Arguments for the Existence of God

[Davian]

“Theism” is Bowne’s word. His argument in Philosophy of Theism is gradual—so gradual in fact that he initially uses the term “world-ground” before beginning to use the word “God.”

Okay. I am surprised, as arguments for theism are generally self-defeating.

As for a logical stopping point, to posit “experience” would be arbitrary since in a non-theistic world “experience” cannot be proven to have any necessary connection to reality.

By "proven", can it be evidenced? Sure. Proven, absolute? No, but it need not be. If it is consistent, persistent, observable, measurable, and behaves in a manner in which we can make reliable predictions, and for all intents and purposes it *is* reality. This is where the solipsism arguments fail.

Bowne describes this approach, generously, as confusing the uniformity of experience with the necessities of being. From an atheistic, materialistic perspective, experience is simply the product of electro-chemical activity in the brain, again with no necessary connection to reality.

And if the theist fools themselves into thinking otherwise, where does that get them?

In addition, experience assumes that the past actually happened, that our memory is accurate, and that the future will be like the past--none of which assumptions can be proven.

My experience says that memory is not necessarily accurate. I do hold the tentative conclusion that tomorrow will be much like yesterday, pending evidence to the contrary.

Again, as Plantinga points out, "If you believe in evolution & naturalism

I do not "believe" in evolution or naturalism, certainly not in the manner that I observe those that "believe" in their particular religion. The conclusions I hold are tentative, and subject to change.

then you have a reason to believe your faculties are unreliable."

Our senses are demonstrably unreliable. Is this news to you?

All these assumptions based on nothing make “experience” an arbitrary standard

It is not arbitrary. We can hypothesize and experiment, and reproduce the results independently. Standards are developed from there.

of truth

Or, of a certain degree of accuracy. Truth implies an absolute, and I do not see a requirement for that.

and therefore irrational.

Or, it isn't.

If you want to assert that experience is a reliable guide, anyway, at least acknowledge that in so doing you are borrowing from a theistic worldview, where alone experience can be justified as a reliable guide to reality.

Justified as a reliable guide?

By what measure? We have thousands of religions and denominations, and by their very nature - being mutually exclusive - they are all wrong. Okay, maybe one is true, but none have them have yet broken out of the pack. If you are sold on a system that promises such poor results, I have some land I'd like to sell you. At low tide.

 

[Mediaeval]

Actually, we know our faculties are unreliable...which is why science makes such prodigious use of instruments. They can actually demonstrate reliability.

What strikes me as most peculiar about these statements though...is that experience assumes that the past actually happened. I mean, certainly he doesn't think experience is the sole factor in assuming that the past happened?

How would Browne go about explaining the past?

If our faculties are unreliable, but we must use our faculties both to create instruments and to evaluate the data they generate, then it would seem that, logically speaking, we are reasoning in a circle, using our fallible faculties to validate our fallible faculties. This kind of epistemological problem is inescapable from an atheistic perspective.

On assuming the past, you are right, Bowne does not think experience is the sole factor in assuming that the past happened, for experience by itself is an inadequate standard of truth, especially from an atheistic perspective where experience cannot be proven to have a necessary connection to reality (assuming, again, that there is even an external reality to be connected to). And if we use experience to prove our experience we are once again engaging in circular reasoning. On explaining the past positively, Bowne might point out that, since there is no proof that the past occurred, the past can only and always be a matter of inference and so necessarily a matter of faith. But if there is a truth-telling God who has spoken of the past as real and that our inferences and memories have a real connection to reality, then we have a justifiable basis to assert that at least some of our assumptions about the past are true. Failing that, we would be left with our underdeterminism, i.e., just making an arbitrary assumption, choosing one explanation out of an indefinite number of possible explanations, keeping in mind that according to scientific demonstration (this was pointed out by CF member Gracchus in another thread not too long ago) the feeling of certainty is traceable to chemical activity in the brain.

 

[Chany]

How does theism fix epistemological issues? For example, we know, for a fact, that our faculties are faulty. This fact would hold true whether theism is true or not.

 

[Davian]

If our faculties are unreliable, but we must use our faculties both to create instruments and to evaluate the data they generate, then it would seem that, logically speaking, we are reasoning in a circle, using our fallible faculties to validate our fallible faculties.

Not if we adhere to methodologies that demonstrably reduce bias and error, and open our findings to the critique of others. While not perfect, it seems that we can work towards a degree of accuracy.

This kind of epistemological problem is inescapable from an atheistic perspective.

What exactly is an "atheistic perspective", when "atheist" is what someone is not?

On assuming the past, you are right, Bowne does not think experience is the sole factor in assuming that the past happened, for experience by itself is an inadequate standard of truth, especially from an atheistic perspective where experience cannot be proven to have a necessary connection to reality (assuming, again, that there is even an external reality to be connected to).

If what we experience is consistent, persistent, observable, measurable, and behaves in a manner in which we can make reliable predictions, and for all intents and purposes it *is* reality. This is where the solipsism arguments fail.

