Philosophical arguments against the existence of God

[zippy2006]

Honestly, I have little issue with this. My attachment to "scientism" (don't like that term very much) is really pragmatic above all - I'm not aware of any other epistemology with consistently useful or valid results. Show me an epistemology that works better, and I will drop science like a rock and switch to the other epistemology.

Why cannot there be multiple means to truth? You already accept at least two: axioms and science. The mistake of Scientism is to demand that there be only one.

The route away from Scientism (and perhaps the route for growth) lies in scrutinizing the axioms you spoke of, and this is what epistemology proper is often concerned with. If we come to know such "axioms" in ways that are not scientific but are clearly rational, then what are those ways and how do they relate to science and knowledge generally? Aristotle takes this up in some detail in the Posterior Analytics, but there are contemporary philosophers who have done the same.

For myself, "Scientism," "Empiricism," and "Rationalism" are not inherently problematic terms, but are rather problematic in the unfortunate methodological narrowness that accompanies them, even apart from matters of revelation and faith. For example, Scientism is related almost exclusively to the scientific method and the modern hard sciences, whereas science once signified a much broader sort of rational inquiry that took on different forms in different spheres of life. The modern world has narrowed this scope to only those spheres which seek to obtain power over nature for the benefit and comfort of mankind--"science" has become largely a discipline of control and technological progress. Methods for attaining knowledge are then shaped by this small set of spheres and it comes to pass that even a field like philosophy--seeking knowledge merely for the sake of knowledge in itself--are brought under suspicion. "What is it good for? How can we test it? How can we quantify it? What will it do for us?"

 

[The Cadet]

Why cannot there be multiple means to truth?

There's no reason why there couldn't be. Which is why it confuses me so much that I have yet to find any.

The route away from Scientism (and perhaps the route for growth) lies in scrutinizing the axioms you spoke of, and this is what epistemology proper is often concerned with. If we come to know such "axioms" in ways that are not scientific but are clearly rational, then what are those ways and how do they relate to science and knowledge generally?

The way I understand it (and my understanding is both lacking and a little tipsy, so feel free to correct me if I mess up here), the key to an axiom being justified is that without it, one cannot reasonably go through life. I'm a huge fan of Evid3nc3's videos, he does a much better job of explaining it:

(It's a real shame he stopped making videos some 4 years ago. :/ )

Just to take an example: his second premise (visible around 3:20), for example, is a justified axiom, as if we can never trust our perceptions, we can never make any statement about reality, and also are liable to get run over the next time we run into a highway. Sure, we could all be in The Matrix, but that's a chance we have to take.

For myself, "Scientism," "Empiricism," and "Rationalism" are not inherently problematic terms, but are rather problematic in the unfortunate methodological narrowness that accompanies them, even apart from matters of revelation and faith. For example, Scientism is related almost exclusively to the scientific method and the modern hard sciences, whereas science once signified a much broader sort of rational inquiry that took on different forms in different spheres of life. The modern world has narrowed this scope to only those spheres which seek to obtain power over nature for the benefit and comfort of mankind--"science" has become largely a discipline of control and technological progress.

I can't say I agree with all of this. See also: social sciences, "soft sciences" like economics, etc. Economics runs off more or less the same framework as biology, but given the data we have to work with, it is far harder to draw any reasonable conclusions. That doesn't mean it's not science, that doesn't mean we can or should discount it outright, it just means we have to be more careful and more studious. And it's not like there's some "alternative economics" not based on the scientific method that works better.

Methods for attaining knowledge are then shaped by this small set of spheres and it comes to pass that even a field like philosophy--seeking knowledge merely for the sake of knowledge in itself--are brought under suspicion. "What is it good for? How can we test it? How can we quantify it? What will it do for us?"

I will say that the problem of the humanities vanishing in colleges is real, and that as little as, say, music theory is likely to help us attain eternal life, we really shouldn't give it that much of a short shrift.

 

[zippy2006]

There's no reason why there couldn't be. Which is why it confuses me so much that I have yet to find any.

Yet in axioms you claim to have truths not found by scientific means, so it seems that you already have found some.

