A question for athiests

[quatona]

I don't know I agree that all ideas lead to self-referential paradoxes, but I have purposed to try to understand the foundations of where you're coming from, and so I think that I'm just going to ask some questions, and will try not to make them annoying, "I have an agenda and I'm not afraid to use it" type questions . . .

Fair enough and fine with me.
On a sidenote, I didn´t say that all ideas are self-referential, but all our ideas concerning our ideas.

Why do you say that the images and concepts are "supposedly" based on perception? I'm also not sure why you would say, also, that the correspondence to reality is not substainable. What makes the concept that my perceptions stem from something with stimulates them untenable?

I say this because I wouldn´t know how to tell the difference. Just like we assume that dreams aren´t perceptions that correspond with a reality out there, it may well be possible that everything else is a product of our minds without there being a reality that it corresponds to.

Can you give me an examples of how your concepts impact the images (by this I am assuming here you mean the mental apprehension of perceptions, the "picture" of what your senses intake)? Maybe an example of how a change in concepts changes the image. I can see how concepts would lead to the understanding or lack thereof of a perception, but not how it would change it.

A simple (and a little simplified, for clarity´s purpose) would be the difference between believing everything to be black and white and believing that there are grey areas. We will see what our concepts dictate to be reality. Another example would be a rotting wooden trunk in the forest. Depending on my knowledge, concepts and needs I could either see it as wood or as earth. A dark spot on the skin of a girl may be a charming, sexy thing for me, but a melanom to a dermatologist. Once I know that the dermatologist identified it as a life threatening tumor, my perception of this spot will be utterly changed.

Let me ask you this . . . If I lack the concept ship in my head, is it then (since concepts can determine precepts) possible that I would not see the ship because I have no concept for it?

Surely you would not see a ship.

Do you believe it is possible for you and I to think the same thought, hold the same concept, apprehend the same perceptions?

No, I don´t believe this.

How would you classify these layers, and what is the nature of abstraction?

I can´t give you a detailed analytical classification. Roughly, I would say that everything we can point a finger at and find a word for that everyone will in the future reliably use and be understood has a low level of abstraction. Whilst concepts that have no – assumed – physical object they are attached to have a higher level of abstraction. IOW abstractions that can be practically tested in terms of being agreed upon to a degree that makes them usable are lower level abstractions than those that are not testable.

I ask because it seems to me that abstraction is unavoidable (simply by looking at this post) and so I wonder how you deal with disagreement here in the realm of abstraction.

Sure abstraction is unavoidable, particularly when it comes to communication. Every word and every concept is product of an abstraction. Disagreement in the realm of abstraction doesn´t seem to leave me with much options to deal with it than acknowledging the disagreement. I´m not entirely sure what you are asking, I´m afraid. Tracking down the meta-concepts based on which the disagreed upon abstractions are held may lead to an improvement, in that we may at least understand better where the disagreement is actually located. I am greatly interested in getting a grip on my and everyone´s most basic axioms (unalienable core beliefs that defy rational support). Knowing them will help explaining most of the disagreements and prevent us from pointless discussions.

If not, thanks for the good discussion.

Same to you!

 

[Silenus]

Since I’m only posing questions, I’ll be able to respond more rapidly.

I say this because I wouldn’t know how to tell the difference. Just like we assume that dreams aren’t perceptions that correspond with a reality out there, it may well be possible that everything else is a product of our minds without there being a reality that it corresponds to.

But, we know the dream from reality because we enter and exit dream state. We know dreams as dreams because there are times when we are not in a dream. We’ve stepped out of it. Is there anything in the nature of reality that is comparable to this situation that would make a view of “mind theater” plausible?

A simple (and a little simplified, for clarity´s purpose) would be the difference between believing everything to be black and white and believing that there are grey areas. We will see what our concepts dictate to be reality. Another example would be a rotting wooden trunk in the forest. Depending on my knowledge, concepts and needs I could either see it as wood or as earth. A dark spot on the skin of a girl may be a charming, sexy thing for me, but a melanoma to a dermatologist. Once I know that the dermatologist identified it as a life threatening tumor, my perception of this spot will be utterly changed.

I think I see a difference in our definitions. I wouldn’t say the perception of the thing has changed, but my emotional response to it. It does color my view, but the sense of the thing itself hasn’t changed. Can you think of an example where a concept would change the perception of something, perception being the sensory facts of the object being apprehended?

Surely you would not see a ship.

Agreed. You would see a thing that is unable to be classified, and therefore, understood.

Do you believe it is possible for you and I to think the same thought, hold the same concept, apprehend the same perceptions?

No, I don’t believe this.

I think this is a place where we disagree, but I won’t expand on that because I’m still learning here. How do you see the ability to communicate and apprehend, the intersubjectivity you have mentioned before, without this ability?

Tracking down the meta-concepts based on which the disagreed upon abstractions are held may lead to an improvement, in that we may at least understand better where the disagreement is actually located. I am greatly interested in getting a grip on my and everyone’s most basic axioms (unalienable core beliefs that defy rational support). Knowing them will help explaining most of the disagreements and prevent us from pointless discussions.

But, say you track down the point of disagreement. How then do you deal with it? Is there a consistent “methodology” to be employed?



Thanks.

 

[quatona]

But, we know the dream from reality because we enter and exit dream state. We know dreams as dreams because there are times when we are not in a dream. We’ve stepped out of it. Is there anything in the nature of reality that is comparable to this situation that would make a view of “mind theater” plausible?

