is meaning required?

[Received]

Sure we choose our standards (more or less consciously, though).
And there´s nothing "arbitrary" about them - they are our own standards, after all, addressing our own make-up, needs and ideas about what a good or better world would be like. Whether they summarize our intuition, our genetics, our social upbringing or whatever is a totally nother question.
Personally, I don´t expect them to be more than an expression of our own ideas - and therefore I don´t see the problem.

Well, I probably largely agree with you. But just stopping at saying our standards are ours doesn't get at the roots of these standards. Either these standards are given by authority, arbitrary, intuitively-mediated, or appeals to another standard, in which case this other standard implies authority, being arbitrary, intuitively-mediated, or it's standards like this all the way down -- infinite regress. Metaethics is about the roots of these standards.

I totally agree with this - ethical and meta-ethical systems are post-hoc rationalizations.
Doesn´t change the fact that these intellectualized systems operate with standards - no matter how they actually have been motivated.

Yes, mpst definitely these theories are post-hoc rationalizations.
I do not, however, agree completely that the judgement "lying is wrong" is acquired exclusively by intuition.
Plus, a single moral opinion doesn´t make an ethical or meta-ethical system.

I don't know about the standard thing. Standards imply comparison. There is definitely comparison with VE, because we're comparing multiple instances of character expression and actions as lining up with the good or not. That, however, is only half of VE: the practical application part. The real basis of VE is the idea that we all have an intuitive idea of what "good" means, and we all apply it intuitively with the information we're given (goes back to the barbarian example). None of this is standard-mediated; it's just a matter of "I get it." Again, this is implicit in our very use of the word "good"; everyone just "gets it." Now, super importantly, the context in which they're applying this sense of "good" might be different: one person thinking "good" means what's pleasurable, and another thinking the good is what can go beyond pleasure because just appealing to pleasure might ignore how pain is added to others' lives, as with the adultery example. The good, like the VE's use of "beautiful", and bad, and even "evil", are all faculties of sorts hard-wired into us; their application can depend on context and comparison.

So the deepest part of VE isn't standard-mediated (our use of "good"), but how we apply it definitely involves standards.

I can agree with this.
And "beautiful" is not a standard?

Beautiful, IMO, means you value something for what it is. Where's the standard in that? A standard might come from that, but the basis of this standard is the sense of valuing (perceiving, experiencing) something intrinsically (not instrumentally). When we say (ethically speaking), "that's a beautiful thing you just did," we mean that this action we perceived is perceived and valued for its own sake, which is really another way of saying that this person's actions have reached (our) conception of the good -- of wholeness, completion, or perfection. Beauty and the good go together in VE: we perceive those things which are perfect (or good or whole) to be beautiful. We see the good as the goal or telos that's valued in itself. Fully expressed for a human being, this means a person who possess all the virtues and overall character that results in him being happy -- eudaimonia, flourishing.

That´s a nice claim - but structurally not any different from "'God has written his morals in our hearts", and therefore affected by the same "problem".

Maybe the above statement means that God has given us the sense of good by which we compare things? I don't know. If so, I don't see how that's a problem. God is giving the "good-o-meter", and we're capable of applying this "good" given our circumstances, values, and knowledge and experience.

I´m still not sure how you arrived at "a standard requires a comparison". A standard is declared the comparandum. Whether it´s "God´s will", "the Golden Mean", "the least possible suffering" or whatever.

Okay, I see what you mean. In this case, there is no declared comparandum, because it's ultimately based in intuition. No authority or external source of knowledge is (ultimately) making any claim as a necessary part of justification for this system (VE). What does this mean, based in intuition? That the individual has his moral and ethical tools hard-wired in his very person.

And we have to point to our intuition as the stopping point, or else we run up against the other possibilities mentioned above with standards: authority, arbitrary, or appeals to another standard (infinite regress).

 

[quatona]

"Good" here means the sense of wholeness or completion that all things "aim" for (i.e., find their telos or goal in, which when attained means it's all complete or whole).

But in order to get to the core of the issue:
This is a world of impernanence. If I were to discern from my observations what all things "aim" for, I´d say they "aim" for their own deconstruction and transformation into something else. Ice-cream doesn´t aim for being whole ice-cream - it aims for melting, rotting and transforming into something else.
And that´s just ice cream.
The idea of a static ideal "wholeness" of a given part of the whole is, in my view, so detrimental to that which makes a living system a living system that it´s completely useless for any given purpose. There is no wholeness to be gained or aimed for, under impermanence.
Whereas the whole is and will always remain the whole - no matter what its elements are or "aim" for.

 

[quatona]

Where's the :humorless: emoticon?

I guess my humour gets a little shy, when ethical discussions amount to calling different opinions "barbaric".

I wouldn't really call it absolute, so much as objective. Absolute, AFAIK, means it applies universally at all times and all places. Well, no, it doesn't, because the good here refers to human beings; good in this sense is relative to the individual. So in that sense it's relative but objective.

Gotta wonder, then, why this conversation started with you objecting to someone´s claim that VE is relativistic.

And yeah, that's my supposition. All this means is that all things have a sort of model or prototype for perfection or completion or wholeness -- and precisely because this is a prototype it isn't really attainable, IMV, but that isn't the point.

Cool assumption. I am unconvinced, though.

In my example there are bad results.

You haven´t shown them, you have merely claimed them. In any case, you haven´t shown the causality you are claiming.

Do you believe in evolutionary psychology, things like instincts? Or are you a constructivist all the way down?

