Philosophical arguments against the existence of God

[variant]

Saying Jesus didn't exist would be senseless as saying philosophy didn't exist, What does that do to your argument?

Nothing, since I ignore incoherent statements.

 

[Fred Nurks]

Philosophers of religion as a part of their discipline, sometimes engage in the formulation and defense of arguments for the existence of God.

We are aware of this.

However, it is oftentimes forgotten that they also interact with arguments against theism.

In this thread, we will discuss those which atheists here think are most persuasive.

Any takers?

Haven't read the entire thread, so I don't know if this has come up.

I think the strongest argument against theism is a metaphysical one, namely that contingent things exist (i.e. things that can exist but need not exist), and the existence of a contingent thing can not be explained by necessary things alone. A contingent thing then must be explained by either an infinite regression of causes or by a contingent first cause - both excluding a necessary first cause such as God.

 

[zippy2006]

You'll need to clarify exactly what you mean because what you've written is uncharacteristically vague.

I was only pointing the crevasse out to you in the hope that you are reminded of it at points in the future.

...in general though, the common reply of skepticism which you gave to the question of the reliability of the human being is given by a great many atheists. The problem is that it is non sequitur unless he is referring to global skepticism, which he almost never is.

Theist: In general, humans are reliable.
Atheist: But sometimes they aren't!​

As someone arguing for the burden of proof, the theist has already succeeded and the atheist's reply has not changed this. After this the atheist must give arguments against the reliability of religious humans, as I noted above (and which you have alluded to). Note though that they undertake this line of argument precisely because they (rightly) own the burden of proof.

Man's basic posture is one of confidence in the reliability of his own faculties and confidence in the testimony of his fellow human beings. Given the widespread existence (and testimony) of general religious belief, a certain kind of inertia naturally comes about which is manifested in the burden of proof.

But I would remind you that this whole topic started when I began bantering with an atheist who offered considerations even more vague than my own, and that there is a much more substantial post awaiting your attention.

This is nothing more than an attempt to shift the burden of proof.

To establish it, yes.

The ubiquity of religion should not be confused for a consensus among religions. There is little agreement between them on any of the fundamental questions of theology or even on the methods and results needed to resolve this and thereby move toward a consensus.

It speaks to a consensus with respect to belief in God, which is just what I said. The fact that scientists disagree about the details of evolution does not undermine the fact that there is a consensus in favor of the theory.

Or properly basic. This is why the idea that scientism is self-refuting is wrong. The fact that an epistemology is not circular does not invalidate it in any way.

The fact that Scientism (and Logical Positivism) is self-refuting has nothing to do with the idea that it is not circular.

 

[The Cadet]

The fact that Scientism (and Logical Positivism) is self-refuting has nothing to do with the idea that it is not circular.

But it is trivial to expand Scientism to encompass the axioms of scientism. It's a little messy, but it works. And even beyond that, even without scientism, science would still be privileged above any other epistemology, as we have yet to be presented with any such other epistemology that provides consistently useful results.

 

[zippy2006]

But it is trivial to expand Scientism to encompass the axioms of scientism. It's a little messy, but it works.

I can't say I believe that, but feel free to explain.

And even beyond that, even without scientism, science would still be privileged above any other epistemology, as we have yet to be presented with any such other epistemology that provides consistently useful results.

Empirical methods may well have a certain kind of primacy, but hopeful not on the basis of pragmatism.

 

[The Cadet]

I can't say I believe that, but feel free to explain.

Do me a favor and define Scientism for me? I'm not sure what definition you're working from here. (Also, wait, I posted that? I thought I deleted that part. In any case, let me step the degree of my assertion waaaay down; I think it might be possible.)

Empirical methods may well have a certain kind of primacy, but hopeful not on the basis of pragmatism.

...Why not? They work. We know they work. When it comes to methodological frameworks, why should we not favor those that work over those that don't work?

 

[zippy2006]

Do me a favor and define Scientism for me? I'm not sure what definition you're working from here. (Also, wait, I posted that? I thought I deleted that part. In any case, let me step the degree of my assertion waaaay down; I think it might be possible.)

Okay.

Yes, I was going to ask you to define it as well. To keep to your previous conversation, I was thinking of something like, "One should only believe propositions which are scientifically verifiable."

...Why not? They work. We know they work. When it comes to methodological frameworks, why should we not favor those that work over those that don't work?