Well, the fact that we wake up from dreams gave me the opportunity to even use this for an illustration. The point is exactly that if all we encounter is an "everlasting dream" or "mind theater" to which there is no external reality that it reflects we could not know about that. So it is one of the options. We simply can´t tell the difference. I am not and have not been saying that I believe in the mere "mind theater" - I simply mentioned it as one of the valid options that we have no (and can´t have) evidence against.
I personally tend towards the notion that there is "something", but this something merely IS in complete immediacy, unless our minds occupy and - if you will - corrupt it by shaping it into things, objects, by dividing it by categories and distinctions. This is how we create our "realities", and since what we are most concerned with about our realities are indeed the objects, things, categories and distinctions, I am convinced that our realities are basically our own products and do not do justice (in lack of a better term) to THAT WHICH IS. In fact, we insist on making it the opposite of what it is. Our mind arranges and structures that WHICH MERELY IS into what we need and want to be there. Not that there´s anything wrong with that, though.

I think I see a difference in our definitions. I wouldn’t say the perception of the thing has changed, but my emotional response to it. It does color my view, but the sense of the thing itself hasn’t changed.

I´m not sure I understand what you mean when saying "the sense of the thing".
Can you think of an example where a concept would change the perception of something, perception being the sensory facts of the object being apprehended?[/quote]
Well, for me it happens all the time, so I have a problem picking one particular impressive or illustrative example. Let´s say a person who has been blind (or just been able to distinguish dark and light roughly) gets a surgery that gives him perfect sight.
Or: I perceive something as being meaningless random chaos (maybe I can not even distinguish it from its environment - I do not even identify it as an object or an entity), and later I adopt a concept which makes me perceive this something as perfectly ordered and so strongly in contrast to its environment that it becomes a highly significant object or entity. (Same is possible the other way round, too).
Or: for the first time looking at a drop of water under a microscope.

Agreed. You would see a thing that is unable to be classified, and therefore, understood.

In some cases I wouldn´t even identify it as a "thing".

I think this is a place where we disagree, but I won’t expand on that because I’m still learning here. How do you see the ability to communicate and apprehend, the intersubjectivity you have mentioned before, without this ability?

I see it as very limited, questionable, doubtful and fragile. However, if using "low level abstractions" it often seems to be pragmatically helpful and reasonably successful. Emphasis on "seems".
Whilst in regards to "high level abstractions" its failure and downright impossibility is obvious.
This, by the way, is the reason why I - out of mere pragmatism - am willing to assume there to be a physical reality to which our concepts (more or less accurately) relate: The degree of agreement we achieve when communicating our ideas about it makes this assumption usable.
However, it doesn´t grant it. Imagine I sense that as "red" which everybody else senses as "blue", i.e. compared to everybody else my sensing of these colours is swapped. We will communicate flawlessly without ever getting the idea that the words "red" and "blue" have completely different meanings for the two of us.

But, say you track down the point of disagreement. How then do you deal with it? Is there a consistent “methodology” to be employed?

To be more precise, I can track down the point of disagreement in the way someone contradicts me, just like I notice agreement if someone says "You are spot on - I fully subscribe to your notion." Unfortunately I can not know whether any of these cases of agreement or disagreement is merely based on communication problems.
The common methodology is: Definitions, definitions of the words used in definitions, definitions of again these words etc. This doesn´t change anything about the fact that even after the umpteenth definition we are still using words and cannot really know which concepts the persons involved use these words as signifiers for.
So all this is a process of approximation the success of which can ultimately not be tested or verified.

On a sidenote, I see many persons who are aware of this problem and are willing to spend a lot of effort on on this approximation and improvement of communication, and others who don´t seem to care a bit and often even feel offended if you ask for further clarification and more definitions (probably because they aren´t even aware of the problem).

 

[Silenus]

Well, the fact that we wake up from dreams gave me the opportunity to even use this for an illustration. The point is exactly that if all we encounter is an "everlasting dream" or "mind theater" to which there is no external reality that it reflects we could not know about that. So it is one of the options. We simply can´t tell the difference. I am not and have not been saying that I believe in the mere "mind theater" - I simply mentioned it as one of the valid options that we have no (and can´t have) evidence against.

However, it doesn´t grant it. Imagine I sense that as "red" which everybody else senses as "blue", i.e. compared to everybody else my sensing of these colours is swapped. We will communicate flawlessly without ever getting the idea that the words "red" and "blue" have completely different meanings for the two of us.

These examples remind me of that straw man for religious belief, the flying spaghetti monster. It is true, that if I were in an eternal dream, or if my sight were different than your is a color context, we would have no way of knowing. At the same time, I have no reason to believe in any of these things. They are interesting speculations showing the inability to define or prove things from which you are not ontologically disconnected or essentially distinct. But, like Descartes’ demon, I don’t think of these as a reliable basis for skepticism. I guess my next question, based on this, would be what is the difference between knowledge and opinion. What classifies one from the other?

personally tend towards the notion that there is "something", but this something merely IS in complete immediacy, unless our minds occupy and - if you will - corrupt it by shaping it into things, objects, by dividing it by categories and distinctions. This is how we create our "realities", and since what we are most concerned with about our realities are indeed the objects, things, categories and distinctions, I am convinced that our realities are basically our own products and do not do justice (in lack of a better term) to THAT WHICH IS. In fact, we insist on making it the opposite of what it is. Our mind arranges and structures that WHICH MERELY IS into what we need and want to be there. Not that there’s anything wrong with that, though.

How do I come to the knowledge that I am restructuring reality into the opposite of its nature, if knowledge comes from this restructuring process? In other words, don’t you have to claim to have contact with that which merely is to be able to say that what you conceive is in opposition to it?

for the first time looking at a drop of water under a microscope.

I can see how understanding something would make the perception of the drop clearer (i.e. I could distinguish elements that before were more indistinguishable), but I don’t see how my basic perception has changed. I was able to see a blob in the drop before, now I am able to see the blob and its various parts because, after study, I have found functions and have taken closer looks. Without this view of how I form concepts that make the blob in the drop more clear, how do we ever get to the point of forming concepts to make the things clearer in the first place?

So all this is a process of approximation the success of which can ultimately not be tested or verified.

