Euthyphro's Dilemma (for atheists)

[muichimotsu]

See post #72.



Great, then you should stop using it. I was quoting your words in post #71.



It looks like you are clearly assenting to option #1.

Pretty sure I didn't use absolute in terms of making moral claims in my perspective, only to describe the false dichotomy I saw where it was either absolutely mind independent or absolutely preference based, neither of which I assent to remotely

And no, I cannot assent to 1 unless we use a nebulous idea of preference to suggest that my moral assessments are the same as what leisure purchase I make or what snacks I eat.

It is not a mere preference, but it isn't reflecting a mind independent reality except in the basic sense that some things would objectively happen and could be assessed as such, which is different than saying there is a concrete property of morality that can be demonstrated in a scientific manner to be there irrespective of our minds

 

[zippy2006]

And no, I cannot assent to 1 unless we use a nebulous idea of preference to suggest that my moral assessments are the same as what leisure purchase I make or what snacks I eat.

It is not a mere preference, but it isn't reflecting a mind independent reality except in the basic sense that some things would objectively happen and could be assessed as such, which is different than saying there is a concrete property of morality that can be demonstrated in a scientific manner to be there irrespective of our minds

Why would you think (1) is about mere preferences?

 

[Moral Orel]

Your option 1 which I chose is not determinative of the whole nature of morality. Its compatible with multiple explanations of the origins of morality.

No, not of the whole nature of everything anyone calls moral. But it is about the nature of some specific morals that you hold to. The problem with the second answer, obviously, is that if what is moral is simply a matter of preference, then what is moral is arbitrary. I'm betting we agree on that.

The problem with the first answer is that you have the unenviable task of providing a reason for morals without mentioning values. Or you can simply assert that they are true for no reason at all. If you try what you're doing, which is to push the chooser to "society" which is a group you yourself belong to, you've still declared, that just like the second option, what is moral is arbitrary.

Even if youre right in principle, your above oversimplification is insufficient to draw conclusions from.

It isn't an oversimplification. You can't put preferences in the premises and the conclusion like that. It's circular. Preferences fall on one side of your argument or the other. They can't be used to justify themselves.

 

[muichimotsu]

Why would you think (1) is about mere preferences?

Because we can't demonstrate the mind independent morality that supposedly comports with my preferences, which are incidental in that case versus option 2, where it's just my preferences that make things moral in essence

 

[durangodawood]

....The problem with the second answer, obviously, is that if what is moral is simply a matter of preference, then what is moral is arbitrary. I'm betting we agree on that.

I do agree. You expressed it in terms of what I prefer. And one persons preference is not a basis for morality, which is a social construct.

It isn't an oversimplification. You can't put preferences in the premises and the conclusion like that. It's circular. Preferences fall on one side of your argument or the other. They can't be used to justify themselves.

It is an oversimplification. Your circular notion requires me to be perfectly wise. But I'm not. The wise have discovered how various behaviors satisfy or hinder deep human preferences. I perhaps have not discovered this, and assent to their morals due to social pressures and conditioning..... until the day when I hopefully become wise.

 

[Moral Orel]

It is an oversimplification. Your circular notion requires me to be perfectly wise. But I'm not. The wise have discovered how various behaviors satisfy or hinder deep human preferences. I perhaps have not discovered this, and assent to their morals due to social pressures and conditioning..... until the day when I hopefully become wise.

It does not require you to be perfectly wise, nor are there any special kinds of "preferences" that are better than any other.

Number (1) requires that something is moral. "...because it is moral." You agree that preferences cannot make a thing be moral, the problem with number (2), so neither you nor any person can make a thing be moral via preferences.

If other people choose what is moral based on their preferences, then it's just as arbitrary as if you had. If other people can choose what is moral based on their preferences, then there's no problem with (2).

 

[Astrid]

It does not require you to be perfectly wise, nor are there any special kinds of "preferences" that are better than any other.

Number (1) requires that something is moral. "...because it is moral." You agree that preferences cannot make a thing be moral, the problem with number (2), so neither you nor any person can make a thing be moral via preferences.

If other people choose what is moral based on their preferences, then it's just as arbitrary as if you had. If other people can choose what is moral based on their preferences, then there's no problem with (2).

Give it up already

 

[Chriliman]

You're running off on a whole slew of tangents here. The question is simple:

Does the first option of the poll indicate that morality is "absolutely mind independent", or does it indicate that morality is preference independent?​

The obvious answer is the latter, yet you continue to persist in the former.

Option 1: Morality depends on something other than my preferences.
Option 2: Morality depends entirely on my preferences.

There’s a 3rd option that morality doesn’t depend on your preference, but you may still learn to prefer it, thereby reenforcing the morality.

 

[zippy2006]

There’s a 3rd option that morality doesn’t depend on your preference, but you may still learn to prefer it, thereby reenforcing the morality.

That's just a subset of the first option.

 

[Chriliman]

That's just a subset of the first option.

And I could see an argument that morality does depend on preference, but the preference for treating each other with respect is more preferred because it leads to a more peaceful society than the preference to not.

 

[Chriliman]

Because we can't demonstrate the mind independent morality that supposedly comports with my preferences, which are incidental in that case versus option 2, where it's just my preferences that make things moral in essence

True, there is no morality apart from minds. So it’s a question of how minds determine what is moral and I think it’s both based on preference and how our preferred actions effect objective reality. The feedback from objective reality(which includes ourselves and others) may change what we prefer.

 

[zippy2006]

And I could see an argument that morality does depend on preference, but the preference for treating each other with respect is more preferred because it leads to a more peaceful society than the preference to not.

