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Right. I edited and softened my position in the OP. ThanksNot necessarily. There's nothing contradictory about the use of the subjunctive even if the Father's intention is to draw everyone (and even if he succeeds in that intention).
OK, I had some time to look at your detail, which I thank you for. Since we're new to one another, ignoring potentially important detail is not my strength. Looking briefly at some lengthy detail in an effort to spot time-wasting error is more and more my general practice on this forum. This work in logic required a fairly thorough read and some thought and leaves me with many questions, so I'll try to narrow them down to somewhat of an end game and come backwards if necessary:Hi GDL, thanks for the comment. Don't miss my reply above; I just wanted to expand upon my argument, if it would be helpful (but feel free to ignore all this detail if not). I noticed you commented on my other post. The following is an additional piece of that post that I decided not to include there (it ventured a bit beyond the scope of the OP):
I'm posting these contrapositives since as I understand you've concluded they work with R - the added ending.
- (Q --> P) ^ R, which reads: "If he is able to come to Jesus, then the Father draws him, and Jesus will raise him up."
- (P --> Q) ^ R, which reads: "If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up."
Agreed re: "Strictly speaking". This was part of my point re: ability, but I'm reading on.Grammatically, the "him" whom Jesus raises is the one who is made able to come to Jesus by the Father's drawing. Strictly speaking, nothing is said here about who actually does come to Jesus.
I agree with this, but it raises a couple points:The drawing of the Father results in one obtaining the ability to come, and what is said here is that obtaining this ability is the grounds of being raised.
I can see how you conclude this, but, again, do we need more Scripture to tell us the whole story? More in a moment.There isn't any room here for the idea that one might have the ability to come, but does not "affirmatively use" that ability. While that is philosophically conceivable, it doesn't fit the grammar of the text.
Understood, but this is my questions raised just above. From this verse we may or may not see the possibility of a subgroup, or subgroups, but this is one verse of Scripture, so likely not the whole story. And it ultimately has to work with all Scripture re: this matter. If there's more to the story, then would this shade or better inform the interpretation of the logic?If it's possible that one can have the ability but not "affirmatively use" it, then the "him" who is raised up and the "him" who is drawn must grammatically refer to different subjects (i.e. the "him" raised would encompass a sub-group of the "him" drawn). However, there's only one referent in the text for both pronouns - εὶς - the "one" who is given the ability to come.
Take your time!And thanks for all the detail! Not being formally trained in logic with symbols, it'll take me time to digest, so thank you for the translations which are helpful.
In light of my above acknowledgement, please bear with me. I'll add that I am trained in Greek.
GDL said:Logically the contrapositive may be beneficial for something, but what good is it if it alters or can be construed to alter the actual precondition? This is likely my lack of training in logic asking, but asking it is.
CorrectGDL said:He is not able to come if the Father does not draw him is the same as if the Father does not draw him, then he is not able to come.
CorrectGDL said:He is able to come if the Father draws him is the same as if the Father draws him, then he is able to come.
I'm a little confused on what you mean. Which is the key verb? The only time "come" appears in the verse is in the opening clause, Q, and it's an infinitive; it's not the main verb. So the key idea, grammatically, for understanding the final clause, is "able," not "come."GDL said:The additional clause - R - is based upon the implied coming, which is really the key verb to the final clause.
Setting aside the meaning of ability for the sake of simple logic is hard to grasp. IOW, what good is the logic if linguistics is not included?
Isn't the ultimate reality of the verse that Jesus will raise those who come (again setting security matters aside)? It not only seems implied in the verse but it's the verse in context.
I'll see if I can work through your longer explanation.
Yes, correct, thank you for catching that!One thing I would clarify is Ἐάν + the subjunctive is the marker and μὴ is simply negating (if vs. if not).
The day's about over for me and I'll need a fresh mind for this. A couple quick observations since you mentioned you may look at my other post.When I gave the contrapositive of "if the Father does not draw him, then he is not able to come to me," I just didn't bother changing the verb tense. But to be more precise, I should have. The logic is that P (the Father's drawing) is needed in order to have Q (the ability to come). No logically equivalent expression will change that, but verb tenses do change in order to reflect the reordering of conditions.
-Q <-- -P
"He cannot come to me if the Father does not draw him"
"He cannot buy food if his employer does not pay him money"
P <-- Q
"The Father has drawn him if he is able to come."