Would it be possible to test it in the realm of action? For instance, we all have the concept of a blueprint, and the building gets build, exists, stands, and I enter into it. Wouldn’t that be evidence of the success of these processes?

 

[quatona]

These examples remind me of that straw man for religious belief, the flying spaghetti monster.

Do they?

It is true, that if I were in an eternal dream, or if my sight were different than your is a color context, we would have no way of knowing. At the same time, I have no reason to believe in any of these things.

What do you mean - "things"? Colours and such?

They are interesting speculations showing the inability to define or prove things from which you are not ontologically disconnected or essentially distinct. But, like Descartes’ demon, I don’t think of these as a reliable basis for skepticism.

They are speculations just like any other idea about the human condition.

I guess my next question, based on this, would be what is the difference between knowledge and opinion. What classifies one from the other?

Since "knowledge" and "opinion" are just words we simply would have to come to an agreement in which way we want to use them. What they mean depends largely on the context, anyways.
I don´t think the term "knowledge" is usable in the absolute sense many people would like it to have meaning. To me it isn´t usable beyond very practical, pragmatic use in everyday life and a pretty obvious frame of reference (If I have seen it written on its door I know that the supermarket is open 9-22, if I am just guessing it because most supermarkets of that kind are open 9-22, it´s my opinion. If I observe cause-effect chains and have a sufficiently reliable explanation why this must be so, I will "know" that A and B result in C.)

How do I come to the knowledge that I am restructuring reality into the opposite of its nature, if knowledge comes from this restructuring process?

You don´t come to this knowledge.

In other words, don’t you have to claim to have contact with that which merely is to be able to say that what you conceive is in opposition to it?

Sure this scenario assumes that you have some sort of contact. Just like paint has contact with the empty sheet of paper and this contact results in a colourful result.

I can see how understanding something would make the perception of the drop clearer (i.e. I could distinguish elements that before were more indistinguishable), but I don’t see how my basic perception has changed.

I guess I don´t know what you mean by "basic perception" then. If I can see "the same object" as merely a transparent bit of fluid, and in the next moment I can see it as a whole microcosmos of living beings I would call that a change of the basic perception of this thing. If this is not enough change of perception for you, what would "change of basic perception" require, by your standards?

I was able to see a blob in the drop before, now I am able to see the blob and its various parts because, after study, I have found functions and have taken closer looks. Without this view of how I form concepts that make the blob in the drop more clear, how do we ever get to the point of forming concepts to make the things clearer in the first place?

There is no "clearer". For my everyday use of water the microcosmos I can see under the microscope is competely irrelevant, confusing and doesn´t add any clarity. When I wash myself, a drop of water is something completely different than when I look at it under a miscroscope.
The thing is: we discern and conceptualize by different criteria. One of them is, for example, function. In which case we usually describe what we want to do rather than making statements about things. The same goes for every other criterium: We make statements about ourselves rather than anything else. The selection of criteria and categories that we use for our statements and descriptions are themselves statements about what we need, what purposes we have, what we regard relevant.

Would it be possible to test it in the realm of action? For instance, we all have the concept of a blueprint, and the building gets build, exists, stands, and I enter into it. Wouldn’t that be evidence of the success of these processes?

Yes, that´s the kind of pragmatic usability of the idea of a common reality I have been talking about. If it works the process was successful. If it doesn´t work, it wasn´t. The individual concepts of the persons involved were communicated in a way that was sufficiently successful for the purpose at hand.

 

[griggs1947]

That monster is no straw man but an attempt to show that intelligent design is on as flimsy ground as it is as I understand matters.

 

[griggs1947]

I find that causal free will- soft determinism, compatabilism- is right.As I had psychological problems-bad causes- I needed to correct them. With medecine and therapy, I have changed those causes for better ones such that I am more at ease with others.If one gets into trouble with the law-causes, it would certainly help to exchange friends who would get one into trouble for ones who would not. One is responsible for ones causes then to an extent.There are degrees of free will.Some have to start with very little in order to change.Acausal free will would be random chaos, I think.

 

[griggs1947]

Rea is wrong. Everyone should, as Antony Flew maintains, start with the presumption of naturalism. Naturalism does depend on provisional,current science which shows with evidence and theory that there might be a succession of bounces or buds, so that an eternal multiverse is possible.Matter -energy,reflecting laws of nature, can be neither destroyed nor created. Some aver nevertheless that God is the sustainer of this multiverse.

 

[griggs1947]

Natural selection is a power that does not require an outside power to direct it.It shows no purposes and goals.It is a non sequitur to allege that from there there is no purpose for us whatsoever: we create our own purposes.See Robert Price's "The Reason Driven Life" to see that in detail.

 

[Silenus]

What do you mean - "things"? Colours and such?

They are speculations just like any other idea about the human condition

J sorry, no, the speculation about the possibilities of the dream world and the different concepts of the perception of color. I don’t see them just like other speculations because I perceive or conceive of no reason to believe them. They are speculations without perceptual content to affirm them. I can admit that the possibility does exist just like I can admit the possibility of space creatures on Alpha Centari. It is conceivable, but not believable.

How do I come to the knowledge that I am restructuring reality into the opposite of its nature, if knowledge comes from this restructuring process?

You don´t come to this knowledge.

Okay, them I’m confused. Would you not have to have knowledge of the reality to know that your minds workings of it do not do justice and are the opposite of it? How do I know my conceptions are not that which is, if its all I got?

In other words, don’t you have to claim to have contact with that which merely is to be able to say that what you conceive is in opposition to it?

Sure this scenario assumes that you have some sort of contact. Just like paint has contact with the empty sheet of paper and this contact results in a colorful result.

But, in your analogy, I have knowledge of the blank sheet of paper and its nature, in your description of our conceptions reworking of our perceptive state, we don’t have that knowledge. Unless I am misunderstanding.

