A question for athiests

[Silenus]

who thinks in ground and consequence. That would be cause and effect?

and I'll try to clarify this, because ground and consequence is not the same thing, to my mind, as cause and effect.

 

[quatona]

I'm going to go back a few pages and maybe provide a summary post before I go on for my own edification. I am trying to provide for you some examples of how free will sets up a reality that can be verified . . . how judgements must be able to observe reality without being bound by it to be able to judge objectivly.

That would be much appreciated.

"Judging objectively" appears to be a contradiction in terms. I am willing, though, to accept for this part of the discussion and for the sake of this particular question, that there is such a thing as an objective reality. Under this premise (caveat: which I might not accept in other parts of this discussion) I would be highly interested to see how "freewill" guarantees such (or merely gives us the opportunity - depending on which of the two it is you want to show - to align our perception with this objective reality), and being determined does not guarantee such an alignment or even makes it downright impossible for our perception to be "in sync" with this objective reality (again, depending on what your claim actually is).

Along with that I would love to see an explanation why - despite your assumption that "freewill" does exist -, there are disagreements (even among objectivists) about the nature of this objective reality observable all over the place. IOW why you ascribe to a determined world that which actually can be observed all the time even in the alleged presence of "freewill".
IOW: I often understand you saying "Without "freewill" the world would be [insert a description of the world as it actually is right now - with the alleged existence of "freewill"]."
Like how can the simple and observable fact that the strongest has the greatest power (which is actually just a tautology) be the result of a determined world, if this is quite obviously the case in this world of which you assume it is not determined? And how is it (under the assumption that there exists an objective good/bad) impossible (or a logical problem) that my recognition (or lack therof) of these objective values is determined?

And another humble request: When you speak of "judgement" you seem to alternatingly use it for "discerning reality" and "making a value judgement". Would you do me the favour to signify unmistakenly in each case in which meaning you are using it (like for example "judgement (r)" and "judgement (v)") - just so we avoid running into equivocations?

I can see by your responses that I have some work ahead of me . . . I'm sorry you are frustrated. It is not my intention to frustrate just to discuss. If we have to agree to disagree, that is no problem.


I, however, am having a good time.

I have no doubt whatsoever that it is not your intention to frustrate me, and generally I enjoy this discussion, as well. That´s exactly why I tell you when frustration kicks in with certain points. I am thinking of such a conversation as a collaboration rather than a fight. To keep it that way I think it´s useful to help each other with such information. If I were under the impression that you frustrate me intentionally, I would have left the building long ago.

I am fine with agreeing to disagree, also. I would, however, hate the idea to agree to disagree before I have even understood your line of reasoning, hence don´t even know what I am supposed to disagree with.
I´m completely fine with you believing "freewill" to exist. Yet, for to establish your notion that "freewill" is a logical necessity, I would indeed expect you to provide the logical deduction. The idea that a logical deduction goes right over my head makes me feel extremely uncomfortable.

I'll re-read the last few pages and try to provide a summary page so I don;'t repeat points you think have been covered or resolved.

May I recommend a different and probably more parsimonous approach?
As far as I can tell chances are that there is just the same one crucial link missing in all those arguments that make me go "What? How the heck is this a necessary consequence of being determined, but not of having "freewill" just the same?". This - from my understanding - "missing link" is either a logical gap, or you simply forgot to mention it, or you have mentioned it but haven´t succeeded in communicating it in a way that makes me understand how it is the link I am missing.
I´m positive that focussing on providing this link would render a lot of detail discussion redundant.

Greetings
quatona

 

[peepnklown]

What do you believe governs reality?

I govern my own reality, thank you.

What is it that determines the rules of physics?

If we do not know, why is it ok to fill in the gap of our knowledge with a God?
Ancient mankind has shown that filling in the gap of knowledge with a God simply does not function to answer questions: just like when they believed lightening was a God; the supernatural origins of lightening was proven wrong.

 

[Silenus]

Here is my summation post, which really isn’t a summation post but is a list of statements that I would like to know whether you agree or disagree with. Feel free to modify or completely redefine/reword statements . ...

• When I say correct or incorrect, I mean that which is correct corresponds to reality, that which is incorrect does not.
• Determinism doesn’t render impossible the ability of concepts, etc. to be incorrect or correct, but it does render people unable to know whether they are correct or incorrect. (I think you made this point in post 217)
• I am trying to state that free will allows for the possibility to know whether a concept is incorrect or correct, while you see no basis for such a belief.
• You believe that both free will and determinism renders knowledge of correctness impossible, and determinism, in Ockham fashion, is a more efficient explanation of the interactions of consciousness and reality.

What do you think?

 

[quatona]

Here is my summation post, which really isn’t a summation post but is a list of statements that I would like to know whether you agree or disagree with. Feel free to modify or completely redefine/reword statements . ...

I take it you talking to me specifically?

• When I say correct or incorrect, I mean that which is correct corresponds to reality, that which is incorrect does not.

Fine with me. In order to give that meaning, however, we would need a proper definition of "reality".

• Determinism doesn’t render impossible the ability of concepts, etc. to be incorrect or correct, but it does render people unable to know whether they are correct or incorrect. (I think you made this point in post 217)

That would surprise me, and glancing over the (long) post I can´t seem to find this point I am supposed to have made.
For clarification:
In my opinion, determinism vs. "freewillism" has no significance whatsoever for this question.
If we are unable to have this knowledge, it is by no means being determined that renders us unable to know whether they are correct or not.
If we are able to have this knowledge it is not "freewill"that renders us able to know it.
Being a perceiver renders us unable to know that. It is a problem for determinism and "freewillism" alike. Whether our ideas are determined by factors that have to be considered part of reality (in which this term is not yet properly defined) or chosen does not make any difference for not knowing whether our notions are correct. (In fact that is your assertion which I have asked you to give your reasoning for eight times).
For obvious reasons I would rather (but not conclusively) assume that a notion determined by the very reality that it is about is more likely to be accurate than a notion that is freely chosen.

I am trying to state that free will allows for the possibility to know whether a concept is incorrect or correct, while you see no basis for such a belief.

Half right.
I am asking for an explanation why having "freewill" (with everything else being the same) allows for being correct and knowing to be correct rather than if our notions are determined.
For simplicity´s sake I want this direct comparison to work out what it is that makes the difference in your opinion.

You believe that both free will and determinism renders knowledge of correctness impossible, and determinism, in Ockham fashion, is a more efficient explanation of the interactions of consciousness and reality.

No. I do not think that "freewill" or "being determined" have any relevance for the knowledge of correctness. I need to be explained how this issue makes a difference for the question whether we can have such knowledge.
KISS! Just show me how "freewill" allows for this knowledge and being determined doesn´t. This is your claim, and this needs to be logically derived to give it and any of your conclusions from it a leg to stand on. I may well have missed it, but in dozens of long posts I have seen absolutely nothing from you in support of this crucial assumption.

Whether I think we can have this knowledge or not is not really important for this question.
If you show how "freewill" allows for it, I am positive I can show you how being determined allows for it just as well.

