The problem of evil

[ToddNotTodd]

Since you refuse to share your views, I can't answer that.

So you don't have any answer as to why you're asking me a question that has nothing to do with the topic? I'm guessing that you either mistakenly think it has some relevance (it doesn't), or you're asking as a distraction.

Sorry, but no. It doesn't make your claims suddenly valid to simply repeat them by substituting a capital letter for your claim.

You don't seem to be understanding at all. This is the Philosophy section. The language I'm using is part and parcel with the territory. Let me try again:

Any moral statement with the form "X is good" is either an objective or subjective claim.

If the statement is objective, its truth value can be determined independently of the claimant, and will be the same for anyone correctly resolving the statement. You can say that in the rephrasing of the statement "X is good because Y", if the statement is true then Y is objectively equivalent to "good" and you end up with the tautology (X is equivalent to Y).

If the statement is subjective, the claimant resolves the truth value, in essence defining the term "good". This defining of terms can be based on anything - random chance, a feeling, an internally consistent system, etc. This is the "Y" in the statement "X is good because Y).

Since the definition of "good" is subjective in this case, and ultimately (X is equivalent to Y), then Y is, by necessity, subjective in terms of defining X. It doesn't matter how simple or complicated Y is, it's still a subjective means of determining "good". It also means that the claimant can hold either view (X is good or not good), and either will be subjectively true regardless of the reasons.

Now, any specific objections?

 

[Picky Picky]

No, I believe animals feel pain. Basic organisms with only a rudimentary nervous system also respond to pain, but I doubt they suffer to any meaningful degree. And that's my point. Pain doesn't necessarily equal suffering.

You are right to point out that pain and suffering are not identical. My understanding, however, is that mammals, to put it no more wide ranging than that, display all the same reactions to pain as humans do (other, of course, than reporting it), all the reactions that we regard in humans as indicative of suffering — distressed sounds, disordered eating and sleeping, avoidance of the cause, seeking physical comfort — are present in animals experiencing pain, as indeed are the nerve processes identical to those in humans. Those are the indicators which, in the absence of an ability to report, we would regard as convincing evidence of suffering in the case of humans, and they apply equally to other mammals.

 

[Resha Caner]

So you don't have any answer as to why you're asking me a question that has nothing to do with the topic?

This is a different question than what you asked previously - though in both cases they were loaded questions. If you honestly wanted an answer, you could simply say, "Why are you asking me this?"

That question has an easy answer. I know exactly why I asked. I was concerned we would start talking past each other - that you might be using terms like "moral" differently than me. I thought it would help the discussion to establish some common ground. That hope has long since vanished.

You don't seem to be understanding at all. This is the Philosophy section. The language I'm using is part and parcel with the territory. Let me try again:

Any moral statement with the form "X is good" is either an objective or subjective claim.

If the statement is objective, its truth value can be determined independently of the claimant, and will be the same for anyone correctly resolving the statement. You can say that in the rephrasing of the statement "X is good because Y", if the statement is true then Y is objectively equivalent to "good" and you end up with the tautology (X is equivalent to Y).

If the statement is subjective, the claimant resolves the truth value, in essence defining the term "good". This defining of terms can be based on anything - random chance, a feeling, an internally consistent system, etc. This is the "Y" in the statement "X is good because Y).

Since the definition of "good" is subjective in this case, and ultimately (X is equivalent to Y), then Y is, by necessity, subjective in terms of defining X. It doesn't matter how simple or complicated Y is, it's still a subjective means of determining "good". It also means that the claimant can hold either view (X is good or not good), and either will be subjectively true regardless of the reasons.

Now, any specific objections?

Yes. Do you even remember my original objection? I ask because it doesn't even show up in this latest dissertation. I understand what you said. I understood this before you said it.

 

[bhsmte]

"Objective" is not a synonym for "unresponsive".

What?

Unless you can show me how you can assess changing conditions in a purely objective, you are relying on subjectivity.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

This is a different question than what you asked previously - though in both cases they were loaded questions. If you honestly wanted an answer, you could simply say, "Why are you asking me this?"

That question has an easy answer. I know exactly why I asked. I was concerned we would start talking past each other - that you might be using terms like "moral" differently than me. I thought it would help the discussion to establish some common ground. That hope has long since vanished.

Since the Euthyphro Dilemma doesn't hinge on an individual's definition of morals, but simply what a god deems "good", there's no issue. In fact, the dilemma handles both objective and subjective morals. So I'm not really buying your excuse for asking.

Yes. Do you even remember my original objection? I ask because it doesn't even show up in this latest dissertation. I understand what you said. I understood this before you said it.

If you understood what I said, then you'd have your answer. You don't seem to understand at all, since I've laid everything out clearly, especially the part where I explain how subjective statements necessarily have subjective reasons attached to them. You seem unable to give specific objections to what I've written.

Well, I'm guessing that other people might find this useful...

 

[Resha Caner]

What?

Unless you can show me how you can assess changing conditions in a purely objective, you are relying on subjectivity.

I give up.

 

[Resha Caner]

If you understood what I said, then you'd have your answer.

So your answer is: No, you don't remember my objection.

So I'm not really buying your excuse for asking.

You think I'm lying?

 

[ToddNotTodd]

So your answer is: No, you don't remember my objection.

Your evasiveness is getting ridiculous. I think it's in my best interest to assume a real objection isn't coming and move on. Again, hopefully everyone else understood what I wrote and can make use of it.