I'm a huge fan of Evid3nc3's videos, he does a much better job of explaining it:

(It's a real shame he stopped making videos some 4 years ago. :/ )

Just to take an example: his second premise (visible around 3:20), for example, is a justified axiom, as if we can never trust our perceptions, we can never make any statement about reality, and also are liable to get run over the next time we run into a highway. Sure, we could all be in The Matrix, but that's a chance we have to take.

I watched about 5 minutes, but can watch more if there is a specific segment that is important.

Descartes' time witnessed a revival of ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, particularly in the revival of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, and his project was to grant the premises of such skepticism while at the same time establishing (mathematical) certitude with respect to self, world, and God. It was a very strange project, probably failed, and unfortunately set the tone for modern philosophy and science. I'm not sure what relevance Descartes' Rationalism is claimed to have for Evid3nc3's Empiricism.

His second premise is interesting but I don't find it sufficient. Supposing our perceptions to be accurate some of the time is not sufficient to ground Western science, for if "some" means "the minority" then the global skepticism that Descartes was trying to respond to reigns supreme. As I've just pointed out to to Archaeopteryx, the perceptions would need to be generally reliable (or accurate the majority of the time) if rational inquiry (and modern science) is to be adequately grounded. If they are only reliable some of the time then confidence is not warranted.

The way I understand it (and my understanding is both lacking and a little tipsy, so feel free to correct me if I mess up here), the key to an axiom being justified is that without it, one cannot reasonably go through life.

Right, but the premises are insufficient, no? This may seem pedantic, but I don't think it's helpful to arrive at a true conclusion by fallacious reasoning. You've given one explicit premise and one implicit premise:

1. If some axiom is not justified, then one cannot reasonably go through life. (explicit premise)
2. One must be able to reasonably go through life. (implicit premise)
3. Therefore some axiom is justified. (modus tollens)

But the obvious question is, "Why is premise (2) true?" (The challenge for Empiricism is not Descartes, but Hume, who dismantles inductive reasoning and falls into his own kind of pragmatism.)

If I wanted to ground Empiricism in a way similar to this, I would revert the epistemological order to the way the ancients understood it. Modern philosophy was generally concerned to first construct an epistemology and then use it to attain knowledge. This naturally resulted in Rationalistic, a priori efforts such as Descartes' and Kant's. The ancients recognized that knowledge is more apparent than epistemology (we know before we know how we know), and thus began with knowledge. Their epistemology was inevitably more descriptive than normative.

1. If some axiom is not justified, then one cannot know anything.
2. But we do know things.
3. Therefore some axiom is justified.

This captures the correlation between knowledge and axioms in a non-pragmatist way, and the argument derives strength from the many different examples that can be substituted into premise (2). Yet epistemologists including the ancients would never have been satisfied with this. In fact, in the modern context you raise it just looks like a cheap way to smuggle in science. The argument does point to the fact that the axiom is justified, but it doesn't explain how it is justified.

For the sake of length I won't say too much more, only a little...

Although I don't know the history of the term, "axiom" rings to my ear of modern computational theory and mathematical logic. They are thought to be the basic building blocks of the entire edifice, and are mysteriously opaque to any scrutiny. I think it is an error to force that mathematical conception on the human being.

I would follow Aristotle and say that foundational premises are self-evidently true. While not being the conclusion of a deductive syllogism, they are also not a priori or inherent knowledge that everyone just has from conception. For example, take the principle of non-contradiction. Once the human being observes and surveys enough of reality, some form of intellection or inductive reasoning seems to provide them with knowledge of this truth. Perhaps something like Newman's "Illative sense." I would have to revisit the works before saying more.

In any case I don't see why basic premises would need to be be justified in the same way that knowledge depending upon the basic premises is justified (i.e. syllogistic reasoning).

I can't say I agree with all of this. See also: social sciences, "soft sciences" like economics, etc. Economics runs off more or less the same framework as biology, but given the data we have to work with, it is far harder to draw any reasonable conclusions. That doesn't mean it's not science, that doesn't mean we can or should discount it outright, it just means we have to be more careful and more studious. And it's not like there's some "alternative economics" not based on the scientific method that works better.

I will say that the problem of the humanities vanishing in colleges is real, and that as little as, say, music theory is likely to help us attain eternal life, we really shouldn't give it that much of a short shrift.

Okay, fair enough.