You would make me incredibly happy if attempting to finally answer this - as I think - pretty clear question.

 

[Silenus]

In order to give that meaning, however, we would need a proper definition of "reality"

cool, How would you define it? I would like to hear how you would define it and I'll probably be fine with using your definition. forgive me for asking this question if you are trying to make the point that it is undefinable or difficult to define.

No. I do not think that "freewill" or "being determined" have any relevance for the knowledge of correctness. I need to be explained how this issue makes a difference for the question whether we can have such knowledge.

I'm getting there and I think I'll use your last question about disagreement to go there, i just want to make sure I get the groundwork first . . .

Finally, do you believe we can know the correctness or incorrectness of things . . . do you believe there is a problem here? If so, where does the problem stem from in your eyes. the reason I ask is because my answer to the question may not even address the problem as you see it . . . I am truly not trying to be evasive here, i just don't want to post again and leave you feeling like I'm not addressing your issue . . .

I see your question as being this, how does free will give the possibility of seeing things as correct or incorrect and how does determinism prevent it . Is that right?

Also, it was this statement you made in 217 that made me think what I did . . .

[QUOTE There is no way to deteremine (no pun intended) truth or falsehood. Ok.][/QUOTE]

you said this . . . and I said this . . .

I'm taking it from the okay that this is not a problem? I'll go from here then. Since we cannot know whether anything we believe is true or false, I have no reason to believe i am right or wrong. If I assume I an right, I also must assume that the other person who disagrees with me is right.

and you replied

Depends on what you mean when saying "is not a problem".
It sure is a troubling thing, generally.
It is, however, not a problem of determinism in particular. It is a problem that comes with any other explanation as well.

So you see knowing correctness and incorrectness as a problem for both?

 

[quatona]

cool, How would you define it? I would like to hear how you would define it and I'll probably be fine with using your definition. forgive me for asking this question if you are trying to make the point that it is undefinable or difficult to define.

I think it is difficult to define. I am sure you won´t accept my definition, because my worldview is so fundamentally different than yours that it doesn´t help the discussion on the common ground that I have tried to provide by accepting fundamental parts of your worldview for the sake of this discussion. You are making the claim that "freewill" is that which warrants this knowledge, and I do not expect you to show that this on basis of my axioms, but I want to understand how you get there logically and consistently on basis of your axioms. I was assuming that you asserted some sort of objective reality that needs to be discerned. That´s basically what I worked from so far.

Finally, do you believe we can know the correctness or incorrectness of things . . . do you believe there is a problem here?

It doesn´t matter what I believe. You say we can know this only with "freewill". Make your case.

If so, where does the problem stem from in your eyes.

Well, this is not about my problems, Silenus, it is about a claim you make: Freely choosing allows for knowing it, whilst being determined doesn´t.
You don´t have to customize your deduction with respect to problems I see. Keep my ideas out of it.

the reason I ask is because my answer to the question may not even address the problem as you see it . . .

That is nice of you, but all I want to know what the problem is for having this knowlege that "freewill" solves.

I am truly not trying to be evasive here, i just don't want to post again and leave you feeling like I'm not addressing your issue . .

Again, I appreciate your willingness to consider my problems, but it is not necessary.
You make a claim and you give the deduction. Just imagine you stand before 1000 people and try to convince them that the ability to choose ones beliefs is a prerequisite for having knowledge that these are correct. You cannot customize your deduction for 1000 individual persons - it´s got to stand on its own legs, and all I ask - for the time being - that it follows logically and is internally consistent.

I see your question as being this, how does free will give the possibility of seeing things as correct or incorrect and how does determinism prevent it . Is that right?

Yes, exactly. I understand that to be your claim. Is that right?
(On a sidenote and just to prevent misunderstandings: I hope we agree in that the question is not whether the worldview "determinism" prevents it but whether the fact that actions and thoughts of persons are determined does).

So you see knowing correctness and incorrectness as a problem for both?

I see correctness and incorrectness as a problem that is completely unrelated and independent of both. I have no clue whatsoever how someone might think it could in any way have to do with the freedom to choose one´s views or lack thereof. Furthermore I see it as a problem only in a worldview that assumes there to be an objective reality out there beyond our minds (which I don´t).

 

[Silenus]

Before I post, i want to say that the reason i asked for your responses to those statements is because I am interested in learning how you view these problems. I have meny issues in process and one of them is free will and one of them is conciousness and its relationship to reality. So, I'd like to learn you opinions to shed light on my own deliberations on these topics.

"Judging objectively" appears to be a contradiction in terms. I am willing, though, to accept for this part of the discussion and for the sake of this particular question, that there is such a thing as an objective reality . . . and being determined does not guarantee such an alignment or even makes it downright impossible for our perception to be "in sync" with this objective reality (again, depending on what your claim actually is).

This comment interests me because I would assume that determinists would believe in an unknowable reality, but a reality nonetheless. I guess the difficulty I see in determinism is that, especially on the upper levels of conceptualization and abstraction, you are locked into a cloud of unknowing. There must be some level of the will that deliberates and chooses to make knowledge of reality par excellence possible. I’m not yet trying to argue that free will makes assurance of objective statements a lock, but it does, philosophically, create the possibility of objective truth statements in the “upper levels.” I am not saying that the “free willist” don’t have problems here going from the possibility of objective knowledge to the probability, and then to the assurance of objectivity. There are big problems. I am saying determinism doesn’t allow me to know whether I am correct or not and I’m pretty sure we agreed on that earlier, although maybe I am wrong here. I am not saying that all aspects of humanity are free; some aspects of consciousness would have to be determined to assure a connection to reality. And, this is where my thoughts always become jumbled, because there seems to be counter-intuitions going on both sides of the fence. I admit, I flirt between libertarianism and compatabalism and am somewhat undecided between the two. Now, how does a free will allow for either objectivity or truth and knowledge . . .

Along with that I would love to see an explanation why - despite your assumption that "freewill" does exist -, there are disagreements (even among objectivists) about the nature of this objective reality observable all over the place. IOW why you ascribe to a determined world that which actually can be observed all the time even in the alleged presence of "freewill" . . . Like how can the simple and observable fact that the strongest has the greatest power (which is actually just a tautology) be the result of a determined world

This is funny because I was just going to ask you the same question. Disagreement in a determinist world, has no ultimate means of arbitration. I would assume these disagreements are caused because there are different causes involved in the effects consciousness produces. However, free will allows us to make errors in belief and action in which the source of those errors is in self, and ultimately, self-correctable. In contrast, any “errors” in determinism could not be known as errors and I’m not sure I understand how there is a concept of error especially on the more abstract or conceptual levels of knowledge. Also, how, in determinism, can anything at all not correspond to reality (which is how I view the concept of truth/falsehood.) If reality is causing all thought and perception, how can anything be incorrect, since every thought and deed would be caused, and therefore, correspond to reality. However, people do disagree. In determinism, contrary beliefs are caused by the causes in their realities, and so both are either true, or just are. In other words, logic has no ability to arbitrate disagreement or connect thought to reality because it is part of a casual chain and is no more valuable to determining reality than any of a host of causes. Logical contradiction becomes true or loses its power, thereby rendering logic moot. In other words, if I use logic, it’s because previous causes caused my logic, which caused my belief from “my reality” by necessity. The other person’s argument without the use of logic (or with an error in logic) is caused by previous causes in a chain that necessarily stems from “their” reality. We must, therefore, have different realities, but there remains no means of arbitration in terms of disagreement.

