Regarding my brief syllogistic argument for theism in my penultimate post, Archaeopteryx thought the conclusion seemed like a non sequitur. But as my contention here has been more particularly the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective, I note with relief that Archaeopteryx went on to acknowledge that a “vexing problem” of epistemology exists. This has been my main point all along. It would seem, by extension, that we agree that this vexing problem cannot be solved by experience or observation alone.
Words like vexing really give the wrong impression about this epistemological problem which, in practicality, isn't much of a problem at all. If we we're relying on "knowledge and experience" alone...perhaps your characterization of the problem being vexing would be correct....but we don't.
Accurate tools/instruments and evidence all help make our understanding of the past reasonably useful (in most contexts, but certainly not all). I can provide you with some rather basic scenarios and examples which could show you what I mean if you don't understand....but frankly, I feel like doing that will look like I'm insulting your intelligence. It's your call though, just ask and I will provide.
But after that acknowledgement, I was surprised that Archaeopteryx did not see an analogy with morality. There is no more logically justifiable basis in atheism for morality than there is for knowledge. If anything, the lack of a basis in atheism for morality is more evident. (How often have you heard Richard Rorty quoted: “There is no answer to the question, ‘Why not be cruel?‘”) While you may not “need to appeal to supernatural forces to make moral judgments,” you need something more than mere human opinion to support and justify your moral judgments as true and authoritative.
I don't think Rorty (and I don't know anything about the man like high credentials or field of study) has thought particularly hard or long about this. Why would someone need to justify their moral judgements as "true and authoritative" in order to act on them? You certainly don't need these things to act on any other opinions. It's almost silly to think you would. Imagine, for example, that you think vanilla ice cream is the best flavor in the world. Would you need some sort of basis to show that vanilla ice cream is the best flavor in the world is a "true and authoritative" opinion before you can tell it to someone, or act on it and eat some vanilla ice cream? Of course not...that's rather dumb. Similarly, you don't need and evidence (supernatural or otherwise) to make a moral judgement, declare it, and/or act on it.
On analogy with my argument from knowledge, I would propose this syllogism arguing from morality: transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality is not possible unless God exists; transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality exists; therefore God exists.
You're walking on some really thin philosophical ice...and I have the feeling that you're going to fall through it in about a post or two. Not only does "transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality exist...but you've definitely not going to find or be able to provide any evidence that it exists, nor will you be able to logically/rationally show it exists. Essentially, you're holding onto a belief without any basis for it whatsoever.
In reply to Ana, Bowne’s book was not all about the inadequacy of experience as a standard of truth. That was, at most, a point made merely in passing. But the question goes deeper as Ana also appeared to realize, judging from the phrase, “absurd reductionist epistemology.” If you have always just assumed you knew something for certain and never sought to identify the bases upon which you can justifiably say that you know something, then I suppose it might seem absurd to question the bases of your knowledge and to trace them back to your ultimate standard or unproven and unprovable basal beliefs. But, however absurd, it remains a “vexing problem.” Meanwhile, if you find absurdity objectionable, as do I, then how can you be an atheist where absurdity is inescapable?
So nice of you to ask. Things like accuracy, evidence, and their track record of explaining phenomena...both observable and not...really solve these so-called "problems" quite easily.
Take for example, my experience of the past of the sun rising yesterday. Not only can I appeal to my experience of it (which while sometimes is faulty, it isn't always) but I can also appeal to the experiences of others....and the uniformity of those experiences lends credibility to my own. Not enough you say? Because it's possible all of our experiences are flawed? That's a fair statement....so we also appeal to instruments that can record the sunrise with remarkable accuracy and compare those to the experiences....and again, the uniformity of those instruments and their correlation to the experiences lends validity to both the accuracy of the experiences and instruments? Still not enough since the instruments can be "wrong" in spite of demonstrated accuracy? This is where the epistemological problems are reaching the level of absurdity. We have, in addition to the experiences and instruments...evidence that the earth rotates upon its axis, in fact....it's a myriad of evidence which is also confirmed by more observations, instruments, and accuracy. We've reached the point where the imperfection of our memory and perception of experiences is no longer a problem at all and rationally...it would be absurd to cast doubt upon the idea that the sun rose yesterday. We've got multiple, accurate, and testable evidences of a past event and literally the only thing Browne could say is "it might not be correct because of the possibility, however slight, that all this evidence is somehow wrong". Of course, he would never actually be able to demonstrate that this evidence is wrong....so that mere possibility, no matter how small, isn't a concern whatsoever.
Does that help explain why Browne's absurd reductionist epistemology isn't actually the problem he believes it is (or should be)?
On Craig and his incontrovertible experiences,
I don't think you're using "incontrovertible" correctly. You just spent several posts explaining how experiences are unreliable in Browne's argument. To label an experience "incontrovertible" now would require a fair amount of evidence (see my example about the sunrise above....that's an incontrovertible experience). My guess is that Craig won't be able to produce any evidence of his experiences at all.
. I expect Bowne would say that his experiences could be justified on a theistic basis, but from an atheistic point of view the experiences would be, like all his other experiences, merely the necessary products of electro-chemical activity in Craig’s brain with no necessary connection to truth or reality.
How do you suppose this theistic justification of religious experiences works? It's seems like it's going to require a lot of special pleading which naturally won't apply to the experiences of an atheist. This is, of course, that there's no demonstrable evidence that the theist and atheist experience in a manner different from each other.
This line of apologetics is supposed to show that, quoting Bowne, “Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests.” According to Bowne’s book (going by fallible memory here), what justifies assuming that there is a truth-telling God is the recognition that theism supports our interests, explains and enriches life, and provides a basis for knowledge and morality; negatively, it would be self-evidently wrong to “wreck all our interests” through atheism, where both free-thought and freewill would be necessarily illusory. Bowne’s view thus anticipated Cornelius Van Til’s assertion: “The indispensable character of the presupposition of God’s existence is the best possible proof of God’s actual existence.”
Davian called me out for imprecise language. By atheist I meant an evidentialist who holds to a naturalistic, materialistic worldview according to which the universe is assumed to consist only of matter and energy and the mind is wholly identified with the brain and its electro-chemical activity.
I'm sorry....it's a bit difficult to see what you're explaining here. Are you saying that all this..."the recognition that theism supports our interests, explains and enriches life, and provides a basis for knowledge and morality".....is actually Browne's justification for assuming the existence of a truth telling god? I'm guessing Browne never studied even basic logic or any philosophy outside of christian philosophy....is that correct?
Not only is his entire justification for a truth telling god completely circular....but one could easily argue every single one of those points as being entirely possible without god at all. Indeed, only the belief in a god, not an actual god himself, is all even a believer would require for those things.
Again though, since the entire justification is circular (if you're arguing that those things exist because of god, you can't simultaneously argue that god exists because of those things...it's circular logic 101)....I don't need to refute any of those points since the argument is logical fallacious.
I'm hoping that you're simply remembering Browne's argument incorrectly and that he said something else....because at this point, his argument is soundly, completely, and in my personal opinion....easily refuted.
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the recognition that theism supports our interests, explains and enriches life, and provides a basis for knowledge and morality