 

[Ana the Ist]

As a preface, it seems that either I'm not explaining myself very well or you're not listening to me. Probably it is both, in part because my aim at the beginning of this topic was not exhaustive explanation, as I have pointed out many times. Finally, I am concerned that if I do take the time to explain my view thoroughly, it will be ignored as it has been in our other discussion.



Their burden of proof is to explain why they are not religious, the same way a Monarchist born and raised in the United States would assume the burden of proof to explain why they do not believe in democracy.



But how does that answer what I've said? Besides, I've already replied to you on this point (local vs. global). In fact it seems to me that you've just reenacted the theist-atheist exchange from my last. To be more explicit:

1. Man is inherently reliable (global skepticism is false).
2. Consensus among inherently reliable instruments establishes a burden of proof for those inclined against the consensus position.
3. Therefore consensus among humans establishes the relevant burden of proof.

Scientific consensus is just a particular and elevated instance of this argument. Let me tentatively offer an example by way of percentages. The first premise means something like "Man is > 50% reliable." He is more reliable than not. Global reliability wins out over global skepticism. It is not saying "Man is 100% reliable." Suppose the average man is 79% reliable in the realm of Newtonian physics, and the physicist is 98% reliable. Local skepticism--which I equate with science only for the sake of argument--has the capacity to increase the reliability of man only on the supposition that the first premise is true. Similarly, a consensus can only be rationally significant if the first premise is true, and a consensus among scientists achieves weight in precisely the same way that consensus among men achieves weight (albeit in different degrees).

I am not sure if you see why the efficacy of local skepticism rests on the falsity of global skepticism. If global skepticism were true (and premise 1 false) then man could not reliably improve reliability. If man were more unreliable than not (i.e. < 50%) then he would have no grounds for trusting what his senses tell him about the world and empirical methods would collapse. He would have no grounds for trusting what his reason determines is the case or ought to be done and rational inquiry would collapse, etc.

(I am not satisfied with the percentage analogy, but it may be helpful in some ways)



And I've constantly provided you with your own accepted instance of the same form of reasoning (based on the reliability and truth-seeking character of the human being) : scientific consensus. Consensus and longevity are both functions of abundance.



Which consensuses have merit and why?

This is actually pretty helpful...when you outline your thinking with numbers when can address your mistakes more easily. For example...

1. What exactly do you mean by "global skepticism? Reliable towards what? Are you attempting to avoid examination of individual claims by lumping them all together and just saying that in general, "people are reliable"?

2. This appears blatantly false. Even if "instruments" were reliable...the people reading them may not be.

3. This is a logical fallacy by popularity. It's not agreement that establishes proof but evidence.

 

[zippy2006]

This is actually pretty helpful...when you outline your thinking with numbers when can address your mistakes more easily. For example...

1. What exactly do you mean by "global skepticism? Reliable towards what? Are you attempting to avoid examination of individual claims by lumping them all together and just saying that in general, "people are reliable"?

2. This appears blatantly false. Even if "instruments" were reliable...the people reading them may not be.

3. This is a logical fallacy by popularity. It's not agreement that establishes proof but evidence.

I am confident that Archaeopteryx, for whom the post was intended, will have a better time understanding it and will address the premises and the arguments given for the premises rather than the conclusion directly (which is a form of begging the question).

 

[sparow]

Nothing, since I ignore incoherent statements.

this is a cop out,

 

[sparow]

There's no reason why there couldn't be. Which is why it confuses me so much that I have yet to find any.



The way I understand it (and my understanding is both lacking and a little tipsy, so feel free to correct me if I mess up here), the key to an axiom being justified is that without it, one cannot reasonably go through life. I'm a huge fan of Evid3nc3's videos, he does a much better job of explaining it:

(It's a real shame he stopped making videos some 4 years ago. :/ )

Just to take an example: his second premise (visible around 3:20), for example, is a justified axiom, as if we can never trust our perceptions, we can never make any statement about reality, and also are liable to get run over the next time we run into a highway. Sure, we could all be in The Matrix, but that's a chance we have to take.



I can't say I agree with all of this. See also: social sciences, "soft sciences" like economics, etc. Economics runs off more or less the same framework as biology, but given the data we have to work with, it is far harder to draw any reasonable conclusions. That doesn't mean it's not science, that doesn't mean we can or should discount it outright, it just means we have to be more careful and more studious. And it's not like there's some "alternative economics" not based on the scientific method that works better.