I guess I don’t know what you mean by "basic perception" then. If I can see "the same object" as merely a transparent bit of fluid, and in the next moment I can see it as a whole microcosmos of living beings I would call that a change of the basic perception of this thing. If this is not enough change of perception for you, what would "change of basic perception" require, by your standards?

I see that blob in the microscope for the first time and it is indefinite. As I study it, I begin to see it better because I classify and develop understanding. It is my concepts and study that make things more clear, but I first must have the closer study and classification to get the concepts, or there would be no way to get the concepts unless you are arguing that the concept of the microbe was already in my mind. Do you see the dilemma I’m facing here?


holla back!

 

[quatona]

sorry, no, the speculation about the possibilities of the dream world and the different concepts of the perception of color. I don’t see them just like other speculations because I perceive or conceive of no reason to believe them.

Do you see the problem with this statement? It basically says „I believe my perceptions to be accurate because they are my perceptions.“
Not that there´s anything wrong with it – it just makes painfully clear that which I am trying to tell you all the time: Perception and mind (no matter whether it is perception of something existing or a mere dream theater) cannot be bypassed and taken out of the equation. They are constantly there, even if we talk about our perceptions and concepts. The whole „reality“ discussion is necessarily self-referential. Something that you – interestingly – kept clearly pointing out about my ideas, but exempt your own ideas from.

They are speculations without perceptual content to affirm them. I can admit that the possibility does exist just like I can admit the possibility of space creatures on Alpha Centari. It is conceivable, but not believable.

Well, not for you. That´s why you don´t believe it. My „perceptual content“ is different than yours, and therefore this theory has certain merits for me (although I do not really believe in it either).
I agree that this theory in terms of „being conceivable but not having an intersubjective basis“ plays in about the same league as the idea of space creatures on Alpha Centauri or the idea that a god exists out there.
Except that it makes less assumptions: It reduces everything to the only thing which we can be certain of (and that which even you keep appealing to here): our own images. If your perception is the most important thing, let´s find a theory that does justice to this idea, a theory that places your perception above everything. That is what the theory of the dream theater does. These are the merits of this theory: It is completely consistent with your and my axiom that we have to go by that which presents itself as our perception.
Which brings me to the issue of axioms. The existence of something existing to which our images are responses to or reflections of is axiomatic. Not that this is a bad thing, not that I necessarily reject this axiom – it just needs to be acknowledged. Axiomatic assumptions, by their nature, are not discussable. We could try to reason about „external reality vs. dream theater“ until the cows come home: they will prove being axioms (any argument for any of them will necessarily require you to accept it, and if you don´t accept it there is no argument possible).

Okay, them I’m confused. Would you not have to have knowledge of the reality to know that your minds workings of it do not do justice and are the opposite of it? How do I know my conceptions are not that which is, if its all I got?

You don´t know it and you can´t know it. That´s the trouble with recursive and self-referential mindgames (and the fun of, if you will).

But, in your analogy, I have knowledge of the blank sheet of paper and its nature, in your description of our conceptions reworking of our perceptive state, we don’t have that knowledge. Unless I am misunderstanding.

Yes, you are misunderstanding. In my analogy you don´t have knowledge of the blank sheet of paper. All the brush sees is its own colour. I just had to mention the blank sheet to make this analogy from a hypothetical outside observer´s point of view.
Just for clarification: I am aware that all analogies have their flaws and fall short sooner or later. The point if I make analogies is merely to give you the idea – not to convince you of this idea.
A probably better analogy: Imagine our mind having a green filter built into it. This green filter is inherent and unbypassable. Everything will be green, and there is no way to see anything but green. The greenness of everything will be highly plausible, will always prove itself being accurate, will always confirm itself as reality, and nothing will ever be able to convince you of the opposite - particularly not, if we follow your above implied axiom that our perception (which is all green, in this case) should be the ultimate means of arbitration.

I see that blob in the microscope for the first time and it is indefinite. As I study it, I begin to see it better because I classify and develop understanding. It is my concepts and study that make things more clear, but I first must have the closer study and classification to get the concepts, or there would be no way to get the concepts unless you are arguing that the concept of the microbe was already in my mind. Do you see the dilemma I’m facing here?

Yes, I see your dilemma and I see its causes: You are begging the question and you impose your paradigms on my statements.
For example you make the assumption that the additional acquiring of concepts necessarily means an improvement in terms of aligning our images with Reality.

Anyways: Your initial question was „Can you give me examples of changes in basic perception.“ I gave you examples for cases in which our perception changes dramatically, and in which things become something completely different that they used to be, yes, in which things come into being that weren´t there before, and in which other things cease to be things. I really don´t know what you might demand, beyond that.
All of these examples come with a change of our concepts, and what we would need next is a means to determine which is the cause for which.

I don´t see any such means.
Again we are caught in axioms and self-reference.

This is where my pragmatism kicks in:
The assumption that my concepts create my reality works perfectly for me. It allows me to explain a lot of things that I have problems explaining otherwise, and without a lot of effort. It is parsimonous (in that it works from that which I cannot doubt being there (my images) and doesn´t add any further assumptions about the nature of something being there beyond them (and which, fatally, would be subject to those images, anyways and unavoidably).
This assumption allows me to allow others their images and concepts, without entering any competition as to whose images and concepts are right, accurate, correct, true. These questions become a non-issue (except for those entertaining, but ultimately futile self-referential meta-discussions such as we have them here).
You believe in a god? Go ahead. You believe in Alpha Centauri creatures. No problem.
I acknowledge and welcome agreement between our realities, and I don´t run into problems when our realities disagree.
You hear voices from behind the wall? I have no problem conceding that this is your reality, as is my reality that there are no such voices.
You hear a difference between a 24bit and a 16bit audio file? Great, then listen to 24bit files. I don´t and I am fine with 16bit files.
You are blind and there are no colours in your reality? That´s fine with me, this reality is as valid and plausible to you as my reality of colours is to me.
The idea of „freewill“ makes your reality plausible to you? Fine. It doesn´t do anything for me, it just adds noise.

