Philosophical arguments against the existence of God

[Colter]

I'm no expert on truth, which is why I attempt to use methods that are. Unfortunately for you (and the other 153 followers of UB) choosing some anonymous book as your arbiter for things true, is well, laughable.

If you had read the book you wouldn't sound so narrow minded criticizing it. At least I could assume you know what it is you disagree with. Your methods must suck if you dismiss a 2,000 page book without reading it.

 

[HitchSlap]

If you had read the book you wouldn't sound so narrow minded criticizing it. At least I could assume you know what it is you disagree with. Your methods must suck if you dismiss a 2,000 page book without reading it.

I dismiss what you have asserted regarding supernatural claims based on your understanding of the UB.
Your baseless assertions are no different than any other religious claims made by the thousands; I don't have time to read them all, so you're going to have to do better if you want me or anyone else here who require evidence for assertions. There are many religious books out there that I will never read, because there are sources of reading that do a better job of explaining our world.

 

[Davian]

I'm no expert on truth, which is why I attempt to use methods that are. Unfortunately for you (and the other 153 followers of UB)

Arguments from popularity aside, I lol'd.

choosing some anonymous book as your arbiter for things true, is well, laughable.

I got as far as 13 minutes, to where he says, atheist cosmologist have unanswered questions? We don't, we have "God".

At 16 minutes "...all of us on the planets of the seven super universes...".

 

[HitchSlap]

Arguments from popularity aside, I lol'd.

I got as far as 13 minutes, to where he says, atheist cosmologist have unanswered questions? We don't, we have "God".

At 16 minutes "...all of us on the planets of the seven super universes...".

Yeah, the video's a bit painful, and I have only made it through the first presenter, but I liked the fact that here is a UB follower, and he's basically claiming that most of the "science" in UB is BS.

 

[Colter]

Yeah, the video's a bit painful, and I have only made it through the first presenter, but I liked the fact that here is a UB follower, and he's basically claiming that most of the "science" in UB is BS.

Having actually read the book I'm aware of the use of science of the day which wasn't BS at the time. The revelatory commission explained why they were limited.



101:4.2 "Mankind should understand that we who participate in the revelation of truth are very rigorously limited by the instructions of our superiors. We are not at liberty to anticipate the scientific discoveries of a thousand years. Revelators must act in accordance with the instructions which form a part of the revelation mandate. We see no way of overcoming this difficulty, either now or at any future time. We full well know that, while the historic facts and religious truths of this series of revelatory presentations will stand on the records of the ages to come, within a few short years many of our statements regarding the physical sciences will stand in need of revision in consequence of additional scientific developments and new discoveries. These new developments we even now foresee, but we are forbidden to include such humanly undiscovered facts in the revelatory records. Let it be made clear that revelations are not necessarily inspired. The cosmology of these revelations is not inspired. It is limited by our permission for the co-ordination and sorting of present-day knowledge. While divine or spiritual insight is a gift, human wisdom must evolve.

101:4.3 Truth is always a revelation: autorevelation when it emerges as a result of the work of the indwelling Adjuster; epochal revelation when it is presented by the function of some other celestial agency, group, or personality.

101:4.4 In the last analysis, religion is to be judged by its fruits, according to the manner and the extent to which it exhibits its own inherent and divine excellence.

101:4.5 Truth may be but relatively inspired, even though revelation is invariably a spiritual phenomenon. While statements with reference to cosmology are never inspired, such revelations are of immense value in that they at least transiently clarify knowledge by:

1. The reduction of confusion by the authoritative elimination of error.
2. The co-ordination of known or about-to-be-known facts and observations.
3. The restoration of important bits of lost knowledge concerning epochal transactions in the distant past.
4. The supplying of information which will fill in vital missing gaps in otherwise earned knowledge.
5. Presenting cosmic data in such a manner as to illuminate the spiritual teachings contained in the accompanying revelation." UB 1955

 

[Colter]

What about spiritual caesarean?

LOL! I don't think it works that way, besides, I don't think they were performing caesareans during Jesus day???

The spirit birth:

THE VISIT WITH NICODEMUS


"One evening at the home of Flavius there came to see Jesus one Nicodemus, a wealthy and elderly member of the Jewish Sanhedrin. He had heard much about the teachings of this Galilean, and so he went one afternoon to hear him as he taught in the temple courts. He would have gone often to hear Jesus teach, but he feared to be seen by the people in attendance upon his teaching, for already were the rulers of the Jews so at variance with Jesus that no member of the Sanhedrin would want to be identified in any open manner with him. Accordingly, Nicodemus had arranged with Andrew to see Jesus privately and after nightfall on this particular evening. Peter, James, and James were in Flavius's garden when the interview began, but later they all went into the house where the discourse continued.

142:6.2 In receiving Nicodemus, Jesus showed no particular deference; in talking with him, there was no compromise or undue persuasiveness. The Master made no attempt to repulse his secretive caller, nor did he employ sarcasm. In all his dealings with the distinguished visitor, Jesus was calm, earnest, and dignified. Nicodemus was not an official delegate of the Sanhedrin; he came to see Jesus wholly because of his personal and sincere interest in the Master's teachings.

142:6.3 Upon being presented by Flavius, Nicodemus said: “Rabbi, we know that you are a teacher sent by God, for no mere man could so teach unless God were with him. And I am desirous of knowing more about your teachings regarding the coming kingdom.”

4 Jesus answered Nicodemus: “Verily, verily, I say to you, Nicodemus, except a man be born from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God.” Then replied Nicodemus: “But how can a man be born again when he is old? He cannot enter a second time into his mother's womb to be born.”

142:6.5 Jesus said: “Nevertheless, I declare to you, except a man be born of the spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit. But you should not marvel that I said you must be born from above. When the wind blows, you hear the rustle of the leaves, but you do not see the wind—whence it comes or whither it goes—and so it is with everyone born of the spirit. With the eyes of the flesh you can behold the manifestations of the spirit, but you cannot actually discern the spirit.”


6 Nicodemus replied: “But I do not understand—how can that be?” Said Jesus: “Can it be that you are a teacher in Israel and yet ignorant of all this? It becomes, then, the duty of those who know about the realities of the spirit to reveal these things to those who discern only the manifestations of the material world. But will you believe us if we tell you of the heavenly truths? Do you have the courage, Nicodemus, to believe in one who has descended from heaven, even the Son of Man?”

142:6.7 And Nicodemus said: “But how can I begin to lay hold upon this spirit which is to remake me in preparation for entering into the kingdom?” Jesus answered: “Already does the spirit of the Father in heaven indwell you. If you would be led by this spirit from above, very soon would you begin to see with the eyes of the spirit, and then by the wholehearted choice of spirit guidance would you be born of the spirit since your only purpose in living would be to do the will of your Father who is in heaven. And so finding yourself born of the spirit and happily in the kingdom of God, you would begin to bear in your daily life the abundant fruits of the spirit.” UB 1955

 

[zippy2006]

Greetings! I hope you've been well. I still have limited time for CF at the moment, but here is a reply...

My basic argument can be found here. My only intention in this thread is to defend that argument in itself, as well as the argument with respect to religious belief. That is, to establish a burden of proof. Other questions can be saved for another day.

It depends on the process they used to reach their conclusions. If you present a black hole to 1000 people who know little or nothing about black holes, you might expect a range of responses. However, as those individuals examine the phenomenon more closely, over time, you would expect a convergence in their thinking that reflects a general understanding of how black holes work.

"Other question" #1: theology. By "theology" I understood you to mean broad religious experience (i.e. diversity in world religions and conceptions of God). In this case we would not be dealing with experts.

