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Yes, this was part of our discussion and for me a very important part of John6.A lot of disciples were 'drawn to' Jesus, and followed Him ...
Most (or many) of the same disciples who followed Jesus, in the NT, left Him.
I saw the "logic", so-called, being used in one or more threads, and it was and is distressing to see it used when it appears to directly try to change the meaning of God's Word, and when the conclusions(of so-called 'logic') are directly contrary to God's Word also.This work in logic required a fairly thorough read and some thought and leaves me with many questions
Many things are done poorly. I enjoyed the work done by @Dikaioumenoi. I'd like to see this discipline done well in other threads where there is virtually no logical reasoning being done. I think you know of some.I saw the "logic", so-called, being used in one or more threads, and it was and is distressing to see it used when it appears to directly try to change the meaning of God's Word, and when the conclusions(of so-called 'logic') are directly contrary to God's Word also.
It's not that symbolic representation doesn't deal with the meaning of words. It's that not all words are relevant to a statement's structure. Δύναται ἐλθείν does not impact the structure of the verse, nor does it need to in order for the logic to be sufficient to demonstrate the conclusion I've offered. This is evident from the fact that there is no contradiction implied by the idea that all who are able to come might actually end up doing so. This is where I think you're missing things. It's not enough to simply argue for the existence of contingency, because contingency alone does not preclude the possibility that "all able to come" could equate to "those who actually do so."...Math is ultimately a language. If symbolic representation cannot deal with the meaning of words, then the symbolism is insufficient and can only represent the language of words to the extent it can symbolize...
Out of curiosity, what material? What variations? I've been dealing with syllogistic and propositional logic, which is pretty straightforward and universal in terms of its concepts, rules, and symbols.I've seen some of the instructional material showing the hundreds of variations on logical constructs and I'm left wondering.
I really think you've answered this yourself. It's because ἔρχομαι completes δύναται, it does not replace it. The chiasm and context doesn't touch on the point here. The point is a grammatical one. We're discussing class relationship within the conditional statement.This also brings me back to my broken record of wondering why dunatai is the factor we're looking at instead of erchomai that completes dunatai.
Why do you view "him" as more specific than "no one"? Grammatically, they're both singular masculine. And logically, if anything, it would actually be the other way around.
- Are all men God draws, trulydrawn?
- Since we're dealing with a global "no man" turning into a specific "him", I'm left questioning.
Are you sure this idea is an adequate comparison to the drawing described in John 6:44? There, the Father is the subject doing the drawing, not Jesus, and it is framed as an inability-countering activity that affects a change of position (i.e. from a position of inability to ability). This doesn't fit the figurative use of ἔλκω ("attract"), even given the idea of a contingency with respect to what one does with his newly granted ability. The drawing simply succeeds. It succeeds in granting the object an ability to come (at the very least), but it is nevertheless successful in that it affects that change of position, from the state of inability to ability.e.g. Jesus was drawing (with miracles) but some could/did not get passed the free food and physical & psychological healing. But all of His miracles were meant to draw people to Him.
The question arises for sure, but it is not left unanswered, because the verse doesn't end with the conditional.
- Do all drawn men come?
- We've been discussing this.
- The question arises from the dunatai construct.
But that's not relevant to the point that was being made with the analogy, which was simply to show that the language of "ability" doesn't necessarily indicate contingency, but that what actually seems to entail it, on your view, is a particular understanding of freedom; namely, one that presupposes (not argues) that the doctrine of effectual calling is false.I had a concern with your example that you ended up progressing out of. Water does not have free will.
Then what exactly are we disagreeing on? Logic, like language itself, is not freeform. It is governed by rules. (I'll take opportunity here to throw in my one-lined response to @Aaron112 : Logic is the grammar of argumentation; Scripture utilizes logic because all language utilizes logic in order to have meaning and communicate truth.) If a proposition contradicts some other truth, then it cannot also be true. So if you have no argument with the logic presented, then there is no basis for our disagreement. If you still have reservations about the conclusion because of δύναται and the chiasm and whatever else, yet at the same time you say you agree with me on the logic presented, then that suggests a willingness to simply live with the possibility of a contradiction in Scripture (or at least your theology). I hope I'm not understanding you correctly.If we add the final clause, then it does look like irresistibility is being stated... If we're simply looking at structure, I have no argument with the logic...