As long as you don´t expect me to create my reality on basis of your perceptions and concepts, everything is good.
Somehow I like the fact that your axiom "We have to go by our perceptions" finds its perfect and consistent application in my approach, without running into any logical problems and unparsimonous assumptions.

 

[Silenus]

Do you see the problem with this statement? It basically says „I believe my perceptions to be accurate because they are my perceptions.“
Not that there’s anything wrong with it – it just makes painfully clear that which I am trying to tell you all the time: Perception and mind (no matter whether it is perception of something existing or a mere dream theater) cannot be bypassed and taken out of the equation. They are constantly there, even if we talk about our perceptions and concepts. The whole „reality“ discussion is necessarily self-referential. Something that you – interestingly – kept clearly pointing out about my ideas, but exempt your own ideas from

So, when you say self-referential, you meant axiomatic, that they are assumed without argument. Okay, I think I see now. I’m going to revisit this however, because I think there are two different things going on between two different examples you give in this post of something being self-referential. I would think it is necessary to establish axioms in areas where the thing being claimed to be axiomatic is unavoidable, and uncontrollable. Perception is an example of this, logic is another. I can’t deny the truth of perception without using perception and I can’t deny logic without using it. There is a later example of self-referential that you use that I don’t think fits this description.

I agree that this theory in terms of „being conceivable but not having an intersubjective basis“ plays in about the same league as the idea of space creatures on Alpha Centauri or the idea that a god exists out there.

I would disagree that these two are the same. One has conceivability without a perceptional basis, but I don’t see a belief in God as fitting that category. There is a basis for belief in the supernatural.

Except that it makes less assumptions: It reduces everything to the only thing which we can be certain of (and that which even you keep appealing to here): our own images. If your perception is the most important thing, let’s find a theory that does justice to this idea, a theory that places your perception above everything. That is what the theory of the dream theater does

But, we have a fundamental disagreement in the way consciousness and perception work that makes me unable to accept dream theater. I believe we can perceive objects, and you believe we perceive the images of the objects, it seems. I should probably hold off on this.

Okay, them I’m confused. Would you not have to have knowledge of the reality to know that your minds workings of it do not do justice and are the opposite of it? How do I know my conceptions are not that which is, if its all I got?

Your response was that we can’t know and that its an example of self-reference. But this is not self-referential in the same way as the last example. I don’t in any way have to believe this to deny it. It seems to deny itself. It says that it is true that we don’t perceive truly. But there is no way for you to know that you don’t perceive truly because, according to the proposition, we have no access to the “truly” we are claiming opposes our perceptions. In the first example, I have to use it to deny it. In this example, that is not the case. By using it, I end up denying it.

A probably better analogy: Imagine our mind having a green filter built into it. This green filter is inherent and unbypassable. Everything will be green, and there is no way to see anything but green. The greenness of everything will be highly plausible, will always prove itself being accurate, will always confirm itself as reality, and nothing will ever be able to convince you of the opposite - particularly not, if we follow your above implied axiom that our perception (which is all green, in this case) should be the ultimate means of arbitration.

But, again, I cannot deny the green filter without using the green filter, so it is a good place for an axiom. However, again, this picture causes me to enter a hypothetical realm I have no right to. That I can see myself seeing without the green filter. I.E. for me to notice this green filter problem, I must have something in me that is ontologically distinct, or essentially separate from the green filter.

For example you make the assumption that the additional acquiring of concepts necessarily means an improvement in terms of aligning our images with Reality.

No, I’m sorry, I typed quickly and wasn’t clear, I guess. I look at the microbe under the microscope first glance and see a blob of sorts. As I study it, I see it more clearly (or in your case, as concepts change, I see it differently.) You have said that concepts change my perception. Here’s my dilemma. At first glance, I see an indefinite blob, at second glance I see something more distinct and understandable. You indicated that it was concepts that changed the perception right? I see only two possibilities, either the concept came by studying the perception, or the concept was already there in my mind waiting to be unlocked. I see no other option. By admitting my change in perception (whatever its nature) was caused by a concept change means the concept was in the mind of acquired with the mind and perception together. I see no other option. Just because I can’t discern another option, doesn’t mean there isn’t one. But right now I’m left with the old dilemma, apriori or a posteriori. Is it a form in the mind or acquired through the mind/perception interplay.

 

[quatona]

So, when you say self-referential, you meant axiomatic, that they are assumed without argument.

No, wait. When I say self-referential I mean self-referential (something that points to itself, thinking about thinking, talking about verbal communication etc,), and when I say axiomatic I mean axiomatic (an assumption that is most basic that it can´t be proven, a starting point that is necessary to even only begin to consider something). Two completely different concepts.

Okay, I think I see now. I’m going to revisit this however, because I think there are two different things going on between two different examples you give in this post of something being self-referential.

Since you don´t tell me which these examples are, I have no opportunity to clarify. I guess, one was an example for an axiom, and the other was an example for self-reference. Indeed two different things.

I would think it is necessary to establish axioms in areas where the thing being claimed to be axiomatic is unavoidable, and uncontrollable.

I think I agree with the first, I do not really know what to do with the latter.

Perception is an example of this, logic is another.

Logic is indeed a prime example for an axiom, whilst perception isn´t. Inner images are. I have given you an example that works without the assumption of perception. Unfrtunately you don´t find it very plausible, but you can´t exclude it. So the assumption of perception is not unavoidable.

I can’t deny the truth of perception without using perception

Sure I can. I did.

and I can’t deny logic without using it.

Is that so?

There is a later example of self-referential that you use that I don’t think fits this description.

Until here it was an example of axiomatic assumptions. The natural self-reference of these issues makes axioms necessary.

I would disagree that these two are the same.

Well, I didn´t say they were the same.