Yet if you were thinking of Christian theology and consensus within Christianity, then what you say here is certainly applicable (and, of course, true). Is there a convergence or is there not? For the time being I will only say that sciences of any kind always produce a diversity of views, not because there is no fundamental agreement, but because sciences are not tools of affirmation and agreement. That's what social clubs are for.

But again, I am going to leave the topic of theology for another day. It is a local consideration, and my argument has to do with global reliability. Your theology argument is presumably elicited by the burden of proof which has already been established.

As mentioned previously, I think I can satisfy that burden by pointing to the ramshackle case the religious present in support of their various supernatural claims.

Perhaps we can start a thread on that in the future.

Sorry about the slight ambiguity in my wording. I didn't mean to imply that there are "globally reliable psychics." Instead, I was linking the example to P1 of your argument, according to which human beings are generally reliable.

Not a problem. I understood your meaning, which is why I said that my clarification didn't bear on your argument. I just wanted to be sure we were clear.

I take this as agreement with (3; emphasis added)?

Yes, I would agree with that. Of course a reason for the domain's unreliability would need to be furnished, given the global reliability of human beings.

I don't recall you introducing this caveat in your original formulation of the argument, so I assume that this is an addition.

My original argument had to do with global reliability. Your point about psychics had to do with local reliability. Global reliability has to do with humans considered as humans, in which case a consensus would need to be >50% of the human race. The "consensus" of psychics you produced simply does not fulfill the requirements of a true consensus of human beings. Yet a true consensus can always be approximated by random sampling.

In any case, I think there is something more pertinent to focus on than the composition of the group, and that is the process by which they reached a consensus. You could take a hand-picked sample of YEC archaeologists and argue that the consensus of the group lacks merit because the process by which it was derived is fundamentally flawed. The process is what distinguishes YEC archaeologists from archaeologists and what makes the consensus of the latter group more credible than that of the former.

I included all archaeologists because I assume that their expertise derives from their archaeological education, and I also assume that their education is similar (and able to produce increased reliability).

But you're still talking about local reliability when my argument talks about global reliability. The extent to which a particular circumstance increases or decreases default reliability is not relevant to my argument.

Now, I should say that my memory may be misleading me. I read the previous 4 posts to refresh my memory, but perhaps you have already submitted that my argument is sound and that the substitution with respect to religion is also sound? I believe you conceded the former but not the latter, but perhaps you did concede both? In which case you have moved on to further questions such as the reliability of particular disciplines and especially theology?

On this point I would disagree. First, you haven't established that there is a consensus of religious thought.

Okay, so you accept the argument but do not accept a consensus of religiosity?

You have conflated the pervasiveness of religion with a consensus among religions. As I noted previously, ubiquity is not equivalent to consensus.

Why isn't ubiquity equivalent to consensus? If Islam were ubiquitous there would be religious consensus.

The question is, "What kind of consensus does ubiquitous religiosity imply?" It might imply consensus with respect to the existence of the supernatural, the importance of worship and religious observance, the validity of religious belief, etc.

Moreover, it seems that theology is plagued by the opposite, by a lack of consensus, with little agreement on the methods and results needed to move toward one.

I haven't said a word about theology; I've spoken of religiosity. Theology is a matter of local reliability. Perhaps the unreliability of theology would entail the unreliability of religion, but either way it is another question.

Second, if the composition of the group is important, as you argue above, then what group should we look to for a consensus and why? Should we take the entire body of religious believers as our group, or theologians, philosophers, and scientists? You seem to have opted for the former simply because it is most convenient to your argument, in which you conflate pervasiveness with consensus.

I have opted for the entirety of the human race, believers and unbelievers alike, because it is required by the argument.

You later go on to argue that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" if it is established by legitimate experts. But what makes one a legitimate expert on the supernatural? Third, as I noted previously, I think the atheist can satisfy her burden by pointing to the weak case presented by the religious. She doesn't need to thoroughly discredit claims that are already unfounded.

I think these would be topics for another thread.

In the case of gymnastics, for example, expertise is demonstrated in the performance (e.g., the floor routine).

Okay.

Thanks for your thoughtful response. I think we have at least clarified a number of issues that were ambiguous in the beginning.

Sure. I'm hoping this thread is almost fully cooked.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Greetings! I hope you've been well. I still have limited time for CF at the moment, but here is a reply...

Welcome back! My time is also limited for the moment, so apologies for the piecemeal response that follows!

"Other question" #1: theology. By "theology" I understood you to mean broad religious experience (i.e. diversity in world religions and conceptions of God). In this case we would not be dealing with experts.

Yet if you were thinking of Christian theology and consensus within Christianity, then what you say here is certainly applicable (and, of course, true). Is there a convergence or is there not? For the time being I will only say that sciences of any kind always produce a diversity of views, not because there is no fundamental agreement, but because sciences are not tools of affirmation and agreement. That's what social clubs are for.

But again, I am going to leave the topic of theology for another day. It is a local consideration, and my argument has to do with global reliability. Your theology argument is presumably elicited by the burden of proof which has already been established.

Again, I can only interpret this as agreement with the point I made earlier:

(3) Again, accepting the argument in its entirety, it's worthwhile considering the 'local' reliability of theology. It may be that, even if human beings are generally reliable, there are particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable.

Yes, I would agree with that. Of course a reason for the domain's unreliability would need to be furnished, given the global reliability of human beings.

My original argument had to do with global reliability. Your point about psychics had to do with local reliability. Global reliability has to do with humans considered as humans, in which case a consensus would need to be >50% of the human race. The "consensus" of psychics you produced simply does not fulfill the requirements of a true consensus of human beings. Yet a true consensus can always be approximated by random sampling.

I included all archaeologists because I assume that their expertise derives from their archaeological education, and I also assume that their education is similar (and able to produce increased reliability).

But you're still talking about local reliability when my argument talks about global reliability. The extent to which a particular circumstance increases or decreases default reliability is not relevant to my argument.

While not relevant to your argument per se, I do think it remains relevant to the discussion at hand. As mentioned previously, not every consensus has merit, and not every consensus is achieved by means of random sampling. The process by which a consensus is established matters, and is why the consensus of archaeologists on the age of the Earth has greater merit than the consensus of religious scholars who dispute it by citing sacred texts.

Now, I should say that my memory may be misleading me. I read the previous 4 posts to refresh my memory, but perhaps you have already submitted that my argument is sound and that the substitution with respect to religion is also sound? I believe you conceded the former but not the latter, but perhaps you did concede both? In which case you have moved on to further questions such as the reliability of particular disciplines and especially theology?

To be honest, I'm not sure. It's been a while. As I recall, you conceded my point above and we were moving toward a discussion of what you call "local reliability" in particular domains. That is why I mentioned psychics in my previous example.

Okay, so you accept the argument but do not accept a consensus of religiosity?

Are you asking whether I accept the argument that atheists hold the burden because of an apparent consensus among the religious? If so, then no, I don't accept that argument, for reasons previously mentioned:

On this point I would disagree. First, you haven't established that there is a consensus of religious thought. You have conflated the pervasiveness of religion with a consensus among religions. As I noted previously, ubiquity is not equivalent to consensus. Moreover, it seems that theology is plagued by the opposite, by a lack of consensus, with little agreement on the methods and results needed to move toward one. Second, if the composition of the group is important, as you argue above, then what group should we look to for a consensus and why? Should we take the entire body of religious believers as our group, or theologians, philosophers, and scientists? You seem to have opted for the former simply because it is most convenient to your argument, in which you conflate pervasiveness with consensus. You later go on to argue that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" if it is established by legitimate experts. But what makes one a legitimate expert on the supernatural? Third, as I noted previously, I think the atheist can satisfy her burden by pointing to the weak case presented by the religious. She doesn't need to thoroughly discredit claims that are already unfounded.