Now, I admit I have a problem. If errors are caused by self, how can we know if we are right or not? I’m left with a big funk here. But my funk allows the possibility of knowledge which corresponds to reality and explains disagreement while keeping logic in tact as a means of interpreting reality without being caused by it by necessity. Logic becomes one of the arbiters for disagreement and can establish correct and incorrect thinking in its relation to reality under a free will premise. Determinism renders logic as subservient to imput/output expectations

Also, the claim of determinism says that determinism corresponds to reality, but free will does not. However, my belief in free will has been caused by my reality. So if determinism is true, how can my belief in free will be false? I have a feeling this will make you frustrated because you feel you have answered this objection already, which then I must admit that I don’t get your answer.

Furthermore, when we deliberate and make decisions, we often sway back and forth between two or more poles before we finally decide. However, cause and effect, as far as I can think of examples, works automatically. The very nature of deliberation seems to indicate that it is not an automatic cause and effect process. I go back and forth rehashing all sorts of thoughts and some of them many times, before I reach a decision or make no decision at all. This hardly seems the “visual” of an automatic process.

So I guess the principle of free will that allows a sense of Truth and value is that errors can be ultimately self-induced, and therefore, self-correctable? I put this in question form because it is a thought in process.

As for the strong man thing, I’ll drop it because it is an argument from consequence. Determinism provides no ultimate basis for condemning the strong man’s unjust use of his strength, in my opinion.



Thanks again for the zesty discussion.

 

[quatona]

Before I post, i want to say that the reason i asked for your responses to those statements is because I am interested in learning how you view these problems. I have meny issues in process and one of them is free will and one of them is conciousness and its relationship to reality. So, I'd like to learn you opinions to shed light on my own deliberations on these topics.

Yes, Silenus, there are a lot of interesting things out there to discuss for us, and I will happily give you my idea on consciousness, reality and all that jazz, and discuss them with you – but for the time being my interest is pretty narrow: I want you to give me a conclusive reasoning for your claim that being determined does not allow for our ideas to be accurate (or for knowing that our ideas are accurate), whilst having free-will does. (#11)
In my observation you conflate every idea that I tell you about with „determinism“ (I feel that even if I told you that I like to play Badminton I will sooner or later find that mentioned as a tenet of determinism ). So I try to stay on track and don´t say anything that might contribute to confusion about what determinism means.




Quote:
"Judging objectively" appears to be a contradiction in terms. I am willing, though, to accept for this part of the discussion and for the sake of this particular question, that there is such a thing as an objective reality . . . and being determined does not guarantee such an alignment or even makes it downright impossible for our perception to be "in sync" with this objective reality (again, depending on what your claim actually is).

This comment interests me because I would assume that determinists would believe in an unknowable reality, but a reality nonetheless.

Please don´t forget that what you assume about determinism might not be a claim of determinism, please!
But, to an extent, I guess I understand where you are coming from:
If you hold the notion that what is done and thought is determined by factors, one must work from the idea that such factors (i.e. some sort of „reality“) exist. Is that what you are getting at? I think I agree.
Now, the next question would be where this „reality“ exists. I don´t think it must necessarily be concluded to be „external“ (to a whatever that needs to be defined as „internal“), although I guess that the majority of determinists – just like almost everybody - assume there is a material reality „out there“ and that what we experience is at least some (more or less accurate and filtered) reflection of something that exists and not of nothing. It would also be almost self-suggesting that the process of experiencing is a physical process – i.e. something physical (a „reality“) must exist.
I am not entirely sure that these are necessary assumptions, but – as I have already conceded long ago – we can for purposes of this discussion keep to the assumption that a determinist agrees with the existence of the physical realm.
The distinction between internal and external remains tricky, though, and if it is crucial to your points, please give me your definitions and explanations.
I do, however, not understand why you think that determinism should presuppose this „reality“ to be unknowable.

I guess the difficulty I see in determinism is that, especially on the upper levels of conceptualization and abstraction, you are locked into a cloud of unknowing.

If that is so, please explain how „free-willism“ provides a way out of that „cloud of unknowing“ rather than determinism. (#12)
I personally am inclined to think that these „upper levels of conceptualization and abstraction“ have not much to do with reality. The more abstract a concept gets the more it is a statement of the experiencing and processing mind about itself rather than the phyiscal reality. That´s why I actually try to keep it simple and stay as close as possible to what is concretely observable and measurable. We observe and predict cause and effect everywhere, so this is – although of course still an abstraction – not one of the „high level ones“ that I think you are talking about (but this paragraph is just my opinion, and not a tenet of determinism).

There must be some level of the will that deliberates and chooses to make knowledge of reality par excellence possible.

I have understood that statement already the first twelve times, and repeating it is not necessary. What I would like to see is an explanation how having „freewill“ is opening the way knowledge that being determined doesn´t. (#13)

I’m not yet trying to argue that free will makes assurance of objective statements a lock, but it does, philosophically, create the possibility of objective truth statements in the “upper levels.”

Ok, I think I can nail the problem in our conversation now:
There may be a misunderstanding as to what you are talking about when you say „in determinism“. I am assuming you talk about the hypothetical scenario in which people are factually determined (FD), whilst actually you perhaps mean „For a person who assumes that humans are determined“ (PD).
You see the difference, and you see the difference as to how those different „ifs“ have to be approached?
So please clarify this, before proceeding with statements about „in determinism“. For the time being I will add (FD) or (PD) to my responses (signifying that of the scenarios which can possibly be meant). But that means I am doing your work for you. Please be precise in distinguishing which of the scenarios you are talking about in the future!

I’m not yet trying to argue that free will makes assurance of objective statements a lock, but it does, philosophically, create the possibility of objective truth statements in the “upper levels.”

Well, determinism doesn´t create anything. The human mind is downright determined to conceptualize and abstract, and I wouldn´t know why determinism of all shouldn´t acknowledge that.
Interestingly though, determinism seems not to go to these „upper levels“. It remains pretty close to the observable and does not introduce cloudy concepts that carry a lot of „unknowns“, such as „freewill“. Insofar it seems pretty consistent.

I am not saying that the “free willist” don’t have problems here going from the possibility of objective knowledge to the probability, and then to the assurance of objectivity. There are big problems.