The concept is too vague and accidental. They work for what? The only reason science works is because it gets at truth, such as correctly identifying causal realities. The reason that hard sciences such as physics work is because they produce true representations of the world, and the reason they have a kind of primacy is because their means to arriving at knowledge are particularly evident or congruent with the human mind and mode of existence.

Saying "they work" without explaining why they work or what counts as working makes no sense to me, especially as a kind of primary criterion for knowledge.

 

[The Cadet]

Yes, I was going to ask you to define it as well.

...That awkward moment when you suddenly realize neither you nor the person you're talking to knows what the discussion is about.

I'll respond to this tomorrow. It's getting kind of late, this is probably gonna take a while, and I desperately need to correct my wacked-out sleep cycle.

 

[Davian]

Mine was a reply to post # 1754 and it appears to have your name on it.

Nothing there that might imply that I was claiming anything. I wonder with whom you have me confused?

Looking back you are a major antagonist on this thread,

Actually, as I am following the statement of purpose of this forum - the critical examination of the rational grounds of our most fundamental beliefs and logical analysis of the basic concepts employed in the expression of such beliefs - that would make me the protagonist in this exchange.

condescending

Post #s please. I do try to keep my tone neutral.

Unless it is more humorous to do otherwise.

and evading.

Evading what? It is not me making the truth claims here.

I was attempting to show by conversation that your rules not only disallow the existence of God but disallow the existence of electrons and Higg's bosons as well.

Your attempt failed. I made no mention of electrons or bosons, and any "rules" that may have been alluded to cannot disallow that which has yet to be defined, such as "gods".

 

[Davian]

...

Theist: In general, humans are reliable.
...​

​

I find this to be an odd statement.

Is it not the theist's position that everyone is wrong except for them? Is that not the position that, in general, humans are unreliable?

 

[Davian]

...Why not? They work. We know they work. When it comes to methodological frameworks, why should we not favor those that work over those that don't work?

From what I gather, because the ones that work do not support the conclusions that the religionists start with.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I was only pointing the crevasse out to you in the hope that you are reminded of it at points in the future.

...in general though, the common reply of skepticism which you gave to the question of the reliability of the human being is given by a great many atheists. The problem is that it is non sequitur unless he is referring to global skepticism, which he almost never is.

Theist: In general, humans are reliable.
Atheist: But sometimes they aren't!​

As someone arguing for the burden of proof, the theist has already succeeded and the atheist's reply has not changed this. After this the atheist must give arguments against the reliability of religious humans, as I noted above (and which you have alluded to). Note though that they undertake this line of argument precisely because they (rightly) own the burden of proof.

What burden of proof do they have other than to explain why they are not convinced by the claims of theists?

Man's basic posture is one of confidence in the reliability of his own faculties and confidence in the testimony of his fellow human beings.

I'm not sure what this has to do with anything. As I mentioned earlier, skepticism can help to improve reliability by identifying methods that are less reliable, allowing us to develop better ones.

Given the widespread existence (and testimony) of general religious belief, a certain kind of inertia naturally comes about which is manifested in the burden of proof.

This goes back to the question I asked earlier: in what way does the abundance or longevity of a belief establish its truth?

It speaks to a consensus with respect to belief in God, which is just what I said. The fact that scientists disagree about the details of evolution does not undermine the fact that there is a consensus in favor of the theory.

Yes, a consensus based on a consideration of the evidence. There may be disagreement over the finer details, but on the whole, the theory is well established. That is no analogy to the religious situation. You are confusing the ubiquity of religion with a consensus of religious thought. However, even if there were a consensus among religions, what would it matter? The consensus among homeopaths is that homeopathy works. Not every consensus has merit.

 

[The Cadet]

Yes, I was going to ask you to define it as well. To keep to your previous conversation, I was thinking of something like, "One should only believe propositions which are scientifically verifiable."

Okay, so I'm no philosophizer or anything, but I would basically define my position as "Only propositions which are:
- Scientifically verifiable
- Properly basic axioms
- Proper logical inferences based on scientific data and/or properly basic axioms
Should be considered viable truth statements."

With perhaps the caveat that, should science detect other methodologies that work as well or better, then those methodologies should be privileged above science.

This is, more or less, the position I hold, but as you seemed to catch onto, I hold it more out of pragmatism than anything else. Science and logic (or as Thunderf00t referred to it, PEARLism) reliably gives us useful information about the world around us, while no other methodology has anything resembling a decent track record. Empiricism and science, its direct descendant, are currently the only epistemologies we have that reliably offer us correct information about the outside world.