"His employer has paid him money if he can buy food."
I think this is important. We're dealing with a complementary infinitive to finish the thought of the verb. If we don't focus on the infinitive, then we don't have the complete thought. It's not just receiving an ability but receiving an ability to come [to Jesus]. Coming to Jesus is the goal of the ability from God's drawing. It's this ability to come vs. the actual coming that I was questioning before.I'm a little confused on what you mean. Which is the key verb? The only time "come" appears in the verse is in the opening clause, Q, and it's an infinitive; it's not the main verb. So the key idea, grammatically, for understanding the final clause, is "able," not "come."
My thinking is that not only is the complementary infinitive important to the complete thought and logic of John6:44 but I don't see John6:44 as standing alone apart from John6:45. I think they're chiastic:Stated more succinctly with this in mind, don't we really have something like: No man believes in Jesus Christ if the Father does not draw Him to Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ will raise him in the last day? The next verse effectively says; No man hears and learns from the Father and believes in Jesus Christ if the Father does not teach him.
Again, sorry for the confusion. Hopefully my above reply clarifies. I made the mistake of not altering the verb tenses as necessary. It would be better to say, "if he is able to come to Jesus, then the Father has drawn him, and Jesus will raise him up."First questions:
- Based in logic, you're saying the first one works, correct?
- So, you're saying the precondition has to work both ways?
- IOW, God draws and gives the ability OR God sees the ability and draws?
- This seems to switch the precondition, which I mentioned before.
This would be a logical possibility if we didn't have the identical pronouns, but as it is I don't think it fits the grammar of the verse, for reasons I explained in my previous reply.GDL said:
- Although we can see in this verse man's obtaining ability being the grounds of being raised, is it the only grounds or is there another or more we must see elsewhere?
It's not simply that we may not see the possibility of a subgroup in this verse; my argument has been that the logic of the verse precludes that as a possibility. I agree that context - both immediate, and the overall witness of Scripture - is vital to the interpretation of any given verse. Nevertheless, when it comes to grammar and logic, there are some things that no amount of context will change. Just as no contextual consideration will change the fact that in the statement, "the dog wags his tail," the dog is the subject doing the wagging, and not the tail, so it is also true that no contextual consideration will change how pronouns function.GDL said:Understood, but this is my questions raised just above. From this verse we may or may not see the possibility of a subgroup, or subgroups, but this is one verse of Scripture, so likely not the whole story. And it ultimately has to work with all Scripture re: this matter. If there's more to the story, then would this shade or better inform the interpretation of the logic?
Sure, there's an implied condition in John 6:45: "If he has heard and learned from the Father, he comes to me."GDL said:With this said, how do you read John6:45 and compare it to John6:44?
- In John6:44 we have the man receiving ability to come to Jesus, the Father drawing, and Jesus raising.
- In John6:45 we have the man hearing & learning and coming to Jesus, and the Father teaching.
- Would you venture to turn John6:45 into conditional structure?
- Does it tell us anything about John6:44 that might help clarify it.
The conditional from verse 44 is almost restated verbatim here, with the exception of the verb in the protasis. Interestingly, we have the sentence structure from verse 44, with the verb from verse 37.GDL said:I've seen John6:65 being very important to this topic.
- Any thoughts about this verse in relation to the above two?
The incompleteness of the thought doesn't have any effect on the logic of the sentence, though. We could take the infinitive out entirely and the logic is the same:GDL said:I think this is important. We're dealing with a complementary infinitive to finish the thought of the verb. If we don't focus on the infinitive, then we don't have the complete thought. It's not just receiving an ability but receiving an ability to come [to Jesus]. Coming to Jesus is the goal of the ability from God's drawing. It's this ability to come vs. the actual coming that I was questioning before.
Again, I don't think the grammar leaves this as a question. Grammatically, who is the "him" who is raised, in the following statement?GDL said:The question I see hanging in the apodosis is whether or not the ability is used to come, which is to believe. As a stand-alone verse I see the connection between ability to come/believe and Jesus raising. But the ability to believe in itself does not say believe. The man has been given an ability, but does he use it to complete what's required - to come to/believe in Jesus Christ?
