is meaning required?

[Received]

By which definitions?
I fail to see how this approach solves, answers or circumvents the problem of or request for a "standard" (Personally I don´t consider it a problem, in the first place - but that´s a different issue).

What isn't a problem, klaustona?

The definitions are the conceptions of the good. The good here is that toward which everything aims, or that toward which everything becomes its most mature self, perfection here meaning completion. How do we know whether something is good or relatively better or best? In the same way we know a tree is good or relatively better or best: we look at it, see how it responds to certain environments, etc. Likewise with human character. The good is that which causes the self to flourish the most. Ultimately definitions can only attempt to encapsulate what we see and intuit, so it's not about definitions but ultimately about a sense we have about the good.

 

[quatona]

What isn't a problem, klaustona?

That which you described as a problem in #52, and which you said could be solved by Virtue Ethics:

"Thinking it's negative doesn't satisfy what seems to be his request in stating what standard you're using to determine that rape is negative. I'm assuming this is why he's talking about relativism.

I'm guessing his answer involves God as the standard, in that God gives down rules that we're to follow. Well, if that's the case, then what standard does God use to put down ethical rules? We're back at the same problem.

I think the problem can be answered by Virtue Ethics[/quote]

​

I don´t consider it a problem (we can simply set a standard), and - if I were to consider it a problem - I don´t see how Virtue Ethics answers it better than any other meta-ethical system: It simply sets a standard.

The definitions are the conceptions of the good. The good here is that toward which everything aims, or that toward which everything becomes its most mature self, perfection here meaning completion. How do we know whether something is good or relatively better or best? In the same way we know a tree is good or relatively better or best: we look at it, see how it responds to certain environments, etc. Likewise with human character. The good is that which causes the self to flourish the most. Ultimately definitions can only attempt to encapsulate what we see and intuit, so it's not about definitions but ultimately about a sense we have about the good.

So, yes, you have offered a standard (I think it hides its vagueness a little behind bitg words, but I´ll let that pass for the moment) - just like any other meta-ethical system does.

 

[Received]

I don´t consider it a problem (we can simply set a standard), and - if I were to consider it a problem - I don´t see how Virtue Ethics answers it better than any other meta-ethical system: It simply sets a standard.

How do we set this standard? We're left with a problem of an infinite regress unless the buck stops with an intuitively-mediated approach (not a standard, because there's no comparison), because your preferred standard either implies a standard by which you choose your standard, or it's totally arbitrary.

So, yes, you have offered a standard (I think it hides its vagueness a little behind bitg words, but I´ll let that pass for the moment)

I've missed you.

- just like any other meta-ethical system does.

Interesting. So you're saying that all metaethical systems require standards? I don't think they do -- not in practice anyways. Seems to me that people spout out metaethical systems (e.g., consequentialism) to explain what they intuitively ascertain in making moral and ethical decisions in the real world, and not the other way around. I don't know of anyone (except professional philosophers maybe) who has concluded that lying is wrong because he reasoned from Kantian ethics; rather, his Kantian ethics is reasoned after his intuitively ascertained sense that lying is wrong. Virtue Ethics bypasses this self-delusion by saying it's all ascertained intuitively, and that our models of what's right and wrong follow our basic sense of those actions we consider "beautiful" (i.e., valued in themselves).

And no, a standard implies comparison. VE works from the assumption that we have a prototype in our heads of what is most "beautiful" for any characteristic (virtue), and there is no comparison involved in this prototype, except in how we practically apply it maybe. The Golden Mean part is all about intuitively sensing what is the mean between two extremes, for example, much in the same way that we intuit what's beautiful in an artistic sense; ain't no computation or comparison involved, and therefore no standard.

 

[quatona]

How do we set this standard? We're left with a problem of an infinite regress unless the buck stops with an intuitively-mediated approach (not a standard, because there's no comparison), because your preferred standard either implies a standard by which you choose your standard, or it's totally arbitrary.

Sure we choose our standards (more or less consciously, though).
And there´s nothing "arbitrary" about them - they are our own standards, after all, addressing our own make-up, needs and ideas about what a good or better world would be like. Whether they summarize our intuition, our genetics, our social upbringing or whatever is a totally nother question.
Personally, I don´t expect them to be more than an expression of our own ideas - and therefore I don´t see the problem.