I do, but I will say that when it comes to providing a comprehensive apologetic for effectual calling, there are many passages I would go to (and even in this text I wouldn't hang my hat on one verse). That's not because I don't think the logic and grammar of this verse is enough to make the case, but because I do believe it's all over Scripture, and because it only strengthens one's argument to treat Scripture as a whole.Do you think 6:44 proves irresistibility?
The words I've highlighted are all words of contingency. If there were no contingency in the language, then there would be no need to use words of contingency to describe what the verse says.It's not that symbolic representation doesn't deal with the meaning of words. It's that not all words are relevant to a statement's structure. Δύναται ἐλθείν does not impact the structure of the verse, nor does it need to in order for the logic to be sufficient to demonstrate the conclusion I've offered. This is evident from the fact that there is no contradiction implied by the idea that all who are able to come might actually end up doing so. This is where I think you're missing things. It's not enough to simply argue for the existence of contingency, because contingency alone does not preclude the possibility that "all able to come" could equate to "those who actually do so."
(A) I'll stand on the meaning of dunatai leaving us with only the possibility (contingency) and there being no need to grant for sake of argument what's already contained in the word itself.In other words, (A) even if we grant your point on contingency for the sake of argument and say that those who are drawn may or may not come, all that does is assert a possibility. (B) Possibility in and of itself does not entail the actual realization of two different classes of people, viz. those who choose to come and those who choose not to. The possibility can logically exist, and (C) yet the reality can still be that all those able to come actually do so. That is why the mere mention of an ability does not infer anything with respect to the logic of the verse. (D) What we would need is a positive identification of both classes of people: (1) Some who are able to come, and do so, and (2) some who are able to come, and don't.
"Some S are P," and "Some S are not P," where S is "those able to come" and P is "those who choose to come."
(A) How do we know from the verse itself that at least some do come - that "Some S are P"?All that is asserted by the mere mention of ability is "Some S are P" (A) (we know that at least some do come). But "Some S are P" is not a contradiction of "All S are P." What "Some S are P" says is that at least one member of the class of S is also a member of the class of P. That does not deny that all members of the class of S may be members of the class of P. What needs to be shown is that "Some S are not P" is verifiably true, not just possible. Only then is "All S are P" contradicted, and only with that contradiction would δύναται offer any challenge to the argument that "those able to come" = "those who do come."
Yes. Why not attempt the logic remaining strictly with the language? What are the basic truths?A final note on this point. I think it's important to remember that what's really being referred to in this verse is an impossibility - i.e. man's inability to come. It was from my own negation of the conditional in undergoing logical analysis that the affirmative language of "being able" arose. This may be worth keeping in mind because inability tells us more than ability. For instance, the statement "he doesn't come" is not as strong as "he is not able to come." The former could simply be an observation that says nothing of necessity, whereas the latter speaks of what isn't possible. But when it comes to ability, the opposite is true. "He comes" is stronger than "he is able to come." The former makes a definite assertion, while the latter only asserts a possibility. So could it be that the affirmative way of restating the verse doesn't necessarily capture the same force of the original idea? Possibility is a broader logical concept than impossibility. So it's worth pondering if δύναται would have appeared in the verse at all if the conditional had been positively stated to begin with, or if the statement would have simply mirrored verse 37, "all that the Father draws will come to me."
As I said before, I'm not trained in logic, so I'm doing what most do these days and asking a search engine. Some of the articles I looked at I did not save. Here is one I did: Logicinaction article.Out of curiosity, what material? What variations? I've been dealing with syllogistic and propositional logic, which is pretty straightforward and universal in terms of its concepts, rules, and symbols.
Although I agree that the Father's drawing provides ability, coming to Jesus (contextually meaning believing in Jesus) is the ultimate point of the verse, not to mention the chapter, not to mention the NC Writings. Even if I work to set aside the knowledge of the last two "not to mention" points, I can see the importance of elthein in the verse.I really think you've answered this yourself. It's because ἔρχομαι completes δύναται, it does not replace it. The chiasm and context doesn't touch on the point here. The point is a grammatical one. We're discussing class relationship within the conditional statement.