Ok. How are their problems fundamentally different from those of the determinists? How does the fact that they assume that „choice“ adds some unknowable and uncalculable bits and pieces to the process of getting in touch with reality (and I mean the „low level“ reality here) would make their conclusion that this freely chosen reality is the „objective reality“ any more plausible than if determinists did it?
[quote ]I am saying determinism doesn’t allow me to know whether I am correct or not and I’m pretty sure we agreed on that earlier, although maybe I am wrong here.[/quote] Are you talking (FD) or (PD) here?
Now, I don´t know why I have to repeat so often that I do not agree with this statement either way. The fact that the human mind needs to perceive reality and is not identical with what it perceives is the logical obstacle to assuming it could have „full knowledge“ of this reality. Perception separates the observer and the observed, therefore I see a logical problem with the idea that the mind can be identical with the observed. Just like a photo can be pretty accurate, but is never the thing, and there are necessarily differences. A reflection, nothing more. (Disclaimer: This is just my personal statement, not a tenet of determinism).

I am not saying that all aspects of humanity are free; some aspects of consciousness would have to be determined to assure a connection to reality.

Good. Everything else would make no sense, no? Now the determinist keeps to this which is logically necessary as well as observable: an impact of reality on the mind; and he abstains from assumptions such as an unexplained device in humans that adds some arbitrariness to the discernment of reality.

And, this is where my thoughts always become jumbled, because there seems to be counter-intuitions going on both sides of the fence.

Agreed. That´s why I think pointing out the counter-intuition of one side in order to show it is inconsistent doesn´t cut it. The „problem“ of discerning reality (and the paradoxes that come with self-reference) is a problem that is independent from determinism and „freewillism“ and affects both alike.

I admit, I flirt between libertarianism and compatabalism and am somewhat undecided between the two.

I am too long out of the philosophy reading business – so I must admit that I do not really know the tenets of these concepts.

Now, how does a free will allow for either objectivity or truth and knowledge . . .

Ah – finally!



[FONT=&quot]t.b.c.
[/FONT]

 

[quatona]

This is funny because I was just going to ask you the same question. Disagreement in a determinist world, has no ultimate means of arbitration.

I have to ask again: do you mean „disagreement in a determined world“ (FD)or as a problem for the determinist view(PD)?

Anyways: I would expect you to first show how there is an „ultimate means of arbitration“ for subjectively perceiving minds, before you make the claim that this is something that determinism prevents.
I mean, I could as well say that in a world with big trees there is no „ultimate means of arbitration“. Would make you wonder what big trees have to do with anything, no? Likewise, I wonder what the determinist view or being determined have to do with anything.

I would assume these disagreements are caused because there are different causes involved in the effects consciousness produces.

Not sure how this statement is meant. Is it a description of what you think determinism says about it, or is it your opinion?
I say that differences in the factors involved determine different results.
It´s actually quite simple: With different data input come different results.
I mean there is a reason why pretty much all people thousand years back believed that the earth was flat, and today almost everybody believes it is approximately spherical. We can also predict that a child with no information but face value will think of the earth as flat. Now, „face value“, „scientific knowledge“, „ ‚indoctrination’“ are just some of the countless factors that can differ. So I do not think it has to take me by surprise if there are still differences and some people believe the earth is flat.

However, free will allows us to make errors in belief and action in which the source of those errors is in self, and ultimately, self-correctable. In contrast, any “errors” in determinism could not be known as errors

How the heck does the fact that you choose what you believe allow for spotting errors rather than being determined by reality? „the correcting of errors“ itself would be subject to choice and the choice could as well make you believe that an actual introduction of error is the correction of error.
I don´t see the connection between choosing a belief and correctness (#14). Whilst – if looking at the determined man - I would easily see a connection between completeness of data and error correction. (Please note that this is not an argument for determinism, it is merely to show how your assertion still makes no sense to me, and even from the pov of intuitivity – which is not really relevant – seems to speak for knowledge in a determined world rather than a world in which you are free to believe what you will wills to believe.

and I’m not sure I understand how there is a concept of error especially on the more abstract or conceptual levels of knowledge.

I do not see a solution to this, either. Yet, you are „blaming“ this on being determined without even having a concept of it.

Also, how, in determinism, can anything at all not correspond to reality (which is how I view the concept of truth/falsehood.) If reality is causing all thought and perception, how can anything be incorrect, since every thought and deed would be caused, and therefore, correspond to reality.

You make it sound like all reality is perceived at once. This is, of course, not so. People have perceived very different segments of reality and are determined by a lot of individual factors (genetics, upbringing, hormonal balance, etc. etc.), and therefore it is no surprise at all that their minds come to different conclusions. And interestingly, the more these factors can be shown to be similar, the more agreement we observe. Two people from the same culture sitting there and looking in the same direction will usually agree on what they see. (And here I have mentioned only few of the factors, and it´s enough to get them to have them agree, even though billions of factors are different).

However, people do disagree. In determinism, contrary beliefs are caused by the causes in their realities, and so both are either true, or just are.

Well, if assuming there to be a reality the one that is a more precise reflection of this reality is more correct. I guess you are actually talking about the lack of „arbitration“, right?
So, praytell (#15): How does everybody choosing their beliefs freely allow for „arbitration“? I need to know this urgently, because this is how you keep argueing for the superiority of „freewillism“, and you still haven´t shown it. You keep concentrating on showing how it is a problem for determinism. This doesn´t make a case for „freewillism“, unless you can show how people choosing their beliefs allows for „arbitration“.

In other words, logic has no ability to arbitrate disagreement or connect thought to reality because it is part of a casual chain and is no more valuable to determining reality than any of a host of causes.

I´m afraid you have lost me completely here. Please show (#16) how logic becomes less of an arbitrational standard if we are determined to go by logic than if we choos logic as an arbitrational standard.

Logical contradiction becomes true or loses its power, thereby rendering logic moot.

I do not see how this follows. If logic is an adequate means of arbitration, then being determined to use logic doesn´t change anything about it.
If you can choose or reject logic as a means of arbitration things seem to be even worse. Please explain (#17).

In other words, if I use logic, it’s because previous causes caused my logic, which caused my belief from “my reality” by necessity. The other person’s argument without the use of logic (or with an error in logic) is caused by previous causes in a chain that necessarily stems from “their” reality. We must, therefore, have different realities, but there remains no means of arbitration in terms of disagreement.

And if everybody is free to choose correct or faulty logic you have exactly the same problem. There is no means for us to „objectively (choose to) decide“ who is right. (#19)

Now, I admit I have a problem. If errors are caused by self, how can we know if we are right or not? I’m left with a big funk here.

Yes, as I said, same problem.

But my funk allows the possibility of knowledge which corresponds to reality and explains disagreement while keeping logic in tact as a means of interpreting reality without being caused by it by necessity.

No, if applying the same reasoning by which you exclude arbitration for a determined opinions, you have to conclude the same inability for a chosen opinions.

Logic becomes one of the arbiters for disagreement and can establish correct and incorrect thinking in its relation to reality under a free will premise.

Not anymore if we choose it to be the arbiter (or not) than when we are determined to use it as the arbiter (or not). (#20)

Determinism renders logic as subservient to imput/output expectations

And, by the same token, „freewillism“ renders logic a subservient to individual choice. I fail to see the advantage. (#21)

Since logic is (on all sides of the spectrum, accepted axiomatically as the prerequisite for drawing conclusions) there is actually no problem. We will face disagreements no matter whether we assume that people are determined to reject or choose to reject logic. The fact that logic is chosen as the arbiter of correctness doesn´t give it any more power than the fact that we are determined to accept it as this arbiter.