I will say that the problem of the humanities vanishing in colleges is real, and that as little as, say, music theory is likely to help us attain eternal life, we really shouldn't give it that much of a short shrift.

I was very impressed with the video, it is a shame some of these Atheist supposed philosophers haven't watched it.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I am confident that Archaeopteryx, for whom the post was intended, will have a better time understanding it and will address the premises and the arguments given for the premises rather than the conclusion directly (which is a form of begging the question).

Ok...from what I've read though, Arch has some problems with your premises as well. You seem to think that you can avoid explaining how you arrived at your premises, and demand that someone just address them as if they were true...they aren't.

Good luck with that.

 

[Ana the Ist]

this is a cop out,

You said this...

"Saying Jesus didn't exist would be senseless as saying philosophy didn't exist, What does that do to your argument?"

You're conflating the existence of a person with a school of thought. Variant is right to say it's incoherent. I would say it's total nonsense. They aren't the same thing.

 

[variant]

this is a cop out,

It's not since the idea that philosophy doesn't exist isn't defensible where as people can make a case that Jesus did not in fact exist.

Comparing the two ideas is nonsense.

Just because you feel strongly that a proposition is wrong, it is not the same as one that is absurd.

I would have rather just ignored your nonsense but you seem to have the need to have it spelled out for you.

My arguments are not affected by your incoherent analogy. Getting mad at people because they disagree with the specific claims of fact made by your religion in a thread in a philosophy forum specifically about questioning that religions basis in fact is childish and petulant.

If you think the claims aren't true argue that, but don't get mad simply because someone thinks them and it offends your sense of what is obviously true.

 

[variant]

Nm DP

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Their burden of proof is to explain why they are not religious, the same way a Monarchist born and raised in the United States would assume the burden of proof to explain why they do not believe in democracy.

As I indicated in the question, I agree broadly with this. They can satisfy this burden by pointing to the ramshackle case the religious have presented in support of their various supernatural claims. They are not required to disprove claims that are already unfounded.

But how does that answer what I've said? Besides, I've already replied to you on this point (local vs. global). In fact it seems to me that you've just reenacted the theist-atheist exchange from my last. To be more explicit:

As I indicated previously, I see no reason to make this distinction (local vs global) for the purposes of this discussion, and it seems to me that you have all but conceded my point in relation to skepticism driving improvements in reliability.

1. Man is inherently reliable (global skepticism is false).
2. Consensus among inherently reliable instruments establishes a burden of proof for those inclined against the consensus position.
3. Therefore consensus among humans establishes the relevant burden of proof.

Scientific consensus is just a particular and elevated instance of this argument. Let me tentatively offer an example by way of percentages. The first premise means something like "Man is > 50% reliable." He is more reliable than not. Global reliability wins out over global skepticism. It is not saying "Man is 100% reliable." Suppose the average man is 79% reliable in the realm of Newtonian physics, and the physicist is 98% reliable. Local skepticism--which I equate with science only for the sake of argument--has the capacity to increase the reliability of man only on the supposition that the first premise is true. Similarly, a consensus can only be rationally significant if the first premise is true, and a consensus among scientists achieves weight in precisely the same way that consensus among men achieves weight (albeit in different degrees).

I am not sure if you see why the efficacy of local skepticism rests on the falsity of global skepticism. If global skepticism were true (and premise 1 false) then man could not reliably improve reliability. If man were more unreliable than not (i.e. < 50%) then he would have no grounds for trusting what his senses tell him about the world and empirical methods would collapse. He would have no grounds for trusting what his reason determines is the case or ought to be done and rational inquiry would collapse, etc.

A few points to consider: (1) The word 'global' seems misleading to me as it implies a composite of local reliabilities, in which case we might expect that improvements on the local level would aggregate to improvements globally, all other things being equal. You appear to be talking about something more foundational, rather than 'global'. (2) Even if we accept the argument in its entirety, I'm not sure what you think the implications are for theology, in which there is little agreement on any of the fundamental questions or even on the methods and results needed to answer those questions and thereby establish a consensus. (3) Again, accepting the argument in its entirety, it's worthwhile considering the 'local' reliability of theology. It may be that, even if human beings are generally reliable, there are particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable.

And I've constantly provided you with your own accepted instance of the same form of reasoning (based on the reliability and truth-seeking character of the human being) : scientific consensus. Consensus and longevity are both functions of abundance.