And if we use experience to prove our experience we are once again engaging in circular reasoning.

That would seem to be the theistic approach.

On explaining the past positively, Bowne might point out that, since there is no proof that the past occurred, the past can only and always be a matter of inference and so necessarily a matter of faith.

proof |pro͞of| noun - 1) evidence or argument establishing or helping to establish a fact or the truth of a statement;

There is evidence of the past having occurred. No faith required.

But if there is a truth-telling God who has spoken of the past as real and that our inferences and memories have a real connection to reality, then we have a justifiable basis to assert that at least some of our assumptions about the past are true.

(my bold)

That is a big "if" you have there, big enough to pull the rug out from under your presumed theistic "justifications".

Failing that, we would be left with our underdeterminism, i.e., just making an arbitrary assumption, choosing one explanation out of an indefinite number of possible explanations,

Why need it be arbitrary, when we can examine those possible explanations using methodologies that demonstrably reduce bias and error, and open our findings to the critique of others?

keeping in mind that according to scientific demonstration (this was pointed out by CF member Gracchus in another thread not too long ago) the feeling of certainty is traceable to chemical activity in the brain.

Are you referring here to the feeling of certainty felt by theists?

 

[Mediaeval]

Many thoughtful replies. You’re all invited over for whiskey and cigars on my back porch to finish hashing this out! Several replies acknowledged the fallibility and limitations of the human mind and one at least admitted the necessity of unproven basal axioms. These replies were therefore consistent with my earlier remark about there being no logical stopping place between theism and universal skepticism or solipsism. In fact, your replies were so consistent with that earlier remark that I now wonder whether the remark came across as commonplace rather than provocative.

Some of you made arbitrary assertions, but perhaps these were intended only as “tentative conclusions,” as Davian put it. Even a basal axiom based on nothing is arbitrary and therefore irrational. And testing a basal axiom would necessarily involve circular reasoning—proving reason by reason. But what has consistent materialism (this is the kind of atheism I have in mind) to do with something immaterial like a basal axiom? Anyway, both theists and atheists can have tentative conclusions. For the purposes of this series of posts, I would distinguish between conjecture and knowledge.

Some impressions may have been mistaken. For example, there is no “worry” that gravity or other natural processes might not always work the same way. The question is more basal, How is it that we, both you and I, know, yea, even know with certainty, that there is such a thing as uniformity in nature? As mentioned before, that natural processes worked uniformly in the past is an unproven assumption. Also that they are working uniformly now cannot be proven. Our present observations may be appearances only and/or simply the products of chemicals in our heads that necessarily give rise to thoughts of uniformity, thoughts over which we actually have no control. That natural processes will work uniformly in the future is also an unproven assumption. Even assuming that the processes are natural (whatever “natural” is assumed to mean) is no more than a hypothesis.

Nobody addressed the Harambe in the room of materialistic atheism, the fact that the cranial chemical processes producing what we perceive to be cognition and volition are parts of a system of necessity, over which we have no control and which have no necessary connection to the external world outside our heads, assuming there is an actual external world and assuming we really do have heads. Seriously, if I were going to be a skeptic, I would not be satisfied with half measures.

One of the points that Bowne makes is that the knowledge of uniformity, for example, does not flow logically from the atheistic hypothesis. Given his worldview, the atheist has justifiable grounds for worrying about uniformity, if he cared to ponder the question. The fact that the atheist does not worry about uniformity is logically an inconsistency. But it is a felicitous inconsistency. The atheist in this regard behaves just as a theist does, believing that there is uniformity in nature. But the theist has a basis for his knowledge of uniformity, viz., a faithful Creator. In this sense, the atheist is borrowing from theism, that is, borrowing a benefit of knowledge that flows logically only from theism. Put more syllogistically (by me, not Bowne), knowledge is possible only if God exists; we know some things; therefore God exists.

The analog to this kind of "borrowing" in the moral universe is the atheist who behaves inconsistently with his worldview by affirming good and evil, affirming the voice of conscience as authoritative, valuing human life above animal life, honoring self-sacrificial love, despising treachery, asserting human rights, recognizing and imposing moral duties, etc. None of these moral behaviors flow logically from a world of materialistic necessity and brute facts mindlessly thrown together. But all are easily justified on a theistic basis, indeed on a specifically Judeo-Christian basis.

 

[Ana the Ist]

If our faculties are unreliable, but we must use our faculties both to create instruments and to evaluate the data they generate, then it would seem that, logically speaking, we are reasoning in a circle, using our fallible faculties to validate our fallible faculties. This kind of epistemological problem is inescapable from an atheistic perspective.