Also, the claim of determinism says that determinism corresponds to reality, but free will does not.

What??? You must be kidding! You were the one who brought the whole thing of corresponding up as an argument for „freewillism“, telling me that „freewill“ allows for it (going to great length about the knowledge in „higher abstraction levels“ with „freewill“ and whatnot) while determinism doesn´t (and I keep and keep asking you how you get there), and now you tell me you freewillism doesn´t even claim to be able to do such?

We haven´t, by the way, established that determinism makes such a claim. All we have agreed upon – for the sake of the argument – that determinism assumes there to be a reality and assumes certain factors to impact our views.

However, my belief in free will has been caused by my reality. So if determinism is true, how can my belief in free will be false?

Because the input data are incomplete. Because a certain combination of those assorted data determines misconclusions. Because your opinion about a particular subject (excerpt) of this reality is not only determined by the subject itself, but by countless other factors.

I have a feeling this will make you frustrated because you feel you have answered this objection already, which then I must admit that I don’t get your answer.

Yup. I don´t blame you for it, but I am really at my wits end. I have no idea anymore how to word my question in a way that helps determining you to answer it and puts a counterdetermining factor to your current determination of evading it.

Furthermore, when we deliberate and make decisions, we often sway back and forth between two or more poles before we finally decide. However, cause and effect, as far as I can think of examples, works automatically. The very nature of deliberation seems to indicate that it is not an automatic cause and effect process. I go back and forth rehashing all sorts of thoughts and some of them many times, before I reach a decision or make no decision at all.

Yes. This is because constantly and permanently data are added and others fade away, and since all data are interdependent in their effects, there is no surprise at all in view of conclusions changing. Only the (completely irrelevant) fact that a flie sits down on your hand co-determines the direction of your thoughts. In the „big questions“, by the way, we do not observe frequent short-term to and forth changes (I mean, we are discussing for pages, new data all the way, and you still believe in „freewill“.)
Whilst, if for example picking a dish from the menu we are facing completely new data coming in and changing quickly that ask for a quick decision. After reading #1-#5 you want #4, and after reading until #20 you want #16 different because new data have come in. If your girlfriend says she takes #15, you may find that it is boring to take two very similar dishes (new data), and since you have read to #30 (new data) you now pick #29. You remember that you had something similar last week (new data), the waiter gives an recommendation (new data) etc. etc. (And this is a very simplified description, which only mentions the most upfront and obvious data entries and changes).

This hardly seems the “visual” of an automatic process.

If you take into account the permanent change of experience, the permanent change of focus of perception, the permanent change of reality (in short: the permanent change of data) and the interdependence of all these data, it is hardly surprising. The change is what is determined itself.
I mean even my computer changes permanently due to new input.

So I guess the principle of free will that allows a sense of Truth and value is that errors can be ultimately self-induced, and therefore, self-correctable?

Whilst, by the same token, in the principle of freewill there are no such things as „self-induced“ errors, in the first place, and therefore such a self-correction is not even required.

I put this in question form because it is a thought in process.

Well, that claim was at the core of your argument so far...
Am I right in assuming that i can stop asking for a substantiation now, because your thought process so far doesn´t allow you to provide it?

[FONT=&quot] Now, maybe we should move to intriguing new shores now - like our ideas about reality, for example? [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]

As for the strong man thing, I’ll drop it because it is an argument from consequence. Determinism provides no ultimate basis for condemning the strong man’s unjust use of his strength, in my opinion.

I fail to see how having the choice to does. (#22)[FONT=&quot]
Knowing that both of you have (merely) chosen your judgement puts you at an impassee just as much as knowing that both of you are determined to hold your judgements.



[/FONT]

 

[phsyxx]

I govern my own reality, thank you.

If we do not know, why is it ok to fill in the gap of our knowledge with a God?
Ancient mankind has shown that filling in the gap of knowledge with a God simply does not function to answer questions: just like when they believed lightening was a God; the supernatural origins of lightening was proven wrong.

And the supernatural origins of heavying have also been wrongly attributed to the Devil!
Although, I could deny the fact that you govern your own reality, considering that you have to use the rules that govern the language which you speak, and therefore, have spelt the word "lightning" incorrectly.

 

[Silenus]

Well, that claim was at the core of your argument so far...

Am I right in assuming that I can stop asking for a substantiation now, because your thought process so far doesn´t allow you to provide it?

[FONT=&quot]Now, maybe we should move to intriguing new shores now - like our ideas about reality, for example[/FONT]

Not at all. You have raised some interesting points and I am interacting and thinking about them. This is usually how a conversation works. That was what you said you were interested in, right, a conversation? The core of my argument on this thread had only some relation to determinism, (however it is the core of my discussion with you) but I made a statement, you pounced on it, and I have no problem letting a conversation take its course. At this point, I am more interesting in hearing your views on consciousness and reality than I am continuing this conversation for the time being, but, being that I can't help myself . . .

With different data input come different results

I'm going to start here. So, our disagreements are caused by different input data. Some of that input is environmental and some of it is hereditary. Being that our environments and, definitely, our heredity causes will never match, since we all are the sum of our causes and they are out of our control, there is no means of arbitration. The same existence that causes me caused you . . . the same everything that makes me think one way, makes you think the other. In such a situation, how do you value one cause over another? In such a situation, how do we rightly say another person is wrong? We could say the person who is right is the person who has the "access to the most causes," but, even if we could accumulate the total of environmental causes to make our position secure, our hereditary genetics will never match, and since we are locked by these causes and can't judge them, since the value of our causes are equal, there is no arbitration. There is no truth with a capital T. If, however, there is a standard by which things can be judged, and I can be independent of the causes I am judging, capital T truth become possible (remember, I took a step back and said determinism makes arbitrating disagreement impossible from the get go, while free will, if true, gives man control and independence from the causes around him. If there a way to judge causes and reality, there is a way to determine the value of causes and input, the error in abstraction. Now, I haven’t demonstrated how free will would supply this, I know. But at point in the conversation, I think that determinism renders it impossible, while free will opens the possibility.

Now, „face value“, „scientific knowledge“, „ ‚indoctrination’“ are just some of the countless factors that can differ

All these causes, in determinism, have equal value (impact), they are all causes outside of our control. We are controlled by them.

ot so. People have perceived very different segments of reality and are determined by a lot of individual factors (genetics, upbringing, hormonal balance, etc. etc.), and therefore it is no surprise at all that their minds come to different conclusions. And interestingly, the more these factors can be shown to be similar, the more agreement we observe. Two people from the same culture sitting there and looking in the same direction will usually agree on what they see.

But when two cultures collide . . . again, no arbitration.