Which consensuses have merit and why?

Suppose you visit ten different psychics who give you ten different predictions about your near-future, none of which are realised. Nonetheless, the consensus among these psychics is that psychic readings are genuine phenomena and that psychics are themselves 'globally' reliable. Does this consensus have merit? Why or why not? You point out to the psychics that the evidence in support of their putative abilities is lacking, but they again point you to the consensus of psychics and argue that, given P1-3, the burden is on you to thoroughly disprove their claims. Accepting the challenge, suppose you did discredit their claims, but the consensus among them remained the same (it was not revised in any way).

So why does a scientific consensus have more merit than a consensus among psychics? I think I already addressed this earlier, noting that a scientific consensus is based on a consideration of the evidence. We can be more confident in a scientific consensus because of the process by which that consensus was established. If the consensus among psychics was reached via a similar process, then we could be similarly confident in it. But it was not, as evident by the psychics' response to your inquiry into their putative abilities. Their consensus is based on something other than a consideration of the evidence, and their consensus resists revision. Such a consensus is worthless and obstructs the path to knowledge.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

This is actually pretty helpful...when you outline your thinking with numbers when can address your mistakes more easily. For example...

1. What exactly do you mean by "global skepticism? Reliable towards what? Are you attempting to avoid examination of individual claims by lumping them all together and just saying that in general, "people are reliable"?

2. This appears blatantly false. Even if "instruments" were reliable...the people reading them may not be.

3. This is a logical fallacy by popularity. It's not agreement that establishes proof but evidence.

He appears to be arguing that, because human beings are generally reliable, a consensus among them imposes a burden on those who disagree with the consensus to provide reasons to doubt it. However, this seems to ignore the process by which the consensus is reached. Not every consensus has merit.

 

[Ana the Ist]

He appears to be arguing that, because human beings are generally reliable, a consensus among them imposes a burden on those who disagree with the consensus to provide reasons to doubt it. However, this seems to ignore the process by which the consensus is reached. Not every consensus has merit.

I think he's wrong on basically every point he's arguing....

Reliable in what way? It's been shown that people typically form beliefs and then form reasons to justify them. It's all part of the brain's basic tendency to simply complex information. Reliability isn't a given...locally, globally, individually....

Consensus on what? I don't think he believes his god is the god of Islam or the gods of the Hindus...there cannot be a consensus without a clear understanding of what the consensus is on.

Every premise he's proposed is horribly flawed and he doesn't want to address them.

 

[The Cadet]

His second premise is interesting but I don't find it sufficient. Supposing our perceptions to be accurate some of the time is not sufficient to ground Western science, for if "some" means "the minority" then the global skepticism that Descartes was trying to respond to reigns supreme. As I've just pointed out to to Archaeopteryx, the perceptions would need to be generally reliable (or accurate the majority of the time) if rational inquiry (and modern science) is to be adequately grounded. If they are only reliable some of the time then confidence is not warranted.

I think it's fair to modify it to "most of the time". I believe I can trust most of my sensory data, even in the worst of times.

Right, but the premises are insufficient, no? This may seem pedantic, but I don't think it's helpful to arrive at a true conclusion by fallacious reasoning. You've given one explicit premise and one implicit premise:

1. If some axiom is not justified, then one cannot reasonably go through life. (explicit premise)
2. One must be able to reasonably go through life. (implicit premise)
3. Therefore some axiom is justified. (modus tollens)

But the obvious question is, "Why is premise (2) true?" (The challenge for Empiricism is not Descartes, but Hume, who dismantles inductive reasoning and falls into his own kind of pragmatism.)

Again, my issue comes down to pragmatism: if I were not to trust my senses (something I must do without any justification, as no justification could possibly be forthcoming due to the problem of hard solipsism), I simply could not do anything with my life. I would be stuck not having any idea if what I was seeing around me was real, whether that speeding train was actually there, et cetera et cetera. At some level, every system of knowledge must make this assumption in order to proceed.

I'll admit that philosophically, this is probably fairly shaky ground. However, your variant I have a mild issue with:

The ancients recognized that knowledge is more apparent than epistemology (we know before we know how we know), and thus began with knowledge. Their epistemology was inevitably more descriptive than normative.

