A question for athiests

[Kaelestis721]

Just out of curiosity, if you don't believe that God is real, what do you believe governs reality? What's your theory? What is it that determines the rules of physics, the architecture of everything that is?

Let me answer your question with some questions:

What makes you think that we will ever understand why the universe operates by certain rules and guidelines? What makes you think that we have the ability to accurately name and comprehend this? What makes you feel that everybody has a NEED to explain why the universe operates the way that it does...maybe they just accept their lack of understanding and move on to a different issue?

 

[Silenus]

everything has a cause.

every thought has a cause, whether it is upbringing, education, or current circumstance.

all circumstances have a cause.

the chain is infinite.

what was done yesterday will determine what is done today.
what is done today will have consequences tomorrow. that goes on forever.

so no, there is no free will at all.

I must amend you concise argument for determinism with a brief retort.

everything has a cause

every thought is caused

every decision is a result of thought

decisions are freely acting causes, not necessary acting causes

not all causes are necessary

not all causes are determined

therefore we have free will

now I think I understand, fishface, where you are coming from when you say this . . .

Neither of these are free will though, are they? And the problems with trying to say that we exhibit something else are twofold: Firstly, how does one tell? What is the difference between something being random and something being "free?" Is there any way of testing or falsifying this?
And the other problem is that no-one has ever properly defined exactly what this other thing is. I can understand the concepts of cause and randomness, but those concepts already seem to cover all that can be. Any concept I've so far been confronted with either seems meaningless, or fits into caused or random.

If free will exists it would be in many ways indistinguishable from determinism, I think I can agree with this. However, only a materialist is left with randomness and cause because you initial axioms reduce consciousness and judgment to this level. However, consciousness is an understandable (although more difficult concept) and so is judgment and deliberation. We know what it is to make judgments and deliberations because we are doing it right now and it is necessary to make deliberations and judgments to decide and develop concept such as determinism or free will.

My point, I guess, is that there are other things to be understood in this argument than just randomness and cause and it is only a materialist axiom that reduces everything necessarily to these two things. The thought or need to make a decision is caused necessarily, but the decision itself (the results of judgment and deliberation) is a freely acting cause. I can choose from a host of actions or choose not to act at all. to say there is a host of unknown causations forcing my decision is to beg the question that consciousness and judgment works on the same level as matter, when from all we can see, this is not true at all. And, as phsyxx has pointed out, the whole theory renders itself moot when applied. The theory itself depends on the consciousness being able to make judgments THAT ARE KNOWABLY TRUE. Otherwise, nothing is verifiable and all falls on the knife of falsification. Otherwise, when a determinist says all is determined he is really just firing off his chemical fizz. And this, I see, I also one of the big problems of naturalism. In the end A does not equal A.

 

[phsyxx]

If free will exists it would be in many ways indistinguishable from determinism,

Absolutely - so what's the difference?
Ultimately does it MATTER if all (your)actions are determined, or if they are free?

My point, I guess, is that there are other things to be understood in this argument than just randomness and cause and it is only a materialist axiom that reduces everything necessarily to these two things. The thought or need to make a decision is caused necessarily, but the decision itself (the results of judgment and deliberation) is a freely acting cause. I can choose from a host of actions or choose not to act at all. to say there is a host of unknown causations forcing my decision is to beg the question that consciousness and judgment works on the same level as matter, when from all we can see, this is not true at all.

"from all we can see" may be badly worded - If not, then it means you aren't looking at the synaptic activity that takes place within the brain when certain functions/activity is demanded of it.


For me, all things are matter, whether thought is minute electrical signals that pulse through you to create certain effects within your brain, and therefore allow you to perform high-level problem solving activities - or not, is unclear.

But does it matter?
It doesn't affect the state of reality, it would verify the theory, but it wouldn't do anything to what things are already like.

Mind you.....I tend to want people to apply this attitude to God....
telling yourself he doesn't exist doesn't suddenly make him disappear, nor does it change anything about the world about you - it just changes your perception of it.