On assuming the past, you are right, Bowne does not think experience is the sole factor in assuming that the past happened, for experience by itself is an inadequate standard of truth, especially from an atheistic perspective where experience cannot be proven to have a necessary connection to reality (assuming, again, that there is even an external reality to be connected to). And if we use experience to prove our experience we are once again engaging in circular reasoning. On explaining the past positively, Bowne might point out that, since there is no proof that the past occurred, the past can only and always be a matter of inference and so necessarily a matter of faith. But if there is a truth-telling God who has spoken of the past as real and that our inferences and memories have a real connection to reality, then we have a justifiable basis to assert that at least some of our assumptions about the past are true. Failing that, we would be left with our underdeterminism, i.e., just making an arbitrary assumption, choosing one explanation out of an indefinite number of possible explanations, keeping in mind that according to scientific demonstration (this was pointed out by CF member Gracchus in another thread not too long ago) the feeling of certainty is traceable to chemical activity in the brain.

If our faculties are unreliable, but we must use our faculties both to create instruments and to evaluate the data they generate, then it would seem that, logically speaking, we are reasoning in a circle, using our fallible faculties to validate our fallible faculties. This kind of epistemological problem is inescapable from an atheistic perspective.

On assuming the past, you are right, Bowne does not think experience is the sole factor in assuming that the past happened, for experience by itself is an inadequate standard of truth, especially from an atheistic perspective where experience cannot be proven to have a necessary connection to reality (assuming, again, that there is even an external reality to be connected to). And if we use experience to prove our experience we are once again engaging in circular reasoning. On explaining the past positively, Bowne might point out that, since there is no proof that the past occurred, the past can only and always be a matter of inference and so necessarily a matter of faith. But if there is a truth-telling God who has spoken of the past as real and that our inferences and memories have a real connection to reality, then we have a justifiable basis to assert that at least some of our assumptions about the past are true. Failing that, we would be left with our underdeterminism, i.e., just making an arbitrary assumption, choosing one explanation out of an indefinite number of possible explanations, keeping in mind that according to scientific demonstration (this was pointed out by CF member Gracchus in another thread not too long ago) the feeling of certainty is traceable to chemical activity in the brain.

I was going to give a more lengthy reply...but it seems most of the points I've made have already been made.

Points about evidence of the past existing independent of our experiences of the past, points about scientific methods increasing accuracy so that the unreliability of our observations isn't necessarily the problem you make it out to be, and so on.

Frankly, I'm surprised you haven't noticed the gaping hole in Browne's theories here.

If he agrees that experience is unreliable, then how could he ever postulate the existence of a god? Wouldn't all that could be known of this god come from experiences? That's a dead end. Beyond that though, how would you know this god tells the truth...or anything at all? Such communication comes in the form of experiences....and again, Browne has dug his own hole here.

It seems he wants to create some absurd reductionist epistemology about experiences...and then write off his own experiences of god as some exception. So if it looks like the atheists in the room are a little underwhelmed...it's probably because we're used to a lot of special pleading in these discussions.

 

[Davian]

Many thoughtful replies. You’re all invited over for whiskey and cigars on my back porch to finish hashing this out! Several replies acknowledged the fallibility and limitations of the human mind and one at least admitted the necessity of unproven basal axioms. These replies were therefore consistent with my earlier remark about there being no logical stopping place between theism and universal skepticism or solipsism. In fact, your replies were so consistent with that earlier remark that I now wonder whether the remark came across as commonplace rather than provocative.

Or simply dismissed as a vacuous assertion. We get a lot of that in this forum.

Some of you made arbitrary assertions, but perhaps these were intended only as “tentative conclusions,” as Davian put it. Even a basal axiom based on nothing is arbitrary and therefore irrational.

I'm glad I based mine on something.

And testing a basal axiom would necessarily involve circular reasoning—proving reason by reason. But what has consistent materialism (this is the kind of atheism I have in mind)

I have never heard of this type of atheism before. Is not atheism a position on deities, and not metaphysics? As I do not identify as an atheist, I won't dwell on this.

to do with something immaterial like a basal axiom? Anyway, both theists and atheists can have tentative conclusions.

I have not seen that reflected in the manner in which the theists in these forums appear to hold their beliefs.

For the purposes of this series of posts, I would distinguish between conjecture and knowledge.

Some impressions may have been mistaken. For example, there is no “worry” that gravity or other natural processes might not always work the same way.

Should there be?

The question is more basal, How is it that we, both you and I, know, yea, even know with certainty, that there is such a thing as uniformity in nature?

Observation.

As mentioned before, that natural processes worked uniformly in the past is an unproven assumption.

I don't see why they need be 'proven'. There is plenty of evidence for it.

Also that they are working uniformly now cannot be proven.

Indeed. Perhaps you should lay off the alcohol if this is an issue for you. I never touch the stuff myself.

Our present observations may be appearances only and/or simply the products of chemicals in our heads that necessarily give rise to thoughts of uniformity, thoughts over which we actually have no control. That natural processes will work uniformly in the future is also an unproven assumption. Even assuming that the processes are natural (whatever “natural” is assumed to mean) is no more than a hypothesis.

Nobody addressed the Harambe in the room of materialistic atheism, the fact that the cranial chemical processes producing what we perceive to be cognition and volition are parts of a system of necessity, over which we have no control and which have no necessary connection to the external world outside our heads, assuming there is an actual external world and assuming we really do have heads.