1. If some axiom is not justified, then one cannot know anything.
2. But we do know things.
3. Therefore some axiom is justified.

This captures the correlation between knowledge and axioms in a non-pragmatist way, and the argument derives strength from the many different examples that can be substituted into premise (2).

To me, I see the error the ontological argument makes in this argument. Sure, premise 2 is valid... But only if the conclusion is valid. After all, if the axiom is not justified, we couldn't know things, and due to solipsism, we aren't sure we actually know things. Also, (1) needs to be modified to "then one cannot know anything other than oneself" due to "I think therefore I am", but that's a very minor point.

I would follow Aristotle and say that foundational premises are self-evidently true. While not being the conclusion of a deductive syllogism, they are also not a priori or inherent knowledge that everyone just has from conception. For example, take the principle of non-contradiction. Once the human being observes and surveys enough of reality, some form of intellection or inductive reasoning seems to provide them with knowledge of this truth. Perhaps something like Newman's "Illative sense." I would have to revisit the works before saying more.

In any case I don't see why basic premises would need to be be justified in the same way that knowledge depending upon the basic premises is justified (i.e. syllogistic reasoning).

...But this sort of demolishes any case of scientism being self-refuting, doesn't it? After all, if the foundational premises are self-evidently true, why would it be considered special pleading for an epistemology to lean on them?

 

[zippy2006]

I think it's fair to modify it to "most of the time". I believe I can trust most of my sensory data, even in the worst of times.

Okay.

Again, my issue comes down to pragmatism: if I were not to trust my senses (something I must do without any justification, as no justification could possibly be forthcoming due to the problem of hard solipsism), I simply could not do anything with my life. I would be stuck not having any idea if what I was seeing around me was real, whether that speeding train was actually there, et cetera et cetera. At some level, every system of knowledge must make this assumption in order to proceed.

I'll admit that philosophically, this is probably fairly shaky ground. However, your variant I have a mild issue with:

Yes, I don't like it because it derives truth from whim. "It's this way because I want it to be, because I would like to reasonably go through life." But I think we understand each other here.

To me, I see the error the ontological argument makes in this argument. Sure, premise 2 is valid... But only if the conclusion is valid. After all, if the axiom is not justified, we couldn't know things, and due to solipsism, we aren't sure we actually know things.

You're just insisting that epistemology precedes knowledge. I was actually explicit in rejecting that idea. I think knowledge precedes knowledge of knowledge (epistemology) and that the syllogism is therefore valid.

That is to say, if we have knowledge and knowledge requires axioms then there must be axioms. Your response is something like, "One cannot say they have knowledge unless they can first independently derive the axioms grounding that knowledge." I disagree with that statement.

...But this sort of demolishes any case of scientism being self-refuting, doesn't it? After all, if the foundational premises are self-evidently true, why would it be considered special pleading for an epistemology to lean on them?

Yes, that's why I said I have no problem with the term "Scientism," but rather in what exactly is meant by it. Scientism is focused on a particular kind of knowledge and wishes it to be the only kind of knowledge. Aristotle's approach introduces a second kind of knowledge, knowledge which is not got at in "scientific" ways, at least given how we understand that word in 2016.

 

[zippy2006]

As I indicated in the question, I agree broadly with this.

Okay good, I thought you might have.

A few points to consider: (1) The word 'global' seems misleading to me as it implies a composite of local reliabilities, in which case we might expect that improvements on the local level would aggregate to improvements globally, all other things being equal. You appear to be talking about something more foundational, rather than 'global'.

Yes, I was using the word "foundational" earlier, but when you brought up skepticism explicitly I switched to the epistemological parlance of local/global skepticism.

(2) Even if we accept the argument in its entirety, I'm not sure what you think the implications are for theology, in which there is little agreement on any of the fundamental questions or even on the methods and results needed to answer those questions and thereby establish a consensus.

Implications for theology? We won't have time to go into this right now, but in general I think that if you understand God a little bit--that is, understand how hard God is to understand--the idea that differences in accounts will appear is quite rational. Put a tree in front of 1000 people and you'll get more or less one account. Put a black hole in front of 1000 people and you'll naturally find much more divergence.

(3) Again, accepting the argument in its entirety, it's worthwhile considering the 'local' reliability of theology. It may be that, even if human beings are generally reliable, there are particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable.

