Free Will and Evil

[zippy2006]

??? Let me rephrase then. If I am given the choice between chocolate ice cream and vanilla ice cream, and I adore chocolate, and vanilla makes me vomit, when I choose the chocolate, did I have FW or were my actions decided for me based on my extreme preferences? I would still be physically capable of saying, "Vanilla please!" and then sticking a spoon in, and scooping a big gulp up to my mouth, I just wouldn't ever choose to based on my preferences. Does this count as a free choice or not?

Perhaps it could count as free choice. But I'm not sure what "physically capable" means, and I don't know if it is possible to rationally choose vomit over pleasure, all things being equal. I see no purpose in positing arbitrary choice. It simply doesn't exist, and it certainly isn't the heart of free will.

What does any of this have to do with the argument from the OP?

 

[Moral Orel]

Perhaps it could count as free choice. But I'm not sure what "physically capable" means, and I don't know if it is possible to rationally choose vomit over pleasure, all things being equal. I see no purpose in positing arbitrary choice. It simply doesn't exist, and it certainly isn't the heart of free will.

What does any of this have to do with the argument from the OP?

Sigh... Fine. Here's what you said before:

In cases where one object is extremely desirable and the other extremely undesirable there is no indetermination of the will and thus no libertarian free will.

I'm going to just pretend you never said the word "libertarian" and assume that this is your definition of "free will" unless you tell me otherwise. So unless you want to give me a new definition of what you consider FW to be, this is what we're going with.

If you really like one choice, and you really dislike another choice, then you do not have FW when you decide between the two. If you have such an extreme preference such that it is guaranteed that you will always pick one option over the other, then you are not making a free choice.

And, the crux of your "standard reply" seems to be this:

You can't have free will without the possibility of evil

Correct? Any free will being might do evil, right?

So I asked if all FW beings will be eliminated. And you said:

Depending on your definition of free will, we will or will not have it in heaven, but since we will see God face to face we will never choose anything over him.

Then you do not believe we will have FW in Heaven because seeing God makes Him too desirable for us to have FW anymore.

Have I said anything incorrect yet?

 

[zippy2006]

I'm going to just pretend you never said the word "libertarian" and assume that this is your definition of "free will" unless you tell me otherwise. So unless you want to give me a new definition of what you consider FW to be, this is what we're going with.

It isn't a definition so much as a condition of free will that answers your question about Heaven. Let's retain the commonsensical definition of free will as a faculty or power. Say that free will is the power to deliberate between contrary options and choose the best means to some end. Therefore it follows upon our ability to reason.

Now, with respect to what I said here, a necessary condition for the power of free will to act is an indetermination of the will based on similarly desirable objects of choice. If you are trying to decide what to eat, free will does not operate in deciding between a hamburger and dog feces. Reason with respect to the goal of nutrition is not indeterminate between these two options. Free will does operate when deciding between a hamburger and a hot dog, for these are similar based on the rational analyses of nutrition, taste, calories, sustainability, etc.

If you really like one choice, and you really dislike another choice, then you do not have FW when you decide between the two. If you have such an extreme preference such that it is guaranteed that you will always pick one option over the other, then you are not making a free choice.

Right, you are not exercising the power of free will since no deliberation occurs.

Correct? Any free will being might do evil, right?

The statement holds with respect to our topic. You can have free will without the possibility of evil insofar as you can freely choose between two good options, such as a hamburger and a hot dog. But you can't have free will without the possibility of evil insofar as you are able to freely choose between an evil and a good option, such as the marital act and adultery. If an act of free will includes an evil option, then the possibility of evil exists. In our existence here on earth acts of free will include evil options.

Then you do not believe we will have FW in Heaven because seeing God makes Him too desirable for us to have FW anymore.

We will not exercise the power of free will insofar as a choice involves God or one of God's commands. This is because it is impossible to rationally consider anything to be greater than God when seeing God face to face. Yet we can still exercise our free will in other matters, such as whether to eat a hamburger or a hot dog.

 

[Moral Orel]

@zippy2006
Okay, so how does God feel about good and evil? Does He have a preference, and if so how strong is that preference? Is He guaranteed to always choose good over evil? If so, does God have free will?