If what we experience is consistent, persistent, observable, measurable, and behaves in a manner in which we can make reliable predictions, and for all intents and purposes it *is* reality. This is where the solipsism arguments fail.

Have I not mentioned this already?

Seriously, if I were going to be a skeptic, I would not be satisfied with half measures.

Yet as a theist, you are satisfied with so little.

One of the points that Bowne makes is that the knowledge of uniformity, for example, does not flow logically from the atheistic hypothesis.

What is a atheistic hypothesis? I have not heard of such a thing.

Given his worldview,

Atheism is not a worldview. Are you new here?

the atheist has justifiable grounds for worrying about uniformity, if he cared to ponder the question.

When he is not pondering the existence of deities, that is.

The fact that the atheist does not worry about uniformity is logically an inconsistency. But it is a felicitous inconsistency.

If I ever run into one of these atheists, I'll be sure to tell them that.

The atheist in this regard behaves just as a theist does, believing that there is uniformity in nature.

Certainly, if he bases his views on observation. The theist, however - would he not have "nature" responding to the whim of his "god"? Would it not be the theist that could not depend on uniformity in nature?

But the theist has a basis for his knowledge of uniformity, viz., a faithful Creator.

How circular. Their belief in a "creator" (needed for this "uniformity") as a basis for their belief in uniformity.

In this sense, the atheist is borrowing from theism, that is, borrowing a benefit of knowledge that flows logically only from theism. Put more syllogistically (by me, not Bowne), knowledge is possible only if God exists; we know some things; therefore God exists.

As an ignostic, perhaps it would be time to ask exactly what do you mean by "God". I gather that we are talking of the "God" character in the Bible, that [allegedly] walked and talked in a garden that has no evidence of having existed, poofed people and animals into existence, and later, in a manner contrary to the modern understanding of genetics, populated the planet with using a tiny group of individuals and animals that survived a global flood in an unbuildable boat, a flood that killed the dinosaurs in a manner that only *appears* to be 65 million years ago, because the Earth is really only somehow 6000 years old, yet remains, by every object measure to date indistinguishable from nothing?

This is the "God" that you are asserting is needed to make knowledge possible? And, to be clear, virtually all of modern scientific knowledge would have to be wildly inaccurate to accommodate such a "god" story as reality? Anything you want to add to that?

The analog to this kind of "borrowing" in the moral universe is the atheist who behaves inconsistently with his worldview by affirming good and evil, affirming the voice of conscience as authoritative, valuing human life above animal life, honoring self-sacrificial love, despising treachery, asserting human rights, recognizing and imposing moral duties, etc. None of these moral behaviors flow logically from a world of materialistic necessity and brute facts mindlessly thrown together.

Now that you have propped up and punched a hole in that strawman, does it leave a metaphysical hole big enough for you to drag your 'god' through?

But all are easily justified on a theistic basis,

If you are making it up as you go along, you can justify anything.

indeed on a specifically Judeo-Christian basis.

Are you Jewish now? Or have they got it all wrong too?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

...
One of the points that Bowne makes is that the knowledge of uniformity, for example, does not flow logically from the atheistic hypothesis. Given his worldview, the atheist has justifiable grounds for worrying about uniformity, if he cared to ponder the question. The fact that the atheist does not worry about uniformity is logically an inconsistency. But it is a felicitous inconsistency. The atheist in this regard behaves just as a theist does, believing that there is uniformity in nature. But the theist has a basis for his knowledge of uniformity, viz., a faithful Creator. In this sense, the atheist is borrowing from theism, that is, borrowing a benefit of knowledge that flows logically only from theism. Put more syllogistically (by me, not Bowne), knowledge is possible only if God exists; we know some things; therefore God exists.

This seems to be a huge non sequitur. As I stated before, the question of how our senses relate to the world looms large in philosophy. The theist asserts that he has the answer that the atheist lacks, but he always stops short of actually showing that to be the case. That is what you have done here. You have described a vexing problem that we all face, and then you've asserted, on the basis of nothing at all, that you've solved that problem by invoking a deity. As others have already pointed out, however, your proposed solution only deepens the problem, or pushes it back a step further.

The analog to this kind of "borrowing" in the moral universe is the atheist who behaves inconsistently with his worldview by affirming good and evil, affirming the voice of conscience as authoritative, valuing human life above animal life, honoring self-sacrificial love, despising treachery, asserting human rights, recognizing and imposing moral duties, etc. None of these moral behaviors flow logically from a world of materialistic necessity and brute facts mindlessly thrown together. But all are easily justified on a theistic basis, indeed on a specifically Judeo-Christian basis.

Not at all. We don't need to appeal to supernatural forces to make moral judgments. Reducing moral judgments to religious opinions means that any proposition is "easily justified" as moral, so long as it comports with the believer's preferred theology.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I was going to give a more lengthy reply...but it seems most of the points I've made have already been made.