I would add a fourth point: the process by which a consensus is established matters. To use your example, if Islam were ubiquitous then there would be religious consensus in that every religionist would consider Islam the "one true religion." But how was this consensus achieved? Was it achieved by open inquiry into the basis of the religion?

Why isn't ubiquity equivalent to consensus? If Islam were ubiquitous there would be religious consensus.

The question is, "What kind of consensus does ubiquitous religiosity imply?" It might imply consensus with respect to the existence of the supernatural, the importance of worship and religious observance, the validity of religious belief, etc.

That is indeed the question: What does the pervasiveness of religion imply? Does it tell us something about the supernatural or does it tell us something about human beings, many of whom believe in and worship supernatural forces?

I have opted for the entirety of the human race, believers and unbelievers alike, because it is required by the argument.

Perhaps I'm losing track, but didn't you say that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts? Is every member of the human species an expert on the supernatural? How did they (we) acquire this expertise?

 

[zippy2006]

Welcome back! My time is also limited for the moment, so apologies for the piecemeal response that follows!

Thanks! Not a problem, I think the discussion can be fruitfully pared down a bit anyway.

Again, I can only interpret this as agreement with the point I made earlier:

Okay, agreed.

While not relevant to your argument per se, I do think it remains relevant to the discussion at hand. As mentioned previously, not every consensus has merit, and not every consensus is achieved by means of random sampling. The process by which a consensus is established matters, and is why the consensus of archaeologists on the age of the Earth has greater merit than the consensus of religious scholars who dispute it by citing sacred texts.

I think I understand how we got to these topics of local reliability. One argument I used to justify the rational significance of a consensus of human beings (via global reliability) was the analogy between that and a consensus among scientists. If you read my last main paragraph here you will see that I already objected to the idea that not every consensus has merit when the set in question is not a subset. That is precisely the case in my argument about the entire human race.

When you say "Not every consensus has merit" you are talking about local reliability and subsets. A consensus always requires a group being "polled." In my argument, the group is not a subset, not a sample group, but the entire human race. When you say, "Not every consensus has merit," you are speaking of consensus among subsets of the entire race.

Once one understands my argument they also understand that the group in which the consensus resides can only be the entire human race (or else an approximation achieved by random sampling). My argument is about a consensus of humans, not a consensus of psychics or archaeologists. A consensus of the complete set of human beings always has merit. Consensuses of subsets do not always have merit. And again, the principle for a subset having merit rests on the complete set having merit. Local reliability does not exist without global reliability.

I would add a fourth point: the process by which a consensus is established matters.

With regard to local reliability and subsets, maybe and maybe not. With regard to global reliability and the complete set, no it does not matter. Perhaps process could be important in determining the truth, but not in establishing the burden of proof.

To use your example, if Islam were ubiquitous then there would be religious consensus in that every religionist would consider Islam the "one true religion." But how was this consensus achieved? Was it achieved by open inquiry into the basis of the religion?

If most all humans were Muslims then opponents of Islam would have the burden of proof based on the argument already given:

1. Man is inherently reliable (global skepticism is false).
2. Consensus among inherently reliable instruments establishes a burden of proof for those inclined against the consensus position.
3. Therefore consensus among humans establishes the relevant burden of proof.

For Islam:

1. Man is inherently reliable.
2. A consensus of humans believe Islam to be true.
3. Therefore the burden of proof with respect to Islam is established.

What part of either argument are you disagreeing with?

That is indeed the question: What does the pervasiveness of religion imply? Does it tell us something about the supernatural or does it tell us something about human beings, many of whom believe in and worship supernatural forces?

Human beings are inherently reliable. That was the first premise of an argument that you seem to have already agreed with. Are you now saying that they aren't inherently reliable?

To take one of the implications I offered, the pervasiveness of religiosity implies that the majority of human beings believe in the existence of the supernatural. The fact that they are reliable establishes a burden of proof, plain and simple.

Colloquially this is like the mother who chides her child who is stubbornly persisting in a vast minority, "Oh Johnny, I'm sure that's it! You're right and everyone else is wrong! How did I miss such an obvious fact?"

Now, Johnny may be right and everyone else may be wrong, but if Johnny does not offer the majority an open ear and the benefit of the doubt then he is acting irrationally. If he does not believe that the opposing consensus places a particular rational pressure upon his minority view, then he is acting irrationally.

Perhaps I'm losing track, but didn't you say that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts? Is every member of the human species an expert on the supernatural? How did they (we) acquire this expertise?

In this post I said that a consensus of legitimate experts is rationally significant, but I was explaining the rationale behind scientific consensus, which is a form of local reliability. Consensus among subsets requires either neutrality (i.e. a random sample of all human beings) in which case the rational significance would be similar to that of the complete set, or else it requires expertise, in which case the rational significance would be increased.

The basic idea behind rational significance cannot be established by a consensus of experts, it can only be strengthened. If non-experts were not globally reliable, experts could not be locally reliable. Or rather, experts would not actually exist. Thus when some scientific consensus establishes a new theory, the rational significance is not obtained by circumventing global reliability, but rather by presupposing and building upon it. If these persons were not scientific experts and constituted a random sample of the human race, then a consensus among them would still have weight, albeit less.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I think I understand how we got to these topics of local reliability. One argument I used to justify the rational significance of a consensus of human beings (via global reliability) was the analogy between that and a consensus among scientists. If you read my last main paragraph here you will see that I already objected to the idea that not every consensus has merit when the set in question is not a subset. That is precisely the case in my argument about the entire human race.

When you say "Not every consensus has merit" you are talking about local reliability and subsets. A consensus always requires a group being "polled." In my argument, the group is not a subset, not a sample group, but the entire human race. When you say, "Not every consensus has merit," you are speaking of consensus among subsets of the entire race.

Once one understands my argument they also understand that the group in which the consensus resides can only be the entire human race (or else an approximation achieved by random sampling). My argument is about a consensus of humans, not a consensus of psychics or archaeologists. A consensus of the complete set of human beings always has merit. Consensuses of subsets do not always have merit. And again, the principle for a subset having merit rests on the complete set having merit. Local reliability does not exist without global reliability.

Yes, we are talking about local reliability because, when it comes to the specific questions we are concerned with, the consensus achieved by polling the entire human race does not matter if the majority of its members are not reliable in that domain. In other words, when considering specific matters, we are necessarily talking about what you call "local reliability," even if we are polling the entire human species or a random sample of its members. We are asking whether they (in this case, the entire species) are reliable on that particular question or in that particular domain ("local reliability"). As I noted previously, and to which you agreed, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. Whether you are sampling the entire set or a particular subset, the question is the same: is this set of individuals reliable in this domain?

With regard to local reliability and subsets, maybe and maybe not. With regard to global reliability and the complete set, no it does not matter. Perhaps process could be important in determining the truth, but not in establishing the burden of proof.

It seems that you are conflating the consensus view of the complete set with what you call "global reliability." But if we are talking about a consensus view on a particular matter, then we must be talking about "local reliability," regardless of whether the consensus was achieved by the complete set or only a subset.

If most all humans were Muslims then opponents of Islam would have the burden of proof based on the argument already given:

This is why I specified "religionists," a subset of humans. If most religionists were Muslims, then opponents of Islam wouldn't necessarily have the burden. If the consensus was achieved by means of indoctrination and conquest, rather than by satisfying the burden of proof for Islam, then nonbelievers need only point to these facts to argue that the consensus, however large, has no merit.

For Islam:

1. Man is inherently reliable.
2. A consensus of humans believe Islam to be true.
3. Therefore the burden of proof with respect to Islam is established.

What part of either argument are you disagreeing with?