See my above comments on verse 45; I agree with a lot of this. But I think we're using the phrase "main verb" differently. Ἔρχομαι is the main verb of the final clause in verse 45; that doesn't make an infinitive form of it the main verb in verse 44a. A complementary infinitive can't be a main verb, for precisely the reason that it's completing the thought of the main action/state.GDL said:So, if we want a complete thought to form a logical construct, then it needs not only the complementary infinitive - to come - but also this parallelism to make sure we know the full thought. It also helps us see that erchomai is the main verb (complementary infinitive then verb) - the main point. Besides this, we also need John6:47 to parallel belief in Jesus Christ with come to Jesus Christ. IOW, what's the purpose of the logic apart from the full thought?
I'm on my way out for a bit and glanced through your post. I'm picking this out just to get back to you relatively briefly."No one can come unless the Father draws him, and I will raise him up."
"No one can sing unless the Father gives him voice, and I will raise him up."
"No one can run unless the Father gives him endurance, and I will raise him up."
What exactly is your argument here? We can't just dismiss δύναται from the conversation, so even with this emphasis on the infinitive the fact remains that we're talking about the ability to come, and not necessarily actually coming. Respectfully, this line of discussion seems like a bit of a red herring, especially since the most critical point of my argument hasn't been addressed yet: What do we do with the pronouns?I'm on my way out for a bit and glanced through your post. I'm picking this out just to get back to you relatively briefly.
I do see your point about not going beyond what's stated in 6:44 and as I said earlier, I do see the logic, and better now that you have changed the verb forms (which is something I think I brought up very early on).
I'm still not settled on the infinitive. Yes, I am referring to it in a way that may seem irregular, but it's to make the point that there is no complete thought in dunamai without the infinitive that completes the verb here. In essence, the main verb is a verb + a complementary infinitive. Wallace calls dunamai as used here a "helper verb"** which seems to conceptually detract from it being a main verb. I'm sure you know this but I'm questioning why you're not giving it more weight. Maybe this can be our focus to make this more brief.
In your examples above with some loose paraphrasing:
This is also why I brought out the chiasm. It supplies erchomai as the main verb clarifying dunamai + infinitive erchomai.
- No one can unless the Father gives him a voice - can what? Can sing. Voice and sing go together. Can is empty.
- No one can unless the Father gives him endurance - can what? Can run [distance]. Same principle. Can is empty.
- No one can unless the Father draws him - can what? Can come. Same principle. Can is empty.
- I suppose we could look at elko and speculate what the Father's drawing or dragging is for or where He is drawing/dragging us, but that seems to beg many questions even if we use the last clause to speculate.
- Dunamis is one of the if not the most used words with a complementary infinitive per Wallace..
- You have ability. That's nice. Ability to do what?
Again, I see the logic of 6:44 but as a standalone looking at dunamai without it's complement, does the logic not leave us wanting? It does me. Sure, we can show the logic but it's not informative. Jesus will raise the one the Father has drawn giving him ability. Ability to be raised, sure. But the infinitive completes the thought - ability to come to Jesus and Jesus will raise him.
Again, I see no reason to not complete the thought of the main helper verb dunamai (dunamai is helping erchomai) which very frequently takes a complementary infinitive in our Text.
**Infinitive per Wallace (my highlighting):
F. Complementary (Supplementary)
1. Definition
The infinitive is very frequently used with “helper” verbs to complete their thought. Such verbs rarely occur without the infinitive. This finds a parallel in English.
What are you not clear about? We've had some long posts. Maybe there's been some misunderstanding, or we've gotten sidetracked a bit. Part of the issue I recall coming up when we were talking about subgroups.What exactly is your argument here? We can't just dismiss δύναται from the conversation, so even with this emphasis on the infinitive the fact remains that we're talking about the ability to come, and not necessarily actually coming. Respectfully, this line of discussion seems like a bit of a red herring, especially since the most critical point of my argument hasn't been addressed yet: What do we do with the pronouns?
"If the Father draws him, then he is able to come to Jesus, and Jesus will raise him up on the last day."
Who is "him"? Are these two "hims" different people? Does the first refer to a larger group than the latter? This is a grammatical question. If these pronouns do not have identical referents, we need a grammatical argument demonstrating what the referent is for the latter.