Points about evidence of the past existing independent of our experiences of the past, points about scientific methods increasing accuracy so that the unreliability of our observations isn't necessarily the problem you make it out to be, and so on.

Frankly, I'm surprised you haven't noticed the gaping hole in Browne's theories here.

If he agrees that experience is unreliable, then how could he ever postulate the existence of a god? Wouldn't all that could be known of this god come from experiences? That's a dead end. Beyond that though, how would you know this god tells the truth...or anything at all? Such communication comes in the form of experiences....and again, Browne has dug his own hole here.

It seems he wants to create some absurd reductionist epistemology about experiences...and then write off his own experiences of god as some exception. So if it looks like the atheists in the room are a little underwhelmed...it's probably because we're used to a lot of special pleading in these discussions.

I wonder what Browne would have to say to someone like Craig, who considers his personal religious experiences to be incontrovertible. Would Browne agree or disagree on that point?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

On assuming the past, you are right, Bowne does not think experience is the sole factor in assuming that the past happened, for experience by itself is an inadequate standard of truth, especially from an atheistic perspective where experience cannot be proven to have a necessary connection to reality (assuming, again, that there is even an external reality to be connected to). And if we use experience to prove our experience we are once again engaging in circular reasoning. On explaining the past positively, Bowne might point out that, since there is no proof that the past occurred, the past can only and always be a matter of inference and so necessarily a matter of faith. But if there is a truth-telling God who has spoken of the past as real and that our inferences and memories have a real connection to reality, then we have a justifiable basis to assert that at least some of our assumptions about the past are true.

Note that that's an "if" that needs to be supported - see below. Is this line of apologetics supposed to reason to God or does it merely assume his existence from the outset?

Failing that, we would be left with our underdeterminism, i.e., just making an arbitrary assumption, choosing one explanation out of an indefinite number of possible explanations,

Isn't assuming the above (that there is "a truth-telling God who has spoken of the past as real and that our inferences and memories have a real connection to reality") also an assumption? What justifies assuming this?

keeping in mind that according to scientific demonstration (this was pointed out by CF member Gracchus in another thread not too long ago) the feeling of certainty is traceable to chemical activity in the brain.

Yes, the brain, which is capable of learning and therefore revising the confidence level assigned to particular claims, including the assertions of theology. The way in which the brain interfaces with the larger world of which it is a part is a salient question in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. Invoking the supernatural as an explanation here doesn't appear to advance our understanding any further than "we don't know."

 

[Ana the Ist]

I wonder what Browne would have to say to someone like Craig, who considers his personal religious experiences to be incontrovertible. Would Browne agree or disagree on that point?

I suppose it all comes down to the answer of what the difference is between the experiences of reality that Browne finds so horribly unreliable...and the experiences of god (whom I'm assuming is a part of reality in this argument) which Browne seems to find totally reliable.

If I had to make a prediction...I'd say that the answer to the above problem will directly involve at the very least, a special pleading fallacy. Browne will try to bury it under as many big words and unclear terms as possible...but without a special pleading fallacy, all of the epistemological problems Browne has with our ability to experience reality will apply equally to our ability to experience god (which, again, would necessarily be a part of reality in this argument).

 

[KCfromNC]

These replies were therefore consistent with my earlier remark about there being no logical stopping place between theism and universal skepticism or solipsism.

Yeah, but most people are smart enough not to try and use logic to pick an epistemological framework, since it would require a logical proof that logical proofs work without assuming they do and circularity blah blah blah.

Nobody addressed the Harambe in the room of materialistic atheism, the fact that the cranial chemical processes producing what we perceive to be cognition and volition are parts of a system of necessity, over which we have no control and which have no necessary connection to the external world outside our heads, assuming there is an actual external world and assuming we really do have heads.

And yet despite all the theoretical objections you come up with, we still manage to do science really well. But hey, feel free to think you can logic your way out of that reality.

One of the points that Bowne makes is that the knowledge of uniformity, for example, does not flow logically from the atheistic hypothesis.

Just as soon as you prove that logical deduction is the correct way to evaluate epistemological choices this objection will matter. In the mean time, we can see that assuming uniformity produces useful results. Who are we going to believe - you or our lying eyes?

But the theist has a basis for his knowledge of uniformity, viz., a faithful Creator.

How does one logically deduce that a god is a creator, and from there a faithful one?

But all are easily justified on a theistic basis, indeed on a specifically Judeo-Christian basis.

You know what would be more convincing that asserting this? Actually demonstrating it.

The first problem you'll have is that a Judeo-Christian is internally inconsistent and thus can't possibly exist.

 

[devolved]

I think that one of the most important things that goes unmentioned about presuppositional argument for God is that God is not a given in our experience of reality.

The reason why scientific presuppositions work is precisely because these seem to align with our immediate experiences first, and then attempts to filter out or create models for other observable inconsistencies.

Pressuppositional argument is not an argument in that sense. It's an assumption. You can't call assumption an argument. It's sort of like saying that all of the pumpkins are made possible because of the invisible pumpkin fairies, and the proof is that both pumpkin fairies and pumpkins share color orange.