I´m a radical constructivist all the way down. Which doesn´t mean I can´t or won´t be able to discuss certain issues based on shared agreements about reality.
I´m sure it´s hard to believe, but even a radical constructivist can buy a banana or a used car without drawing the vendor into a discussion whether bananas or cars exist.
Plus, even a radical constructivist constructs his own reality - i.e. he might or might not believe in instincts. So you can easily ask me about the way I construct reality without asking whether I´m a radical constructivist. It´s a given.

If you do dig it, then this means that regardless of the society there is going to be some degree of genetic influence on things like emotions, and therefore our responses to having our lovers not be committed lovers but have sex with multiple people.

Well, I would agree that emotions are strongly determined by cultural heritage (to which degree might be debatable, though), but
1. that doesn´t make them instincts,
2. that doesn´t make them virtues,
3. that´s very far from "a wholeness or completion that all things aim for".

Forgive the extremist example, but if there was a society that valued sexual abuse of young children by family members, are you saying that there is only negativity if the boys and parents believed there would be negativity? Presumably not. Why? Because biologically and psychologically speaking, there is damage done with certain behaviors -- objectively -- regardless of the society and its constructs.

I´ll forgive you about anything, but I have to wonder why you changed the example upon me addressing the one you brought up. Does that mean you concede it was a poor example?

I was interested to find out what VE can do for me, particularly how it could add something valuable to those approaches that I have found to be post-hoc rationalisations of people´s feelings (and by "adding" I don´t mean veiling the same old in even more pompous verbiage).

I do agree that there are countless aspects to every issue (and even more aspects to a concrete given situation). I would agree that the more aspects we take into consideration, the closer our view becomes to "whole". But that doesn´t seem the view (or practice?) I am presented here. I am noticing that a hierarchy of aspects is claimed (without substantiation).
To be honest, I am not seeing much more than the good old circular reasoning.
I am not seeing how VE helps us with gaining common ground when it comes to differences in our moral views.
I don´t see much progress from people banging their heads over "it´s good - no it isn´t" to "it´s good because it´s virtuous - no, it isn´t".

Now, the society has the possibility of covering up the severity of any negativity, like with Americans and their infinite "freedom" (construct) with everything, including the freedom of the rich to screw the poor through a certain super capitalist economic system. Well, this particular economic system is screwing people over, objectively speaking, but it's really not because, well, "freedom".

Well, I´d be about the last to defend capitalism.
But I´d surely like to see you and the other glowing proponent of VE - Mark (who, as far as I can tell, is at the same time praising capitalism at every opportunity) discuss this issue in VE manner. (And I am not being sarcastic here. Such a discussion might help me greatly in seeing the practical benefits of the VE approach over other meta-ethical approaches).

 

[quatona]

Okay, I see what you mean. In this case, there is no declared comparandum, because it's ultimately based in intuition. No authority or external source of knowledge is (ultimately) making any claim as a necessary part of justification for this system (VE). What does this mean, based in intuition? That the individual has his moral and ethical tools hard-wired in his very person.

Ok, I see.
However, minus the big words, I do not really see the progress made from "good is what I feel is good" (I mean I admit that this doesn´t sound as philosophical and and intellectual and things, but to me it sounds more straightforward).

On a sidenote, I have to wonder why this approach - seeing what emphasis it puts on intuition as the final arbiter - isn´t called IntuitionEthics but VirtueEthics.

And we have to point to our intuition as the stopping point, or else we run up against the other possibilities mentioned above with standards: authority, arbitrary, or appeals to another standard (infinite regress).

We have discussed that before, but I feel it´s important:
"Intuition" is a tricky thing to identify. It´s hard to discern from prejudices, petty emotions and learned creeds.

 

[Received]

But in order to get to the core of the issue:
This is a world of impernanence. If I were to discern from my observations what all things "aim" for, I´d say they "aim" for their own deconstruction and transformation into something else. Ice-cream doesn´t aim for being whole ice-cream - it aims for melting, rotting and transforming into something else.
And that´s just ice cream.
The idea of a static ideal "wholeness" of a given part of the whole is, in my view, so detrimental to that which makes a living system a living system that it´s completely useless for any given purpose. There is no wholeness to be gained or aimed for, under impermanence.
Whereas the whole is and will always remain the whole - no matter what its elements are or "aim" for.

Right, but the VE sense of "aim" means a sort of prototype for anything. A tree deconstructs, like everything else, but this doesn't mean that its state of wholeness or perfection doesn't exist. To say a tree's "aim" is an ideal of tree health (or wholeness, completion) isn't to say that the tree itself aims for this (trees don't aim for anything), but that by being a tree it brings with it (which we ascertain through experience) a sort of picture of completion of what it means to be a tree. Now, this completion is all in our minds -- we're the ones with this sense of ideality, so the aim is all ours. But when we apply this to human beings and ethics, we see that there's this strange continually expanding sense of goodness that goes with human action, and at points we're able to see that someone's action or actions are really "good" in the highest sense. Hence we use the word "good": "that was a good thing to do," "that was a good ice cream cone," etc. Translation: that thing you did fits my conception of a complete, whole, or perfect action in that situation.

 

[Received]

I guess my humour gets a little shy, when ethical discussions amount to calling different opinions "barbaric".

It was an example for the sake of argument, and I would never call anyone barbaric in daily life. If you're still bothered by this, then we've gotta just reach an impasse here.

Gotta wonder, then, why this conversation started with you objecting to someone´s claim that VE is relativistic.

Because I made a mistake.

You haven´t shown them, you have merely claimed them. In any case, you haven´t shown the causality you are claiming.