The concept is too vague and accidental. They work for what? The only reason science works is because it gets at truth, such as correctly identifying causal realities. The reason that hard sciences such as physics work is because they produce true representations of the world, and the reason they have a kind of primacy is because their means to arriving at knowledge are particularly evident or congruent with the human mind and mode of existence.

Saying "they work" without explaining why they work or what counts as working makes no sense to me, especially as a kind of primary criterion for knowledge.

Well, you pretty much nailed it though. Science provides reliable models we can use to understand the world around us, and to improve our own standing in it. It gets at truth. There is no other epistemology outside of empiricism that does that, that provides consistently reliable results (at least, I have yet to find any), and within empiricism, anything I've seen that isn't science is just "science lite" - empiricism without the mechanisms science has for identifying and overcoming cognitive biases. I don't favorite science out of some preconceived bias against religion, I favor it because, well, I really like having computers and video games and ChristianForums and vaccines and an overabundant food supply and a house that stays warm in the winter. (Well, obviously, not exactly that reason, but the implications that follow from it - science provides accurate, useful models of reality and therefore comes reasonably close to approximating the truth as it is commonly applied.)

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I came up with a reverse moral cosmological arguemnt.

If x is necessary, it exists in all possible cases. Lets suppose x is god. I am not god, therefore god (x) is not necessary. Because theres a case (i.e. me) which is not god.

This is valid, but is it sound?

Or is there a something like a logical fallacy going from "If God then necessarily existence (i.e existence is an intrinsic attribute of God) " to "If existence then necessarily God (i.e. God is a intrinsic attribute of any existent thing)"?

 

[quatona]

You can do a lot of fancy stuff, once you start applying modal logic to things instead of propositions.

 

[zippy2006]

Okay, so I'm no philosophizer or anything, but I would basically define my position as "Only propositions which are:
- Scientifically verifiable
- Properly basic axioms
- Proper logical inferences based on scientific data and/or properly basic axioms
Should be considered viable truth statements."

With perhaps the caveat that, should science detect other methodologies that work as well or better, then those methodologies should be privileged above science.

Okay, good. The problems with Scientism inevitably come in the overly certain belief in the exclusivity of science, and in the non-scientific nature of that belief, thus resulting in the self-contradiction. In general this is because science is a much higher-level discipline than epistemology; it is built on epistemological building blocks, but is not itself able to accommodate the minutiae required in epistemology. This cashes out in Scientism's inability to support its own foundations (due to the inability to support such foundations by way of high-level procedures such as the scientific method).

In other words, how are "properly basic axioms" justified, particularly by science?

Well, you pretty much nailed it though. Science provides reliable models we can use to understand the world around us, and to improve our own standing in it. It gets at truth. There is no other epistemology outside of empiricism that does that, that provides consistently reliable results (at least, I have yet to find any), and within empiricism, anything I've seen that isn't science is just "science lite" - empiricism without the mechanisms science has for identifying and overcoming cognitive biases. I don't favorite science out of some preconceived bias against religion, I favor it because, well, I really like having computers and video games and ChristianForums and vaccines and an overabundant food supply and a house that stays warm in the winter. (Well, obviously, not exactly that reason, but the implications that follow from it - science provides accurate, useful models of reality and therefore comes reasonably close to approximating the truth as it is commonly applied.)

I generally understand what you're saying, but I'm wondering what you mean by Empiricism, and especially by the Epistemology of Empiricism?

 

[zippy2006]

As a preface, it seems that either I'm not explaining myself very well or you're not listening to me. Probably it is both, in part because my aim at the beginning of this topic was not exhaustive explanation, as I have pointed out many times. Finally, I am concerned that if I do take the time to explain my view thoroughly, it will be ignored as it has been in our other discussion.

What burden of proof do they have other than to explain why they are not convinced by the claims of theists?

Their burden of proof is to explain why they are not religious, the same way a Monarchist born and raised in the United States would assume the burden of proof to explain why they do not believe in democracy.

I'm not sure what this has to do with anything. As I mentioned earlier, skepticism can help to improve reliability by identifying methods that are less reliable, allowing us to develop better ones.

But how does that answer what I've said? Besides, I've already replied to you on this point (local vs. global). In fact it seems to me that you've just reenacted the theist-atheist exchange from my last. To be more explicit:

1. Man is inherently reliable (global skepticism is false).
2. Consensus among inherently reliable instruments establishes a burden of proof for those inclined against the consensus position.
3. Therefore consensus among humans establishes the relevant burden of proof.