How does everybody choosing their beliefs freely allow for „arbitration“? I need to know this urgently, because this is how you keep arguing for the superiority of „freewillism“, and you still haven’t shown it. You keep concentrating on showing how it is a problem for determinism. This doesn´t make a case for „freewillism“, unless you can show how people choosing their beliefs allows for „arbitration“.

I’m going to concede this for the moment. I'm hoping to learn something in the realm of consciousness and reality from you. Free will simply allows for control, but I admit I see now that it puts the problem off for one step later in my processes of thought. Even if it makes arbitration possible, it doesn’t make it probable until the nature of arbitration is shown. I have some thoughts, but I want to do some thinking and reading to firm them up a little instead of spewing somewhat unformed thoughts. I have my thoughts on what arbitration and knowledge is, but I’d like some time to think about its relation to our current discussion.

he fact that logic is chosen as the arbiter of correctness doesn´t give it any more power than the fact that we are determined to accept it as this arbiter.

How do you establish logic as superior to any of the other causes that control me? I see, by the many people who don't use or even know logic except as a distant echo, that people are not determined to follow the logic that structures their thinking. If I have a strong desire to have something a way which I know is illogical according to my other thoughts, but I really want it, my desires may win because of some cause . . . all causes are equal, after all . . . they all push me on to a conclusion I can't control.
All this means is that I am not writing these thoughts down, but that they were caused many years ago, and will result in some other results many years hence. However, I am not writing them because they are true. And you aren't writing them down because they are true. We are both being controlled by causes that we have no view of. It is all chemicals doing the tango. This isn't a discussion, just matter moving about in a fury of, in my case, late night wine drinking. Red to be exact. This is what I meant when I wrote this . . .

Also, the claim of determinism says that determinism corresponds to reality, but free will does not. However, my belief in free will has been caused by my reality. So if determinism is true, how can my belief in free will be false?

Determinism claims to be True with a capital T, as in universally true, as in not just matter in motion, but a statement of universal proportions. It is the result of the abstractions you put down last post. But, all causes being equal, my non-determinist view is caused and has the same ontological value as your view denying it. If I accept your determinism, I deny the ability to universalize abstract statements, thereby denying your statement of determinism. By agreeing with you, I am forced to look at a world full of people who believe in free will and deny you or at least hold you in extreme skepticism. All causes are equal after all. I have no way to deny the causes; I have no control over them all.
Sorry, I could not help myself. I had to respond. I admit, this is not fair, to ask you to elaborate on your views on consciousness and reality and continue the same argument. In the interest of fairness, I can't expect you to do so until I drop the present subject . . . so, if you are interested, I am willing to give you the last word on this and then move the conversation to reality and consciousness. But that is just my causes talking. My atoms bounce to the tune of intellectual fairness in conversations. By the way, I am not evading, I don't think that's a fair statement. You are, however, showing me some things I could question some more . . . maybe you will turn me back into a compatablist . . . but then again, my intuitions are as good a cause for my beliefs as my logic.

 

[quatona]

quote]Not at all. You have raised some interesting points and I am interacting and thinking about them. This is usually how a conversation works. That was what you said you were interested in, right, a conversation? The core of my argument on this thread had only some relation to determinism, (however it is the core of my discussion with you) but I made a statement, you pounced on it, and I have no problem letting a conversation take its course. At this point, I am more interesting in hearing your views on consciousness and reality than I am continuing this conversation for the time being, but, being that I can't help myself . . .[/quote]
That´s fine with me, Silenus. The only thing I would like to avoid (because I have seen it happening all the time) is to move on and then in the further course of the discussion find myself facing the ever same line of reasoning that I haven´t seen any basis for so far, or that I haven´t understood.
On another note, I have a little problem with the long interruptions in our conversation. After a few weeks I tend to have forgotten the details, where we have achieved common ground, etc. No criticism – just saying.

I'm going to start here. So, our disagreements are caused by different input data. Some of that input is environmental and some of it is hereditary.

Without further explanation I have problems accepting the dichotomy „environmental vs. hereditary“. It seems to be a variation of the dichotomy „external vs. internal“ which – as I have said a couple of times already - I think requires a lot of work to be established as meaningful (without begging the question). If you regard these distinctions important for the dicussion I would like you to do this work first.

Being that our environments and, definitely, our heredity causes will never match, since we all are the sum of our causes and they are out of our control, there is no means of arbitration.

Sorry, Silenus, but I am not sure I understand what you are trying to say here.
I don´t understand the first partial sentence (Never match with what? Each other? Why not?), and concerning the latter parts I don´t see how this is an exclusive problem to being determined. (#19? #20?)

The same existence that causes me caused you . . .

What do you mean – „the same existence“?

the same everything that makes me think one way, makes you think the other.

Of course not. We are in completely different situations, we are working from completely different data.

In such a situation, how do you value one cause over another?

According to what the data determine me to value more or less. As far as I can see this problem does not go away if I assume that I choose what I value. (#21)

In such a situation, how do we rightly say another person is wrong?

How is this problem solved if we assume we choose our valuation of data instead of being determined in our valuation? (#22)

We could say the person who is right is the person who has the "access to the most causes," but, even if we could accumulate the total of environmental causes to make our position secure, our hereditary genetics will never match, and since we are locked by these causes and can't judge them, since the value of our causes are equal, there is no arbitration.

The same applies if the different valuations are based on our individual choices. (#23)

There is no truth with a capital T.

Sure there isn´t. But that´s not a problem of determinism, it´s a problem of being different individuals.

If, however, there is a standard by which things can be judged, and I can be independent of the causes I am judging, capital T truth become possible

That appears to be merely a tautology.
However, the problem you keep pointing out is the lacking ability of arbitrating an assumed „Truth“ (and not the existence or non-existence of such "Truth" itself), and this problem doesn´t seem to be solved just because we can choose our opinions. (#24)

(remember, I took a step back and said determinism makes arbitrating disagreement impossible from the get go, while free will, if true, gives man control and independence from the causes around him. If there a way to judge causes and reality, there is a way to determine the value of causes and input, the error in abstraction.

I don´t see how there is (#25).
Please explain on the example of a factual or hypothetical disagreement how choice allows for abitration any better than being determined. Let´s, hypothetically, assume that the Truth is „Water is transparent“. Let´s assume that you hold the opinion that water is transparent and I don´t. Please explain the arbitration process that becomes possible if assuming we have chosen our opinions, and that is not possible if we assume that the sum of our data determines our opinions.

Now, I haven’t demonstrated how free will would supply this, I know. But at point in the conversation, I think that determinism renders it impossible, while free will opens the possibility.

Unless you show me how it does I don´t consider it common ground for the further course of our discussion, and whenever you use this argument I will keep counting up (if you don´t mind I will do that without further explanation in the future).

All these causes, in determinism, have equal value (impact), they are all causes outside of our control. We are controlled by them.

Yes, but they are different for each of us.

But when two cultures collide . . . again, no arbitration.

Yes. (#26)

I’m going to concede this for the moment. I'm hoping to learn something in the realm of consciousness and reality from you. Free will simply allows for control, but I admit I see now that it puts the problem off for one step later in my processes of thought. Even if it makes arbitration possible, it doesn’t make it probable until the nature of arbitration is shown.