Yeah, because me showing this means just pointing out how anyone would be worse off in a society where people had open sexual relations with each other -- which to me is counter to evolutionary psychology to some degree, meaning that no matter how much we claim it's good and well for anyone to do anything, we still have instincts that make us feel certain ways when people do anything sexually here. Of course, that's my assumption which isn't validated merely by stating it, given it clashes with your radical constructivism. So no, to you I haven't shown how it's worse, because to you "worse" has a totally different flavor in this context given your philosophical presuppositions which are different from mine.

I´m a radical constructivist all the way down. Which doesn´t mean I can´t or won´t be able to discuss certain issues based on shared agreements about reality.
I´m sure it´s hard to believe, but even a radical constructivist can buy a banana or a used car without drawing the vendor into a discussion whether bananas or cars exist.
Plus, even a radical constructivist constructs his own reality - i.e. he might or might not believe in instincts. So you can easily ask me about the way I construct reality without asking whether I´m a radical constructivist. It´s a given.

I don't think it's that strange an approach, I just don't agree with it.

Well, I would agree that emotions are strongly determined by cultural heritage (to which degree might be debatable, though), but
1. that doesn´t make them instincts,
2. that doesn´t make them virtues,
3. that´s very far from "a wholeness or completion that all things aim for".

I´ll forgive you about anything, but I have to wonder why you changed the example upon me addressing the one you brought up. Does that mean you concede it was a poor example?

I changed the example because sometimes using more extreme examples helps drive home points rather than using less extreme ones, which could possibly mean having more room to piddle on details and not really drive home a point which could be driven him better with a more extreme example.

1. No kidding. What I'm saying is that what makes a society of pedophilia bad is our hard-wired instincts, which would have relation to our discussion of what's good or bad: having sex with boys is bad, regardless of your constructs, because it results in psychological and emotional damage regardless of the views of the boys or adults. How can we know? Because there are plenty of people out there -- and I've counseled a few of the -- who were children and thought it was totally normal to have a father who had sex with them, and they're far from being as "good" psychologically (and many times ethically) as their non-abused peers. (Again, this is just an example. I have total props for a constructivist disagreement with this, and my intention isn't to kick down constructivism with such examples.)

2. I didn't say they did. 3. Ibid.

I do agree that there are countless aspects to every issue (and even more aspects to a concrete given situation). I would agree that the more aspects we take into consideration, the closer our view becomes to "whole". But that doesn´t seem the view (or practice?) I am presented here. I am noticing that a hierarchy of aspects is claimed (without substantiation).
To be honest, I am not seeing much more than the good old circular reasoning.
I am not seeing how VE helps us with gaining common ground when it comes to differences in our moral views.
I don´t see much progress from people banging their heads over "it´s good - no it isn´t" to "it´s good because it´s virtuous - no, it isn´t".

This partly goes back to the example of pedophilia, where I tried to drive home the point that different values can be determined to be better or worse in proportion to the types of character they impute on the person who actualizes these values. The idea at heart is easy and easy to agree or disagree with: we all have a good-o-meter instilled within us, and every time we use the word "good" in any situation we're referred to some type of ideal of completion or wholeness with whatever we're referring to. VE adds this to the ethical sphere with actions, and how certain actions which when repeated become characteristics result in certain types of characters. Is the person who has sex with young boys just a "good" as a person who doesn't? You might counter that it's totally relative to the constructs of a society, but VE says that there is something beyond the realm of subjectivity that our sense of good and bad are drawn towards, this being our understanding or ideal of a type of character for any person who practices such-and-such actions. In this view we can say (or argue about) whether pedophilia results in better or worse characters than people who don't engage in this. Yes, there are contexts and considerations, as well as exceptions, but this isn't the case when we're referring to entire cultures and sets of values regarding, say, pedophilia, or child labor, or advocating a machismo attitude for men, or a feminine and passive role for women, etc. All these prescriptions for behavior and character, say the VE crowd, result in distinctly different characters for the people who practice such prescriptions and values.

Well, I´d be about the last to defend capitalism.
But I´d surely like to see you and the other glowing proponent of VE - Mark (who, as far as I can tell, is at the same time praising capitalism at every opportunity) discuss this issue in VE manner. (And I am not being sarcastic here. Such a discussion might help me greatly in seeing the practical benefits of the VE approach over other meta-ethical approaches).

Right, but in Mark's case you can make an argument by appealing to each of the aspects of laissez-faire capitalism (and/or libertarianism) and evaluate whether each characteristic, considered individually but ultimately put together into a grand sum, result in a better or worse society in terms of this society's character, both in terms of the victims of this system or those who perpetuate it. IOW, it's precisely because Mark and I would have agreements on what is good or not in general that we could even argue about whether or not such-and-such system of capitalism is better or worse for individuals; and it's not just a matter of us having totally constructed opinions of what's good or bad, completely handed down by our upbringings, but rather that our upbringings and current sense of good and badness that add to this grand sum involve some sense of intuitively ascertained understanding of goodness which goes beyond strict learning in being handed down. This is precisely why, so far as I can see, that people even change their values in the first place when they're autonomous human beings: they're able to say that their own original values aren't as good as they could be because they realize how they influence people who practice them and have run across other people who practice different virtues and just seem, well, more happy -- that is, more good, complete, whole, or flourished.

 

[Received]

If the good is constructed, this means it's totally handed down. How then does a person know to accept another construct or value that has a different conception of the good? He either does it arbitrarily, or because his own sense of goodness (i.e., the values he has learned from his society and upbringing) has another standard of goodness beyond this sense of (culturally handed-down system of) goodness, and this is the intuitively built-in sense of good that I've been talking about.