Maybe. But not certain due to the word "able".Let P = the Father draws
Let Q = able to come to Jesus
Let R = Jesus will raise up
Let x = him/he
(Px --> xQ) ^ Rx
(I'm letting x after a variable identify an object, and before a variable identify a subject)
The expression says this:
"[If the Father draws (him), then (he) is able to come to Jesus], and Jesus will raise up (him)."
Will every single person who is drawn by the Father also be raised by the Son?
Yes, because if they do not exercise the ability, then they will not be raised.Or might some be drawn (i.e. enabled to come) who are not ultimately raised (i.e. don't actually come)?
Yes, the word "able" is the grammatical reason. Linguistics is part of logic.If the latter is the case, then the above logical expression is false. This would actually be the correct expression:
(Px --> xQ) ^ Ry
...where x is "him1" and y is "him2," the latter making up a subgroup of the former. Is there a grammatical basis for this?
You've mentioned this a few times, "linguistics is a part of logic." Can you elaborate on what you mean by that?Yes, the word "able" is the grammatical reason. Linguistics is part of logic.
Firstly, I read it in some logic basics material, so credit where credit is due.You've mentioned this a few times, "linguistics is a part of logic." Can you elaborate on what you mean by that?
Firstly, to clarify as I did using your wording, you showed 3 referents in one of your statements. If it's simply about referents, then I said I have no problem with what you're saying about them. But it's not just about referents. For the logic to work we have to look at all the words in the argument and this includes the verb and it's complement in this case. If verbs were not important, then why would it be necessary to change a verb tense to maintain the logic? If verbs were not important, then do we have a complete thought to test logically? If we don't use all the words to test the logic, then are we truly testing what's being said?My question pertained to sentence structure and pronoun function; you're offering an answer related to the meaning of a verb. The meaning of words does not alter how pronouns function in a sentence. How does the word "able" argue for a distinction in referent between the two "hims"?
But I can turn this back to you and say you have to be importing an assumption that it's not resistible. And this is where we have to deal with the meaning of "able" and what the completed verb actually says; "able to come".You would have to be importing a theological assumption about what this ability entails (i.e. that it must be resistible).
But it does suggest a distinction. The question is whether or not the distinction can be concluded one way or another, but it's there.Nothing about the grammar of the text itself suggests a distinction.
Yes, because "able to come" does not automatically mean "will come". So, the way I see it, we have to go with an assumption that it may not be irresistible. Resistible is thus a factor. Irresistible is conclusive. Resistible can go other way. In my current view the better read is to allow "able" to mean "able" and not force it beyond being given the ability.We have identical pronouns. So are you assuming that the latter "him" must be a subgroup because the nature of the Father's enabling is resistible?
To begin, I'm interested in knowing what you think of the chiastic structure I presented. Do you disagree that it's there?Backtracking a bit, I also am interested if you have further comments on verse 65. That portion of the discussion kind of died out.
So, you're taking me to v.37 to pick up didomi. Certainly, there's a relationship between didomi and elko (please pardon my laziness on the fonts and verb markings) but I wouldn't go so far as to say they're necessarily interchangeable and this gets back to dunatai. Since we're now getting into a broader interpretation of how 6:44 works, I'll take it further.Do you disagree that verse 65 suggests a paradigmatic relationship between δίδομι and ἔλκω? The terms seem interchangeable in this context. And if that's the case, then verse 37 has already equated the giving/drawing of the Father with the subsequent guarantee that those so given/drawn will come. That too would identify the "him" drawn and the "him" raised of verse 44 as the same person.
Yes, but a change in verb tense and the lexical meaning of a word are different issues. Grammatical issues like verb tense do have an impact logical structure, but we can fill that structure with all sorts of lexemes and it's not going to alter the logic of the verse. If the meaning of δύναται with its compliment had any impact on logical structure, it would have to show up in the symbolic representation. But it won't because it doesn't define a new clause or negate anything.You dealt with this when you determined to change a verb tense to maintain the logic when you were working on some equivalencies.
I don't think it's actually the verb "able" that implies this in your argument, but rather a certain understanding of the agency of the subject. This can be demonstrated by the fact that "able" can be meaningfully used with inanimate subjects. For instance, the statement, "water is able to flow if and only if all obstacles to its course are removed," is a meaningful statement. If all obstacles are removed, such that water is then able to flow, that does not entail that the flow of water remains a matter of some contingency.IMO, "able" in itself leaves contingency...