Essentially, every aspect of it. I feel that I have already articulated the main reasons, so I'll try to summarise them concisely here. Regarding P1, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. You agreed on this point. Regarding P2, you have introduced religion into the argument, thereby raising the question of whether man is inherently reliable in that domain. (What you call "local reliability" thus enters the picture.) Related to this, I have argued that the way in which the consensus is established matters, which implies that not every consensus has equal merit. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about the complete set (the entire species) or a particular subset (e.g., archaeologists). Again, you seemed to agree on this point also, noting that a consensus is "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts. However, you make an exception for the complete set, arguing that any consensus achieved by the complete set has merit regardless of how it was achieved. I don't think it necessarily has any merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe. It certainly doesn't tell us whether their conclusions in that domain are reliable or not.

Human beings are inherently reliable. That was the first premise of an argument that you seem to have already agreed with. Are you now saying that they aren't inherently reliable?

No, it seems to me that you are jumping from "inherently reliable" to "reliable in this particular domain." But every time I point out that the discussion has moved into that specific domain, simply by necessity given that you have introduced religion into the discussion, you revert back to talking about general reliability. Even accepting the first premise for the sake of argument, we are left wondering whether human beings are reliable in the domain being discussed.

To take one of the implications I offered, the pervasiveness of religiosity implies that the majority of human beings believe in the existence of the supernatural. The fact that they are reliable establishes a burden of proof, plain and simple.

I think you are giving this consensus more credit than it deserves, given how it was achieved (e.g., superstition, tradition, indoctrination). I don't think this consensus has any merit beyond what it tells us about the supernaturalistic beliefs of the majority of humans. It would have greater merit if those who achieved consensus (religionists) were able to satisfy their burden of proof, rather than merely expressing shared belief in the supernatural. (As I argued previously, the way in which the consensus is established matters).

Colloquially this is like the mother who chides her child who is stubbornly persisting in a vast minority, "Oh Johnny, I'm sure that's it! You're right and everyone else is wrong! How did I miss such an obvious fact?"

Now, Johnny may be right and everyone else may be wrong, but if Johnny does not offer the majority an open ear and the benefit of the doubt then he is acting irrationally. If he does not believe that the opposing consensus places a particular rational pressure upon his minority view, then he is acting irrationally.

If the majority view is baseless and is maintained merely by indoctrination or tradition, for example, then I don't see what additional pressure must compel Johnny to do more than merely point that out. He is under no obligation to disprove claims that are already unfounded. He just needs to point to the emperor and say, "He's wearing no clothes."

In this post I said that a consensus of legitimate experts is rationally significant, but I was explaining the rationale behind scientific consensus, which is a form of local reliability. Consensus among subsets requires either neutrality (i.e. a random sample of all human beings) in which case the rational significance would be similar to that of the complete set, or else it requires expertise, in which case the rational significance would be increased.

The basic idea behind rational significance cannot be established by a consensus of experts, it can only be strengthened. If non-experts were not globally reliable, experts could not be locally reliable. Or rather, experts would not actually exist. Thus when some scientific consensus establishes a new theory, the rational significance is not obtained by circumventing global reliability, but rather by presupposing and building upon it. If these persons were not scientific experts and constituted a random sample of the human race, then a consensus among them would still have weight, albeit less.

Okay, but that still leaves open the question of how expertise on the supernatural is acquired and how we might recognise such expertise in ourselves or in others.

***

Good post. Made me think. I first read it early in the morning and just couldn't organise my thoughts about it at that time. Coffee helped a lot.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The best argument against the existence of God is windsurfing. It doesnt actually establish anything, but its more fun than counterapologetics.

 

[anonymous person]

Encouraged to see the thread still active.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Encouraged to see the thread still active.

Many of the threads you abandon remain active, absent your contributions.

 

[anonymous person]

Many of the threads you abandon remain active, absent your contributions.

And in this I rejoice.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

And in this I rejoice.

As do we all.

 

[zippy2006]

Note that there are two main topics at play: my initial argument (which considers consensus in itself), and the question of whether and why some particular consensus can lack rational weight given considerations posterior to the facts of consensus and global reliability (i.e. posterior to my initial argument).

Yes, we are talking about local reliability because, when it comes to the specific questions we are concerned with, the consensus achieved by polling the entire human race does not matter if the majority of its members are not reliable in that domain. In other words, when considering specific matters, we are necessarily talking about what you call "local reliability," even if we are polling the entire human species or a random sample of its members. We are asking whether they (in this case, the entire species) are reliable on that particular question or in that particular domain ("local reliability"). As I noted previously, and to which you agreed, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. Whether you are sampling the entire set or a particular subset, the question is the same: is this set of individuals reliable in this domain?

It seems that you are conflating the consensus view of the complete set with what you call "global reliability." But if we are talking about a consensus view on a particular matter, then we must be talking about "local reliability," regardless of whether the consensus was achieved by the complete set or only a subset.

I think this represents the main point of your post.

First, I grant that global reliability does not mean the same thing as the complete set, and local reliability does not mean the same thing as a subset. Yet global reliability is related to the complete set in the same way that local reliability is related to the subset. Further, given your domain emphasis, let us think of local reliability only in terms of expertise (even though it is true that a reliable subset could be reliable on the basis of expertise or the basis of random sampling).

Why is global reliability related to the complete set? Because global reliability is the antithesis of global skepticism, and the object of global skepticism is the human being (rather than some particular sort of qualified human being). That is, there is no human being that does not escape the judgment of global skepticism. Global reliability, as the opposite of global skepticism, also takes the human being (considered as human) as its object. So global reliability says that human beings are reliable. It doesn't say that scientists, archaeologists, or psychics are reliable. Insofar as they are human, they are reliable, but global reliability passes no judgment on particular varieties of humans.

It is related to the complete set because we are talking about consensus. The argument I gave rests on a consensus of reliable instruments--indeed, of all existing reliable instruments of the human kind.

But if we are talking about a consensus view on a particular matter, then we must be talking about "local reliability," regardless of whether the consensus was achieved by the complete set or only a subset.

I disagree. Every matter is a particular matter. Therefore if what you say is true, we could never talk about global reliability.

Yes, we are talking about local reliability because, when it comes to the specific questions we are concerned with, the consensus achieved by polling the entire human race does not matter if the majority of its members are not reliable in that domain.

Again, all questions are specific questions. Global reliability extends to all "domains," just as global skepticism extends to all "domains." Human beings are not inherently reliable when it comes to counting to five, and inherently unreliable when it comes to astronomy.

Let's revisit your example of 10 psychics at this point. The problem I already pointed out has to do with the nature of consensus, sets, and subsets. If there are 5,999,999,990 humans who do not believe the future can be known by tarot cards, and 10 psychics who disagree, it is misleading to talk about a consensus. If we hold to global reliability (and therefore prescind from expertise) then this answer I already gave is quite relevant to your scenario of 10 psychics.

But you want something stronger. You want to suppose that there is a true consensus among all humans in favor of psychic activity, and that their belief is simultaneously known to be false. Does this create a problem for my argument? If so, I would be curious as to what premise it falsifies. I don't think it does.

1. I don't think there actually exists a true consensus among all humans in favor of psychic activity.
2. If at some point in the past such a consensus did exist (e.g. geocentrism), then it carried the relevant rational weight of a burden of proof given the state of knowledge at the time. If everyone then knew what we know now, no such consensus would have existed.

If there is a bias in the consensus population that is known to you and not to them, and this biases them in favor of their belief, then this would be a reason to ignore the consensus. At this point the discussion could branch in many directions. I would contend that this bias is a secondary consideration that follows after the burden of proof.

My main argument is based on reliability and testimony. Let me spell out a scenario. You are living a few millenia ago and you poll the human race, asking what celestial model is thought to be true. You yourself are undecided on the matter. The overwhelming answer is geocentrism. All you have is the answer. You don't have explanations, methods, or rational argumentation. You have testimony. Will this incline you to believe or disbelieve in geocentrism? The answer has to do with whether you are a proponent of global skepticism or global reliability.