How does a person from a VE or moral realist approach choose another value than the set of values he has been exposed to from his own culture? Because there is some type of standard of goodness that transcends just what he knows from his given constructs. This, IMO, is the only way you get out of him choosing arbitrarily when he comes across another set of values (which imply what's good or bad).

So maybe you can distinguish known goods (i.e., goods we have because of values, which are given by others and shared with them), and the faculty of goodness, which transcends any set of known goods. With radical constructivism, you can't have this faculty, because the faculty is identical to what has already been constructed before you -- i.e., isn't a separate faculty at all, but is constituted by the preceding constructs handed down by your culture.

 

[quatona]

Right, but the VE sense of "aim" means a sort of prototype for anything.

Sorry, but that is quite a wild claim, to me. I can´t relate to it.
Is the prototype of a guitar more Fender-style or more Gibson-style? Or Spanish?
And even if you can answer that question, what does this say about the guitars diverging from the prototype?

A tree deconstructs, like everything else, but this doesn't mean that its state of wholeness or perfection doesn't exist.

No, but it doesn´t mean it exists, either. Actually, I´m more like looking for something that suggests that such a state exist.

To say a tree's "aim" is an ideal of tree health (or wholeness, completion) isn't to say that the tree itself aims for this (trees don't aim for anything),

...[side-note] then, I think it´s not a particularly good idea to describe it as "that which everything aims for".... Just saying.

but that by being a tree it brings with it (which we ascertain through experience) a sort of picture of completion of what it means to be a tree.

I´m sorry, but I can evoke countless very different images of trees - all of which qualify as "trees", in my world. I guess I value diversity more than the typical VE-protagonist does.
I have no idea (or unnumerable different ideas) what it means to be a tree.

Now, this completion is all in our minds -- we're the ones with this sense of ideality, so the aim is all ours. But when we apply this to human beings and ethics, we see that there's this strange continually expanding sense of goodness that goes with human action, and at points we're able to see that someone's action or actions are really "good" in the highest sense. Hence we use the word "good": "that was a good thing to do," "that was a good ice cream cone," etc.

Well, if you guys see all that and have all this stuff on your minds, I guess it´s a good idea or even a necessity for you to operate with those sights and mind-stuff.
I guess it helps keeping things neatly in order, or something.
Doesn´t resonate with me. At all.

Translation: that thing you did fits my conception of a complete, whole, or perfect action in that situation.

You know, I am a simple-minded guy. Where I come from, we say "I like what he did".

 

[Received]

Well, if you guys see all that and have all this stuff on your minds, I guess it´s a good idea or even a necessity for you to operate with those sights and mind-stuff.
I guess it helps keeping things neatly in order, or something.
Doesn´t resonate with me. At all.

So you're saying that good and bad don't imply ideals that are projected onto the action or thing considered to be good and bad? Or that you don't believe in good and bad at all, even within constructivist limits?

 

[FredVB]

We, even all, give ourselves meaning surely all the time. A lot of this is good to have happening, with reasons for the meanings that are found. But there is meaning already there, which is universal as opposed to the things for individuals to find for themselves. It is in the Christian message, and others may only hope to find it. God created us, each of us, to be in relationship. God loves us, and with God being our God in relationship and knowing God's love, we then will love God. This, with being in communication with God, will be in blessing that is with that, and which then would come to blissful eternity of that, it is purpose for our being here. But we are in a fallen world with sin of humanity, in rebellion, and there is misery to many, and Christ came for delivery from that, for any that would come to God for that.

 

[Inkfingers]

Why can't such meaning be decided on by each individual?

Why can't the laws of physics and mathematics, or the meaning of words, be decided on by each individual?

From the perspective of the individual, the earth looks flat and the sun goes around the earth. We require context and perspective for a more accurate view.

 

[quatona]

So you're saying that good and bad don't imply ideals that are projected onto the action or thing considered to be good and bad?

Yes, I do not see why assume that this is necessarily or generally the case.
Also, I don´t encounter my mind working that way.

Or that you don't believe in good and bad at all, even within constructivist limits?

I find the repeated reference to (my) constructivism a bit confusing - mainly because I had also tried to tell you that - at this point - I am not arguing from this position.
Personally, I operate with these words just like I operate with every other noun - say, "house" or "bread".
Does my philosophy "radical constructivism" allow for such things to actually exist out there? No. It doesn´t even allow for radical constructivism to actually exist out there.
Does this answer your question?

 

[Received]

Yes, I do not see why assume that this is necessarily or generally the case.
Also, I don´t encounter my mind working that way.

In what way? By associating certain responses (approach for good, move away for bad) with good or bad? Because that's the only way people understand on an everyday level what good and bad mean: good means (most basically) what's approach-worthy, and bad means what's move away-worthy (or at least not look at worthy).

So the question becomes: do you approach (behaviorally, emotionally, cognitively) certain phenomena and avoid others? (Did you just find one of my previous comments about "barbaric" distasteful? If yes, that's cogntive-emotional distance, avoidance.) Because if you do, all we're talking about is labels: you don't label things good or bad but you respond in the same way that's implied by these labels. Like you saying you don't believe in "cars", but you drive a red four-wheeled shiny chrome thing that needs gas and is constantly breaking down.

 

[quatona]

In what way?

In the way you described it here, and to which I responded: post #85 (the entire completion/wholeness/"good in the highest sense" idea).

By associating certain responses (approach for good, move away for bad) with good or bad? Because that's the only way people understand on an everyday level what good and bad mean: good means (most basically) what's approach-worthy, and bad means what's move away-worthy (or at least not look at worthy).

No, that´s not what I disagree with. In fact, it´s almost as simple as I would describe it.