Interesting. So you're saying that all metaethical systems require standards?

Sure. That´s what you yourself described above when talking about the infinite regress.

I don't think they do -- not in practice anyways. Seems to me that people spout out metaethical systems (e.g., consequentialism) to explain what they intuitively ascertain in making moral and ethical decisions in the real world, and not the other way around.

I totally agree with this - ethical and meta-ethical systems are post-hoc rationalizations.
Doesn´t change the fact that these intellectualized systems operate with standards - no matter how they actually have been motivated.

I don't know of anyone (except professional philosophers maybe) who has concluded that lying is wrong because he reasoned from Kantian ethics; rather, his Kantian ethics is reasoned after his intuitively ascertained sense that lying is wrong.

Yes, mpst definitely these theories are post-hoc rationalizations.
I do not, however, agree completely that the judgement "lying is wrong" is acquired exclusively by intuition.
Plus, a single moral opinion doesn´t make an ethical or meta-ethical system.

Virtue Ethics bypasses this self-delusion by saying it's all ascertained intuitively, and that our models of what's right and wrong follow our basic sense of those actions we consider "beautiful" (i.e., valued in themselves).

I can agree with this.
And "beautiful" is not a standard?

And no, a standard implies comparison.

I don´t see how it does. A standard is an idea how things should be (and of course, this implies an opinion how things should not be).
I fail to see how "beautiful"/"valued in themselves" are not standards.

VE works from the assumption that we have a prototype in our heads of what is most "beautiful" for any characteristic (virtue), and there is no comparison involved in this prototype, except in how we practically apply it maybe.

That´s a nice claim - but structurally not any different from "'God has written his morals in our hearts", and therefore affected by the same "problem".

The Golden Mean part is all about intuitively sensing what is the mean between two extremes, for example, much in the same way that we intuit what's beautiful in an artistic sense; ain't no computation or comparison involved, and therefore no standard.

I´m still not sure how you arrived at "a standard requires a comparison". A standard is declared the comparandum. Whether it´s "God´s will", "the Golden Mean", "the least possible suffering" or whatever.

Anyway, while I agree that a good portion of intuition is involved in the process of forming our ethical views, I don´t think that pointing to my own intuition (and simply assuming that everyone else´s intuition will or should tell them the same) is a particularly powerful argument.
What, however, speaks strongly in favour of it: it has a ring of honesty and admission of subjectivity to it.
If it wants to be more than this, it has still a long way to go.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

A recurring them in debates about God's existence often come down to God and the afterlife as a source of meaning in life. But to me there's a bigger implied question.

Does life require a meaning or purpose? Why can't such meaning be decided on by each individual?

To the OP.

For me if we have something preferable thenn that is choiceworthy and an therefore an ethical goal. This may take different shapes for different people, like swimming, dancing, marrying etc.

Yet the essence of all this is for me "rational attraction to being" - because we are using our (theoretical and practical or applied) intellect and reason to live out a life where we:

1] struggle or strive to survive, or maintain our biological being or form

and

2] strive to enjoy life and existence, or find Being attractive (even if that means we focus on God as the ground of Being rather than a secularist perspective) .

 

[FireDragon76]

Why then, do many countries with higher levels of atheists, have a high quality of life and low crime rates?

Because they allow religious freedom and have a Christian heritage, with Christian values as normative, even if conscious intellectual belief has disappeared among many. In countries that lead pogroms to stamp out Christian belief, like the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, this went hand in hand with a disregard for human dignity and human rights.

Being a liberal Christian, I would tend to argue the Enlightenment that secularists cherish cannot be separated from the Christian humanism that spawned it. Have you ever read Victor Hugo, for instance? He died outside the Catholic church but his works are deeply Christian in their themes.

 

[bhsmte]

Because they allow religious freedom and have a Christian heritage, with Christian values as normative, even if conscious intellectual belief has disappeared among many. In countries that lead pogroms to stamp out Christian belief, like the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, this went hand in hand with a disregard for human dignity and human rights.

Being a liberal Christian, I would tend to argue the Enlightenment that secularists cherish cannot be separated from the Christian humanism that spawned it. Have you ever read Victor Hugo, for instance? He died outside the Catholic church but his works are deeply Christian in their themes.