It's not an argument. It's a manipulation of semantics.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I think that one of the most important things that goes unmentioned about presuppositional argument for God is that God is not a given in our experience of reality.

The reason why scientific presuppositions work is precisely because these seem to align with our immediate experiences first, and then attempts to filter out or create models for other observable inconsistencies.

Pressuppositional argument is not an argument in that sense. It's an assumption. You can't call assumption an argument. It's sort of like saying that all of the pumpkins are made possible because of the invisible pumpkin fairies, and the proof is that both pumpkin fairies and pumpkins share color orange.

It's not an argument. It's a manipulation of semantics.

That's my problem with presuppositional arguments as well. To the extent that an argument can be discerned, it seems to fall prey to either begging the question or special pleading.

 

[Mediaeval]

Regarding my brief syllogistic argument for theism in my penultimate post, Archaeopteryx thought the conclusion seemed like a non sequitur. But as my contention here has been more particularly the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective, I note with relief that Archaeopteryx went on to acknowledge that a “vexing problem” of epistemology exists. This has been my main point all along. It would seem, by extension, that we agree that this vexing problem cannot be solved by experience or observation alone.

But after that acknowledgement, I was surprised that Archaeopteryx did not see an analogy with morality. There is no more logically justifiable basis in atheism for morality than there is for knowledge. If anything, the lack of a basis in atheism for morality is more evident. (How often have you heard Richard Rorty quoted: “There is no answer to the question, ‘Why not be cruel?‘”) While you may not “need to appeal to supernatural forces to make moral judgments,” you need something more than mere human opinion to support and justify your moral judgments as true and authoritative. On analogy with my argument from knowledge, I would propose this syllogism arguing from morality: transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality is not possible unless God exists; transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality exists; therefore God exists.

In reply to Ana, Bowne’s book was not all about the inadequacy of experience as a standard of truth. That was, at most, a point made merely in passing. But the question goes deeper as Ana also appeared to realize, judging from the phrase, “absurd reductionist epistemology.” If you have always just assumed you knew something for certain and never sought to identify the bases upon which you can justifiably say that you know something, then I suppose it might seem absurd to question the bases of your knowledge and to trace them back to your ultimate standard or unproven and unprovable basal beliefs. But, however absurd, it remains a “vexing problem.” Meanwhile, if you find absurdity objectionable, as do I, then how can you be an atheist where absurdity is inescapable?

On Craig and his incontrovertible experiences, I expect Bowne would say that his experiences could be justified on a theistic basis, but from an atheistic point of view the experiences would be, like all his other experiences, merely the necessary products of electro-chemical activity in Craig’s brain with no necessary connection to truth or reality.

This line of apologetics is supposed to show that, quoting Bowne, “Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests.” According to Bowne’s book (going by fallible memory here), what justifies assuming that there is a truth-telling God is the recognition that theism supports our interests, explains and enriches life, and provides a basis for knowledge and morality; negatively, it would be self-evidently wrong to “wreck all our interests” through atheism, where both free-thought and freewill would be necessarily illusory. Bowne’s view thus anticipated Cornelius Van Til’s assertion: “The indispensable character of the presupposition of God’s existence is the best possible proof of God’s actual existence.”

Davian called me out for imprecise language. By atheist I meant an evidentialist who holds to a naturalistic, materialistic worldview according to which the universe is assumed to consist only of matter and energy and the mind is wholly identified with the brain and its electro-chemical activity.

 

[KCfromNC]

But as my contention here has been more particularly the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective, I note with relief that Archaeopteryx went on to acknowledge that a “vexing problem” of epistemology exists.

Sounds like someone's rediscovered the problem of induction. The issue here is again that abstract philosophical objections aren't going to change the fact that it works.

There is no more logically justifiable basis in atheism for morality than there is for knowledge.

Interestingly enough, this is the exact same problem that theism has with this subject.

“Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests.”

Sure it can. You're obviously ignoring the posts here explaining how, but that doesn't mean they don't exist.

 

[devolved]

But as my contention here has been more particularly the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective, I note with relief that Archaeopteryx went on to acknowledge that a “vexing problem” of epistemology exists. This has been my main point all along. It would seem, by extension, that we agree that this vexing problem cannot be solved by experience or observation alone.

Again, this is an issue of semantic confusion rather than a reality of the issue. We have to actually consider unpacking the meaning of these terms and what the real world meaning is.

1) Knowledge is not a thing. I think we can agree on that. Knowledge is a state of mind that formulates a model of some externally observed world. When someone claims some knowledge, all they do is "host" a model in the framework of their mind that allows them to predict certain state of reality outside of their mind.

That's all knowledge is. Thus, claiming that knowledge is epistemological not possible without God is absurd. Knowledge is and will always be a mind-based model of reality. Whether God is there or not will not change that or enhance of how we relate to knowledge.