So the question becomes: do you approach (behaviorally, emotionally, cognitively) certain phenomena and avoid others? (Did you just find one of my previous comments about "barbaric" distasteful? If yes, that's cogntive-emotional distance, avoidance.) Because if you do, all we're talking about is labels: you don't label things good or bad but you respond in the same way that's implied by these labels.

As I already said in my previous posts, I do label things good or bad. All that´s implied by these labels is that I like certain things and dislike others. That doesn´t require any intellectual meta-ethical approach or explanation. If you are submitting that that´s all VE is meant to say, I am inclined to feel that VE is using an unnecessarily complicated terminology to say something very simple.
If however VE says something beyond this, I don´t know why you start reducing it to this almost tautological level at this point.
And yes, of course language is all about labels. That´s the problem. And the problem gets worse, the more we tangle ourselves up in big words/labels.

Like you saying you don't believe in "cars", but you drive a red four-wheeled shiny chrome thing that needs gas and is constantly breaking down.

Do you want to change the subject of this discussion? Do you want to discuss radical constructivism? We can do that any time, but at this point I was merely explaining to you that in this discussion I did not argue from the radical constructivist pov.

Here´s what I said, in my previous post, again:

I find the repeated reference to (my) constructivism a bit confusing - mainly because I had also tried to tell you that - at this point - I am not arguing from this position. Personally, I operate with these words just like I operate with every other noun - say, "house" or "bread".
Does my philosophy "radical constructivism" allow for such things to actually exist out there? No. It doesn´t even allow for radical constructivism to actually exist out there.

​

I tried to explain to you that I am willing and able to speak and operate with these terms - within the frame of reference of our practical language - quite fine. I do know that the idea that there are distinct objects is so widely spread (to the point that our languages don´t allow for expressing a dissenting opinion) that I accept it in my daily life and pretend consent.
Likewise, I use the word good for what I prefer, and the word bad for what I dislike.
My philosophy is a totally different issue.
So what´s the point in saying "you do what in our language is typically call a car, but don´t believe that cars or objects exist" - when this is exactly what I had been telling you a moment ago?

 

[Received]

Basically:

I was having a discussion on a specific point, and didn't see the connection with one of your responses with something you'd said before (imagine that).

And so far there are two probable very big distinctions that make arguing about VE (as I understand it, and I can't help but understand it in my own way) pretty difficult without quibbling away on smaller philosophical presuppositions, given you're not a moral realist and are a radical constructivist.

But let's continue on this point:

As I already said in my previous posts, I do label things good or bad. All that´s implied by these labels is that I like certain things and dislike others. That doesn´t require any intellectual meta-ethical approach or explanation. If you are submitting that that´s all VE is meant to say, I am inclined to feel that VE is using an unnecessarily complicated terminology to say something very simple.
If however VE says something beyond this, I don´t know why you start reducing it to this almost tautological level at this point.
And yes, of course language is all about labels. That´s the problem. And the problem gets worse, the more we tangle ourselves up in big words/labels.

I think a case can be made for a metaethical consideration, only indirectly. Nobody (except people like you and me here and professional philosophers otherwise) ever thinks about the metaethical implications of their actions -- again it's probably a post hoc thing, like we agreed about.

Here's the deal. Either your experience of good and bad goes down to visceral reactions -- approach or avoid -- OR you conceptualize the good (your ideas of good) in a deeper way. This is probably where we get to what you call a hierarchy. I.e., you don't just react but have an idea of good and badness. Good so far?

If so, then we have multiple goods arranged in a matter of degrees. (For the sake of discussion I'm not talking about aesthetic goods, like guitars and such, and I think my using examples like this only muddied the conversation, given this is about ethics.) So it's good if a person responds with hesitation but still acts like a jerk in a conversation; better if he hesitates and refrains completely; even better if he sees empathically what's going on behind the scenes of the person who provoked him; best if he responds from this empathy and makes a grand gesture of support and connection. That is an example of a hierarchy with regard to a very specific set of responses. Aristotle would take this further and start a discussion on virtue and the golden mean using degreed examples like this to support his point.

So we have a hierarchy, a collection of goods. But we also have, behind this, a sense of goodness of the goods -- a standard of goodness that determines whether one good is sorta good, another moderately good, another better than this, and another that's best.

This is well on the way to VE. We're not just looking at discrete and possibly non-conceptualized, visceral reactions which are good or bad, but using our intellect to project an ideal onto different actions which we can categorize according to varying degrees of goodness and badness. VE simply states that this tendency toward the "good beyond goods" is ultimately happiness, i.e., that state which we attain that we consider intrinsically valuable or worthy of being in for its own sake. IOW, what we're aiming at if we go beyond just discrete instances of good and bad is some sort of ideal which in being attained (in the moment with certain expressions of virtue, or later down the road as something we aim for) results in being happy -- meaning here not just sappy superficial feelings of pleasure, but a more rooted sense where the individual's conception of the good is grasped and results in a type of character that "flourishes". This also means that happiness ultimately motivates all our responses (not exactly a new idea), and that with VE happiness (in this deeper sense) is tied up with ethics or personal becoming (which goes further than just morals, or how we relate to others).

 

[quatona]

Basically:

I was having a discussion on a specific point, and didn't see the connection with one of your responses with something you'd said before (imagine that).

And so far there are two probable very big distinctions that make arguing about VE (as I understand it, and I can't help but understand it in my own way) pretty difficult without quibbling away on smaller philosophical presuppositions, given you're not a moral realist and are a radical constructivist.

Ok, I´m open to clarifying these points. I´m also open to dropping them for the time being.