This is why I specified "religionists," a subset of humans.

If the group is religionists rather than all humans, then the conclusion may have no more weight than the case of the 10 psychics.

If the consensus was achieved by means of indoctrination and conquest, rather than by satisfying the burden of proof for Islam, then nonbelievers need only point to these facts to argue that the consensus, however large, has no merit.

Again, I take this to be a secondary consideration that does not bear on my argument.

The question is this: does consensus qua consensus have merit, or not? Without introducing extraneous factors, this question must be answered. My argument has nothing to do with methods or means, it has to do with consensus and reliability.

You seem to be introducing an accidental consideration, similar to this:

Person A: Taller people have a better chance of dunking than shorter people.
Person B: But there are some short people who can jump much higher than tall people!

This is why I have often inquired into precisely what premise you wish to oppose.

Essentially, every aspect of it. I feel that I have already articulated the main reasons, so I'll try to summarise them concisely here. Regarding P1, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. You agreed on this point. Regarding P2, you have introduced religion into the argument, thereby raising the question of whether man is inherently reliable in that domain. (What you call "local reliability" thus enters the picture.) Related to this, I have argued that the way in which the consensus is established matters, which implies that not every consensus has equal merit. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about the complete set (the entire species) or a particular subset (e.g., archaeologists). Again, you seemed to agree on this point also, noting that a consensus is "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts. However, you make an exception for the complete set, arguing that any consensus achieved by the complete set has merit regardless of how it was achieved. I don't think it necessarily has any merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe. It certainly doesn't tell us whether their conclusions in that domain are reliable or not.

It doesn't tell us whether the conclusions are true, but I never claimed that it did.

In order to attack my argument, you need to prescind from the means by which the belief was formed. The only insight my argument offers into the means is general human reliability, which you can oppose if you like.

The rational significance of consensus rests on the notion of reliability. You are attempting to undermine that reliability in particular instances. But even before we look further and move into particular questions of reliability, we already have global reliability. That is our starting point. If, after investigation, nothing is learned regarding reliability, we necessarily default to the position of global reliability (and the burden of proof I already noted). Investigation into particular reliability, means, etc., can produce positive or negative results, but my point is that the neutral position is already rationally significant.

Therefore you can battle apologists all day long in an attempt to discredit the reliability of this consensus, but if your arguments against reliability are refuted then you are in the same position you were in before the investigation into reliability: inclination towards belief (i.e. you have the burden of proof). As I already said, the atheist therefore lives or dies by his arguments.

Even accepting the first premise for the sake of argument, we are left wondering whether human beings are reliable in the domain being discussed.

But this is evidence that the first premise is not understood, nor is the idea of global skepticism. Global reliability has to do with the reliability of human beliefs, apart from any "domains" (which are ultimately arbitrary designations anyway).

(As I argued previously, the way in which the consensus is established matters).

It matters in strengthening or weakening the bare fact of consensus. But the question is this: what is the implication of the bare fact of consensus?

As I've said so many times, local reliability (via expertise) presupposes and relies upon global reliability. Heightened reliability presupposes initial reliability.

Good post. Made me think. I first read it early in the morning and just couldn't organise my thoughts about it at that time. Coffee helped a lot.

Haha, glad to hear it. Yours was good too. I don't know why it took me so long to see your point. I hope this one wasn't too confusing; we seem to be moving fast.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

First, I grant that global reliability does not mean the same thing as the complete set, and local reliability does not mean the same thing as a subset. Yet global reliability is related to the complete set in the same way that local reliability is related to the subset. Further, given your domain emphasis, let us think of local reliability only in terms of expertise (even though it is true that a reliable subset could be reliable on the basis of expertise or the basis of random sampling).

Why is global reliability related to the complete set? Because global reliability is the antithesis of global skepticism, and the object of global skepticism is the human being (rather than some particular sort of qualified human being). That is, there is no human being that does not escape the judgment of global skepticism. Global reliability, as the opposite of global skepticism, also takes the human being (considered as human) as its object. So global reliability says that human beings are reliable. It doesn't say that scientists, archaeologists, or psychics are reliable. Insofar as they are human, they are reliable, but global reliability passes no judgment on particular varieties of humans.

I don't quite agree with the way you've conceptualised "global reliability." From my perspective, global reliability would be a composite of local or domain-specific reliabilities. So when one says that human beings are "generally reliable," one is saying that they tend to be reliable across multiple domains. They may be more or less reliable in some domains than in others, but overall, when multiple domains are considered, they are "generally reliable."

It is related to the complete set because we are talking about consensus. The argument I gave rests on a consensus of reliable instruments--indeed, of all existing reliable instruments of the human kind.

An instrument's reliability can only be estimated for what it was specifically designed to measure. This necessarily brings us to what you call "local reliability."

I disagree. Every matter is a particular matter. Therefore if what you say is true, we could never talk about global reliability.

Well, that's exactly why I disputed the distinction you were making from the beginning. I don't think it's particularly informative when we are dealing with any particular issue to say that "well, humans are generally reliable." Okay, but are they are reliable on this specific matter? Are they reliable in their responses to this particular question?

Again, all questions are specific questions. Global reliability extends to all "domains," just as global skepticism extends to all "domains." Human beings are not inherently reliable when it comes to counting to five, and inherently unreliable when it comes to astronomy.

Exactly. Global reliability is a composite of local domain-specific reliabilities. Human beings may be outstandingly reliable in some domains, while being notoriously unreliable in others. Saying that they are, on the whole, "generally reliable" does not tell us whether they are reliable in the specific domain in question. It may be that, in that domain, their conclusions are consistently poorly reasoned. It seems to me that, in such a situation, one could always defend conclusions made in that domain by insisting that human beings are "generally reliable." That seems to be what you are doing in fact.

Let's revisit your example of 10 psychics at this point. The problem I already pointed out has to do with the nature of consensus, sets, and subsets. If there are 5,999,999,990 humans who do not believe the future can be known by tarot cards, and 10 psychics who disagree, it is misleading to talk about a consensus. If we hold to global reliability (and therefore prescind from expertise) then this answer I already gave is quite relevant to your scenario of 10 psychics.

But you want something stronger. You want to suppose that there is a true consensus among all humans in favor of psychic activity, and that their belief is simultaneously known to be false. Does this create a problem for my argument? If so, I would be curious as to what premise it falsifies. I don't think it does.

1. I don't think there actually exists a true consensus among all humans in favor of psychic activity.
2. If at some point in the past such a consensus did exist (e.g. geocentrism), then it carried the relevant rational weight of a burden of proof given the state of knowledge at the time. If everyone then knew what we know now, no such consensus would have existed.

If there is a bias in the consensus population that is known to you and not to them, and this biases them in favor of their belief, then this would be a reason to ignore the consensus. At this point the discussion could branch in many directions. I would contend that this bias is a secondary consideration that follows after the burden of proof.

My main argument is based on reliability and testimony. Let me spell out a scenario. You are living a few millenia ago and you poll the human race, asking what celestial model is thought to be true. You yourself are undecided on the matter. The overwhelming answer is geocentrism. All you have is the answer. You don't have explanations, methods, or rational argumentation. You have testimony. Will this incline you to believe or disbelieve in geocentrism? The answer has to do with whether you are a proponent of global skepticism or global reliability.

But, as I already said, the way in which the consensus was established matters. So I wouldn't rely solely on testimony at all. Nor would I consider polling the entire human species since I don't assume that every member of the species possesses sufficient knowledge to reliably determine which celestial model has the greatest merit. As I said previously, and to which you agreed, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. Moreover, in considering different celestial models, I would know that many such models are derived entirely from religion - a domain plagued by a lack of consensus!