The indicative is the mood of assertion. The basis of the assertion made in the statement δύναται ἐλθείν is δύναται. Yes the complementary infinitive completes the idea, but it functions like a noun adding content to the assertion. It is not the operative term in establishing that assertion. Δύναται is the only thing distinguishing between the two very different statements, "those who have the ability to come," and "those who come." That's why it's the factor that must be looked at when considering the logic of the conditional.
To put it another way, the critical element to the conditional statement is what the antecedent counters. The drawing of the Father is presented as an activity countering man's inability to come, not merely the fact of his not coming. What does the chiasm have to do with the logic of the conditional statement?
Because "no man" as I said is a global phrase, i.e., no man among men. "auton" would be the man among men who is drawn.Why do you view "him" as more specific than "no one"? Grammatically, they're both singular masculine. And logically, if anything, it would actually be the other way around.
Although you are more practiced and thus free to be altering language here, and although I might agree with what you're doing in this instance, I'd prefer to stay tight to the Text. Whether or not it makes any difference I can't say at this point. With that said, "A man who is able to come is a man who has been drawn." S is P.To illustrate this, the conditional can be represented with the universal proposition, "All persons who are able to come are persons who have been drawn." All S are P. In a universal affirmative proposition, to use the language of syllogistic logic, S is distributed, P is not. That is, the statement asserts something about all members of the class of those able to come ("one"), but it does not assert something about all members of the class of those drawn ("him"). P is broader than S, not the other way around, because every S is a P, but not necessarily every P is an S.
Maybe so, but why add more complexity at this time? I think the S is P from just above is the point being made.It is logically possible, for instance (given no further considerations), that there exists some drawn ones who remain unable to come.
Based upon what I said just above. I'm bypassing this for now.This would make the class of those drawn a less specific category than the class of those able to come, not a more specific category. So our options are either that "one" and "him" refer one-to-one to the same individuals (my position), or that the class to which "him" refers is broader than the class to which "one" refers.
Good question. Remembering my flow of thought from 2 weeks ago on simple things is taxing enough! For now, I'll stick with what I said above - S is P.As to your question, what do you mean by "truly" drawn? Do you mean to ask if all men God attempts to draw are truly drawn? Or perhaps if all men God draws are able to come?
Agree.Let's work through this. For starters, there's no question that the drawing is a necessary condition for being able to come. The conditional at least says that much.
It's probably best to just stick with S is P. Going beyond the meaning of "able" and the importance of "to come" at this point seems unnecessary but I appreciate your willingness to delve into more semantics.The only question is this: Is the drawing of the Father sufficient for enablement? Or is it possible that some who are drawn might in spite of that drawing still be unable to come? (Or, alternatively, can the Father's attempt to draw fail?)
Answering this question requires asking a further question: What is drawing? How do we define it? Is the drawing activity something that occurs prior to and apart from the enabling action, or is it the enabling action? And if it isn't the enabling action, then what is it? How do we define it?
If the drawing of the Father is an enabling act, then that seems to answer the question of sufficiency in terms of ability. It is not possible for one to be drawn and yet remain unable to come, if the drawing is itself what enables. In that case, both "All S are P" and "All P are S" are true, and we have a definitive proof that the class of those able to come and the class of those drawn are equivalent.
If on the other hand the drawing of the Father is not an enabling act, but is something that occurs in addition to whatever it is that makes one able to come, then what is it? What does the drawing do?
In regard to the drawing, I don't think we can separate Jesus from the Father. What the Father was doing to draw, He was doing through Jesus unless we want to add another dimension of activity into this.Are you sure this idea is an adequate comparison to the drawing described in John 6:44? There, the Father is the subject doing the drawing, not Jesus, and it is framed as an inability-countering activity that affects a change of position (i.e. from a position of inability to ability). This doesn't fit the figurative use of ἔλκω ("attract"), even given the idea of a contingency with respect to what one does with his newly granted ability. The drawing simply succeeds. It succeeds in granting the object an ability to come (at the very least), but it is nevertheless successful in that it affects that change of position, from the state of inability to ability.