But let's continue on this point:



I think a case can be made for a metaethical consideration, only indirectly. Nobody (except people like you and me here and professional philosophers otherwise) ever thinks about the metaethical implications of their actions -- again it's probably a post hoc thing, like we agreed about.

Ok.
There´s just a minor (and probably not crucial) point here that I´m stumbling over: I don´t think that actions (can) have meta-ethical implications. I wouldn´t know how that´s technically possible.

Here's the deal. Either your experience of good and bad goes down to visceral reactions -- approach or avoid -- OR you conceptualize the good (your ideas of good) in a deeper way.

Please allow me a question for purposes of clarification: When you say "visceral reactions" - is that another way of saying "intuition"?

This is probably where we get to what you call a hierarchy. I.e., you don't just react but have an idea of good and badness. Good so far?

Well, not quite. When you say "idea" - are you referring to a cognitive, intellectual process? Or to something else?

I am asking these questions because I have learned that in the very end you will establish "intuition" as the instrument of choice.
So, when you start from "visceral" feelings vs. "ideas", I would like to first understand whether and how these are distinguished from "intuition".

If so, then we have multiple goods arranged in a matter of degrees. (For the sake of discussion I'm not talking about aesthetic goods, like guitars and such, and I think my using examples like this only muddied the conversation, given this is about ethics.) So it's good if a person responds with hesitation but still acts like a jerk in a conversation; better if he hesitates and refrains completely; even better if he sees empathically what's going on behind the scenes of the person who provoked him; best if he responds from this empathy and makes a grand gesture of support and connection. That is an example of a hierarchy with regard to a very specific set of responses. Aristotle would take this further and start a discussion on virtue and the golden mean using degreed examples like this to support his point.

Well, maybe that´s you and many other people do it, but it´s not the way I perceive myself doing it. I don´t seem to have an explicit or implicit set of standards to which I compare the behaviour of a person. Too much, in my experience and self-observation, depends on the particularities of a given situation and even more on the persons (their characteristics, their struggles, their abilities, their fortes, their intelligence, our relationship, their relationships and history, etc.etc.) involved.
So, to take the example at hand: the VE approach may be helpful for persons at a certain point in life and their personal path, but it isn´t for me. From my perspective, it´s way too static.

So we have a hierarchy, a collection of goods. But we also have, behind this, a sense of goodness of the goods -- a standard of goodness that determines whether one good is sorta good, another moderately good, another better than this, and another that's best.

Well, what can I say? It´s not the way my mind works.
But I have a question: Do you think this "sense of goodness" is and has always there behind the scenes and manifests in the situational judgement - or do you rather think, that, vice versa, this "sense of goodness" is the result of an effort made to intellectually structure the spontaneous (visceral, intuitive,...) judgements the person has made so far in his life? (I´d tend towards the latter notion).

But there´s another thing I am wondering: Our conversation here started with your statement that VE solves a problem that other meta-ethical approaches, in that it doesn´t require standards (and my objection to this statement). And here you are, telling me about the "standard of goodness" that your approach operates from. I am confused.

This is well on the way to VE. We're not just looking at discrete and possibly non-conceptualized, visceral reactions which are good or bad, but using our intellect to project an ideal onto different actions which we can categorize according to varying degrees of goodness and badness. VE simply states that this tendency toward the "good beyond goods" is ultimately happiness, i.e., that state which we attain that we consider intrinsically valuable or worthy of being in for its own sake. IOW, what we're aiming at if we go beyond just discrete instances of good and bad is some sort of ideal which in being attained (in the moment with certain expressions of virtue, or later down the road as something we aim for) results in being happy -- meaning here not just sappy superficial feelings of pleasure, but a more rooted sense where the individual's conception of the good is grasped and results in a type of character that "flourishes". This also means that happiness ultimately motivates all our responses (not exactly a new idea), and that with VE happiness (in this deeper sense) is tied up with ethics or personal becoming (which goes further than just morals, or how we relate to others).

Would it take something important away from this paragraph if I summarized it this way: "Happiness, in the VE view, is the feeling that you are a good person who matches his own standards"?

 

[Received]

Ok, I´m open to clarifying these points. I´m also open to dropping them for the time being.


Ok.
There´s just a minor (and probably not crucial) point here that I´m stumbling over: I don´t think that actions (can) have meta-ethical implications. I wouldn´t know how that´s technically possible.

Well, in the sense that actions can be considered within metaethical frameworks. I.e., action X is considered according to VE, consequentialist, etc. metaethical interpretations.

Please allow me a question for purposes of clarification: When you say "visceral reactions" - is that another way of saying "intuition"?

No, not quite to me, but more to the sort of emotional-behavioral reaction. Intuition, to me, is the viscera of the intellect; i.e., what an emotional-behavioral action is to a visceral reaction, a cognitive reaction is to an intuition. I see someone I don't like; I get an immediate emotional twitch in my stomach. That's visceral. I ascertain without reasoning some realization, an epiphany. That's intuition. Intuition is knowing without reasoning; visceral responses have no knowing, except in a metaphorical sense.

Well, not quite. When you "idea" - are you referring to a cognitive, intellectual process? Or to something else?

That.

Well, maybe that´s you and many other people do it, but it´s not the way I perceive myself doing it. I don´t seem to have an explicit or implicit set of standards to which I compare the behaviour of a person. Too much, in my experience and self-observation, depends on the particularities of a given situation and even more on the persons (their characteristics, their struggles, their abilities, their fortes, their intelligence, our relationship, their relationships and history, etc.etc.) involved.
So, to take the example at hand: the VE approach may be helpful for persons at a certain point in life and their personal path, but it isn´t for me. From my perspective, it´s way too static.