Scientific consensus is just a particular and elevated instance of this argument. Let me tentatively offer an example by way of percentages. The first premise means something like "Man is > 50% reliable." He is more reliable than not. Global reliability wins out over global skepticism. It is not saying "Man is 100% reliable." Suppose the average man is 79% reliable in the realm of Newtonian physics, and the physicist is 98% reliable. Local skepticism--which I equate with science only for the sake of argument--has the capacity to increase the reliability of man only on the supposition that the first premise is true. Similarly, a consensus can only be rationally significant if the first premise is true, and a consensus among scientists achieves weight in precisely the same way that consensus among men achieves weight (albeit in different degrees).

I am not sure if you see why the efficacy of local skepticism rests on the falsity of global skepticism. If global skepticism were true (and premise 1 false) then man could not reliably improve reliability. If man were more unreliable than not (i.e. < 50%) then he would have no grounds for trusting what his senses tell him about the world and empirical methods would collapse. He would have no grounds for trusting what his reason determines is the case or ought to be done and rational inquiry would collapse, etc.

(I am not satisfied with the percentage analogy, but it may be helpful in some ways)

This goes back to the question I asked earlier: in what way does the abundance or longevity of a belief establish its truth?

And I've constantly provided you with your own accepted instance of the same form of reasoning (based on the reliability and truth-seeking character of the human being) : scientific consensus. Consensus and longevity are both functions of abundance.

Yes, a consensus based on a consideration of the evidence. There may be disagreement over the finer details, but on the whole, the theory is well established. That is no analogy to the religious situation. You are confusing the ubiquity of religion with a consensus of religious thought. However, even if there were a consensus among religions, what would it matter? The consensus among homeopaths is that homeopathy works. Not every consensus has merit.

Which consensuses have merit and why?

 

[The Cadet]

Okay, good. The problems with Scientism inevitably come in the overly certain belief in the exclusivity of science, and in the non-scientific nature of that belief, thus resulting in the self-contradiction. In general this is because science is a much higher-level discipline than epistemology; it is built on epistemological building blocks, but is not itself able to accommodate the minutiae required in epistemology. This cashes out in Scientism's inability to support its own foundations (due to the inability to support such foundations by way of high-level procedures such as the scientific method).

In other words, how are "properly basic axioms" justified, particularly by science?

They aren't; they are necessarily assumed as a pretext to scientism working in the first place.

I generally understand what you're saying, but I'm wondering what you mean by Empiricism, and especially by the Epistemology of Empiricism?

Empiricism is a method of acquiring knowledge based on observing events via our senses and building inferences based on those observations. That's more or less how I'd define it, but as said in the past, I'm not great with definitions.

 

[zippy2006]

They aren't; they are necessarily assumed as a pretext to scientism working in the first place.

I think atheists on CF would call this "special pleading." "Science is the most important thing, but it depends on other, non-scientific things, without which it could not even exist."

Why not just say that science and scientific methodologies aren't the most important thing? It's like saying that wheat is the most important thing, the thing by which all other things are measured and attain value. Soil can't be measured or explained by wheat, and it provides the very conditions for the existence of wheat, yet for some reason the importance (and autonomy) of soil is ignored or disregarded.

The problem, as it seems to me, is that Scientism is irrational in that way. it effectively denies the existence of that which gives rise to its existence. The modern hard sciences just aren't exhaustive or self-sufficient in the way that the adherent of Scientism desires. If such axioms are rational, and are not derived from science, then Scientism is false (because there are rational spheres outside of the scientific domain).

And what is the motivation for believing in Scientism? Apparently it is that if Scientism is denied, then irrational practices will receive sanction. Yet the points above show that there are rational spheres outside of the scientific domain. I would advise those inclined to believe Scientism to stop worrying so much and taking such a defensive stance, to admit the facts of reason with respect to the failure of Scientism, and to address irrational practices as they come, on a case-by-case basis. This seems the more honest and rational route.

(I realize I am not holding fast to your definition of Scientism, but you could consider the post a critique of that definition, particularly the part about axioms.)

 

[The Cadet]

I think atheists on CF would call this "special pleading." "Science is the most important thing, but it depends on other, non-scientific things, without which it could not even exist."

Why not just say that science and scientific methodologies aren't the most important thing?

Honestly, I have little issue with this. My attachment to "scientism" (don't like that term very much) is really pragmatic above all - I'm not aware of any other epistemology with consistently useful or valid results. Show me an epistemology that works better, and I will drop science like a rock and switch to the other epistemology.