One has conceivability without a perceptional basis, but I don’t see a belief in God as fitting that category. There is a basis for belief in the supernatural.

Which would be the perceptional basis for a belief in a god?

But, we have a fundamental disagreement in the way consciousness and perception work that makes me unable to accept dream theater. I believe we can perceive objects, and you believe we perceive the images of the objects, it seems. I should probably hold off on this.

The latter is about correct, but remember I do not really believe in dream theater only.
And yes, you are right: We have fundamental disagreement there. That was what I tried to emphasize with my previous post. I also tried to emphasize that it´s safe to say that we won´t be able to argue rationally for one or the other. They are axioms.

Your response was that we can’t know and that its an example of self-reference. But this is not self-referential in the same way as the last example.

I don’t in any way have to believe this to deny it.

That was and is not my definition of „self-refence“, but your definition of „axiomatic“ (a definition that I think is not really a good one, at that).

It seems to deny itself. It says that it is true that we don’t perceive truly. But there is no way for you to know that you don’t perceive truly because, according to the proposition, we have no access to the “truly” we are claiming opposes our perceptions. In the first example, I have to use it to deny it. In this example, that is not the case. By using it, I end up denying it.

Please don´t get hung up on the „denying“ too much. It is not really my argument and not relevant for my argument. You are imposing your paradigms on my statements. In order to deny something it must be there, in the first place. This begs the question.
I do not say that perception is self-referential. I say that all our ideas as to how ideas come about are subject to themselves, necessarily. This is most basic logic.

But, again, I cannot deny the green filter without using the green filter, so it is a good place for an axiom.

Yes, you are axiomatically assuming that we have/are no such filters, and I axiomatically believe that we do.

However, again, this picture causes me to enter a hypothetical realm I have no right to.

Excuse me, but I have no idea what „rights“ have to do with anything. That´s a completely new concept that you introduce into the discussion. I really don´t know what you mean.

That I can see myself seeing without the green filter. I.E. for me to notice this green filter problem, I must have something in me that is ontologically distinct, or essentially separate from the green filter.

Exactly my point. We can´t/couldn´t detect such filters.

No, I’m sorry, I typed quickly and wasn’t clear, I guess. I look at the microbe under the microscope first glance and see a blob of sorts. As I study it, I see it more clearly (or in your case, as concepts change, I see it differently.) You have said that concepts change my perception.

Not sure I have said this, but just in case: Then I would like to say it more precisely in order to avoid misunderstandings (it´s really hard to find the right words for that which you want to say in these matters). A more accurate wording would be: Our concepts change our images (i.e. that which we think we perceive).

Here’s my dilemma. At first glance, I see an indefinite blob, at second glance I see something more distinct and understandable.

As I said, the drop of water you saw first was completely understandable, too. It made perfect sense in a certain situation, and exactly this image will return when you need it and when it will be more adequate to your needs.

You indicated that it was concepts that changed the perception right?

If I have said that I would like to correct my wording and say that our concepts change our images (or that which we think we perceive). In fact, these two (concepts and images) are hard to clearly distinguish between, anyways.

I see only two possibilities, either the concept came by studying the perception, or the concept was already there in my mind waiting to be unlocked. I see no other option.

But there are other options. Something completely different (something that doesn´t have to do with what we think we perceive (our images).
Another option (and a very likely and observable one): Concepts and images are constantly feeding back into each other.

By admitting my change in perception (whatever its nature) was caused by a concept change means the concept was in the mind of acquired with the mind and perception together. I see no other option.

Just because I can’t discern another option, doesn’t mean there isn’t one.[/quote] Well, I do see other options. I am afraid, however, that I am the one who put you on the wrong track by talking about the whole issue as though it were a simple mono-cause – mono-effect relation.

But right now I’m left with the old dilemma, apriori or a posteriori. Is it a form in the mind or acquired through the mind/perception interplay.

I do not think these are preconceived unchanging „forms“ already sitting in the mind. There are such „forms“ already existing and co-determining the way we form new „forms“, though.

 

[Mysticus]

Just out of curiosity, if you don't believe that God is real, what do you believe governs reality? What's your theory? What is it that determines the rules of physics, the architecture of everything that is?

The Universe is God... Life is the self awareness of the Universe.

 

[Silenus]

I'm typing this fast in a block of free time so sorry if anything sounds confusing.

No, wait. When I say self-referential I mean self-referential (something that points to itself, thinking about thinking, talking about verbal communication etc,), and when I say axiomatic I mean axiomatic (an assumption that is most basic that it can´t be proven, a starting point that is necessary to even only begin to consider something). Two completely different concepts.

Yes, I jumped the gun. My apologies. Self-referential = the concept of concepts, for example. Axiomatic = assumed without proof.

Logic is indeed a prime example for an axiom, whilst perception isn´t. Inner images are. I have given you an example that works without the assumption of perception. Unfrtunately you don´t find it very plausible, but you can´t exclude it. So the assumption of perception is not unavoidable.

Do you believe all concepts, memories, abstractions, perceptions, sensations, and imaginations are images in the brain? How do these images arise? If you are referring to the example of mind theater and the “different color example,” you still, in the first example, have to posit either a dream state or manipulation of perception by an outside force. In the second you have to assume that all experiences of perception and sensation are private, but not anti-reality. Either way, perception has not been denied. Maybe a large spider with magic tentacles has wrapped my sensations in a magic force field of deception. Speculation of these sorts of realities which are created via analogies from experience but of which there is no contact because they encapsulate our ontological being without manifesting themselves therein will open up a multiplicity of unverifiable scenarios which one is good to ignore as creative, but not tenable. It is interesting to consider the possibility of such a belief, but to actually hold to it is ludicrous and unlivable. Don’t take this statement to mean I think you do hold to it, if I understand you, you hold to neither dream theater or the other example.