You are proposing a hierarchy of preferences established on the basis of the criterion of peacefulness. If that hierarchical ordering is not itself a preference, then the morality you are proposing does not "depend on preference." At least not fully. In that case we would be back to option #1.

 

[Chriliman]

You are proposing a hierarchy of preferences established on the basis of the criterion of peacefulness. If that hierarchical ordering is not itself a preference, then the morality you are proposing does not "depend on preference." At least not fully. In that case we would be back to option #1.

I think the hierarchy would be based on the objective effects of preferences.

 

[muichimotsu]

True, there is no morality apart from minds. So it’s a question of how minds determine what is moral and I think it’s both based on preference and how our preferred actions effect objective reality. The feedback from objective reality(which includes ourselves and others) may change what we prefer.

The problem is the word preference has implications that are almost as problematic as using that to express things that are not chosen or deliberated on (sexual preference versus orientation)

It isn't a mere preference that would determine my notions about morality, that's barely even moral relativism in an ontological sense, that's bordering on moral nihilism. Assessments are more than simple preference when it comes to trying to be objective in considering the quality of any action that has moral implications

These questions would require a separate discussion on moral universalism and the varieties therein, as well as even some aspects of moral relativism that aren't making normative claims, but descriptive ones. A choice to shoot someone in the head will be judged differently if that person is so horribly maimed that there's no chance they'll survive (mercy killing in war) versus if this is just in broad daylight when there's no provoking situation or rational reason.

 

[muichimotsu]

I think the hierarchy would be based on the objective effects of preferences.

Not really the preferences so much as the actions: the effects of preferences would be a separate consideration because that's more people's attitudes and whether it reflects empathy or egocentrism as a rough dichotomy

 

[Chriliman]

The problem is the word preference has implications that are almost as problematic as using that to express things that are not chosen or deliberated on (sexual preference versus orientation)

It isn't a mere preference that would determine my notions about morality, that's barely even moral relativism in an ontological sense, that's bordering on moral nihilism. Assessments are more than simple preference when it comes to trying to be objective in considering the quality of any action that has moral implications

These questions would require a separate discussion on moral universalism and the varieties therein, as well as even some aspects of moral relativism that aren't making normative claims, but descriptive ones. A choice to shoot someone in the head will be judged differently if that person is so horribly maimed that there's no chance they'll survive (mercy killing in war) versus if this is just in broad daylight when there's no provoking situation or rational reason.

I wouldn’t normally use the term preference, but in this context I’m using it to mean what you perceive to be good and true for you. I normally understand preference to be more about what you want to do regardless of what’s true or good, but I think they can coincide.

 

[muichimotsu]

I wouldn’t normally use the term preference, but in this context I’m using it to mean what you perceive to be good and true for you. I normally understand preference to be more about what you want to do regardless of what’s true or good, but I think they can coincide.

Coinciding is more incidental than indicative of a proper ontological or even epistemological link. What I think is right is going to vary by context, especially when it comes to use of force or violence against other people, let alone problems that come about in a society that values pursuit of profit over balancing that against the welfare of those who work and are practically exploited in some form or fashion (cutting hours so they don't have to pay health benefits, forcing people to utilize the broken healthcare system outside of something that still has issues in itself while pushing people to work related burnout and the like)

What I assess is going to be subjective in the sense that my perspective is not perfectly objective and also that we all approach morality in terms of people that experience suffering and would like to reduce it as much as possible (unless you're a psychopath or such)

 

[Chriliman]

Coinciding is more incidental than indicative of a proper ontological or even epistemological link. What I think is right is going to vary by context, especially when it comes to use of force or violence against other people, let alone problems that come about in a society that values pursuit of profit over balancing that against the welfare of those who work and are practically exploited in some form or fashion (cutting hours so they don't have to pay health benefits, forcing people to utilize the broken healthcare system outside of something that still has issues in itself while pushing people to work related burnout and the like)

What I assess is going to be subjective in the sense that my perspective is not perfectly objective and also that we all approach morality in terms of people that experience suffering and would like to reduce it as much as possible (unless you're a psychopath or such)

Yea, it’s a complex thing, but I don’t think the complexity of moral issues should dissuade us from trying to figure out a solution that works for everyone involved, but when viewing it as completely subjective, that seems impossible. There has to be some objectivity to ground reasons on, otherwise it may very well be impossible.

 

[muichimotsu]

Yea, it’s a complex thing, but I don’t think the complexity of moral issues should dissuade us from trying to figure out a solution that works for everyone involved, but when viewing it as completely subjective, that seems impossible. There has to be some objectivity to ground reasons on, otherwise it may very well be impossible.

Subjective in the existential sense is different from the ontological sense, where everyone's opinions are equally valid. When someone is ignorant or even just a psychopath with no empathy, then their claims from a subjective perspective are not necessarily beneficial, because they fail to even utilize that basic aspect of morality: empathizing or looking outside their individual viewpoint

That's the problem in terms of the words used, they're multifaceted in meaning and can thus be construed in ways not necessarily intended

 

[Moral Orel]

I do agree. You expressed it in terms of what I prefer. And one persons preference is not a basis for morality, which is a social construct.

Let's just talk about number (2) that you agree makes for an arbitrary morality. What does it mean to be arbitrary, and what are the "bad" things about it.

For starters, it means that two people with differing preferences are both right. That can't really be, so they must both be wrong.

It also means that morality changes over time. That can't be either, right? A thing can't be wrong and then be right, and then be wrong. It's either right or wrong. This isn't a reference to an absolute, by the way. Absolute would be about being right or wrong regardless of the circumstances. I mean literally chronologically.

We can't just change our minds about some thing, and then the quality of that thing changes. That would be ridiculous. Our mind changed, not the thing.