Remember, I asked if God will eradicate all evil by eliminating all free will beings, but your answer only talked about us humans. So did you not mention God because you already don't consider Him as having free will?

 

[zippy2006]

@zippy2006
Okay, so how does God feel about good and evil? Does He have a preference, and if so how strong is that preference? Is He guaranteed to always choose good over evil?

God never chooses evil.

If so, does God have free will?

God has free will insofar as he can choose different options, but not insofar as he can choose evil. This is explained in my last post.

Remember, I asked if God will eradicate all evil by eliminating all free will beings, but your answer only talked about us humans. So did you not mention God because you already don't consider Him as having free will?

My answer provided a principle that applies to everything: having the beatific vision is incompatible with doing evil (because the beatific vision undermines any indeterminacy of the will with respect to good and evil). Therefore angels and humans who have the beatific vision will never choose evil. God, knowing himself perfectly, necessarily has the beatific vision.

 

[Moral Orel]

Since the context of this discussion is just about choosing evil, we can just agree now that if we say someone has free will, it means they are free to choose evil. Being free to choose between hamburgers and hotdogs can just be considered a given so that you don't have to keep typing out that caveat, and we can both just type "FW" and know what the other one is talking about, agreed?

God has free will insofar as he can choose different options, but not insofar as he can choose evil.

Okay, so God is perfect and doesn't have FW. The ultimate goal of humans is to give up our FW to the will of a being that does not have FW. So what is the point of FW? What makes it good to have if the perfect existence lacks it?

 

[zippy2006]

Since the context of this discussion is just about choosing evil, we can just agree now that if we say someone has free will, it means they are free to choose evil. Being free to choose between hamburgers and hotdogs can just be considered a given so that you don't have to keep typing out that caveat, and we can both just type "FW" and know what the other one is talking about, agreed?

I see what you are saying, but if we define free will as the ability to do evil then free will is generally a bad thing. This contrasts with the general opinion that, due to the autonomy and freedom of choice that it brings, free will is a good thing. And I think the faculty itself is a good thing. To compromise I will use the acronym FWE to describe the ability to choose evil.

Okay, so God is perfect and doesn't have FW. The ultimate goal of humans is to give up our FW to the will of a being that does not have FW. So what is the point of FW? What makes it good to have if the perfect existence lacks it?

Good question. I suppose I should first note that FWE becomes stronger after Adam's sin, insofar as Original Sin comes into existence. The increased strength of FWE is a punishment due to the first sin.

But FWE must have already existed prior to the first sin, even before the Fall, and I think this is what you are primarily asking about. I address this question here and here, but I can try to add a few things.

I think the answer is that God wants us to make a choice, he wants our final state to reflect something that comes from ourselves. He wants us to freely accept or reject the gift offered to us. He wants us to risk losing some alternative in order to gain beatitude; he wants us to have some skin in the game. Perhaps he wants us to freely love him in himself rather than to love him only because of the gifts he gives, and FWE provides a way for that to happen.

 

[Moral Orel]

I see what you are saying, but if we define free will as the ability to do evil then free will is generally a bad thing. This contrasts with the general opinion that, due to the autonomy and freedom of choice that it brings, free will is a good thing. And I think the faculty itself is a good thing. To compromise I will use the acronym FWE to describe the ability to choose evil.

I didn't mean to define it that way, just to use it that way. FWE is fine though.

There are some larger parts to consider about this though. First, it means that my argument does still stand, because free will about plenty of decisions can exist without FWE. At least from your perspective. I don't know that many Christians would state God lacks free will about anything. Most of the time the responses I get say that if you can't do evil, then doing good means squat.

But following your usage of FWE, and God lacking FWE, then we must say that the praiseworthiness of doing good is in no way diminished by a lack of ability to do evil. Otherwise our doing good, while having FWE, would be better than God, and that can't happen.

I think the answer is that God wants us to make a choice, he wants our final state to reflect something that comes from ourselves. He wants us to freely accept or reject the gift offered to us. He wants us to risk losing some alternative in order to gain beatitude; he wants us to have some skin in the game. Perhaps he wants us to freely love him in himself rather than to love him only because of the gifts he gives, and FWE provides a way for that to happen.