It seems to deny itself. It says that it is true that we don’t perceive truly. But there is no way for you to know that you don’t perceive truly because, according to the proposition, we have no access to the “truly” we are claiming opposes our perceptions. In the first example, I have to use it to deny it. In this example, that is not the case. By using it, I end up denying it.

Please don´t get hung up on the „denying“ too much. It is not really my argument and not relevant for my argument. You are imposing your paradigms on my statements. In order to deny something it must be there, in the first place. This begs the question.

I thought you were asserting this. Although I still think its valuable. If the premise asserted ends in necessary contradiction, that’s a good indication that it should be denied. Are you saying we do or don’t perceive truly? Or is it some sort of mixture? I know this question assumes a outside reality, but I’m asking because you stated earlier that you don’t hold to mind theater.

The latter is about correct, but remember I do not really believe in dream theater only. And yes, you are right: We have fundamental disagreement there. That was what I tried to emphasize with my previous post. I also tried to emphasize that it´s safe to say that we won´t be able to argue rationally for one or the other.

Well, I’m not sure of this yet. I’m still trying to get at your idea of images. It sounds like this is a term you use for almost all aspects of mental activity.

I do not say that perception is self-referential. I say that all our ideas as to how ideas come about are subject to themselves, necessarily. This is most basic logic.

I’ll wait on this to see how other questions are answered. I have no problem with this, as long as it doesn’t, when applied nessessarly, lead to contradiction down the read.

Something completely different (something that doesn´t have to do with what we think we perceive (our images).

Another option (and a very likely and observable one): Concepts and images are constantly feeding back into each other.

How is this different from the quote below?

By admitting my change in perception (whatever its nature) was caused by a concept change means the concept was acquired with the mind and perception together.

How is an interplay different?

I do not think these are preconceived unchanging „forms“ already sitting in the mind. There are such „forms“ already existing and co-determining the way we form new „forms“, though.

Explain this please. Are you saying there are not forms or images in the mind apriori, but rather something structural, like the BIOS programming of a computer?

Which would be the perceptional basis for a belief in a god?

The belief in god is based on concepts which are based on perceptions which can be tested when its concepts interacts with lesser concepts and perceptions. Jesus rose from the dead is a historical claim which can be tested with historical criticism. God created the universe is a claim that can be tested as we study the cosmos. The world was created in six days can be tested by scientific study. The claim of God will be verifiable and testable in the many ways the God concept being postulated interacts with reality and other more perceptual based concepts. To deny the ability to test this metaphysical concept this way is similar to denying the claim that we can test purely theoretical Scientific concepts like black holes and quarks. They are also concepts based on concepts based on perception. Let’s take the easiest one, the six day thing. This concept is based on the concept of the inerrancy of scripture. Scientific evidence goes against the six day creation narrative. So a Christian has to decide on two things . . .

1)Is the six day creation model necessary to the concept it is based upon . . . i.e. the inerrancy of scripture?
2)Is the scientific evidence secure or based on a bias or a debated field?

I’m not going to go into this because it is off topic, but it is by testing where the more abstract concepts interact with the lesser abstract concepts and perceptions that these claims are bore out. It is, however, ludicrous to equate the belief in Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or so forth, with the flying spaghetti monster or my aforementioned magic spider scenario.

 

[quatona]

I'm typing this fast in a block of free time so sorry if anything sounds confusing.

Ok. Not to complain (and I don´t find this post of yours confusing), but since you mention it: I´d prefer you to take your time and write carefully.

Yes, I jumped the gun. My apologies. Self-referential = the concept of concepts, for example. Axiomatic = assumed without proof.

No problem. However, I think this definition of „axiomatic“ does not really cut it. „Proof“ is a very high standard (and hardly ever to be achieved), and everything that is assume without proof is not necessarily an axiom. I´m afraid I cannot really give a complete and accurate definition myself, but I would think that it is an that does not allow being discussed rationally. You either accept it or you don´t.

Do you believe all concepts, memories, abstractions, perceptions, sensations, and imaginations are images in the brain?

I do not really hold a positive belief about that. I just notice that these images are all I can safely assume to be there. Everything beyond that requires a lot of guesswork and is self-referential or begging the question. Even only your wording „exists in the brain“ would require me to assume that a brain is there beyond the image „brain“ I have – an assumption based on my images, for which I would have to presuppose that my images are a sufficiently accurate reflection of the assumed reality.

How do these images arise?

I don´t know. I just know that they are there, and this is all I know.

If you are referring to the example of mind theater and the “different color example,” you still, in the first example, have to posit either a dream state or manipulation of perception by an outside force.

Do I have to? What exactly do you mean when saying „a force“ and how do you distinguish an „outside“ force from an „inside“ force?
I don´t see how I need to assume such a „force“. Once I accept there to be a Reality out there which my images reflect, it is all too obvious that there must be a difference between „the thing“ and „the thing as observed“ (the image). If they were identical/congruent „the thing“ itself would be inside my head, and not outside it.

In the second you have to assume that all experiences of perception and sensation are private, but not anti-reality. Either way, perception has not been denied.

Just so we don´t miscommunicate, and so I know what you mean (and am able to use this word in your meaning): What does „perception“ exactly mean when you use this word (and what would be that from which you distinguish „perception“).? You know, I have been struggling with this word in my previous post already, because I wasn´t sure I understand.

Maybe a large spider with magic tentacles has wrapped my sensations in a magic force field of deception. Speculation of these sorts of realities which are created via analogies from experience but of which there is no contact because they encapsulate our ontological being without manifesting themselves therein will open up a multiplicity of unverifiable scenarios which one is good to ignore as creative, but not tenable.

Yes, there are speculations of various degrees of creativity. If discussing philosophy, I would prefer to avoid such speculations altogether. I have these images, that´s for sure.
Whilst in real life, and pragmatically, I simply accept those that appear to be useful.