S is P (A man who is able to come is a man who has been drawn).The question arises for sure, but it is not left unanswered, because the verse doesn't end with the conditional.
The drawing of the Father is a necessary condition for one to be able to come to Jesus. If one is not drawn, he cannot come. And unless you can provide a definition of drawing that is not itself descriptive of this enabling act, then as I've shown the drawing also must be understood as a sufficient condition for at least obtaining the ability to come to Jesus.
This means that the members of the class of those who are able to come ("one") are one-to-one the same members of the class of those who are drawn ("him"), and vice versa. They are equivalent in terms of class membership.
Agreed. If raised, then [came and] was drawn.How, then, do you explain the identical use of the pronoun in the last clause, without the addition of a new grammatical subject? You've said you don't have a problem seeing this point (if I understand you correctly), but that really leaves me puzzled. If we can agree that the two "hims" make reference to the same individual, then it ought to be quite evident that the class of those drawn and the class of those raised are equivalent (in terms of class membership). That is, there is not a person who will be raised who has not been drawn,
Maybe and maybe not due to dunatai + elthein. If drawn and if came, then will be raised.and there is not a person who has been drawn who will not be raised.
I don't think we've ever disagreed on this.But does that not effectively conclude our discussion, when considering the further fact that those who aren't drawn are not able to come?
But this is simply a continuation of not considering elthein.There really seems to be no room here for a third category between those undrawn/unable, and those drawn/raised.
Same issue: unable to come vs. able to come is the first and main point of the verse. For me, "actually coming" is a leap considering the meaning of dunatai. If we want to work at the basic level of propositional logic, then maybe we make that leap. But, as the article I posted for you above says somewhere within, this could well be an example of why the disciplines of logic and linguistics have been working together. I've looked at other articles that speak of the depths of where propositional logic goes when considering even the semantics of connectives are considered regarding establishing truth statements.All men are one or the other -- either (1) unable to come, or (2) actually coming, on account of the ability granted.
I'd rather attempt to remain detached from doctrinal presuppositions at this juncture. I flagged Jesus bringing in election at the end of John 6 and I mentioned in passing eternal security. All of these must eventually enter into discussion.And that fits the doctrines of total depravity and effectual calling, which respectively assert that no man is naturally capable (on account of his own heart's love for sin) to turn to Christ of his own accord (category 1), and the flip side to that being that if the Father so chooses to restrain that natural tendency and replace it with an equally powerful desire for righteousness, it will naturally result in one willfully and gladly throwing himself upon Christ (category 2).
It is relevant to me. The ability of the flow of water via gravity is not the same as the ability of a man and his choice to flow or self-restrict. If there is any presupposition to be considered in this verse, it's that man is a rational creature. It's either this or we have to define "man". Defining "ability" is enough work at this juncture.But that's not relevant to the point that was being made with the analogy, which was simply to show that the language of "ability" doesn't necessarily indicate contingency,
Again, I'm not going there. I'm simply dealing with a rational man having an ability that he uses or does not use.but that what actually seems to entail it, on your view, is a particular understanding of freedom; namely, one that presupposes (not argues) that the doctrine of effectual calling is false.
Same comment.It presupposes this because, as I discussed earlier, the mere reality of a contingency is not an argument against effectual calling. An argument against effectual calling would have to involve the proof that some who are able will not come, not just the assertion of the logical possibility.
I think it's clear what our disagreement is. It is and has been how to deal with the verbal construct "dunatai elthein" and my questioning as to the level of logic being considered. I also think that some of the disagreement was clarified in the continuation of the summary list you drew from; the part where I showed Jesus dealing with men's will.Then what exactly are we disagreeing on?
Fine.Logic, like language itself, is not freeform. It is governed by rules. (I'll take opportunity here to throw in my one-lined response to @Aaron112 : Logic is the grammar of argumentation; you utilize logic every time you reason with others, so I'd recommend you don't knock it.) If a proposition contradicts some other truth, then it cannot also be true.
I have no disagreement with the seemingly very basic logic presented but have clearly stated from what I've read on logic, that it seems likely there is more advanced logic to deal with dunatai in this verse.So if you have no argument with the logic presented, then there is no basis for our disagreement.