Does God make a free choice about who to love, or does He have extreme preferences in that regard? For instance, is it fair to say that God loves anyone who loves Him? If someone loved Him, and He chose to not love them back, would that not be evil?

If God gave us a perfect existence, and we only loved Him because of what He gave us, would that not be selfish and therefore evil? If FWE doesn't exist, then neither does selfishness, so that kind of "bad love" wouldn't exist, and it would instead only be genuine love.

If God gave us a perfect existence and we didn't appreciate it, would that not be ungrateful? Is being ungrateful not evil? If FWE doesn't exist, then neither does ungratefulness, so that kind of attitude wouldn't exist, and it would instead be genuine gratitude.

God risks nothing to lack FWE, but isn't diminished, so we wouldn't be diminished if there was no risk for us. He still values Himself and His qualities regardless of the fact that there is no risk of Him losing anything for them. So risk isn't necessary for value to exist.

Here's an odd thought. God's choice to create FWE indirectly created evil, which made it a moral choice, not a choice between hamburgers and hotdogs. If God is perfectly morally good, then his choice to create FWE had to be determined and not a free choice.

 

[zippy2006]

I didn't mean to define it that way, just to use it that way. FWE is fine though.

Okay.

There are some larger parts to consider about this though. First, it means that my argument does still stand, because free will about plenty of decisions can exist without FWE.

It is possible for free will and the inability to do evil to coexist in the beatific vision, but this is a supernatural state that is hardly the norm. As long as we are on this side of heaven free will implies the possibility of doing evil.

But following your usage of FWE, and God lacking FWE, then we must say that the praiseworthiness of doing good is in no way diminished by a lack of ability to do evil.

When good and evil are similarly attractive we must rely more heavily on faith, on trust in God's word. Since it is good to have faith, it is in some ways more praiseworthy to cling to God in this life than to love him in the next, for faith will be unnecessary in Heaven. Indeed Heaven is a kind of reward for faith and good works, and the act of meriting is more praiseworthy than the act of being rewarded.

Otherwise our doing good, while having FWE, would be better than God, and that can't happen.

It is true that God cannot merit by faith, but I don't think your conclusion follows. Something can be better for us or for a time without being better absolutely. Absolutely speaking, it is better to behold God in heaven than to walk by faith on Earth, but the Earthly state is better insofar as we consider it under the aspect of being able to merit. It is good to be able to merit, to be able to progress, but when you've reached your destination progress is no longer necessary.

Does God make a free choice about who to love, or does He have extreme preferences in that regard? For instance, is it fair to say that God loves anyone who loves Him? If someone loved Him, and He chose to not love them back, would that not be evil?

God loves all, which is why he created all, but he loves some more than others, which is why he bestows special favors on some.

If God gave us a perfect existence, and we only loved Him because of what He gave us, would that not be selfish and therefore evil? If FWE doesn't exist, then neither does selfishness, so that kind of "bad love" wouldn't exist, and it would instead only be genuine love.

I don't think utility love is evil, it is just lesser than friendship love. It would be unfitting for God to provide an elevation or reward without the subject having merited it in some way.

If God gave us a perfect existence and we didn't appreciate it, would that not be ungrateful? Is being ungrateful not evil? If FWE doesn't exist, then neither does ungratefulness, so that kind of attitude wouldn't exist, and it would instead be genuine gratitude.

I think we would appreciate it, but not as much as if we labored for it. An infant who enjoys his mother's milk and yet does not comprehend the love and effort she showers him with is not evil or ungrateful. Yet as he grows and begins to comprehend these things his gratitude will grow accordingly. God has provided us with an opportunity to better appreciate his gift. If that opportunity was not given we would still appreciate it, but not as much.

God risks nothing to lack FWE, but isn't diminished,...

Perhaps this is because he is God, who understands everything perfectly.

...so we wouldn't be diminished if there was no risk for us.

Why think that? We are not God. We do not understand everything perfectly, but only according to our capacity. Perhaps the risk increases our capacity, allowing us to ultimately understand better in the end.

He still values Himself and His qualities regardless of the fact that there is no risk of Him losing anything for them. So risk isn't necessary for value to exist.