If all I have is a poll of what humanity believes, then all I have is a crude estimation of the amalgamation of various views, many of them poorly justified. I have, in other words, very little in the way of evidence for the superiority of any one model over another. But I do have some idea of which models are most popular. They may be popular because they are well supported, or they may be popular because superstition and tradition have made them so. I would need to investigate further to determine which is the case.

Again, I take this to be a secondary consideration that does not bear on my argument.

I don't consider it secondary at all; I think it cuts right to the heart of your argument. Not every consensus has equal merit, even if it is based on a poll of the entire species. If we cannot consider the way in which a consensus was established, then we cannot judge its merits and whether it should have any purchase on us.

The question is this: does consensus qua consensus have merit, or not? Without introducing extraneous factors, this question must be answered. My argument has nothing to do with methods or means, it has to do with consensus and reliability.

I think I have answered this question: no, not necessarily. One must consider what you call "extraneous factors" to ascertain the extent to which the consensus has merit. If your "consensus" on a specific issue is based on a poll of the entire human species, in a domain in which the majority of its members are unreliable, then your consensus isn't likely to have much merit beyond indicating what the majority believe.

In order to attack my argument, you need to prescind from the means by which the belief was formed. The only insight my argument offers into the means is general human reliability, which you can oppose if you like.

The rational significance of consensus rests on the notion of reliability. You are attempting to undermine that reliability in particular instances. But even before we look further and move into particular questions of reliability, we already have global reliability. That is our starting point. If, after investigation, nothing is learned regarding reliability, we necessarily default to the position of global reliability (and the burden of proof I already noted). Investigation into particular reliability, means, etc., can produce positive or negative results, but my point is that the neutral position is already rationally significant.

Again, you seem to shift to "global reliability" whenever I point to the fact that we must focus on what you call "local reliability" given that the discussion is about reliability in a particular domain. As I noted earlier, even accepting global reliability, we are left wondering about reliability in the particular domain under discussion.

Therefore you can battle apologists all day long in an attempt to discredit the reliability of this consensus, but if your arguments against reliability are refuted then you are in the same position you were in before the investigation into reliability: inclination towards belief (i.e. you have the burden of proof). As I already said, the atheist therefore lives or dies by his arguments.

I have already addressed this from multiple angles. You are once again leaping from "human beings are generally reliable" to "human beings are reliable in this particular domain." When I point out that you are doing this, however, you go back to defending the former when it's the latter that is desperately in need of justification.

Therefore you can battle apologists all day long in an attempt to discredit the reliability of this consensus, but if your arguments against reliability are refuted then you are in the same position you were in before the investigation into reliability: inclination towards belief (i.e. you have the burden of proof). As I already said, the atheist therefore lives or dies by his arguments.

The following bears repeating:

I think you are giving this consensus more credit than it deserves, given how it was achieved (e.g., superstition, tradition, indoctrination). I don't think this consensus has any merit beyond what it tells us about the supernaturalistic beliefs of the majority of humans. It would have greater merit if those who achieved consensus (religionists) were able to satisfy their burden of proof, rather than merely expressing shared belief in the supernatural. (As I argued previously, the way in which the consensus is established matters).

It matters in strengthening or weakening the bare fact of consensus. But the question is this: what is the implication of the bare fact of consensus?

The implications that the consensus has depends on those "secondary factors" you don't appear to want to consider, like how the consensus was established, how it is maintained, and whether it should have any purchase on us.

 

[zippy2006]

I don't quite agree with the way you've conceptualised "global reliability." From my perspective, global reliability would be a composite of local or domain-specific reliabilities. So when one says that human beings are "generally reliable," one is saying that they tend to be reliable across multiple domains. They may be more or less reliable in some domains than in others, but overall, when multiple domains are considered, they are "generally reliable."

Then perhaps we are disagreeing on what is meant by global reliability. Yet I've never been unclear about what it is. It is the opposite of global skepticism, a technical term that comes from the field of epistemology. Indeed in my argument I don't even use the term "global reliability," I just note that global skepticism is false. It is an epistemological issue proper to human beings, not a domain-specific issue.

An instrument's reliability can only be estimated for what it was specifically designed to measure. This necessarily brings us to what you call "local reliability."

Unless you have the blueprint of the Designer, conjectures about what humans are or aren't designed to measure are unfounded. Global reliability--the position which contradicts global skepticism--claims first and foremost that man's sense perceptions are accurate, and secondarily that his reasoning apparatus is fundamentally sound. Unless you've had some training in epistemology and the idea of global skepticism, I'm not sure this will go anywhere... The global skeptic doesn't say, "We shouldn't believe him because he's a psychic." Instead he says, "We shouldn't believe him because he's a human." I'm not sure you're understanding this point, the nature of global skepticism.

Well, that's exactly why I disputed the distinction you were making from the beginning. I don't think it's particularly informative when we are dealing with any particular issue to say that "well, humans are generally reliable." Okay, but are they are reliable on this specific matter? Are they reliable in their responses to this particular question?

As an aside, while it could be interesting to get into an analysis of your own "composite" epistemological model, it simply isn't necessary in understanding my argument and therefore I won't address it in any great detail here.

Exactly. Global reliability is a composite of local domain-specific reliabilities. Human beings may be outstandingly reliable in some domains, while being notoriously unreliable in others. Saying that they are, on the whole, "generally reliable" does not tell us whether they are reliable in the specific domain in question. It may be that, in that domain, their conclusions are consistently poorly reasoned. It seems to me that, in such a situation, one could always defend conclusions made in that domain by insisting that human beings are "generally reliable." That seems to be what you are doing in fact.

To claim that human beings are inherently unreliable in a particular domain is just to say that that domain is inaccessible to human beings, and therefore imaginative or fictional in the first place. According to your own reasoning, it isn't a domain at all.

And that's just to say that human beings can make mistakes that lead to false conclusions.

Zip: Global reliability is true (global skepticism is false)
Arch: But humans make mistakes (and some "domains" are founded on presuppositional mistakes)
Zip: So what? I didn't claim that human beings are infallible.

This is a key exchange:

My main argument is based on reliability and testimony. Let me spell out a scenario. You are living a few millenia ago and you poll the human race, asking what celestial model is thought to be true. You yourself are undecided on the matter. The overwhelming answer is geocentrism. All you have is the answer. You don't have explanations, methods, or rational argumentation. You have testimony. Will this incline you to believe or disbelieve in geocentrism? The answer has to do with whether you are a proponent of global skepticism or global reliability.

If all I have is a poll of what humanity believes, then all I have is a crude estimation of the amalgamation of various views, many of them poorly justified. I have, in other words, very little in the way of evidence for the superiority of any one model over another. But I do have some idea of which models are most popular. They may be popular because they are well supported, or they may be popular because superstition and tradition have made them so. I would need to investigate further to determine which is the case.

I think you need to re-read my argument. If global reliability holds, then you have much more than just "a crude estimation of the amalgamation of various views." You don't seem to be comprehending the argument, but perhaps that is because you don't understand global skepticism. Two questions become important:

1. Are you saying that if you have only testimony and consensus, you would not be rationally influenced whatsoever?
2. If this is so, then which premise of my argument do you reject and why?

I don't consider it secondary at all; I think it cuts right to the heart of your argument. Not every consensus has equal merit, even if it is based on a poll of the entire species. If we cannot consider the way in which a consensus was established, then we cannot judge its merits and whether it should have any purchase on us.