Unfortunately, after a lengthy 4 hour philosophical discussion with my tutor, we ended up reducing everything to only one certainty,
" I think therefore I am" , beyond that, nothing is clear.
But then he had to go one further and say, as he left,

"I think, therefore I think I am".

And, as phsyxx has pointed out, the whole theory renders itself moot when applied. The theory itself depends on the consciousness being able to make judgments THAT ARE KNOWABLY TRUE. Otherwise, nothing is verifiable and all falls on the knife of falsification. Otherwise, when a determinist says all is determined he is really just firing off his chemical fizz. And this, I see, I also one of the big problems of naturalism. In the end A does not equal A.

I like the word moot!!!

 

[Silenus]

That's why it matters to me. because I see determinism and naturalism as being a poor explanation of reality. It reduces the things to nothingness that the very theory of determinism itself depends on to justify itself. Judgment must be falsifiable and able to discern truth to be useful. I need judgment to establish determinism. Determinism destroys judgment. Determinism destroys itself. Furthermore, science, the method that established determinism and naturalism in the first place, has no ontological and philosophical foundation under these systems. Science becomes a blind guess.

Finally, try to live like a determinist who holds truly to its principles and discard concepts of justice, freedom, value, or consequence. It can't be done.

 

[quatona]

That's why it matters to me. because I see determinism and naturalism as being a poor explanation of reality. It reduces the things to nothingness that the very theory of determinism itself depends on to justify itself. Judgment must be falsifiable and able to discern truth to be useful. I need judgment to establish determinism. Determinism destroys judgment. Determinism destroys itself. Furthermore, science, the method that established determinism and naturalism in the first place, has no ontological and philosophical foundation under these systems. Science becomes a blind guess.

You and I have discussed this thoroughly, and I still don´t see how you arrive at these conclusions.
So I guess taking another round won´t do it for either of us.

Finally, try to live like a determinist who holds truly to its principles and discard concepts of justice, freedom, value, or consequence. It can't be done.

Determinism doesn´t require you to discard any of those concepts. Some of them just don´t have the specific connotations they have in the "freewill" worldview. Others - like "consequence" - are completely congruent in the "freewill" and the deterministic understanding.
What, however, you have to suspend: The idea of personal guilt. This can be done, and I don´t miss it at all.

 

[Silenus]

Ah, quatona, I figured you'd come back with that one. I was half expecting a quantonian beat down. My thing is that I don't see ontological, logical, or otherwise, foundations for things like justice and value. How do they even exist in determinism? If there isn't responsibility, guilt or no guilt, doesn't might make right in the end? Don't I get to commit injustice because, under determinism "injstice" suddenly becomes justly put in quotations.

Sorry, into word play right now.

 

[quatona]

Ah, quatona, I figured you'd come back with that one. I was half expecting a quantonian beat down.

You mean I disappointed you?

My thing is that I don't see ontological, logical, or otherwise, foundations for things like justice and value.

Assuming this is correct, how does "freewill" provide us with such ontological, logical or otherwise foundations for them?
"justice" is what I think is just (no matter whether I have chosen this idea or it is a program), and "value" is what I value (and it makes practically - i.e. in my perception of this value - no difference whether I have determined this to be a value or I am determined to consider this a value)

How do they even exist in determinism?

Why would they not? Everything´s the same in determinism as in "freewillism" - except that we are determined. You can even be a "freewilly" in determinism - but you are determined to be one.

If there isn't responsibility, guilt or no guilt, doesn't might make right in the end?