Humans appreciate things more if they lack them or understand what it is like to lack them.

Here's an odd thought. God's choice to create FWE indirectly created evil, which made it a moral choice, not a choice between hamburgers and hotdogs. If God is perfectly morally good, then his choice to create FWE had to be determined and not a free choice.

I don't follow your reasoning. Being perfect does not mean that one is not free.

 

[Moral Orel]

Okay, @zippy2006 , I think it's time we backed up a bit and discussed what it really means when we say God lacks a free choice. Not just that, but we'll have to discuss whether something is better for being a free choice than if it was not a free choice. I made some assumptions I clearly shouldn't have, so let's clear this up.

God hates evil, so He won't do evil ever, guaranteed, and that is not a free choice.

God loves good, so He will do good, guaranteed, and that is not a free choice.

Is doing nothing equally desirable to God as doing Good? If He is faced with a choice of doing nothing, or doing something good, would He not always choose to do something good because He loves doing good so much?

Since God hates evil, will He ever do something that results in evil with no good reason. In other words, does everything God does, that results in evil, ultimately have a good reason for doing it?

Of course God is always free to choose between hamburgers and hotdogs (H&H), as there is no moral consequence to some decisions. But where morality comes into play, is there not a guarantee that God will always do the most good thing?

Basically, what I'm asking, is if we say that God is omnibenevolent, then what guarantees does that make, thereby removing free choice?

What it seems like, at this point, is that you are saying God lacks free will in areas of morality, but you still cling to the idea that a free choice makes a choice better by virtue of that choice being free. I say this cannot be the case if God both lacks free choices and is the greatest being possible. Good choices, free or not, are equally good, free or not.

 

[zippy2006]

Okay, @zippy2006 , I think it's time we backed up a bit and discussed what it really means when we say God lacks a free choice. Not just that, but we'll have to discuss whether something is better for being a free choice than if it was not a free choice.

This seems like it relates to the purpose of creating creatures with FWE, and if that is so I addressed it in my last post.

God hates evil, so He won't do evil ever, guaranteed, and that is not a free choice.

God loves good, so He will do good, guaranteed, and that is not a free choice.

Sure. As noted above, God does not have FWE.

Is doing nothing equally desirable to God as doing Good? If He is faced with a choice of doing nothing, or doing something good, would He not always choose to do something good because He loves doing good so much?

God is perfect, and nothing he or anyone else does can add to his perfection. So he has no need to create or do good or anything of the like. However, goodness and love are diffusive of themselves, therefore it is natural for God's goodness to overflow into creation.

Since God hates evil, will He ever do something that results in evil with no good reason. In other words, does everything God does, that results in evil, ultimately have a good reason for doing it?

We would say that God allows evil for the purpose of a greater good.

Of course God is always free to choose between hamburgers and hotdogs (H&H), as there is no moral consequence to some decisions.

According to the classical view, every voluntary decision is a moral decision. The choice between hamburgers and hotdogs is simply the choice between two morally good decisions.

But where morality comes into play, is there not a guarantee that God will always do the most good thing?

If God chooses to act his act will be good.

Basically, what I'm asking, is if we say that God is omnibenevolent, then what guarantees does that make, thereby removing free choice?

Sorry, I'm not sure what you're asking here.

I will take a guess that you are asking why omnibenevolence implies ~FWE. God does not choose evil because to choose evil is to act irrationally, and God is perfectly rational. God does not choose evil because to choose evil is to choose to create some privation--some lack of being--and God is the creator, the one who brings being out of non-being, not vice versa.

What it seems like, at this point, is that you are saying God lacks free will in areas of morality, but you still cling to the idea that a free choice makes a choice better by virtue of that choice being free. I say this cannot be the case if God both lacks free choices and is the greatest being possible. Good choices, free or not, are equally good, free or not.

Of course I address this issue in more detail in my last post to which you did not directly reply. Let's look at your argument:

1. God, as the greatest possible being, possesses every creaturely perfection/good.
2. Creatures possess FWE, and this is good because it allows their choices to be meritorious.
3. Therefore we arrive at the disjunction: either God is not the greatest possible being, or God possesses FWE, or FWE is not good. All three cannot be true.