The argument claims that there is weight apart from the means and gives reasons why. Your response can be seen to be secondary because it focuses exclusively on the means, despite the fact that the argument deliberately prescinds from the means (much like the basketball example given in my last). Secondarily your response can be seen to be tangential because it relies so heavily on the assertion that, "Not every consensus has equal merit," despite that fact that my argument in no way requires that every consensus have equal merit.

The question is this: does consensus qua consensus have merit, or not? Without introducing extraneous factors, this question must be answered. My argument has nothing to do with methods or means, it has to do with consensus and reliability.

I think I have answered this question: no, not necessarily.

You have answered but you haven't yet given justification for your answer. Why doesn't it have merit? If humans are generally reliable, then it would have merit. If humans are generally unreliable, then it would also have merit (in the opposite direction). Only if humans have no relation at all to reliability would it not have merit. Is that what you think? (The fact that the means by which a consensus was achieved can either strengthen or weaken the consensus does not at all answer the question of why a consensus qua consensus has no merit)

Again, you seem to shift to "global reliability" whenever I point to the fact that we must focus on what you call "local reliability" given that the discussion is about reliability in a particular domain. As I noted earlier, even accepting global reliability, we are left wondering about reliability in the particular domain under discussion.

I address the misunderstanding of global reliability above. Beyond that, domains are arbitrary. We have sense data and rational inference, to which all "domains" are reduced. The domain is human knowledge (or opinion). We can subdivide human knowledge or opinion into whatever categories we like, but the basis of each of them is the same. There is no qualitative difference between any two domains: each is a product of sense knowledge and rational inference. Some are founded on errors, but the error is always reducible to sense perception or rational inference. My argument focuses on the bare fact of consensus which prescinds from particular errors and particular knowledge and is based on reliability, not infallibility.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I take up your "domain" model. A similar conclusion follows. Suppose that, in the face of human consensus, you are unfamiliar with whether the domain in question is reliable or unreliable. Do you do nothing, lean towards the consensus, or lean against the consensus? Are most human domains reliable or unreliable?

The implications that the consensus has depends on those "secondary factors" you don't appear to want to consider, like how the consensus was established, how it is maintained, and whether it should have any purchase on us.

Of course the weight of a consensus will vary based on those secondary factors, I've admitted that several times. The question is whether there are implications prior to the secondary factors.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Then perhaps we are disagreeing on what is meant by global reliability. Yet I've never been unclear about what it is. It is the opposite of global skepticism, a technical term that comes from the field of epistemology. Indeed in my argument I don't even use the term "global reliability," I just note that global skepticism is false. It is an epistemological issue proper to human beings, not a domain-specific issue.

But whether human beings are reliable on the particular matter we are discussing (gods and supernatural forces) is a domain-specific issue, regardless of whether we are surveying the entire population, a random selection of its members, or those who claim to possess supernatural expertise.

Unless you have the blueprint of the Designer, conjectures about what humans are or aren't designed to measure are unfounded. Global reliability--the position which contradicts global skepticism--claims first and foremost that man's sense perceptions are accurate, and secondarily that his reasoning apparatus is fundamentally sound. Unless you've had some training in epistemology and the idea of global skepticism, I'm not sure this will go anywhere... The global skeptic doesn't say, "We shouldn't believe him because he's a psychic." Instead he says, "We shouldn't believe him because he's a human." I'm not sure you're understanding this point, the nature of global skepticism.

I studied philosophy formally; I know what global skepticism is. I just don't see it as having any significant bearing on the argument you go on to make, which focuses on a particular domain and therefore raises questions about local reliability. Even rejecting global skepticism, this remains the core issue.

Unless you have the blueprint of the Designer, conjectures about what humans are or aren't designed to measure are unfounded.

You made the analogy, not me. If this is problematic, then it is problematic for your analogy.

To claim that human beings are inherently unreliable in a particular domain is just to say that that domain is inaccessible to human beings, and therefore imaginative or fictional in the first place. According to your own reasoning, it isn't a domain at all.

Not necessarily. Remember that, very early on, I noted that skepticism can help to improve domain-specific reliability by exposing errors and encouraging us to approach our inquiry with greater care. That's how knowledge in that domain grows.

I think you need to re-read my argument. If global reliability holds, then you have much more than just "a crude estimation of the amalgamation of various views."

What else do I have but that? Even if global reliability holds (and global skepticism is therefore false), you are still forced to deal with the same issue: is this set of individuals reliable in this domain? Again, you are shifting to "global reliability" to avoid this. Whether you've sampled the entire population or a random collection of its members, the issue remains the same.

You don't seem to be comprehending the argument, but perhaps that is because you don't understand global skepticism. Two questions become important:

1. Are you saying that if you have only testimony and consensus, you would not be rationally influenced whatsoever?

I am saying that I would not search for the answer to that question ("which celestial model is best?") by collecting testimonials from the entire population, for reasons I've already outlined.

If this is so, then which premise of my argument do you reject and why?

I've addressed this already from various angles across multiple posts; most recently in this post with reference to your example of Islam being the consensus:

Essentially, every aspect of it. I feel that I have already articulated the main reasons, so I'll try to summarise them concisely here. Regarding P1, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. You agreed on this point. Regarding P2, you have introduced religion into the argument, thereby raising the question of whether man is inherently reliable in that domain. (What you call "local reliability" thus enters the picture.) Related to this, I have argued that the way in which the consensus is established matters, which implies that not every consensus has equal merit. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about the complete set (the entire species) or a particular subset (e.g., archaeologists). Again, you seemed to agree on this point also, noting that a consensus is "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts. However, you make an exception for the complete set, arguing that any consensus achieved by the complete set has merit regardless of how it was achieved. I don't think it necessarily has any merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe. It certainly doesn't tell us whether their conclusions in that domain are reliable or not.

The argument claims that there is weight apart from the means and gives reasons why.

I don't think you have given reasons why such a consensus should be taken to indicate anything more than what the majority of human beings happen to believe on a particular matter. You've simply stated that human beings are "generally reliable." Even if true, are they reliable on that particular matter?

Your response can be seen to be secondary because it focuses exclusively on the means, despite the fact that the argument deliberately prescinds from the means (much like the basketball example given in my last). Secondarily your response can be seen to be tangential because it relies so heavily on the assertion that, "Not every consensus has equal merit," despite that fact that my argument in no way requires that every consensus have equal merit.

No, but your argument does ascribe more merit to such a consensus than it deserves, given how it was established. If you want to argue that such a consensus should have some intellectual purchase on us, then you must accept that a consideration of the means by which it was achieved is required.

You have answered but you haven't yet given justification for your answer. Why doesn't it have merit? If humans are generally reliable, then it would have merit. If humans are generally unreliable, then it would also have merit (in the opposite direction). Only if humans have no relation at all to reliability would it not have merit. Is that what you think? (The fact that the means by which a consensus was achieved can either strengthen or weaken the consensus does not at all answer the question of why a consensus qua consensus has no merit)

But are they are reliable in that domain? As I noted many times before, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are unreliable. (You even agreed on this point.) I am not saying that such a consensus has no merit whatsoever; I am saying that it has no merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe.

I address the misunderstanding of global reliability above. Beyond that, domains are arbitrary. We have sense data and rational inference, to which all "domains" are reduced. The domain is human knowledge (or opinion). We can subdivide human knowledge or opinion into whatever categories we like, but the basis of each of them is the same. There is no qualitative difference between any two domains: each is a product of sense knowledge and rational inference. Some are founded on errors, but the error is always reducible to sense perception or rational inference. My argument focuses on the bare fact of consensus which prescinds from particular errors and particular knowledge and is based on reliability, not infallibility.

Yes, they are somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that the boundaries are blurred and what happens in one domain affects activity in others, particularly those closely related to it.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I take up your "domain" model. A similar conclusion follows. Suppose that, in the face of human consensus, you are unfamiliar with whether the domain in question is reliable or unreliable. Do you do nothing, lean towards the consensus, or lean against the consensus? Are most human domains reliable or unreliable?

