Does anyone listen to Ann Coulter anymore?

[Nathan Poe]

JDAMS, TLAMS, AH-64-s, A-10's, F117's, B-2's, GPS guided bombs, etc, etc. The most awesome display of military weaponry on the planet.

Don't forget the humvees with the scrapyard armor.

Same old story: We need a switchblade; we bring a neutron bomb. The wrong tools for the wrong job.

What good is any of this high-tech whiz-bang gear in the down-and-dirty streetfight we're in?

 

[Blemonds]

Don't forget the humvees with the scrapyard armor.

Same old story: We need a switchblade; we bring a neutron bomb. The wrong tools for the wrong job.

What good is any of this high-tech whiz-bang gear in the down-and-dirty streetfight we're in?

A humvee is not a vehicle that would normally be armored. They are being uparmored because the situation in Iraq warrants it. Its called adapting to the battle conditions.

 

[tulc]

and professional wrestling. You watch and say to yourself, "Is this real, or is it fake?"

Dude! You have to ask if wrestling is fake?
tulc(who knows wrestlers are tremendous athletes but actors? not so much)

 

[Doctrine1st]

A humvee is not a vehicle that would normally be armored. They are being uparmored because the situation in Iraq warrants it. Its called adapting to the battle conditions.

It seems rather than fiquring out a plan to get tiny American flags to Bagdhad to wave at our troops as they roll through the streets, they should have paid attention to the intelligence reports that forwarned them of exactly what was going to happen, is happening now, rather just dismissing them as "just guessing."

Moreover, they should have paid attention to the initial request to start with more troops and maybe they would have been able to protect munitions dumps and fight the war at the same time rather than having to scramble to armor Humvee because of this, Iraq Insurgents Increase Explosives' Power ...

BAGHDAD, Iraq - [size=-1]A roadside bomb destroyed a second heavily armored Bradley Fighting Vehicle in less than a week Monday, killing two U.S. soldiers, wounding four others and indicating that insurgents have increased the power of the explosives they are using against American troops. [/size]

...to which David Kay described as the missing 380 tons of missing explosives.

This is a genuine fiasco, as so appropiately forwarned by everyone from Think tanks, intelligence reports, and as to why Bush Sr and Rumsfeld chose not to take the same path in 91. But ideologues never waiver in light of reality.

 

[tulc]

They are being uparmored because the situation in Iraq warrants it. Its called adapting to the battle conditions.

Interesting statement, care to hear some comments on it? Check here http://www.thislife.org/ go to the file for last weeks show and listen to some people talk about that very subject.
tulc(loves "This American Life")

 

[Blemonds]

Interesting statement, care to hear some comments on it? Check here http://www.thislife.org/ go to the file for last weeks show and listen to some people talk about that very subject.
tulc(loves "This American Life")

I will, as soon as wrestling s over

 

[tulc]

I will, as soon as wrestling s over

LOL!
tulc(used to watch Dick the Bruiser and Baron Von Rashkie when he was a kid!)

 

[Blemonds]

It seems rather than fiquring out a plan to get tiny American flags to Bagdhad to wave at our troops as they roll through the streets, they should have paid attention to the intelligence reports that forwarned them of exactly what was going to happen, is happening now, rather just dismissing them as "just guessing."

Moreover, they should have paid attention to the initial request to start with more troops and maybe they would have been able to protect munitions dumps and fight the war at the same time rather than having to scramble to armor Humvee because of this, Iraq Insurgents Increase Explosives' Power ...



...to which David Kay described as the missing 380 tons of missing explosives.

This is a genuine fiasco, as so appropiately forwarned by everyone from Think tanks, intelligence reports, and as to why Bush Sr and Rumsfeld chose not to take the same path in 91. But ideologues never waiver in light of reality.

I don't know what all this has to do with either the main topic of nn Coulter or the off topic of Humvee's. You should have posted this in the thread about poor war planning where my posts would have educated you in that subject.

 

[Blemonds]

Interesting statement, care to hear some comments on it? Check here http://www.thislife.org/ go to the file for last weeks show and listen to some people talk about that very subject.
tulc(loves "This American Life")

Remember, a Humvee is a light, mobile vehicle. Armoring it seriously adds to the weight which defeats the "light" and "mobile" functions of the vehicle.

 

[Doctrine1st]

I don't know what all this has to do with either the main topic of nn Coulter or the off topic of Humvee's. You should have posted this in the thread about poor war planning where my posts would have educated you in that subject.

Poor war planning is directly related to the need to armor humvees right now, but please link me to your poor war planning posts.