Ok, so when more people don't believe in a God, it means they are following Christian values as to why their society has a high standard of living and low crime rate?

A bit of a reach, don't ya think?

You would also have to explain, why countries with a high percentage of Christians, tend to have higher crime rates and lower standard of living.

 

[Received]

Because they allow religious freedom and have a Christian heritage, with Christian values as normative, even if conscious intellectual belief has disappeared among many. In countries that lead pogroms to stamp out Christian belief, like the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, this went hand in hand with a disregard for human dignity and human rights.

Being a liberal Christian, I would tend to argue the Enlightenment that secularists cherish cannot be separated from the Christian humanism that spawned it. Have you ever read Victor Hugo, for instance? He died outside the Catholic church but his works are deeply Christian in their themes.

How do you prove such a statement? It seems it's much easier to go the "God exists in the hearts of men" route if you really insist on a theistic influence. But I agree that secularism can't be distinguished from an earlier tradition spawned by Christian humanism. That doesn't mean Christianity gets all the credit, though, unless you want to claim that any society which is Christian and violent, repressive, etc., also owes this negativity to the Christianity that preceded it. Post hoc ergo propter hoc.

We have secular humanism now, which was originally part of Christian humanism. Great. But you can't continue to actualize a set of ideas without a willing set of individuals who value these ideas. And plenty of atheists are just this way. They deserve the credit, not their atheism as a culture or theism as a culture; here atheism has become assimilated with Christian ideas, but the atheists we're speaking about deserve all the credit, and Christians do only minimally (but importantly).

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The good is that which causes the self to flourish the most.

I just hate ever ready flourish talk, its too context free. A sadistic prison guard can "flourish", but is that ethical? I can flourish working for a bank, but what about the people on the sub end of the investment regime?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Meaning is not required for all life, for not all life is conscious. But when it becomes conscious, it is faced with alternatives - some better and some worse. Obviously this form of being would not be naturally selected unless it were better for the survival and life chances of the entity. Therefore meaning in life stems from consciounsess being a better option, because it is involves the emergence of better options! So meaning is required for something like morality, or aesthetic life.

 

[Received]

I just hate ever ready flourish talk, its too context free. A sadistic prison guard can "flourish", but is that ethical? I can flourish working for a bank, but what about the people on the sub end of the investment regime?

The context is determined by your conception of the good. Having sex feels good, but having sex in an adultery context both feels good and is bad. The former (smaller) context of pleasure is its own good but is negated by the latter (bigger) context of how it influences your relationships, etc.

 

[quatona]

The context is determined by your conception of the good. Having sex feels good, but having sex in an adultery context both feels good and is bad.

Is it?

 

[Received]

Is it?

Depending on your conception of the good.

ETA: other response planned; swamped at work, crazy last few days, will get to it. Sorry.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Hurry up, lazy bones. Where does the conception of "good" come from?

 

[quatona]

Depending on your conception of the good.

Ah, come on. If the VE metamoral approach comes down to "Good is what good, depending on your conception of the good", I can not only see why it earns you the reproach of "relativism" from the objectivist/absolutist fraction of theists, I also am a little underwhelmed by what appears to be only a thinly veiled tautology at the core of a ambitious meta-moral system.

The former (smaller) context of pleasure is its own good but is negated by the latter (bigger) context of how it influences your relationships, etc.

This statement gives me the impression that there´s a considerable consequentalist/utilitarian aspect in VE.

ETA: other response planned; swamped at work, crazy last few days, will get to it. Sorry.[/quote]
Take your time. Looking forward to it.

 

[Received]

Ah, come on. If the VE metamoral approach comes down to "Good is what good, depending on your conception of the good", I can not only see why it earns you the reproach of "relativism" from the objectivist/absolutist fraction of theists, I also am a little underwhelmed by what appears to be only a thinly veiled tautology at the core of a ambitious meta-moral system.

Sorry, can't respond because of so many big words.

"Depending on your conception of the good" isn't as relativistic (i.e., arbitrary) as it sounds. I should have added that your conception of the good is definitely influenced by the society in which you live, but the more a person is exposed to conceptions of the good by different cultures and values, the more he can determine which good is "more good" than the other. "Good" here means the sense of wholeness or completion that all things "aim" for (i.e., find their telos or goal in, which when attained means it's all complete or whole).