Sure, make the argument if you like. The burden of proof is yours.

Suppose you visit ten different psychics who give you ten different predictions about your near-future, none of which are realised. Nonetheless, the consensus among these psychics is that psychic readings are genuine phenomena and that psychics are themselves 'globally' reliable.

Thanks for the illustration, but allow me to interject. Psychics cannot be globally reliable considered as psychics, only as humans. To speak very strictly, we have a consensus among a group of (globally reliable) humans about the nature of psychic readings. "Globally reliable psychics" just doesn't make sense, as psychic reading is a local area of human activity. This doesn't bear directly on your argument, but it is worth noting.

When talking about particular groups of humans or areas of study, local reliability is what comes into play. In points 2 & 3 below "reliable" is generally meant as "locally reliable." All humans are globally reliable.

Does this consensus have merit? Why or why not? You point out to the psychics that the evidence in support of their putative abilities is lacking, but they again point you to the consensus of psychics and argue that, given P1-3, the burden is on you to thoroughly disprove their claims. Accepting the challenge, suppose you did discredit their claims, but the consensus among them remained the same (it was not revised in any way).

Four points:

1. It is possible to establish a burden of proof that favors your position and then be proven wrong.
2. In my argument, "consensus" cannot be understood as a consensus in some hand-picked sample, but rather a consensus among all members of a reliable group (or at least a random sample). First let's take scientists, namely young earth creationist scientists (assume science is a reputable discipline and scientists a reliable group). If we have 20 YEC archaeologists and they all say the earth is 6000 years old, does the consensus have rational weight? No, the sample group is flawed. The perfect group would be all archaeologists and lesser groups would be randomly selected.
3. The question of whether the group must be "reliable" is in some sense moot. Suppose the psychics made their claim and you responded by demonstrating that they are not reliable with respect to the discipline. Two interpretations are possible: 1) their argument only succeeds with reliable groups, or 2) they established a paper-thin burden of proof and you responded with a sufficient argument. Yet the heuristic that most common folk use for determining the reliability of a particular group is the whole group (i.e. "Do most humans think psychics, or scientists, are a reliable group?"). I don't advise stopping there, but I'm just noting an answer already implicit in my own argument.
4. The rational weight given to consensus is obviously not as strong as other arguments could produce, which is why I only claim that it establishes the burden of proof.

For the sake of time, I think we both agree that I've successfully established a burden of proof, even though we may disagree on the strength of the burden. For my purposes, this means that the atheist must lean on his arguments. He lives or dies by his arguments, because he has the burden of proof. This is perhaps one reason why atheists are more inclined to argument than religious. (Note that we are talking about a consensus of religiosity)

So why does a scientific consensus have more merit than a consensus among psychics? I think I already addressed this earlier, noting that a scientific consensus is based on a consideration of the evidence. We can be more confident in a scientific consensus because of the process by which that consensus was established. If the consensus among psychics was reached via a similar process, then we could be similarly confident in it. But it was not, as evident by the psychics' response to your inquiry into their putative abilities. Their consensus is based on something other than a consideration of the evidence, and their consensus resists revision. Such a consensus is worthless and obstructs the path to knowledge.

That may all be true but I don't think even that much is required. From the perspective of my argument, scientific consensus has more merit because scientists are legitimate experts in their domain of study. As long as I know that they are legitimate experts in a (legitimate) domain of study, then their consensus with respect to that field will be rationally significant. Maybe that's what you were saying, but "evidence" is an ambiguous word. What if we are polling public speakers, or gymnasts (i.e. experts of practical rather than speculative knowledge)? Or in fields that do not always deal in hard evidence, such as philosophy? You might say "evidence" can mean something like "reasons," but I think legitimate expertise is cleaner.

However, this seems to ignore the process by which the consensus is reached. Not every consensus has merit.

Just to be clear--and because we probably won't get a chance to talk for awhile--I have given arguments for why humans considered generally are reliable. In fact I've never argued on the basis of consensus pure and simple, as premises (1) and (2) have a great deal to do with reliability.