 

[tulc]

Remember, a Humvee is a light, mobile vehicle. Armoring it seriously adds to the weight which defeats the "light" and "mobile" functions of the vehicle

I see your point, the problem being the guys who's lives depend on them are a little nervous operating them in Iraq without some protection. The link I gave is to interviews with guys on the front lines talking about this subject. Man it's beyond me having never been in this type of situation to say how I'd react to some of the things they face everyday. We need to pray very hard for them.
tulc(never got shot at till I got out of the military!)

 

[Blemonds]

I see your point, the problem being the guys who's lives depend on them are a little nervous operating them in Iraq without some protection. The link I gave is to interviews with guys on the front lines talking about this subject. Man it's beyond me having never been in this type of situation to say how I'd react to some of the things they face everyday. We need to pray very hard for them.
tulc(never got shot at till I got out of the military!)

Frankly, if I had to choose between light and mobile or staying alive, there wouldn't be much to consider

 

[Blemonds]

Poor war planning is directly related to the need to armor humvees right now, but please link me to your poor war planning posts.

Have Fun, but let me say that it would be better for you to know what the plan for the war was before you start to criticize it.

 

[Nathan Poe]

Remember, a Humvee is a light, mobile vehicle. Armoring it seriously adds to the weight which defeats the "light" and "mobile" functions of the vehicle.

OTOH, Being vaporized by a homemade explosive tends to make one's remains quite "light" and "mobile."

"light" and "mobile" vehicles are best used in secured areas, where they are less likely to get blown up. Away from the front lines comes to mind.

Of course, in a guerrilla war, there are no "front lines." Again, poor planning.

But I do agree; we're off topic. (Except to say that Coulter would probably accuse me of treason for saying these things.... or just about anything else once she determined I was liberal.)

 

[SpaceProg]

Stick a fork in yon thread. It be done... Mayhap?

 

[Blemonds]

But I do agree; we're off topic. (Except to say that Coulter would probably accuse me of treason for saying these things.... or just about anything else once she determined I was liberal.)

Or for criticizing a war plan while not actually knowing the plan.

 

[Nathan Poe]

Or for criticizing a war plan while not actually knowing the plan.

That's not the definition of treason, now is it?

AFAIK, our "plan" was to march in like the wrath of God and be "welcomed as liberators."

Worked like a charm, hmmm?

 

[Doctrine1st]

Have Fun, but let me say that it would be better for you to know what the plan for the war was before you start to criticize it.

Know it? We are living it, or should I say dying from it. Shock and awe with not enough forces to win the battle and secure the peace. More than one weapons inspector, the ones there on the ground, have said just that. More so, than bad planning, it was pure stupidity.

In fact in their ideological rigidness, they are making the same mistakes that McNamara sized up in Vietnam:

• We misjudged then -- and we have since -- the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries . . . and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.

• We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. . . . We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

• We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.

• Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.

• We failed then -- and have since -- to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine. . . . We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.

• We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement . . . before we initiated the action.

• After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course . . . we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.

• We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.

• We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action . . . should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

• We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions. . . . At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.

• Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues.

As Secretary of Defense in 1991 Dick Cheney seemed to understand the problem with invading Iraq:

"If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam Hussein,you have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime? Or one that tilts toward the Baathists, or one that tilts toward the Islamic fundamentalists? How much credibility is that government going to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How long does the United States military have to stay to protect the people that sign on for that government, and what happens to it once we leave?"


Even down to the faulty premise for war, those who don't learn from mistakes are doomed to repeat them.

 

[Blemonds]

Know it? We are living it, or should I say dying from it. Shock and awe with not enough forces to win the battle and secure the peace. More than one weapons inspector, the ones there on the ground, has said just that. Moreso, than bad planning, it was pure stupidty.

In fact in their ideological rigidness, they are making the same mistakes that McNamara sized up in Vietnam:

• We misjudged then -- and we have since -- the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries . . . and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.

• We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. . . . We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

• We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.

• Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.

• We failed then -- and have since -- to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine. . . . We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.

• We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement . . . before we initiated the action.

• After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course . . . we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were doing what we did.

• We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.

• We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action . . . should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

• We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions. . . . At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.

• Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues.

As Secretary of Defense in 1991 Dick Cheney seemed to understand the problem with invading Iraq:

"If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam Hussein,you have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime? Or one that tilts toward the Baathists, or one that tilts toward the Islamic fundamentalists? How much credibility is that government going to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How long does the United States military have to stay to protect the people that sign on for that government, and what happens to it once we leave?"
Even down to the fautly premise for war, those who don't learn from mistakes are doomed to repeat them.

I thought i gave you the link for the appropriate thread for that discussion. Did my link fail?

 

[PACKY]

JDAMS, TLAMS, AH-64-s, A-10's, F117's, B-2's, GPS guided bombs, etc, etc. The most awesome display of military weaponry on the planet.

all of that technology is useless when your enemy is in close range....like I said spitballs.