I think you are misunderstanding me and hope I have resolved some of this hereinabove.If you still have reservations about the conclusion because of δύναται and the chiasm and whatever else, yet at the same time you say you agree with me on the logic presented, then that suggests a willingness to simply live with the possibility of a contradiction in Scripture (or at least your theology). I hope I'm not understanding you correctly.
Disagree. There is an equivalence in the man who is drawn, enabled to come, and raised, but this does not in itself have to be the full story. If the man does not use the ability to come, then he will not be raised.What the logic demonstrates is equivalence in class membership between all those drawn, enabled, and raised.
Implication is subjective. Although I have no argument with the content of your implication, as soon as you conclude that "all those enabled to come actually end up coming" I part ways with you and keep reading the Scripture for its conclusion. So, your 2nd premise may well be False and I again, would keep looking to Scripture for confirmation, because I don't think Scripture does contradict itself, but we do.From that conclusion, it takes but one simple step of further implication (i.e. our knowledge that those who will be raised = those who come) to arrive at the conclusion that all those enabled to come actually end up coming.
1. All those who will be raised are those who come. (All M are P)
2. All those whom the Father draws are those who will be raised. (All S are M)
C. Therefore, all those whom the Father draws are those who come. (All S are P)
This argument is valid. The only question is whether the premises are sound. But if you're agreeing with me on the logic presented, then that ship has sailed, because what the logic shows is that premise 2 is true. So again, if language is to have any meaning at all, I don't know what basis we have for disagreement at this point if you have no argument with the logic presented. But maybe I've misunderstood you.
Thank you for your answer.I do, but I will say that when it comes to providing a comprehensive apologetic for effectual calling, there are many passages I would go to (and even in this text I wouldn't hang my hat on one verse). That's not because I don't think the logic and grammar of this verse is enough to make the case, but because I do believe it's all over Scripture, and because it only strengthens one's argument to treat Scripture as a whole.
The words you highlighted (as well as "ability") are words of possibility, not contingency. The two are not the same. Possibility just means that it is not necessary that a proposition be false. Contingency is a subcategory of this which says it is not necessary that a proposition be false or true.The words I've highlighted are all words of contingency. If there were no contingency in the language, then there would be no need to use words of contingency to describe what the verse says.
See above.(A) I'll stand on the meaning of dunatai leaving us with only the possibility (contingency) and there being no need to grant for sake of argument what's already contained in the word itself.
It is not my burden to refute an assertion, but yours to argue for it. I have no need for possibility in itself to preclude the option of there being two classes. Possibility is consistent with my position. The lack of two classes (i.e. those able who (1) come and (2) do not come) is something I have argued for already by means of observing the grammatical equivalence between the "him" drawn and the "him" raised. What must be demonstrated in order to refute this is that two classes actually exist. The logical possibility of it is not a response to my argument.(B) Nor does possibility preclude the possibility of two different classes of people.
Again, what is logically possible is not the issue here. We're talking about what actually happens. My argument has already offered a conclusion regarding who comes, which has not been responded to apart from the offer of an assertion that begs the question of contingency.(C) And the reality can be that some or none of those able to come actually do so. Thus, we have three possible groups: None, Some and All.
What verses do you believe make the case that there actually exists a class of people who (1) are able to come, and (2) choose not to do so?(D) Which is why I early in this discussion opened up other verses in the context. And now that I've identified three classes of people, I'd modify "both classes of people", but will use it for now.
Jesus' promise to raise some up.(A) How do we know from the verse itself that at least some do come - that "Some S are P"?
"All" entails "some." If it is the case that every S is P, then it follows that at least one S is P. That's all that "Some S are P" says. "Some" is not a negation of "all" (just as "possible" is not a negation of "necessity"); it just says that the truth value of "all" is left undetermined by this particular proposition.(B) "Some" is not the same as "All".
I believe I have already done this...What ultimately needs to be shown is that Some, All or None come.