Again, the answer to your argument is that there are certain perfections/goods that belong properly to creatures and not to God. Not everything that is good for creatures is good for God. For example, it is good for creatures to take food and water, for this reinforces their nature as something which is dependent. God need not take food and water, even though it is good for creatures to do so, because God is not the sort of thing which is dependent. Indeed he is rather the sort of thing which everything else depends on.

The principle of merit runs along the same lines. It reinforces the human's nature as something which is dependent, receptive, progressing, and growing. Since the human is these things--especially on earth--it is good to perform actions which reflect this reality. It is in accord with truth. Yet meriting does not reflect the reality of God, for God is not dependent, receptive, progressing, or growing.

Feel free to reply slowly. I will be gone for a few days.

 

[Moral Orel]

God is perfect, and nothing he or anyone else does can add to his perfection. So he has no need to create or do good or anything of the like. However, goodness and love are diffusive of themselves, therefore it is natural for God's goodness to overflow into creation.

That isn't what I asked, really. I asked about how much desire God has to do good, versus how much desire God has to do nothing. These are the terms of a free choice that you set out in the beginning, I'm going to stick with those even though your new wording seems to be trying to move away from that. If you're saying that God made a completely free choice to create and completely free choices to do good, then you're saying that His desire to create and do good is equal to His desire to do nothing. It isn't about what He "needs" to do, never was. It's about what He wants to do and how badly He wants to do it.

So is this what you're saying, that God is exactly as content to do nothing as He is to do something?

We would say that God allows evil for the purpose of a greater good.

"Allow" is such a passive tone. Isaiah doesn't try to be so passive. And while I am fine with agreeing that God won't do an evil act Himself, and I'm fine with the idea that even if God knows His creation is going to do evil it is still their choice, the word "allow" implies that evil is perfectly natural and will be a result through no action of God's at all, but that isn't true.

FWE didn't always exist. God doesn't have it, so it had to be created. And what are the necessary components of having FWE? A desire to do good coupled with a desire to do evil so that the act of one or the other isn't determined or guaranteed. That means God had to make evil desirable in order for us to ever do evil. Good, being the natural and fundamental thing that it is, would naturally flow into His creation, making intelligent beings have a desire to do good, sure. But evil doesn't arise naturally. You have to have a desire to do evil, and that doesn't happen naturally because evil isn't natural.

If God chooses to act his act will be good.

That's not what I asked. I asked if He will do the most good thing.

Sorry, I'm not sure what you're asking here.

I will take a guess that you are asking why omnibenevolence implies ~FWE. God does not choose evil because to choose evil is to act irrationally, and God is perfectly rational. God does not choose evil because to choose evil is to choose to create some privation--some lack of being--and God is the creator, the one who brings being out of non-being, not vice versa.

What I'm getting at is whether God will simply do a good thing because He likes doing good things, and as long as it's a good thing He is fine with it or does He consider the outcomes, both direct and indirect, of His choice to act and act accordingly.

Consider this: I see a homeless woman and decide to give her some money. If I give her $10, that is good. If I give her $1,000 that is better. However, if I give her $1,000,000 and she ends up becoming a greedy and selfish rich person in love with money and who begins to look down her nose at people with less wealth than her, that is actually worse.

Does God consider any of that if He decides to help her, or does He just pick whatever good thing and does it. Even giving her $1,000,000 is the best thing if you don't consider all the bad that comes from it.

So, if God is "omnibenevolent" does that mean He is guaranteed to always do the most good thing, or just that everything He does is good in some way, if He decides to do anything at all?

Of course I address this issue in more detail in my last post to which you did not directly reply. Let's look at your argument:

1. God, as the greatest possible being, possesses every creaturely perfection/good.
2. Creatures possess FWE, and this is good because it allows their choices to be meritorious.
3. Therefore we arrive at the disjunction: either God is not the greatest possible being, or God possesses FWE, or FWE is not good. All three cannot be true.

Again, the answer to your argument is that there are certain perfections/goods that belong properly to creatures and not to God. Not everything that is good for creatures is good for God. For example, it is good for creatures to take food and water, for this reinforces their nature as something which is dependent. God need not take food and water, even though it is good for creatures to do so, because God is not the sort of thing which is dependent. Indeed he is rather the sort of thing which everything else depends on.