2) The model will always be a model. Knowledge is a model. Models don't always have to reference the world out there. We can know things that we define to be so with certainty. For example, we can define the world APPLE to refer to a very specific object. Thus, we give the identity to the word, thus it is Knowledge.

Your core argument doesn't follow.

But, let's say that you are talking about the ontological reality that we have to find "out there", and have no clear and precise formulation or a model for. The issue is precisely with consistency of application of such presupposition argument. You can't merely use it to say that everything comes from God is knowledge. You have to demonstrate it to be consistently valid.

In a more pragmatic terms, all of the philosophy BS wouldn't be able to convince you that I'm a God and I have created this world 5 minutes ago, including all of the memories. I could go on and on in various evasive means to construct various philosophical arguments... but none of these matter when it comes to our pragmatic experience of reality. If I indeed was a God, and all I had is a claim that such is the scope of reality, then my claim makes no difference at all.

But after that acknowledgement, I was surprised that Archaeopteryx did not see an analogy with morality. There is no more logically justifiable basis in atheism for morality than there is for knowledge. If anything, the lack of a basis in atheism for morality is more evident. (How often have you heard Richard Rorty quoted: “There is no answer to the question, ‘Why not be cruel?‘”) While you may not “need to appeal to supernatural forces to make moral judgments,” you need something more than mere human opinion to support and justify your moral judgments as true and authoritative. On analogy with my argument from knowledge, I would propose this syllogism arguing from morality: transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality is not possible unless God exists; transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality exists; therefore God exists.

Again, you are doing exact thing with morality that you are doing with knowledge. Let's revisit this again:

1) Morality is a concept that denotes proper CONTEXTUAL behavior.

It wouldn't make any sense for me to walk over to someone who is punching someone and say "you know, you shouldn't lie". Morality is always contextual, thus it's a model of proper behavior.

2) The adequacy of moral behavior is justified contextually

There is an answer to the question "Why not be cruel". Actually there are several answers, coming from social framework, and personal framework. Cruelty has viable personal and societal implications, and we merely have to compare the alternatives to derive the better one... based on consequential reality that we experience. And lastly, it does have personal implications as to which world one would like to live in, the world where people are cruel, or the world where people are not.

That's all morality is. Projecting it on a supernatural deity is simply an attempt to standardize the concept with some authority.

But let's say that morality necessitates God. How does God know what's moral and what's not? If it's based on consequential grasp of circumstances, then God is not a source of morality or the authority. He is merely a perfect judge, but we can and do have consequential judgement frameworks that can accomplish similar things.

Overall, the argument seems like saying "We are right because we couldn't be wrong otherwise".

 

[Davian]

That's my problem with presuppositional arguments as well. To the extent that an argument can be discerned, it seems to fall prey to either begging the question or special pleading.

And when that fails, strawman the opposing point of view and set it alight.

 

[Davian]

Regarding my brief syllogistic argument for theism

When one makes an argument for theism, it would seem that you are making an argument for a whole lot of wrong, as they (religions) cannot all be right.

in my penultimate post, Archaeopteryx thought the conclusion seemed like a non sequitur. But as my contention here has been more particularly the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective, I note with relief that Archaeopteryx went on to acknowledge that a “vexing problem” of epistemology exists. This has been my main point all along. It would seem, by extension, that we agree that this vexing problem cannot be solved by experience or observation alone.

Not if 'we' are going to reach the 'god' conclusion that you have started with.

But after that acknowledgement, I was surprised that Archaeopteryx did not see an analogy with morality. There is no more logically justifiable basis in atheism for morality than there is for knowledge. If anything, the lack of a basis in atheism for morality is more evident.

Fortunately, there are many other things on which morality can be based, no gods required.

(How often have you heard Richard Rorty quoted: “There is no answer to the question, ‘Why not be cruel?‘”)

Not once.

While you may not “need to appeal to supernatural forces

Can you define what "supernatural" is in this context. Can it be in any way delineated from "imaginary"?

to make moral judgments,” you need something more than mere human opinion to support and justify your moral judgments as true and authoritative.

Sure. We can base it on reason, compassion, human wellness, empathy, the Silver Rule, and/or the social contract.

On analogy with my argument from knowledge, I would propose this syllogism arguing from morality: transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality is not possible unless God exists; transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality exists; therefore God exists.

Again I have to ask what do you mean by "God" in this context; is this the [hypothetical] "God" that will burn for eternity the majority of those that ever lived for reasons beyond their control? How is that not morally bankrupt?

In reply to Ana, Bowne’s book was not all about the inadequacy of experience as a standard of truth. That was, at most, a point made merely in passing. But the question goes deeper as Ana also appeared to realize, judging from the phrase, “absurd reductionist epistemology.” If you have always just assumed you knew something for certain and never sought to identify the bases upon which you can justifiably say that you know something, then I suppose it might seem absurd to question the bases of your knowledge and to trace them back to your ultimate standard or unproven and unprovable basal beliefs. But, however absurd, it remains a “vexing problem.” Meanwhile, if you find absurdity objectionable, as do I, then how can you be an atheist where absurdity is inescapable?

