large believes that genocide is evil, should they interfere and stop a genocide that is in progress? Would this not be a case of "might makes right" if it is merely their subjective opinion about genocide? If they do not, how strong can we say their principles really are?

Our society does generally believe genocide is bad/evil and there have been multiple genocides that we haven't interfered with because morality isn't the sole consideration for any action/behavior. This is a pretty weak argument.

Surely you're aware of our nation hasn't attempted to stop every genocide from occurring, and yet you remain a part of our nation. Does that mean you lack principles? Or does this argument just make you a hypocrite?

Or to use your child molestation example. You live in a society that believes child molestation is good, but you view it as evil. Your neighbor is molesting a child under his care. Do you try to put an end to it or do you not have the right, as your view that this is evil is only your subjective opinion?

See above. It's the same poor argument as your genocide one. I've never claimed that morality was the sole indicator of behavior, that would be stupid.

If you think it is objectively wrong, you can. But how could you possibly argue that genocide is objectively wrong if you believe morality is inherently subjective?

Pay real close attention....this is gonna go real quick, and I don't want you to miss it...

"I believe genocide is morally wrong."

Did you see that? I just argued that genocide is morally wrong even though it's only my subjective opinion lol.

My question is how could you possibly begin to argue that it's objectively wrong? All I would have to do to point out how nonsensical that statement is....is to ask you "How do you know genocide is objectively wrong?"

Purposes are not objective. The society attributes purpose to an entity like a school intersubjectively; there's no divine mandate that says the school must continue to operate in such a fashion. The intersubjective understanding that the society has concerning the proper functioning of a school could change, unless you suddenly believe there's some sort of Platonic Form of a school out there.

If we're talking about the utility of something, it's objective. If you're asking about the morality of it, it's subjective.

If you tried to use an anvil as a flotation device, you are objectively using it wrong. If you're asking if it's objectively morally good or bad to use an anvil as a flotation device...you're talking utter nonsense.

The exact same logic applies to your school statements.

I suppose so, if you want to render the concept of meaning absolutely, well, meaningless.

If you think the meaning of your life is objective, tell me how you know. If you don't know, and you simply believe it's objective, then guess what? Your "objective meaning" has no more value than my subjective one.

If that renders your life meaningless, I feel sorry for you.

 

[DogmaHunter]

This isn't an approximation. I'm a former atheist existentialist

So therefor, you feel like you can speak for all atheists?

I never said that anyone else had to view things in the same light.

Then maybe you should qualify your statements as them simply being your personal opinion, instead of using general terms as if you are professing general universal truths.

My point is merely that there is nothing that can be said from an atheistic perspective to someone who actually feels this way.

See?
There you go again, pretending to be able to speak for any and all atheists.

Instead, your actual point is that YOU can't imagine what to say from an atheistic perspective.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Then they're fictions.

Doesn't follow.

Potentially useful, but look too closely and they'll go up in smoke.

No.