The principle of merit runs along the same lines. It reinforces the human's nature as something which is dependent, receptive, progressing, and growing. Since the human is these things--especially on earth--it is good to perform actions which reflect this reality. It is in accord with truth. Yet meriting does not reflect the reality of God, for God is not dependent, receptive, progressing, or growing.

Well, it's good that you're moving towards acknowledging that it is meriting instead of calling it a "gift" as you did originally. It certainly isn't a "gift" if there are demands involved. Those are wages, and generous as they may be, it absolutely isn't a "gift".

But you're going to have to do better to explain why meriting is good. Will something bad happen if it isn't reinforced? If so, what? If not, why does it need reinforced? People don't need to be able to forget things. Why isn't simply knowing good enough?

 

[zippy2006]

That isn't what I asked, really. I asked about how much desire God has to do good, versus how much desire God has to do nothing. These are the terms of a free choice that you set out in the beginning, I'm going to stick with those even though your new wording seems to be trying to move away from that. If you're saying that God made a completely free choice to create and completely free choices to do good, then you're saying that His desire to create and do good is equal to His desire to do nothing. It isn't about what He "needs" to do, never was. It's about what He wants to do and how badly He wants to do it.

So is this what you're saying, that God is exactly as content to do nothing as He is to do something?

Yes. God's happiness is not augmented or diminished by anything apart from him. Creating the world did not increase God's beatitude.

"Allow" is such a passive tone. Isaiah doesn't try to be so passive. And while I am fine with agreeing that God won't do an evil act Himself, and I'm fine with the idea that even if God knows His creation is going to do evil it is still their choice, the word "allow" implies that evil is perfectly natural and will be a result through no action of God's at all, but that isn't true.

I would say that "allow" does not imply that it is perfectly natural, but it does imply that it will be a result through no action of God's.

FWE didn't always exist. God doesn't have it, so it had to be created. And what are the necessary components of having FWE? A desire to do good coupled with a desire to do evil so that the act of one or the other isn't determined or guaranteed. That means God had to make evil desirable in order for us to ever do evil. Good, being the natural and fundamental thing that it is, would naturally flow into His creation, making intelligent beings have a desire to do good, sure. But evil doesn't arise naturally. You have to have a desire to do evil, and that doesn't happen naturally because evil isn't natural.

Evil is something like a disproportionate good. Take pride, which is commonly thought to be the first sin (of the angels and of man). Pride is an excessive regard for oneself. It begins with the estimation that one is better than one in fact is in reality. Regard for oneself is not evil. Believing oneself to be good is not evil. Yet regard for oneself to excess is evil. So it's not like balancing a desire for good with a desire for evil. Evil is always a distortion of good. FWE is the consequence of a freedom to choose capable of distorting the good.

That's not what I asked. I asked if He will do the most good thing.

No, not necessarily. There is no "most good thing." God is infinite and creation is finite. God could always have created one more spotted owl--one more good thing.

What I'm getting at is whether God will simply do a good thing because He likes doing good things, and as long as it's a good thing He is fine with it or does He consider the outcomes, both direct and indirect, of His choice to act and act accordingly.

The outcomes are always part of the goodness of some thing, and must therefore be considered.

Consider this: I see a homeless woman and decide to give her some money. If I give her $10, that is good. If I give her $1,000 that is better. However, if I give her $1,000,000 and she ends up becoming a greedy and selfish rich person in love with money and who begins to look down her nose at people with less wealth than her, that is actually worse.

Does God consider any of that if He decides to help her, or does He just pick whatever good thing and does it. Even giving her $1,000,000 is the best thing if you don't consider all the bad that comes from it.

Sure, God considers outcomes.

So, if God is "omnibenevolent" does that mean He is guaranteed to always do the most good thing, or just that everything He does is good in some way, if He decides to do anything at all?

I think it is the latter.

Well, it's good that you're moving towards acknowledging that it is meriting instead of calling it a "gift" as you did originally.

I haven't repudiated that fact at all; I simply didn't feel like repeating myself. Heaven is a gift, and the nature of receiving a gift requires free choice. Indeed, to be able to receive a gift and to be able to merit spring from the same principle, and reception can be seen as a kind of meriting in itself.