Yes, exactly. Arbitration requires agreement. If this agreement is not given (be it due to being determined so or to be chosen) an assumed „Truth“ doesn´t help us with arbitration.

I have some thoughts, but I want to do some thinking and reading to firm them up a little instead of spewing somewhat unformed thoughts. I have my thoughts on what arbitration and knowledge is, but I’d like some time to think about its relation to our current discussion.

Fair enough, although I certainly would like to hear these thoughts, since they might help me get at least an idea as to what your answer is to the question I have asked 26 times by now.

How do you establish logic as superior to any of the other causes that control me?

I don´t have to establish that. I observe it. I observe that even people who (if their claims don´t make sense) appeal to logic as being not superiour use logic in their argument („Because logic is not superiour, I am allowed to make this illogical claim&#8220.

I see, by the many people who don't use or even know logic except as a distant echo, that people are not determined to follow the logic that structures their thinking.

True. Then again, using a method faultily does not mean you don´t accept it for a standard.
Just like making calculation errors doesn´t mean you reject the rules of mathematics as the standards for your mathematical calculation.

If I have a strong desire to have something a way which I know is illogical according to my other thoughts, but I really want it, my desires may win because of some cause . . . all causes are equal, after all . . . they all push me on to a conclusion I can't control.

The result and the problem wouldn´t be any different if your wantings would be chosen. (#27)

All this means is that I am not writing these thoughts down, but that they were caused many years ago, and will result in some other results many years hence.

How does that mean that you are not writing them down?

However, I am not writing them because they are true. And you aren't writing them down because they are true.

Yes, we are writing them down because we think they have merits. If you are right, you don´t aren´t any less right just because you are determined to hold an opinion that is congruent with the „Truth“.

We are both being controlled by causes that we have no view of.

Oh, I think we can track down a lot of these causes. That´s actually the advantage I see in determinism: We concentrate on that which we can track down, on that which can be explained.

It is all chemicals doing the tango.

Oh no, it´s much more. Chemicals are merely one of the countless factors.

This isn't a discussion, just matter moving about in a fury of, in my case, late night wine drinking. Red to be exact. This is what I meant when I wrote this . . .

Glad to hear you have made yourself comfortable. Unfortunately I stopped drinking alcohol a couple of months ago, and sometimes I miss it as an inspiration for discussions like these.
Quote:
Also, the claim of determinism says that determinism corresponds to reality, but free will does not. However, my belief in free will has been caused by my reality. So if determinism is true, how can my belief in free will be false?

Determinism claims to be True with a capital T, as in universally true, as in not just matter in motion, but a statement of universal proportions.

For me it´s just a way of looking at things without violating parsimony. We know billions of determining factors, and we know nothing about „freewill“.

It is the result of the abstractions you put down last post. But, all causes being equal, my non-determinist view is caused and has the same ontological value as your view denying it.

What do you mean „all causes being equal“? I don´t recall saying or implying anything to that effect. The causes are very different for each indididual, resulting in different opinions. Just like you don´t seem to accept that an assumed individual capacity to choose makes „all choices equal“ – else you would have the same problem (#27).

If I accept your determinism, I deny the ability to universalize abstract statements, thereby denying your statement of determinism.

If I accept your idea that we choose our opinions, I deny the ability to universalize abstract statements just the same (they are merely a result of our arbitrary choices, after all), thereby denying your „Truth“ statement of „freewill“. (#28)

By agreeing with you, I am forced to look at a world full of people who believe in free will and deny you or at least hold you in extreme skepticism.

I am not sure I understand: Is this merely an argument ad populum?
[quotes]All causes are equal after all.[/quote]
Says who? And what do you mean when saying this?
If there is an „objective reality“, a „Truth“, those causes that determine someone to see this „Truth“ are not equally valid as those which don´t. Just like those choices that would lead to the „Truth“ are not equally valid as those which wouldn´t. The problem of arbitration, however, remains in both scenarios.

I have no way to deny the causes; I have no control over them all.

Yes.

Sorry, I could not help myself. I had to respond. I admit, this is not fair, to ask you to elaborate on your views on consciousness and reality and continue the same argument. In the interest of fairness, I can't expect you to do so until I drop the present subject . . . so, if you are interested, I am willing to give you the last word on this and then move the conversation to reality and consciousness.

Well, I have given you my responses, and now it´s up to you to put your case (which I understand as: „ with choice arbitration is possible, whilst being determined prevents it&#8220 to rest, or to continue. I still don´t see how choice would make any difference for arbitration.

But that is just my causes talking. My atoms bounce to the tune of intellectual fairness in conversations. By the way, I am not evading, I don't think that's a fair statement.

In the quotes you have given I don´t find me saying this. I am too lazy to go back through the entire thread to find out if I have said it at one point. If I have said so it was surely not meant to blame you, but merely to tell you what my problem is: I don´t get an answer to my objection, instead I see the same claim simply repeated time and again.

You are, however, showing me some things I could question some more . . .

Feel free to go ahead!

maybe you will turn me back into a compatablist . . .

but then again, my intuitions are as good a cause for my beliefs as my logic.

Same here. Logic and intuition aren´t competing.
However, whilst intuitions may be sufficiently good causes for our beliefs, they aren´t sufficiently good arguments in discussions.

 

[peepnklown]

I could deny the fact that you govern your own reality, considering that you have to use the rules that govern the language which you speak, and therefore, have spelt the word "lightning" incorrectly.

It takes a ‘big-man’ to point out a mistyped word, eh?

 

[Silenus]

Quote:
Sorry, I could not help myself. I had to respond. I admit, this is not fair, to ask you to elaborate on your views on consciousness and reality and continue the same argument. In the interest of fairness, I can't expect you to do so until I drop the present subject . . . so, if you are interested, I am willing to give you the last word on this and then move the conversation to reality and consciousness.
Well, I have given you my responses, and now it´s up to you to put your case (which I understand as: „ with choice arbitration is possible, whilst being determined prevents it“) to rest, or to continue. I still don´t see how choice would make any difference for arbitration.

you missed my point here, I wanted to give you the last word in this discussion so that we could do as you suggested before and delve into your thoughts on conciousness and reality and how these things relate to the problem of truth. I was hoping you woul dgive your views here, but it wouldn't be fair fo rme to change the subject and still harp on the old one . . . so I gave you the last word on this in hopes that you would share your views on these conciousness, reality, and truth.

 

[quatona]

you missed my point here, I wanted to give you the last word in this discussion so that we could do as you suggested before and delve into your thoughts on conciousness and reality and how these things relate to the problem of truth. I was hoping you woul dgive your views here, but it wouldn't be fair fo rme to change the subject and still harp on the old one . . . so I gave you the last word on this in hopes that you would share your views on these conciousness, reality, and truth.