It is interesting to consider the possibility of such a belief, but to actually hold to it is ludicrous and unlivable. Don’t take this statement to mean I think you do hold to it, if I understand you, you hold to neither dream theater or the other example.

Yes, right.

I thought you were asserting this. Although I still think its valuable. If the premise asserted ends in necessary contradiction, that’s a good indication that it should be denied. Are you saying we do or don’t perceive truly? Or is it some sort of mixture? I know this question assumes a outside reality, but I’m asking because you stated earlier that you don’t hold to mind theater.

I understand how this can be confusing. I am willing to accept the axiom that my images are some sort of connection to something other than themselves. There is a „world“ out there. I am, however, not assuming that this world has properties. This world JUST IS, in its immediacy – until my mind structures it in a way that makes sense. This is the predominant occupation of „mind“, imo: it creates meaning, it creates distinctions, it creates categories, it creates properties.

Well, I’m not sure of this yet. I’m still trying to get at your idea of images. It sounds like this is a term you use for almost all aspects of mental activity.

When using this term I do not intend to make a statement from a hypothetically outside/objective position (like „mental activity“). „Images“, in my terminology here, includes all that I experience – subjectively. It is not meant to be an explanation of sorts. It is a term for that which I can´t deny to have.


Quote:
I do not say that perception is self-referential. I say that all our ideas as to how ideas come about are subject to themselves, necessarily. This is most basic logic.


I’ll wait on this to see how other questions are answered. I have no problem with this, as long as it doesn’t, when applied nessessarly, lead to contradiction down the read.

Something completely different (something that doesn´t have to do with what we think we perceive (our images).
Quote:
Another option (and a very likely and observable one): Concepts and images are constantly feeding back into each other.
How is this different from the quote below?
Quote:
By admitting my change in perception (whatever its nature) was caused by a concept change means the concept was acquired with the mind and perception together.
How is an interplay different?

I´m not sure it is entirely different. I guess whether there is a difference (or a potential difference) would depend on what you exactly mean when saying „perception“, and how you distinguish between „mind“ and „perception“.

Explain this please. Are you saying there are not forms or images in the mind apriori, but rather something structural, like the BIOS programming of a computer?

Yes, sort of – with all the problems that analogies come with. I have been talking about constant feedback, and – other than with the computer – not even a change of this BIOS can be excluded.

The belief in god is based on concepts which are based on perceptions which can be tested when its concepts interacts with lesser concepts and perceptions. Jesus rose from the dead is a historical claim which can be tested with historical criticism. God created the universe is a claim that can be tested as we study the cosmos. The world was created in six days can be tested by scientific study. The claim of God will be verifiable and testable in the many ways the God concept being postulated interacts with reality and other more perceptual based concepts. To deny the ability to test this metaphysical concept this way is similar to denying the claim that we can test purely theoretical Scientific concepts like black holes and quarks. They are also concepts based on concepts based on perception. Let’s take the easiest one, the six day thing. This concept is based on the concept of the inerrancy of scripture. Scientific evidence goes against the six day creation narrative. So a Christian has to decide on two things . . .

1)Is the six day creation model necessary to the concept it is based upon . . . i.e. the inerrancy of scripture?
2)Is the scientific evidence secure or based on a bias or a debated field?

I’m not going to go into this because it is off topic, but it is by testing where the more abstract concepts interact with the lesser abstract concepts and perceptions that these claims are bore out. It is, however, ludicrous to equate the belief in Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or so forth, with the flying spaghetti monster or my aforementioned magic spider scenario.

I´d like to avoid a theism/atheism discussion at this point. Just that much: If I write down the claim that „a large spider with magic tentacles has wrapped my sensations in a magic force field of deception“ everyone can base his opinion about this on „perceptions which can be tested with historical criticism“ in the same way they can do it with the claim „god“ and the bible. Thus, I do not really see the essential difference you are trying to establish here.
Of course, the approach you have outlined is the one I basically agree with if talking pragmatically. It gives us usable and useful results, and that´s all that counts when it comes to concepts: Do they serve my purposes? Do they make sense in the frame-work of the concepts I already hold? Or do I have to either refute this new concept or abandon some of the concepts I already hold in order to avoid cognitive dissonance or inconsistency?

 

[griggs1947]

I see no more a reason to invoke God than to invoke Thor for the weather, gremlins for mechanical failures and demons for my personality disorder and depression. I note that goes with the no need of Him for morality as Plato in the Euthyphro shows.
Victor Stenger notes the laws of physics as just basic.
I am a happy depressive neurotic. I have no reason for personal complaints. It is a matter of patience for me for matters to be ever so good.I live by " The Myth of Self-Esteem" and "The Reason-Driven Life."
Blessings to all!

 

[platzapS]

I don't know.

 

[Rayndeon]

Just out of curiosity, if you don't believe that God is real, what do you believe governs reality? What's your theory? What is it that determines the rules of physics, the architecture of everything that is?

Nothing does. That is, there is not anything that the universe* derives from. It is a brute fact.

*By universe, I mean all causally disconnected spacetime continua - so, this would include even

 

[griggs1947]

I agre with Mysitcus and Selenus: I am a naturalist pantheist like Quinten Smith in "Ethical and Religious Thought in Analyytic Philosophy of Language."
As Existence is all, [Lee Smolin] there cannot be a transcendent divinity but only an immanent, contingent one.
And we are that one on Earth. It is our welcomed responsability for ourselves to exist. As Paul Kurtz ever notes, we can lead exuberant lives and ought to practice a planetary ethic and use the Social Contract for all.
Think how nowadays we can bring dictators to trial and we are working to end global pestilence and poverty. We must ever be humbled but proud before our fellow human beings. Our humility keeps us in check, and our pride keeps us moving.
1776 marks the beginning of humane civlization! Thanks to our deistic and tolerant Christian forefathers!
Blessings and good fortune to all! Yes to goodwill!