Hmm. Would it make it an easier if we're talking about yourself? Let's start there. Say you have a certain social interaction with a friend who hurt you in the past and you have the options of responding to him by flipping him off, begrudgingly acknowledging his presence but still being minimally civil, giving a handshake, or totally letting bygones be bygones and offering him a lunch date where you could possibly (if the chance arose) get his reaction to the event and see if you can mend any previous wounds on your part toward him as a friend in general.

Notice how you answer that question. In that moment you either respond totally spontaneously (i.e., arbitrarily), or by appealing implicitly or explicitly to a standard "behind" these responses which determines (to you) which one is best for that situation. Or something else?

But! The example standard I expressed above is a bit incorrect, because the standard in VE relates directly to virtues in general and the golden mean: we experience a set of options for a particular action, and have some sense of applying our understanding of virtue (which is a mean between two extremes) to particular situations and behaviors. Take courage: it's a virtue between being too "big balls" running into things and being too timid and resigned from things; this is the virtue we have in mind in situations where courage is applicable (i.e., we're called to act in a potentially courageous way, such as with standing up for the small guy), according to which we apply the particular options which our minds offer us in the moment, as if we're thinking, "hmm, option A seems more courageous than option B, but overall I'll go with option C." Sometimes this deliberation is explicit and we're pretty much thinking this way. In this sense, the virtue is the standard; we know what we should aim for in the abstract: not too haughty, not too timid, but just right as a courageous person. This consideration is part and parcel of looking at particular circumstances, because there's no such thing as a static virtuous act -- e.g., running into battle at 7 miles per hour is always the courageous thing in all situations. No, that's static. Which makes me retort that actually VE is the most relativistic thing out there, given that each virtue is only a broad abstract sense of how to act, and we always need practical judgment in each particular circumstance to determine what is the "best" action, or how this virtue unfolds in the world around us.

Well, what can I say? It´s not the way my mind works.
But I have a question: Do you think this "sense of goodness" is and has always there behind the scenes and manifests in the situational judgement - or do you rather think, that, vice versa, this "sense of goodness" is the result of an effort made to intellectually structure the spontaneous (visceral, intuitive,...) judgements the person has made so far in his life? (I´d tend towards the latter notion).

I'd say "yes".

I think the sense of goodness is part and parcel of the judgment itself; you can't have judgment of anything particular without some sense of goodness for a standard (or whatever) according to which particular behaviors in particular circumstances are considered. But it's also spontaneously the result of the judgments a person has made before, more particularly how he's acted before. The more he tries to act justly, to use a random virtue, the more he becomes a just person (has a just character), and the more he has a just character the more spontaneously and easily it becomes to be just.

But there´s another thing I am wondering: Our conversation here started with your statement that VE solves a problem that other meta-ethical approaches, in that it doesn´t require standards (and my objection to this statement). And here you are, telling me about the "standard of goodness" that your approach operates from. I am confused.

IIRC, I was referring to the experience of goodness. Goodness is immediate, intuitive; we know the good action in the moment, even though uncovering this good action might involve deliberation or practical reasoning, i.e., how to actualize this good in this particular circumstance. IOW, at every moment of consideration of how to act, we have a sense of the good. This doesn't make this "sense" the best sense that's out there, which is why thinking about things a little longer might help us get an idea of what action is better than another.

Would it take something important away from this paragraph if I summarized it this way: "Happiness, in the VE view, is the feeling that you are a good person who matches his own standards"?

I'd say that happiness in the VE view is the state of being (which definitely includes good feelings) constituted by a character in line with virtue. Right there we can stop and have it make enough sense. But I have to go further by adding a moral realist part you'll disagree with me on: VE means that virtue isn't (just) something private and subjective ("your own standards"), but something objective (or at least objective in the sense that it's part and parcel of subjectivity), i.e., you can measure the happiness that results from it as a function of how well the individual flourishes in the world.

 

[dlamberth]

A recurring them in debates about God's existence often come down to God and the afterlife as a source of meaning in life. But to me there's a bigger implied question.

Does life require a meaning or purpose? Why can't such meaning be decided on by each individual?

Even as a Lover of God, I do not believe the meaning of life comes down to God and the afterlife. Quite simply, the meaning of life is "happiness", in my humble opinion.

.

 

[quatona]

Well, in the sense that actions can be considered within metaethical frameworks. I.e., action X is considered according to VE, consequentialist, etc. metaethical interpretations.

Maybe we are just using the word "implication" differently...

No, not quite to me, but more to the sort of emotional-behavioral reaction. Intuition, to me, is the viscera of the intellect; i.e., what an emotional-behavioral action is to a visceral reaction, a cognitive reaction is to an intuition. I see someone I don't like; I get an immediate emotional twitch in my stomach. That's visceral. I ascertain without reasoning some realization, an epiphany. That's intuition. Intuition is knowing without reasoning; visceral responses have no knowing, except in a metaphorical sense.

I see. Thanks for explaining.
I feel uncomfortable with this. Seeing how hard it is to tell my emotional reactions from my intuitive reactions, I don´t find it particularly helpful if this distinctions lies at the core of a thought- or advice-system. I would expect the meta-ethical system to focus on the means and methods to tell these reactions apart - as opposed to simply postulating that one is a good guide and the other isn´t, without any further explanation.

Hmm. Would it make it an easier if we're talking about yourself?

I don´t know. Your question, however, makes me aware that I don´t even know what you are trying to tell me. Do you describe how you personally perceive yourself as approaching moral questions? Are you giving a theory how everybody does it? Are you telling me how you feel you should do it? Are you telling me how everyone should do it?