Do you mean two objects of the same referent? By "referent" I meant what the two αὐτόνs refer to, i.e. they have the same grammatical subject.Firstly, to clarify as I did using your wording, you showed 3 referents in one of your statements.
Maybe we're using the term "logic" differently? I don't know. When I speak of the logic of a verse, I'm simply talking about clause structure. "If P then Q, and R." The expression "if P then Q" remains "if P then Q" regardless of what we fill those variables with. Now, it is possible to fill those variables with something that makes the expression false, but the truth value of a statement is not in question when determining logical structure (re: validity vs soundness).If verbs were not important, then do we have a complete thought to test logically? If we don't use all the words to test the logic, then are we truly testing what's being said?
Sure. But there are different elements to what makes a statement a statement. Just because I chose to focus on a point of logic and grammar doesn't mean I'm ignoring lexical meaning. It just means that's not the focus of a question about logical or grammatical sentence structure. And while I agree that lexical meaning is important to an overall interpretation, that doesn't mean the grammatical structure of a verse is dependent upon it.There is more being stated and all words in the statements are part of the statements being tested.
But I haven't. The irresistibility of coming is an implication given the argument's conclusion; it is not a premise in the argument itself.But I can turn this back to you and say you have to be importing an assumption that it's not resistible.
Not in terms of grammar, it doesn't. Both instances of αὐτὸν share the same grammatical subject. You're talking about lexical meaning, and more than that, a particular lexical meaning that restricts possible valid interpretations. "Able" does not in itself entail contingency, lest we conclude that "water is able to flow freely" means that it may or may not do so. "Able" is a valid descriptor of something that necessarily happens in relation to a discussion about the absence of obstacles. Contingency is a further question that relates to the nature of the subject.But it does suggest a distinction. The question is whether or not the distinction can be concluded one way or another, but it's there.
In philosophy? Or in Scriptural discussions about the nature of the Father's drawing? I'll grant the former. In the statement, "no prisoner can leave his cell unless the guard leaves the door open for him," the ability to leave one's cell does not necessarily mean he will do so. But we can conclude this because the guard leaving the door open has nothing to do with the nature of the prisoner. The issue at hand is that we haven't determined precisely what the drawing of the Father entails. If the Father's drawing entails an effectual change of nature, then the above quoted statement is not necessarily true. And as I've demonstrated with the water analogy, it is perfectly acceptable to use the term "able" when describing a necessary outcome, especially in the context of a removal of obstacles.Yes, because "able to come" does not automatically mean "will come".
But you seem to be doing the opposite. The statement, "'able' in itself implies contingency" is not "an assumption that it may not be irresistible"; rather, as shown with the above syllogisms, it's an assumption that precludes the very possibility of an interpretation of irresistibility. You're not actually leaving both avenues open. You're taking for granted the resistible nature of the Father's drawing as a premise. My argument actually does leave both avenues open, that is, until we get to the conclusion.So, the way I see it, we have to go with an assumption that it may not be irresistible.
No, I think that makes sense.To begin, I'm interested in knowing what you think of the chiastic structure I presented. Do you disagree that it's there?
Speaking of, if I may ask (I know we're just adding more and more to this discussion), what is your understanding of "gives" there if it is not interchangeable with "draws"?So, you're taking me to v.37 to pick up didomi.
So you don't agree that the relationship between these two statements is paradigmatic? -Certainly, there's a relationship between didomi and elko (please pardon my laziness on the fonts and verb markings) but I wouldn't go so far as to say they're necessarily interchangeable and this gets back to dunatai.
What is there to interchange here? It's the same verb. Moreover, how do you explain a paradigmatic relationship between 37 and 65, but not between 37 and 44?I think didomi in 6:37 is interchangeable with didomi in 6:65
As argued previously I think the predicate adjective διδακτοὶ is informative here. That's not a term used of a teaching offered. That's descriptive of individuals as educated. Therefore, it seems best to take "hearing and learning" as another way of describing those "taught," and those "taught" are being described as recipients of the teaching, not as those who merely have the ability to receive it, but may or may not do so. Thus, I would suggest that both "they will all be taught" and "everyone who has heard and learned" are parallel statements to "the Father draws," as well as "all that the Father gives." They're descriptive of these actions. I think the context of the Isaiah passage from which verse 45 is quoted sheds light on this as well.But I'm still left with a question; does ability to come mean will hear and learn and come? It seems it should, or is it still "could" (ability)?