It certainly isn't a "gift" if there are demands involved. Those are wages, and generous as they may be, it absolutely isn't a "gift".

The principle of eternal life is freely given, and therefore it is a gift. We are to guard and grow that principle, but we would be able to do neither without the original gift being in place.

(This point is particularly Catholic. Protestants follow your logic, accepting gift and doing away with merit.)

But you're going to have to do better to explain why meriting is good. Will something bad happen if it isn't reinforced? If so, what? If not, why does it need reinforced?

The fact that meriting reinforces central truths of creaturely existence provides a sufficient reason for why God's plan of salvation includes merit. The reinforcement helps to teach us who and what we are, especially in relation to God. If the reinforcement were not present we would have less of this kind of knowledge.

People don't need to be able to forget things. Why isn't simply knowing good enough?

I don't follow.

 

[Moral Orel]

Yes. God's happiness is not augmented or diminished by anything apart from him. Creating the world did not increase God's beatitude.

This is such a bizarre thought, and I know it's plenty common among Christians. God would be just as happy if you were never born. Bizarre, truly bizarre.

I would say that "allow" does not imply that it is perfectly natural, but it does imply that it will be a result through no action of God's.

Evil cannot result through no action of God's though, can it? If He chose to do nothing, which apparently He would be just as happy to do, then evil would never exist. If He only chose to create unintelligent creatures then evil would never exist. So "allow" is much too passive. I won't claim you should say "creates" like Isaiah does, but it has to fall somewhere in the middle, at least.

No, God created intelligent beings in such a manner that He knew evil coming into existence was inevitable.

Evil is something like a disproportionate good. Take pride, which is commonly thought to be the first sin (of the angels and of man). Pride is an excessive regard for oneself. It begins with the estimation that one is better than one in fact is in reality. Regard for oneself is not evil. Believing oneself to be good is not evil. Yet regard for oneself to excess is evil. So it's not like balancing a desire for good with a desire for evil. Evil is always a distortion of good. FWE is the consequence of a freedom to choose capable of distorting the good.

Sorry, but you I let you define FW for the sake of the argument, and you chose a definition that explicitly states a balance between the amount of desire between two choices, remember:

Libertarian Free will is a kind of indetermination of the will based on equally desirable objects of choice. That is, it requires that there exist at least two objects which are similarly desirable so that we can deliberate and proceed to choose between them. In cases where one object is extremely desirable and the other extremely undesirable there is no indetermination of the will and thus no libertarian free will.

Bolding added by me for emphasis.

How in the world are you going to tell me that ain't about a balance between desirability? You need to stick to the context of the discussion that you wrote.

No, not necessarily. There is no "most good thing." God is infinite and creation is finite. God could always have created one more spotted owl--one more good thing.

The outcomes are always part of the goodness of some thing, and must therefore be considered.

Sure, God considers outcomes.

I think it is the latter.

I disagree that there is no "most good thing" but I can't argue that God must do the best thing if He can choose to do nothing at all, so who cares about all this?

I haven't repudiated that fact at all; I simply didn't feel like repeating myself. Heaven is a gift, and the nature of receiving a gift requires free choice. Indeed, to be able to receive a gift and to be able to merit spring from the same principle, and reception can be seen as a kind of meriting in itself.

The principle of eternal life is freely given, and therefore it is a gift. We are to guard and grow that principle, but we would be able to do neither without the original gift being in place.

(This point is particularly Catholic. Protestants follow your logic, accepting gift and doing away with merit.)

No, my logic is that it is merit only, and not a gift at all. It can't be both, and there are clear requirements to receive eternal life, so it is not a gift. Do I really have to link the definition of "gift" from any dictionary for you to see the other half of the definition that you're leaving off?

The fact that meriting reinforces central truths of creaturely existence provides a sufficient reason for why God's plan of salvation includes merit. The reinforcement helps to teach us who and what we are, especially in relation to God. If the reinforcement were not present we would have less of this kind of knowledge.

God can imbue knowledge of anything, in any creature, in an instant. What do you even mean by "reinforce"? And why is being in God's immediate presence an insufficient means to reinforce the concept that we depend on Him for existence?