You say that not every consensus has merit, and if you are talking about consensus within subsets of all humans then I'm inclined to agree with you. But it's not nearly so clear that not every consensus has merit when the entire set rather than a subset is under consideration. You simply can't compare the psychics to all of humanity. The quality of such a consensus is similar to a scientific consensus (although, again, it is different in degree). While I would not overestimate the significance of such a consensus, I would point out that it ought to weigh, even against methodological opinions. If the whole of mankind disagrees with a belief I hold, I would give that belief special attention. If the whole of mankind claims to have done or understood something that I consider to be impossible, then I would want to give special attention to my belief which renders this impossible, etc. To simply ignore such a convergence without giving it extra rational attention would seem to be dishonest or even arrogant.

Very good post. Sorry I didn't dig in earlier, but my initial post on this topic was simply not meant to be argumentatively rigorous and I shy away from starting new topics with persons who I am already in dialogue with on multiple other topics.

 

[anonymous person]

To highlight on what Zippy is saying, I think a passage from G. Campbell Morgan's "Be Strong and Work" is so fitting (bold mine):

"God is the age-abiding Fact, the ever and everywhere present Fact, and men who forget Him are leaving out of their calculations the supreme quantity, and therefore their findings are inevitably doomed to be wrong. A science that forgets God is blind, seeing only that which is near, and at last boasting itself that it has no interest in anything that is far. The philosophy that excludes God is equally incomplete, and therefore incompetent. Science starts with emptiness of mind, a perfectly proper attitude. Philosophy starts with a question, What is truth? a perfectly fair method of operation. But science proceeding to the discovery of the facts will inevitably finally touch God. The question is whether it will dare to call Him God when it finds Him? Philosophy attempting to account for things and to give us the true wisdom of life must take God into account. The question is whether it will ultimately do so or not. The one fact from which there is no escape is the fact of God. God is not distanced from human life. In Him we live and move and have our being. God is not uninterested in human life. If the great revelation of these sacred writings is to be trusted, there is absolutely nothing in which God is not interested. In passing, let me urge very seriously those of you who have not been reading the Old Testament recently to read it once more, without prejudice, simply to see it as revealing God's interest in the common things of life, the commonplaces of life. It is the Old Testament that teaches you that God puts human tears into His bottle. It is the Old Testament that tells that God knows whether the garment you wear is a mixture of wool and something else or not. The Old Testament tells us that God is interested in the fringes that people wear on their garments. Trivial things, you say. That is our God! He is the God of the infinitely small as well as of the infinitely great, not alienated from any part of human life, knowing our downsitting and our uprising, our going out and our coming in; near to us in the casual as well as in the critical, numbering the hairs of our head. That is the supreme fact of life, and the fact from which there can be no escape.

http://articles.ochristian.com/article14080.shtml

 

[sparow]

It's not since the idea that philosophy doesn't exist isn't defensible where as people can make a case that Jesus did not in fact exist.

Comparing the two ideas is nonsense.

Just because you feel strongly that a prtion is wrong, it is not the same as one that is absurd.

I would have rather just ignored your nonsense but you seem to have the need to have it spelled out for you.

My arguments are not affected by your incoherent analogy. Getting mad at people because they disagree with the specific claims of fact made by your religion in a thread in a philosophy forum specifically about questioning that religions basis in fact is childish and petulant.

If you think the claims aren't true argue that, but don't get mad simply because someone thinks them and it offends your sense of what is obviously true.

I am trying to keep this non personal. You do know a few philosophical words, like philosophy and incoherent. There may be rational augments against the existence of God but denying the existence of Jesus Christ is insanity. You also fail as a mind reader.

The thread is in the Philosophy section but it was started by an Anglican I believe and the challenge was for those who had philosophical arguments against the existence of God to strut their stuff. I am not aware any arguments have been presented, the atheist have merely changed the discussion to "you prove God exists".

 

[sparow]

You said this...

"Saying Jesus didn't exist would be senseless as saying philosophy didn't exist, What does that do to your argument?"

You're conflating the existence of a person with a school of thought. Variant is right to say it's incoherent. I would say it's total nonsense. They aren't the same thing.

Good day team Atheist.

You should already know that, "this is a cop out " was in reply to "Nothing, since I ignore incoherent statements."

"Saying Jesus didn't exist would be senseless as saying philosophy didn't exist, What does that do to your argument?" was a reply to a third person Atheist who denied the existence of Jesus Christ in response to a requested explanation he requested.

Denying the existence of Jesus Christ is not to do with philosophy but to do with Psychiatry.