I see.
Do you have any particular questions? (That might help me getting started)

 

[Silenus]

Our previous discussion tended to revolve around the question of truth and objectivity. If I remembered correctly, you mentioned that the problem of objectivity is related to conciousness. Maybe talk about your view of conciousness and how it relates to the possibility or impossibility of objectivity and maybe throw in a defintition of reality to boot.

Thanks.

 

[quatona]

Our previous discussion tended to revolve around the question of truth and objectivity. If I remembered correctly, you mentioned that the problem of objectivity is related to conciousness. Maybe talk about your view of conciousness and how it relates to the possibility or impossibility of objectivity and maybe throw in a defintition of reality to boot.

Ok, I´ll try to give you a short sketch, although I am afraid I don´t have much to offer that might satisfy you. My ideas are characterized by acknowledgement of the great uncertainties we have to deal with, and with growing age I observe myself turning more and more towards pragmatic approaches.

Please keep in mind that everything we think about consciousness, mind, perception etc. is self-referential and hence can easily be shown to lead to paradoxes. I am fully aware that my ideas are no exception there, and in the interest of a fruitful discussion I would kindly ask you to – other than in our previous discussion – abstain from using it against my ideas selectively (whilst in fact it is a common problem of all philosophies concerning these topics).

All I have is „my reality“ – that which suggests itself as „real“ to me. Ideas, concepts, experiences – supposedly based on perception. Do I know, can I know how these – let´s say – „images“ come into being? No. The idea that they are reflections of something out there (like a physical world) is self-suggesting, but not ultimately substantiable. Everything from solipsism to the idea that there exists a world that can be accurately recognized (and everything in between) can not entirely be excluded. However, even in the latter case I would have to acknowledge that everything points to „the images“ being the products of my concepts, categories and ideas, nonetheless. Time and again I notice how my concepts, ideas, categories, perspectives are not so much resulting from what I mean to perceive („the images“), but determine „the images“. I change perspective, I apply different categories and concepts, and as a result the images change dramatically. At least both appear to change interdependently.

Thus, I basically see two options:

• There is nothing „out there“. All there is are the „images“. Everything is „mind theatre“.
• There is something out there to which the „images“ more or less refer, respond, relate. Something that merely exists in its immediacy and that my perception/mind/concepts/categories/needs form into those „images“. My mind structures and orders that which merely exists in its immediacy into distinct objects, it creates „the world“ as I see it.

Now, for myself it wouldn´t matter much which it is. As long as I am able to deal with „the world“ that my mind creates it doesn´t make a practical difference whether it is a reflection of something else or an entirly closed system. Yet, I tend towards notion B, for a simple reason: I cannot help having the image that there are other minds in „the world“ that require me to communicate with. Supposedly being in company, pragmatism calls its duty in that comparing „images“ appears to be useful, and agreement is useful. Interestingly and fortunately, agreement appears not that hard to achieve when it comes to certain ideas. Simply put: I can point my finger at something, say a word, and the next person will (more or less) accurately understand the concept that I apply. Our images seem to correspond in many cases sufficiently for certain purposes (and even if assuming the images themselves do not correspond, the way terms prove practically usable suggests that our categorization works in a sufficiently similar way.

However, there appear to be different layers at which our minds work. Unfortunately, there is a lot of disagreement and misunderstanding, either, and this disagreement (as well as the unability to sort out whether it points to different images or is merely a communication problem) seems to increase proportionally to the abstractness of the concepts in question.

For purely pragmatical purposes in view of intersubjectivity I tend to call that in which agreement can be and is reliably achieved „reality“. This is not to say that this is therefore an accurate reflection of an „objective“ world out there – it merely is to say that it is a sufficient basis for communication and intersubjective activity.

I will stop here for now.
Bottomline: I can think of reality as „my reality“ as well as an „intersubjective, agreed upon reality“. Both appear to be useful and even necessary. Whilst the idea of a discernable „objective reality“ or „truth“ is of no relevance to me, in view of the fact that (even if such existed) it wouldn´t survive my subjective perception and mind processing.

 

[VinceNoir]

"Governs reality"? What exactly do you mean by that? The anthropic principle is your friend here. Stuff like the laws of physics just are how they are. If they weren't, you wouldn't be here to wonder about it, would you? It's pretty meaningless to say that they could have been any different.

To quote Bertie Russell:

I completely agree. If the universe wasn't the way it was we wouldnt be here to wonder why.

 

[Silenus]

Please keep in mind that everything we think about consciousness, mind, perception etc. is self-referential and hence can easily be shown to lead to paradoxes. I am fully aware that my ideas are no exception there, and in the interest of a fruitful discussion I would kindly ask you to – other than in our previous discussion – abstain from using it against my ideas selectively (whilst in fact it is a common problem of all philosophies concerning these topics).

I don't know I agree that all ideas lead to self-referential paradoxes, but I have purposed to try to understand the foundations of where you're coming from, and so I think that I'm just going to ask some questions, and will try not to make them annoying, "I have an agenda and I'm not afraid to use it" type questions . . .

[All I have is „my reality“ – that which suggests itself as „real“ to me. Ideas, concepts, experiences – supposedly based on perception. Do I know, can I know how these – let´s say – „images“ come into being? No. The idea that they are reflections of something out there (like a physical world) is self-suggesting, but not ultimately substantiable.

Why do you say that the images and concepts are "supposedly" based on perception? I'm also not sure why you would say, also, that the correspondence to reality is not substainable. What makes the concept that my perceptions stem from something with stimulates them untenable?

Everything from solipsism to the idea that there exists a world that can be accurately recognized (and everything in between) can not entirely be excluded. However, even in the latter case I would have to acknowledge that everything points to „the images“ being the products of my concepts, categories and ideas, nonetheless. Time and again I notice how my concepts, ideas, categories, perspectives are not so much resulting from what I mean to perceive („the images“), but determine „the images“. I change perspective, I apply different categories and concepts, and as a result the images change dramatically. At least both appear to change interdependently.

Can you give me an examples of how your concepts impact the images (by this I am assuming here you mean the mental apprehension of perceptions, the "picture" of what your senses intake)? Maybe an example of how a change in concepts changes the image. I can see how concepts would lead to the understanding or lack thereof of a perception, but not how it would change it.

Let me ask you this . . . If I lack the concept ship in my head, is it then (since concepts can determine precepts) possible that I would not see the ship because I have no concept for it?

Our images seem to correspond in many cases sufficiently for certain purposes (and even if assuming the images themselves do not correspond, the way terms prove practically usable suggests that our categorization works in a sufficiently similar way

Do you believe it is possible for you and I to think the same thought, hold the same concept, apprehend the same perceptions?

However, there appear to be different layers at which our minds work. Unfortunately, there is a lot of disagreement and misunderstanding, either, and this disagreement (as well as the unability to sort out whether it points to different images or is merely a communication problem) seems to increase proportionally to the abstractness of the concepts in question.

How would you classify these layers, and what is the nature of abstraction? I ask because it seems to me that abstraction is unavoidable (simply by looking at this post) and so I wonder how you deal with disagreement here in the realm of abstraction.

Thanks for taking the time, if you do so.

If not, thanks for the good discussion.