Say I'm exposed to a barbaric society that believes in getting it on with everyone, and I don't see how this activity causes anything negative (e.g., adultery leading to broken relationships, trust, hurt, etc.). Okay, so here my "good" conception is based on having pleasure -- it feels good to have pleasure, and in this sense my sphere is pleasure. But say I come across (in my barbaric garb) a book that tells me how terrible cheating on your lover can be for the lover and even for the cheater (i.e., how having random sexual encounters is bad). Wow, okay, so now my conception of the good has grown: it's not that pleasure is the ultimate aim, but that there's something beyond pleasure that when considered makes feeling good not the ultimate good.

And so on. So our conception of the good is in a sense relative given our epistemic limitations -- we only know so much at any given time, to a large degree determined by the people who we're influenced by. But in another sense there is decidedly something that *isn't* relative or arbitrary, and that is how there are wider and wider understandings of the good -- such-and-such action might be good in a limited sense but not good in another sense, implying another action that would really be good overall. Just like botanists used to have not-so-great ideas of how to nurture such-and-such a plant but now have better ideas and in the future might even have better ideas, so it goes with character and one's conception of the good. The wider and wider conceptions with growing knowledge and experience indicates that there's something "objective" to goodness and ethics. We may never reach that goal of goodness with our ethics, but that's not the point: the point is to have something to aim for, and continually to update our definitions given our experiences and knowledge so that we continually approach this goal.

This statement gives me the impression that there´s a considerable consequentalist/utilitarian aspect in VE.

There is. That's why Alastair MacIntyre said that all the other ethical systems after virtue ethics are composed of bits and shards of VE.

 

[Received]

Hurry up, lazy bones. Where does the conception of "good" come from?

It doesn't really come from anything. We use it all the time with a perfectly good grasp (pre-linguistically) of what it means. Good ice cream: that means "whole" or "perfect" (or close to it) ice cream. Good car. Good dog (acts in an ideal way according to our preferences). Good means in line with what is whole or complete.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I just hate ever ready flourish talk, its too context free. A sadistic prison guard can "flourish", but is that ethical? I can flourish working for a bank, but what about the people on the sub end of the investment regime?

I totally agree with you Growing. I think the term flourish is necessarily kept vague and context free because I think there are very few actions that groups can engage in that don't have both positive and negative consequences.

I think I could easily argue that 51% of the people in the world could "flourish" if the other 49% were dead. Does that mean that ending the lives of 49% of the world's population is morally good? It would clearly improve the lives of the majority... and mankind for generations to come. It reminds me of Swift's book, "A Modest Proposal"....which is about eating babies as a rational, logical solution to the Irish potato famine.

 

[quatona]

Sorry, can't respond because of so many big words.

"Depending on your conception of the good" isn't as relativistic (i.e., arbitrary) as it sounds.

I´m not sure "relativistic" and "arbritrary" are synonyms. Just as a side note.

I should have added that your conception of the good is definitely influenced by the society in which you live, but the more a person is exposed to conceptions of the good by different cultures and values, the more he can determine which good is "more good" than the other. "Good" here means the sense of wholeness or completion that all things "aim" for (i.e., find their telos or goal in, which when attained means it's all complete or whole).

So you are presupposing that there is such a wholeness or completion that all things aim for - or should I say "should aim for"?
This indeed explains how your view is not relativistic but absolute, but it appears to be a pretty huge assumption or - so far - unsubstantiated premise.

Say I'm exposed to a barbaric society that believes in getting it on with everyone, and I don't see how this activity causes anything negative (e.g., adultery leading to broken relationships, trust, hurt, etc.). Okay, so here my "good" conception is based on having pleasure -- it feels good to have pleasure, and in this sense my sphere is pleasure.

I think that reducing the potential motive for such a behaviour to "pleasure" is a little uncharitable on your part (and you´d need to draw a clear line between your beloved "flourishing" and "pleasure", in the first place. But again, I feel generous and let that pass.

But say I come across (in my barbaric garb) a book that tells me how terrible cheating on your lover can be for the lover and even for the cheater (i.e., how having random sexual encounters is bad). Wow, okay, so now my conception of the good has grown: it's not that pleasure is the ultimate aim, but that there's something beyond pleasure that when considered makes feeling good not the ultimate good.