Do you really think that? Much of the discourse is characterized by parabolic language. The crowd consistently misunderstands the spiritual application of Jesus' words. Yet, rather than clarify their meaning (which he could easily have done in a more straightforward manner), Jesus simply continues on and tells them to stop grumbling. That's where the explanatory value of vv. 44-45 seems to come in. He's not putting in the effort to persuade them to believe; he's explaining why it is they won't. Namely, because they are not among those drawn/taught. What other contextual purpose would these verses serve here? Why even mention man's inability if Jesus' purpose is to persuade?Jesus is doing an awful lot of work to get these people to shift perspective from a physical to a spiritual paradigm.
This is a caricature of the position you're objecting to. An effectual motivation is not an act that goes against the will; it is an act that stimulates the will. It is an act that infuses new qualities into it, rendering a new desire upon which the will then proceeds. Surely you don't think I'm denying that mean choose to come to Christ? The issue is not whether the choice is present. No one disagrees that the choice is present. The issue is the motivation. Why do some choose and not others? Is it the effectual nature of the Father's drawing, or is it something in addition to that, which resides in differences that exist between the individuals?In 6:53 Jesus gives us another 'ean me' lesson using an eating and drinking analogy. So, still having a question about dunatai, we have been given food (spiritual food as Jesus says - so His words - so the Gospel again), so we have the ability to eat because the food is there, but do we eat & drink or is it forced down our throat or hooked into our veins apart from our will?
Again, I think you're reading into this more than what is there. All four instances of the English word "whoever" in verses 54-58 are a part of the translation of the same participle, τρώγων. Literally, "the one who feeds/eats." The English translation of "whoever" does not imply anything about who can do this. There is no implied contingency. It doesn't say anything about ability. It literally means "the one who does this." That's just a simple statement of fact. It is silent on the question of who can or will.And for the next 5 verses Jesus repeats the theme of "whoever" so it's back to some contingency again as was there in "able" in 6:44. I think this is narrowing down on the resistible vs. irresistible question to some degree.
No forgiveness necessary. I've enjoyed this as well. Honestly, I've set out a few times to do some self-learning in logic but could not proceed for various reasons of life and time. Maybe I will do so. Maybe not at this point. I worked in the technical end of large computer systems before the PC came out. I was quite proficient in chasing 1's and 0's through cabinets of "logic boards" and componentry. It came quite natural to me, and I did it in person and on the phone using others around the country as my eyes and hands. I enjoy whatever processes are available for deeper thinking. I don't desire it, but if I had it to do over again, I'd probably pursue it into madness.Forgive me for the lengthy reply, but I had a lot to comment on. I want to express again my appreciation for your time. I don't usually encounter people who are interested in going into such depth with me in discussion. I've really enjoyed this, and even if neither of us ultimately convinces the other, this has been helpful for me in thinking through how to better articulate my views and concerns. So again, thank you for that.
It may not seem like it, but I'm deferring to you more than you may realize.Yes, but a change in verb tense and the lexical meaning of a word are different issues. Grammatical issues like verb tense do have an impact logical structure, but we can fill that structure with all sorts of lexemes and it's not going to alter the logic of the verse. If the meaning of δύναται with its compliment had any impact on logical structure, it would have to show up in the symbolic representation. But it won't because it doesn't define a new clause or negate anything.
A couple comments:I think you may be confusing the contingency you see in "able" with the contingency implied by -Q <--> -P. They are not the same. -Q <--> -P reads, "He is not able to come to me unless (i.e. if and only if not) the Father draws him." The contingency here is with respect to whether or not the Father's drawing is sufficient in making one able to come, not whether the ability to come is sufficient for actually coming. What you seem to be talking about is an additional contingency that you suggest exists in order for R to be true. You might want to argue for that contextually, but my point was this is not something that shows up in the logical structure of the way the verse is stated.