You think I'm lying?

Much like my stance on morality, my opinion is completely unnecessary to the discussion.

 

[Resha Caner]

Your evasiveness is getting ridiculous.

It's your refusal to answer a single request that seems ridiculous and evasive to me.

I think it's in my best interest to assume a real objection isn't coming and move on.

Post #226.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

It's your refusal to answer a single request that seems ridiculous and evasive to me.

Answering questions not pertinent to the discussion is invasive and wastes time. I find it interesting that you think not wasting time is ridiculous...

Post #226.

Which I've addressed in every single post. But I suppose we can trudge alone slowly.

Do you believe that when a god says that "X is good", that statement is either objective or subjective?

 

[FireDragon76]

Those are the indicators which, in the absence of an ability to report, we would regard as convincing evidence of suffering in the case of humans, and they apply equally to other mammals.

But it's likely there is an element of suffering in humans that is cognitive in nature that animals cannot share, because most animals don't seem to have anything remotely like human cognition (even ones that do, such as chimpanzees, don't seem to be very sophisticated, and this area is still controversial). Animals cannot contemplate their own mortality, for instance. A kid dying of cancer can think of a lost future of "what-if's" in a way that a rabbit or dog cannot.

 

[Resha Caner]

Answering questions not pertinent to the discussion is invasive and wastes time.

Wow. So every single request I've made of you is wasteful and invasive? Even when this supposedly began with me trying to explain my thoughts to you? Hmm. It doesn't seem your alternative of refusing to answer has been very efficient either. Regardless, if you think you have a right to dictate what will be admitted as relevant to this conversation - if your intent is to make it that one-sided - this isn't going anywhere.

Further, if it wastes your time to pause and discuss with me something I think is relevant, then don't let me burden you any further.

Do you believe that when a god says that "X is good", that statement is either objective or subjective?

You expect me to answer your question? Nope. If we're going to reboot, we'll start with my original objection - that the one horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma mentioned by FrumiousBandersnatch makes God's morality autocratic and arbitrary.

 

[bhsmte]

I give up.

That was easy.

 

[Achilles6129]

That´s an immensely important question. How do you suggest we go about collecting criteria and standards?

I would suggest that the most intelligent being would know the true difference between good and evil. Since God is, by definition, the most intelligent being, I say that God would know the true difference between good and evil. So it's God's perception that's important and that we should adjust our perception to.

 

[Achilles6129]

I guess the problem of evil is something there is no good answer to,

I would definitely disagree. I've given the answer on this thread. You don't find it to be satisfactory?

I will say its hard to believe God will fix everything that has gone wrong.

Why would that be hard to believe? That's certainly the claim of Scripture.

 

[FireDragon76]

I would definitely disagree. I've given the answer on this thread. You don't find it to be satisfactory?

Not really.

Why would that be hard to believe? That's certainly the claim of Scripture.

It's hard to believe because most of my experiences do not point towards a happy ending for things. And I don't find the Bible all that persuasive in this matter. I guess because I take an entirely different approach to the Bible and I always have. I'm not a "Bible answer man" kind of Christian.

 

[Picky Picky]

But it's likely there is an element of suffering in humans that is cognitive in nature that animals cannot share, because most animals don't seem to have anything remotely like human cognition (even ones that do, such as chimpanzees, don't seem to be very sophisticated, and this area is still controversial). Animals cannot contemplate their own mortality, for instance. A kid dying of cancer can think of a lost future of "what-if's" in a way that a rabbit or dog cannot.

As you say, this is an area where our understanding is far from complete, but the likelihood that humans are capable of an extra degree of suffering does not affect the point I have been making: why did God organise much of the natural world on the basis of predator and prey, with all the suffering — pain, if you prefer — that such a system entails, given that there seems no reason why He could not have organised a creation of herbivores; and, while theology attempts to think up ways (unconvincing though they be) of justifying the suffering of humanity, why does it not address the suffering of the rest of animate nature?

 

[quatona]

I would suggest that the most intelligent being would know the true difference between good and evil.

Remember, your question was
How do you decide what is and what isn't the behavior of a benevolent being?
My response:
That´s an immensely important question. How do you suggest we go about collecting criteria and standards?
Your response:
I would suggest that the most intelligent being would know the true difference between good and evil.

That
a. is not an answer to the questions (it may be an answer to a question not asked, though),
b. leaves us with complete circularity (you are suggesting that we measure God by God´s standards),
and c. doesn´t even follow (Why would you assume that the most intelligent being would know this difference?).

Since God is, by definition, the most intelligent being, I say that God would know the true difference between good and evil.

While you are at defining entities into existence: you are making it more complicated than it has to be. You could have simply defined God to be "benevolent".

So it's God's perception that's important and that we should adjust our perception to.

Sorry, but at this point we haven´t even established that a God exists. So let´s not take the second step before the first.

But let´s not forget: You initially asked an epistemological question, and now you are presenting an ontological idea (an idea that rests on premises not shared, at that) as a response.

Interestingly the answer "God" leaves us with no epistemological progress in regards to "How do we decide what´s good/evil"? Rather, it creates a whole bunch of additional epistemological problems.

 

[Resha Caner]

That was easy.

What was easy?

 

[ToddNotTodd]

Further, if it wastes your time to pause and discuss with me something I think is relevant, then don't let me burden you any further.

Good idea. I'm not finding that you're understanding what I've written, since I clearly address your "second horn" objection. So it's probably best that we just drop it.