I guess that´s why, instead of arguing, I tend to prefer to describe the way I do it: just comparing our approaches.
Depending on what the discussion is, I could also try to substantiate my impression that VE-people are mistaken about the way they do it. [It seems to me that appealing to one´s own intuition ("I know that I know") leaves you empty handed when it comes to discussing value judgements with someone who disagrees with you. Also, it does not really match the standard of rationality that VE people often claim for their ideal. So they build a complicated theoretical, intellectual system using lots of big words. This allows them to feel rational and cognitive, when actually they still and ultimately appeal to their gut feeling.]

Let's start there. Say you have a certain social interaction with a friend who hurt you in the past and you have the options of responding to him by flipping him off, begrudgingly acknowledging his presence but still being minimally civil, giving a handshake, or totally letting bygones be bygones and offering him a lunch date where you could possibly (if the chance arose) get his reaction to the event and see if you can mend any previous wounds on your part toward him as a friend in general.

Notice how you answer that question. In that moment you either respond totally spontaneously (i.e., arbitrarily), or by appealing implicitly or explicitly to a standard "behind" these responses which determines (to you) which one is best for that situation. Or something else?

Something else. I could not answer your question. How I would react would depend on a lot of things, first and foremost on whether or not and how I want this relationship to continue. That, again, depends entirely on my feelings towards this person.
Of course, I will go into deep considerations what to do and how to behave, but my guide in these considerations is not "what is good" but "what will work best towards my goal".

But! The example standard I expressed above is a bit incorrect, because the standard in VE relates directly to virtues in general and the golden mean: we experience a set of options for a particular action, and have some sense of applying our understanding of virtue (which is a mean between two extremes) to particular situations and behaviors. Take courage: it's a virtue between being too "big balls" running into things and being too timid and resigned from things; this is the virtue we have in mind in situations where courage is applicable (i.e., we're called to act in a potentially courageous way, such as with standing up for the small guy), according to which we apply the particular options which our minds offer us in the moment, as if we're thinking, "hmm, option A seems more courageous than option B, but overall I'll go with option C." Sometimes this deliberation is explicit and we're pretty much thinking this way. In this sense, the virtue is the standard; we know what we should aim for in the abstract: not too haughty, not too timid, but just right as a courageous person. This consideration is part and parcel of looking at particular circumstances, because there's no such thing as a static virtuous act -- e.g., running into battle at 7 miles per hour is always the courageous thing in all situations. No, that's static. Which makes me retort that actually VE is the most relativistic thing out there, given that each virtue is only a broad abstract sense of how to act, and we always need practical judgment in each particular circumstance to determine what is the "best" action, or how this virtue unfolds in the world around us.

Well, if courage is not always the advisable way to handle a situation (and the opposite can be the advisable thing, depending on the situation), I don´t know why call it a virtue. Again, I guess I have no idea how thinking in terms of virtues would help me with anything. It just seems to overcomplicate things. A detour, if you will.

I think the sense of goodness is part and parcel of the judgment itself; you can't have judgment of anything particular without some sense of goodness for a standard (or whatever) according to which particular behaviors in particular circumstances are considered. But it's also spontaneously the result of the judgments a person has made before, more particularly how he's acted before. The more he tries to act justly, to use a random virtue, the more he becomes a just person (has a just character), and the more he has a just character the more spontaneously and easily it becomes to be just.

Well, I have a bit of a hard time swallowing this example (because, as I think we have discussed years ago, I don´t believe in justice or being just as an ideal).
But apart from that I would agree that there is a feedback loop between our experiences and our decisions - if that´s not too simply put, for you.

IIRC, I was referring to the experience of goodness. Goodness is immediate, intuitive; we know the good action in the moment, even though uncovering this good action might involve deliberation or practical reasoning, i.e., how to actualize this good in this particular circumstance. IOW, at every moment of consideration of how to act, we have a sense of the good. This doesn't make this "sense" the best sense that's out there, which is why thinking about things a little longer might help us get an idea of what action is better than another.

You almost make me feel like a freak - seeing that I don´t seem to have this "sense of goodness" (other than having a "visceral" reaction).

I'd say that happiness in the VE view is the state of being (which definitely includes good feelings) constituted by a character in line with virtue. Right there we can stop and have it make enough sense. But I have to go further by adding a moral realist part you'll disagree with me on: VE means that virtue isn't (just) something private and subjective ("your own standards"), but something objective (or at least objective in the sense that it's part and parcel of subjectivity), i.e., you can measure the happiness that results from it as a function of how well the individual flourishes in the world.

Well, again: What can I say? I guess I wish you the best of luck and happiness as a result of approaching things this way.
If "objectivity" is part and parcel of my subjectivity, I personally would prefer to keep calling it "subjectivity". (But I remember how much I missed being able to appeal to a subjective "objectivity" still many years after I had left theism. I don´t recall how that felt, though.)

 

[FredVB]

Even as a Lover of God, I do not believe the meaning of life comes down to God and the afterlife. Quite simply, the meaning of life is "happiness", in my humble opinion.

Indeed, meaning to life does not just come down to what there would be to afterlife, though there is such thing and important as that is. There would be what is for eternity with that. God is absolutely relevant to this meaning, even Yahweh God, who it is. The most relevant to this meaning is relationship, which is what we are to have with God our Maker, as we are meant to, along with any relationships we are to have. What we have without that restoration wouldn't qualify to be called life, though awareness always continues, which then after this life would be in misery. With the restoration we have blissful relationship with God forever. It is made possible through Christ. In this there will be abundant happiness and joy.