I'm quoting in brief just to save space and the extent of your expressed thinking requires more energy than I currently have to ponder it all. So, a few highlights I noted reading through it on a first pass:To put it another way, if one has not been drawn, we could say he irresistibly chooses the sin that he naturally loves. That's not a denial of choice itself; it's simply an affirmation that creatures choose according to the desires of their hearts (Matt 7:17-18?). There is no need here to see ability as necessarily entailing contingency with respect to choosing against one's natural desires. Hence, it's not merely the term "able" that implies the contingency you speak of. What implies it is a certain understanding of ability; namely, the ability to choose contrary to the desire of one's heart.
I still maintain that "able to come to Jesus" although it most certainly provides the flip-side of being unable to come to Jesus, does not in itself mean will or does come to Jesus, for whatever reasons not specified here a man is unable to come to Jesus. I'm also going to tighten up what I was saying before re: linguistics to being semantics, which includes meanings. From what I've seen there is an entire discussion on linguistic semantics within the topic of logic. In attempting to not have presuppositions in looking at 6:44, I cannot ignore the meaning of a word.In an effort to sum up the above reply, I've narrowed my concerns in that post down to three key issues:
- The term "able" (as well as "whoever") does not in itself imply contingency; it seems there's an additional assumption being made here about the nature of human agency which precludes the very possibility of the resistible/irresistible discussion. It takes for granted that the nature of the human will must be described in terms of resistibility. I see two problems with this:
- The very clause, "no one is able to come," contradicts the notion of resistibility on the "other side" of things - i.e. those who are dead in their sins are not capable of resisting the sinful desires of their hearts.
Again, I have ultimately had no arguments regarding the 2 hims. (My mention of a third was because of your wording in one of your statements where I underlined your 3 pronouns. The 3rd was not a different him).
- Apart from the assumption of resistibility, or a contextual (not philosophical) argument for the principle that ability entails contingency, there is no basis for a distinction between the two "hims" in verse 44. There certainly isn't a grammatical distinction, so we would need an argument for this principle from the context. I think it has been assumed, but not argued for.
I do see this point. However here on the fly is the process maintaining the meaning of ability I flagged for myself above:
- I maintain that there is a clear syntagmatic-paradigmatic relationship in this context between ἕλκω and δίδωμι in verses 44 and 65, respectfully.
- In verse 65 Jesus says, "this is why I told you," and repeats the conditional of verse 44 almost verbatim. This indicates what lexicographers call a syntagmatic-paradigmatic sense relation between two terms in a given context. "Draws" and "gives" have been interchanged in the same phrase.
- The shift to δίδωμι, however, is not a new introduction to the context. It calls back to verse 37, where the concept of being "given" by the Father has already been discussed. And in that statement there is no mention of ability. Rather, there is the promise that the subject will indeed come to Jesus (the whole relative clause, "all that the Father gives me," i.e. the one given by the Father, makes up the grammatical subject).
- Even without recognizing the paradigmatic relationship, this raises the question, how can the coming of an individual be guaranteed, if contingency is a factor? But the paradigmatic relationship seems to answer this question.
Then there's the discussion as to whether God renews or doesn't renew whoever He chooses. So now we see why Jesus opened election at the end of John6.
- Toward the end of your reply I get the sense that there's some misunderstanding of the "irresistible" position, and I can see this feeding back into the insistence that "able" must imply contingency.
- Choice is not at issue. No one disagrees that men make a choice. The issue in the resistible/irresistible debate pertains to the basis of one's choosing. The argument isn't that men are saved against their wills, but that they are saved by the renewal of their wills.
I'm not trying or desiring to go there either.
- This is why the term "effectual" is really a better choice than "irresistible."
- When I chose Christ, did I do so because I made good use of what was gifted to me (and is this to be contrasted against those who did not do the same, thus giving me grounds to boast in some personal quality; i.e., what is it that makes the difference between the believer and unbeliever - God's grace, or some quality about the individuals?), or was it because of the efficacy of regeneration, in which my heart was softened, and my will quickened? This could easily turn into a much larger debate, looking at countless other passages, and I'm genuinely not trying to go there in this thread. My point here is simply that the "irresistible" perspective does not argue against choice. It addresses the nature of choice and its motivations.
A lot of disciples were 'drawn to' Jesus, and followed Him ...If the man who God draws means this man does come to Jesus, then we can better conclude that ability is irresistibility. Otherwise, we must conclude resistibility.
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