So far, it´s just a different view on the issue. You simply declared a hierarchy.
Personally, I feel that the entire idea of sexual exclusivity is an attempt to shelter the petty emotion of jealousy. Now, I understand that this might come in useful if you want to keep things simple, and if you don´t want to face your emotions (and everyone is free to act upon it) - but elevating it to a superiour moral good is absurd, in my understanding.
Furthermore, violating the paradigm of sexual exclusivity only leads to terrible results in an environment that believes in sexual exclusivity as an ideal - and thus isn´t much more than a self-fulfilling prophecy. Like always, it´s not the things that worry people, but it´s their thoughts about these things.
After all, in your example nobody in this "barbaric" (note how you can´t even describe a situation without imposing your preconceived moral values on it) community there were no terrible results - until a new idea worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

And so on. So our conception of the good is in a sense relative given our epistemic limitations -- we only know so much at any given time, to a large degree determined by the people who we're influenced by. But in another sense there is decidedly something that *isn't* relative or arbitrary, and that is how there are wider and wider understandings of the good -- such-and-such action might be good in a limited sense but not good in another sense, implying another action that would really be good overall.

I understand and accept your explanation how and why VE isn´t relativistic. Thus, if this was all you meant to explain, ok. And I appreciate this clarification.

But OTOH I can´t help mentioning that I am amazed how easily you (and or VE) throw out unsubstantiated premises (and build an entire ethical system around them) - premises that I am not ready to accept just because you guys say so.

There is. That's why Alastair MacIntyre said that all the other ethical systems after virtue ethics are composed of bits and shards of VE.

Well, from what I have learned so far, to me it sounds more like VE is composed of bits and shards of the other ethical systems.

 

[Received]

Where's the :humorless: emoticon?

So you are presupposing that there is such a wholeness or completion that all things aim for - or should I say "should aim for"?
This indeed explains how your view is not relativistic but absolute, but it appears to be a pretty huge assumption or - so far - unsubstantiated premise.

I wouldn't really call it absolute, so much as objective. Absolute, AFAIK, means it applies universally at all times and all places. Well, no, it doesn't, because the good here refers to human beings; good in this sense is relative to the individual. So in that sense it's relative but objective.

And yeah, that's my supposition. All this means is that all things have a sort of model or prototype for perfection or completion or wholeness -- and precisely because this is a prototype it isn't really attainable, IMV, but that isn't the point.

I think that reducing the potential motive for such a behaviour to "pleasure" is a little uncharitable on your part (and you´d need to draw a clear line between your beloved "flourishing" and "pleasure", in the first place. But again, I feel generous and let that pass.

You'll let it pass after not letting it pass.

So far, it´s just a different view on the issue. You simply declared a hierarchy.
Personally, I feel that the entire idea of sexual exclusivity is an attempt to shelter the petty emotion of jealousy. Now, I understand that this might come in useful if you want to keep things simple, and if you don´t want to face your emotions (and everyone is free to act upon it) - but elevating it to a superiour moral good is absurd, in my understanding.
Furthermore, violating the paradigm of sexual exclusivity only leads to terrible results in an environment that believes in sexual exclusivity as an ideal - and thus isn´t much more than a self-fulfilling prophecy. Like always, it´s not the things that worry people, but it´s their thoughts about these things.
After all, in your example nobody in this "barbaric" (note how you can´t even describe a situation without imposing your preconceived moral values on it) community there were no terrible results - until a new idea worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In my example there are bad results. Do you believe in evolutionary psychology, things like instincts? Or are you a constructivist all the way down? If you do dig it, then this means that regardless of the society there is going to be some degree of genetic influence on things like emotions, and therefore our responses to having our lovers not be committed lovers but have sex with multiple people. Forgive the extremist example, but if there was a society that valued sexual abuse of young children by family members, are you saying that there is only negativity if the boys and parents believed there would be negativity? Presumably not. Why? Because biologically and psychologically speaking, there is damage done with certain behaviors -- objectively -- regardless of the society and its constructs. Now, the society has the possibility of covering up the severity of any negativity, like with Americans and their infinite "freedom" (construct) with everything, including the freedom of the rich to screw the poor through a certain super capitalist economic system. Well, this particular economic system is screwing people over, objectively speaking, but it's really not because, well, "freedom".