I think I already answered a similar question with regard to celestial models.

Of course the weight of a consensus will vary based on those secondary factors, I've admitted that several times. The question is whether there are implications prior to the secondary factors.

No implications beyond providing an indication of what "the majority of X believes." Perhaps enough to warrant further investigation, but not enough to say that the consensus must have a purchase on us. If we want to know whether the consensus should have a purchase on us, then we are forced to consider those secondary factors, principally how the consensus was established and how it is maintained.

 

[zippy2006]

I studied philosophy formally; I know what global skepticism is. I just don't see it as having any significant bearing on the argument you go on to make, which focuses on a particular domain and therefore raises questions about local reliability. Even rejecting global skepticism, this remains the core issue.

If you understood what global skepticism was, you would understand that it has nothing to do with particular domains and transcends every domain. Global reliability, as its opposite, also transcends domains. I've already noted this and given more specific arguments.

Global skepticism is built on a critique of sense perception and rational inference, not unreliability of specific domains (or a further composite reliability gained from the particular domains). Since the validity of global skepticism has nothing to do with particular domains, attacking its validity on the basis of particular domains is fallacious. Particular domains depend on global reliability, not the other way around. You could undermine particular reliability with global skepticism (which is precisely what it does), but you cannot undermine global skepticism with particular reliability.

If you understood what global skepticism was, you would not claim that it is a composite of particular domains (which your whole argument depends upon).

You made the analogy, not me. If this is problematic, then it is problematic for your analogy.

I made the analogy of an instrument, and you arbitrarily defined the range of the instrument apart from the range implied by global reliability (i.e. sense knowledge and rational inference).

Not necessarily. Remember that, very early on, I noted that skepticism can help to improve domain-specific reliability by exposing errors and encouraging us to approach our inquiry with greater care. That's how knowledge in that domain grows.

But then you're just not claiming that human beings are inherently unreliable in that domain, which is precisely what you wish to claim with respect to religion. For example, what you say here has no application to psychics.

1. Are you saying that if you have only testimony and consensus, you would not be rationally influenced whatsoever?

I am saying that I would not search for the answer to that question ("which celestial model is best?") by collecting testimonials from the entire population, for reasons I've already outlined.

But you didn't answer the question.

I don't think you have given reasons why such a consensus should be taken to indicate anything more than what the majority of human beings happen to believe on a particular matter. You've simply stated that human beings are "generally reliable." Even if true, are they reliable on that particular matter?

Let me take up your composite model again to show that the same result holds even under this model:

Consider a gambler who has a source that is generally reliable with respect to horse racing, boxing, and basketball. He only knows that the source is more reliable than not (that is, the average reliability in these three areas is >50%). Perhaps the source is 40% reliable in horse racing, 65% reliable in boxing, and 80% reliable in basketball, but the gambler does not know what the individual numbers are.

When this source provides the gambler with information about one of these three areas, should he place a bet? The answer is obvious, and I don't understand why you keep avoiding it.

Note that the answer you continually give is, "I wouldn't place any bet. Who knows if the particular sport (or even event) is one which my source predicts reliably?" Here is what the experienced, rational gambler would say, "Your loss!" You seem to be confusing statistical probability with certain knowledge, and claiming that statistical probability has no merit.

No, but your argument does ascribe more merit to such a consensus than it deserves, given how it was established.

More than it deserves? My argument says that it has merit. Period. You are arguing that it has no merit. Given how it was established? My argument says nothing at all about how it was established.

You have answered but you haven't yet given justification for your answer. Why doesn't it have merit? If humans are generally reliable, then it would have merit. If humans are generally unreliable, then it would also have merit (in the opposite direction). Only if humans have no relation at all to reliability would it not have merit. Is that what you think? (The fact that the means by which a consensus was achieved can either strengthen or weaken the consensus does not at all answer the question of why a consensus qua consensus has no merit)

But are they are reliable in that domain? As I noted many times before, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are unreliable. (You even agreed on this point.) I am not saying that such a consensus has no merit whatsoever; I am saying that it has no merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe.

I feel as though you've quite nearly contradicted yourself in this exchange. Let me formalize the argument I gave:

1. An instrument is either generally reliable, generally unreliable, or neither reliable nor unreliable (i.e. 50% of the time it will yield a correct answer, 50% an incorrect answer).
2. A consensus of generally reliable instruments lends rational weight towards the consensus.
3. A consensus of generally unreliable instruments lends rational weight against the consensus.
4. A consensus of instruments which are neither reliable nor unreliable produces no effect, no merit.

Note that this correlation is bidirectional (owing to the exhaustive division) :

1. There are three possible conclusions in response to the fact of a consensus: inclination in favor of the consensus, inclination against the consensus, or no inclination at all.
2. If there is justified inclination in favor of the consensus, then the consensus must be among generally reliable instruments.
3. If there is justified inclination against the consensus, then the consensus must be among generally unreliable instruments.
4. If there is justified non-inclination in light of the consensus, then the consensus must be among instruments that are neither reliable nor unreliable (50% reliable).

To be clear, in the argument I already gave and formalized here, I am asking you to justify the consequent of 4, "The consensus must be among instruments that are neither reliable nor unreliable." And to make the reductio perfectly clear:

1. Assume that human beings are neither globally reliable nor unreliable; global skepticism and global reliability are false. {Consequent of 4 above)
2. If (1), then there is no reason to trust conclusions drawn by humans. (e.g. no reason to trust human sense perception, human rational inference, human activity in any domain whatsoever) {Premise}
3. Therefore there is no reason to trust conclusions drawn by humans. {modus tollens, 1 & 2}
4. Therefore this proof, your proof, and all our reasoning is not able to be trusted. {Substitution from 3}
5. This is absurd; we must reject assumption (1). {reductio}

I address the misunderstanding of global reliability above. Beyond that, domains are arbitrary. We have sense data and rational inference, to which all "domains" are reduced. The domain is human knowledge (or opinion). We can subdivide human knowledge or opinion into whatever categories we like, but the basis of each of them is the same. There is no qualitative difference between any two domains: each is a product of sense knowledge and rational inference. Some are founded on errors, but the error is always reducible to sense perception or rational inference. My argument focuses on the bare fact of consensus which prescinds from particular errors and particular knowledge and is based on reliability, not infallibility.

Yes, they are somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that the boundaries are blurred and what happens in one domain affects activity in others, particularly those closely related to it.

They are entirely arbitrary (with respect to the argument basing itself in global reliability). This is because the object of global skepticism is sense knowledge and rational inference, and no domain exists apart from sense knowledge and rational inference. Global skepticism judges every domain, not just some of them. There are no domains that are exempt from global skepticism (or global reliability).

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I take up your "domain" model. A similar conclusion follows. Suppose that, in the face of human consensus, you are unfamiliar with whether the domain in question is reliable or unreliable. Do you do nothing, lean towards the consensus, or lean against the consensus? Are most human domains reliable or unreliable?

I think I already answered a similar question with regard to celestial models.

I don't think you did answer it and I think it is very important, but I rephrased it in the case of the gambler above.

What you did is evaded the question by bringing in the idea of "domains." But now the question itself already includes domains, so it cannot be evaded on the same basis. You must answer the question. I don't need to rewrite it; it is clear enough.

No implications beyond providing an indication of what "the majority of X believes." Perhaps enough to warrant further investigation...

What does it mean, "Perhaps enough to warrant further investigation"? Instead of trying to explain the nature of a burden of proof, I've abandoned that language in favor of the exhaustive division: inclination towards belief, inclination away from belief, or no inclination at all. Those are the three options. Those are the only options.