I am not an atheist as you define the term.

On Craig and his incontrovertible experiences, I expect Bowne would say that his experiences could be justified on a theistic basis, but from an atheistic point of view the experiences would be, like all his other experiences, merely the necessary products of electro-chemical activity in Craig’s brain with no necessary connection to truth or reality.

Then Craig's experiences can be dismissed as such. Do you concur?

This line of apologetics

This is the wrong forum for apologetics. If you care.

is supposed to show that, quoting Bowne, “Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests.”

Did it ever occur to him that out of the thousands of religions and denominations, that only one can be right (if any)? That makes the most of them falsehoods. Possibly all of them.

According to Bowne’s book (going by fallible memory here), what justifies assuming that there is a truth-telling God is the recognition that theism supports our interests, explains and enriches life,

Theism makes us happy? How weak is that?

and provides a basis for knowledge

False knowledge.

and morality;

Or, more accurately, a means of control of a populace.

negatively, it would be self-evidently wrong to “wreck all our interests” through atheism,

"Wrecking your interests" would make you sad. I have to say, your arguments are not very compelling.

where both free-thought and freewill would be necessarily illusory.

Since when is atheism incompatible with free will? Or are we limited to talking about your strawman atheist?

Bowne’s view thus anticipated Cornelius Van Til’s assertion: “The indispensable character of the presupposition of God’s existence is the best possible proof of God’s actual existence.”

As an ignostic, perhaps it would be time to ask exactly what do you mean by "God". I gather that we are talking of the "God" character in the Bible, that [allegedly] walked and talked in a garden that has no evidence of having existed, poofed people and animals into existence, and later, in a manner contrary to the modern understanding of genetics, populated the planet with using a tiny group of individuals and animals that survived a global flood in an unbuildable boat, a flood that killed the dinosaurs in a manner that only *appears* to be 65 million years ago, because the Earth is really only somehow 6000 years old, yet remains, by every object measure to date indistinguishable from nothing?

To hold such a presupposition, would I not have to firstly toss out virtually all of modern scientific knowledge as wildly inaccurate? And this is your "best possible proof"?

Davian called me out for imprecise language. By atheist I meant an evidentialist who holds to a naturalistic, materialistic worldview according to which the universe is assumed to consist only of matter and energy and the mind is wholly identified with the brain and its electro-chemical activity.

I am not an evidentialist, or an atheist, by that definition.

Perhaps if you mean "evidentialist" you should use the word "evidentialist", for the precision that you currently lack.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Regarding my brief syllogistic argument for theism in my penultimate post, Archaeopteryx thought the conclusion seemed like a non sequitur. But as my contention here has been more particularly the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective,

That's the problem: you haven't established "the impossibility of knowledge from an atheistic perspective." You've simply asserted it.

I note with relief that Archaeopteryx went on to acknowledge that a “vexing problem” of epistemology exists. This has been my main point all along. It would seem, by extension, that we agree that this vexing problem cannot be solved by experience or observation alone.

There are many problems that we have thus far been unable to solve, in cosmology, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and so on. Religionists often insist that they have the answer to these and many other questions, but they don't show that to be true.

But after that acknowledgement, I was surprised that Archaeopteryx did not see an analogy with morality. There is no more logically justifiable basis in atheism for morality than there is for knowledge. If anything, the lack of a basis in atheism for morality is more evident.

Atheism is not a position on ethics or epistemology. In any case, what you seem to be saying is that the atheist cannot make moral claims because she cannot appeal to a deity in the process. Bollocks. We don't need to appeal to deities to say "That's wrong" at all.

(How often have you heard Richard Rorty quoted: “There is no answer to the question, ‘Why not be cruel?‘”) While you may not “need to appeal to supernatural forces to make moral judgments,” you need something more than mere human opinion to support and justify your moral judgments as true and authoritative.

How does invoking a deity make moral judgments "true and authoritative"?

On analogy with my argument from knowledge, I would propose this syllogism arguing from morality: transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality is not possible unless God exists; transcendent, authoritative, obligatory morality exists; therefore God exists.

I don't accept your first premise and see it as somewhat of a tautology given that, I suspect, you define "authoritative, obligatory morality" as "God-given morality."

In reply to Ana, Bowne’s book was not all about the inadequacy of experience as a standard of truth. That was, at most, a point made merely in passing. But the question goes deeper as Ana also appeared to realize, judging from the phrase, “absurd reductionist epistemology.” If you have always just assumed you knew something for certain and never sought to identify the bases upon which you can justifiably say that you know something, then I suppose it might seem absurd to question the bases of your knowledge and to trace them back to your ultimate standard or unproven and unprovable basal beliefs. But, however absurd, it remains a “vexing problem.” Meanwhile, if you find absurdity objectionable, as do I, then how can you be an atheist where absurdity is inescapable?

You haven't shown that theism alleviates this absurdity, and you haven't responded to suggestions that it actually worsens the situation.