Do you really, though? Your position doesn't make sense if we are in agreement here. I'm not sure why you say this. In saying that the two "hims" are the same, I am speaking of the classes or groups of people that these pronouns refer to. To say that they are identical is to say they have the same referent in terms of class membership; i.e. both "the one drawn" and "the one raised" make equal reference to "the one able to come," such that class membership between all three is identical.On the one hand, I agree with the simple logic, the two "hims" you've been presenting.
I'm not sure what you're asking here. The purpose of logical operations like contraposition is to demonstrate equivalence between statements, allowing for the rewording of propositions in a way that can help to clarify their meaning. "Remaining strictly with the language" of the verse would make it awfully difficult for a discussion to take place. After all, we don't disagree with what the language is, but with the meaning of that language.Yes. Why not attempt the logic remaining strictly with the language? What are the basic truths?
What's your reasoning for this assertion? You've already agreed, have you not, that there is a syntagmatic-paradigmatic relationship between these two terms in John 6? It is the meaning of such a relationship that the terms can be used interchangeably.Verse 37 does not use the word "draws" but the word "gives". There is very likely a big difference between the two words in John 6.
"No man among men" is not the subject term of the proposition. The subject term is "he who is able." The predicate term is "he who is drawn." Then both are negated. So the logic of it is "All A are D." That proposition can mean one of two things: A and D are equivalent in terms of class membership, or D is larger.Because "no man" as I said is a global phrase, i.e., no man among men. "auton" would be the man among men who is drawn.
Who's separating them? Their work is clearly united. Jesus came to accomplish the Father's will (vs. 38). That doesn't change the fact that they perform different roles. It is not grammatically insignificant that the Father is the subject of the drawing, and the Son the subject of the raising.In regard to the drawing, I don't think we can separate Jesus from the Father.
You have gone there. You went there when you said ability implies contingency. That's not a mere assertion that man has the ability to make a choice. What you're asserting is more specific than that. This is easy to see, my friend. Consider my view, and how what you're suggesting precludes the very possibility of it being reasonably considered:Again, I'm not going there. I'm simply dealing with a rational man having an ability that he uses or does not use.
I've responded already, but I quote this just to point out that here you're denying the equivalence of the two "hims." I don't understand why when directly asked you claim to agree with me on that, but when elaborating on the point and its implications you go back on it. Again, maybe you've not understood my argument there.Disagree. There is an equivalence in the man who is drawn, enabled to come, and raised, but this does not in itself have to be the full story. If the man does not use the ability to come, then he will not be raised.
Can you elaborate on this? A conditional statement is an implication. "If P then Q" is an implication. That's subjective?Implication is subjective.
Everybody chooses their own way, like for like, if a person is the opposite to meek, they go to the mighty, if they prefer lies, they go after the devil and claim that is god.A lot of disciples were 'drawn to' Jesus, and followed Him ...
Most (or many) of the same disciples who followed Jesus, in the NT, left Him.
Are they? I know you may not have been following the full exchange I've been having with GDL, but to summarize:Here is that continuance why the people having intellectual conversations/debates, cannot be drawn to Jesus Christ, and who is drawn, even though all men are drawn.
All men are drawn, either to God or to their own lust.Are they? I know you may not have been following the full exchange I've been having with GDL, but to summarize:
"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up on the last day."
This is equivalent in meaning to the following:
"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to me, and I will raise him up."
It follows from this that the one who is drawn will be raised. Will all men be raised?
Okay, but in the sense that Jesus means in John 6:44, the Father "drawing" those who are unable to come to Christ, that's not a reference to everybody.All men are drawn, either to God or to their own lust.
Apologies, but busy with other things and I'm not always seeing alerts enumerated on my page.The words you highlighted (as well as "ability") are words of possibility, not contingency. The two are not the same. Possibility just means that it is not necessary that a proposition be false. Contingency is a subcategory of this which says it is not necessary that a proposition be false or true.
As @Dikaioumenoi alluded, our discussion is specific (and extensive) and concerns precisely what we see is actually being said in John6:44 and some context. Please don't assume we do not understand and believe the Gospel or in any way are distracted from or have departed from it.All men are drawn, either to God or to their own lust.
"The one who states his case first seems right, until the other comes and examines him." - Prov. 18:17i do not want to give any of my time to disputers.
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