 

[bling]

This is such a bizarre thought, and I know it's plenty common among Christians. God would be just as happy if you were never born. Bizarre, truly bizarre.

Evil cannot result through no action of God's though, can it? If He chose to do nothing, which apparently He would be just as happy to do, then evil would never exist. If He only chose to create unintelligent creatures then evil would never exist. So "allow" is much too passive. I won't claim you should say "creates" like Isaiah does, but it has to fall somewhere in the middle, at least.

No, God created intelligent beings in such a manner that He knew evil coming into existence was inevitable.

Sorry, but you I let you define FW for the sake of the argument, and you chose a definition that explicitly states a balance between the amount of desire between two choices, remember:


Bolding added by me for emphasis.

How in the world are you going to tell me that ain't about a balance between desirability? You need to stick to the context of the discussion that you wrote.




I disagree that there is no "most good thing" but I can't argue that God must do the best thing if He can choose to do nothing at all, so who cares about all this?


No, my logic is that it is merit only, and not a gift at all. It can't be both, and there are clear requirements to receive eternal life, so it is not a gift. Do I really have to link the definition of "gift" from any dictionary for you to see the other half of the definition that you're leaving off?

God can imbue knowledge of anything, in any creature, in an instant. What do you even mean by "reinforce"? And why is being in God's immediate presence an insufficient means to reinforce the concept that we depend on Him for existence?

You allow your child to ride a bike knowing they will fall, but you put a helmet on them have a level empty parking lot and run to pick them up, knowing they cannot hurt themselves bad. A little knowledge (experience) of the consequences of their bad actions can help them do better in the future.

God is like the most wonderful Loving parent there could be but that does not mean He keeps us from sinning, since sin has purpose in helping the nonbeliever become a believer.

The story of Adam and Eve (you do not have to believe it is real) does teach us man cannot fulfill his earthly objective in a heaven on earth situation and without first sinning. So God will “allow” humans to sin, but remember sin is not the problem, while unforgiven sin can be a huge problem.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

You allow your child to ride a bike knowing they will fall, but you put a helmet on them have a level empty parking lot and run to pick them up, knowing they cannot hurt themselves bad. A little knowledge (experience) of the consequences of their bad actions can help them do better in the future.

If I were an omnipotent father, I'd create a bike my son couldn't fall off of. I'm not a fan of my son suffering. In fact, if I were an omnipotent father, I would have created my son without the ability to suffer.

God is like the most wonderful Loving parent there could be but that does not mean He keeps us from sinning, since sin has purpose in helping the nonbeliever become a believer.

Personally, I'm a big fan of evidence being the best way of believing in something.

 

[quatona]

If I were an omnipotent father, I'd create a bike my son couldn't fall off of. I'm not a fan of my son suffering. In fact, if I were an omnipotent father, I would have created my son without the ability to suffer.

Yeah, I´m always baffled by the God-parent analogy.
Here we have an omnipotent, omnisicient guy who created each and everything (including the natural laws), and there we have guys who have to do their best to prevent the worst cases within this scenario invented and created by someone else.

 

[Chriliman]

We're given the ability to follow and act on our own desires, whether those desires are good or bad. This isn't hard to understand.

 

[Moral Orel]

We're given the ability to follow and act on our own desires, whether those desires are good or bad. This isn't hard to understand.

God made us what we are, good and bad desires alike. Why did He give us bad desires if He doesn't have them? Seems like if God is the perfect existence, there's no good reason for Him to make imperfect creations.

 

[Chriliman]

God made us what we are, good and bad desires alike. Why did He give us bad desires if He doesn't have them? Seems like if God is the perfect existence, there's no good reason for Him to make imperfect creations.

You're correct to assume God is perfectly good, but then you go on to assume he implants bad desires in us and controls us to act on those desires, almost as if it's him doing it and not us. No, obviously something that's perfectly good would not do that. What he does do is give us the option to desire what is good(Godly desires) or desire what is bad(not Godly desires) and leaves it to us to act on those desires.

I reject the notion that perfect goodness implants bad desires in such a way that it's inevitable that we'll act on them. It's a contradiction to think in this way.