Well, there is this an argument from consequence, again. That the effect is undesirable does not make an argument against the validity of the concept. Else I would have to conclude that I have wings, because not having wings is undesirable.
But even more important: How is this the effect of determinism, praytell?
Looking at the world as it is, people exploit others, people oppress others all the time - if your are assuming that we have "freewill", this "freewill" quite obviously doens´t change anything about the fact that "might makes right". The stronger person can hit you on the nose, and whether he does it out of "freewill" or because he is determined doesn´t change anything about it. I fail to see how "might makes right" has anything to do with the question "freewill vs. determinism". It is not even remotely linked. "Might makes right" is a problem of objectivism vs. subjectivism (and even objectivism doesn´t escape this problem. Heck, theism more than any other worldview is centered around the acceptance of "might makes right"). If you assume there to be an objective moral right/wrong the fact that your actions are determined wouldn´t change anything about the fact that they are objectively wrong. So, no, "might makes right" can in no way be associated with determinism.

Don't I get to commit injustice because, under determinism "injstice" suddenly becomes justly put in quotations.

What´s that got to do with anything? You get to commit injustice just the same in determinism as in "freewillism". The mere difference is that in one case you are determined to commit it and in the other you assume an internal moral agency determining it.

 

[phsyxx]

Ah, quatona, I figured you'd come back with that one. I was half expecting a quantonian beat down. My thing is that I don't see ontological, logical, or otherwise, foundations for things like justice and value. How do they even exist in determinism? If there isn't responsibility, guilt or no guilt, doesn't might make right in the end? Don't I get to commit injustice because, under determinism "injstice" suddenly becomes justly put in quotations.

Sorry, into word play right now.

May I respond with a retort?
To:
"I get to commit injustice, because, under determinism "injustice" suddenly becomes justly"

Well then, I suppose I'm determined to put you in jail, no choice about it.

 

[Silenus]

Well then, I suppose I'm determined to put you in jail, no choice about it.

can I be determined to determine to break myself out?

 

[Silenus]

Well, I agree that some of my arguments are from consequence, but this is hardly the same as your wings example . . . unless of course you are saying that those weird protrusions at the end of my shoulder blades used to hold wings . . . but I’m going to briefly comment on your statements, because you are right, at this point we are waltzing, and then make another statement.

"justice" is what I think is just (no matter whether I have chosen this idea or it is a program), and "value" is what I value (and it makes practically - i.e. in my perception of this value - no difference whether I have determined this to be a value or I am determined to consider this a value)

". It is not even remotely linked. "Might makes right" is a problem of objectivism vs. subjectivism (and even objectivism doesn’t escape this problem. Heck, theism more than any other worldview is centered around the acceptance of "might makes right"). If you assume there to be an objective moral right/wrong the fact that your actions are determined wouldn´t change anything about the fact that they are objectively wrong. So, no, "might makes right" can in no way be associated with determinism.

well, yes, I was jumping ahead in the chain of thinking by pointing out that determinism is necessarily subjective, except when it says that all is determined, then its actually being objective, except that it can’t be objective because . . . grrrrrr

I would disagree with your assertion that might makes right is an aspect of theism because it is a conceptual reduction. It is not might that makes god right, but authorship and that is an entirely different bag o beans. My point is that the concept of justice depends on its ability to be chosen (hence responsibility) and true (i.e. Can be known to be true) to work. Otherwise, justice is farce, but no one lives as if justice is farce. Many of the aspects of society are built on these two concepts and, you could say that I am determined to agree with them, but wouldn’t consistency force determinists to abandon them once they realize they have no foundation, I mean, if we are determined to think logically . . .

You get to commit injustice just the same in determinism as in "freewillism". The mere difference is that in one case you are determined to commit it and in the other you assume an internal moral agency determining it.

ahhh, but I’m not speaking of the ability to commit injustice, I’m talking about the ability to identify and punish injustice without hypocrisy or farce. I.e. That justice is actually justice, and not some random construct of delight.

Here is the sum I think, of my thoughts from the beginning of the thread until now.

1) Determinism needs judgment to be able to identify and know truth, but determinism undermines judgments ability to do so. Determinism is an objective statement of reality based on judgment, after all.

2) In philosophy, if you remove the pillar the house falls down. Determinism is based on naturalism and naturalism is based on science, not the other way around. Naturalism took hold of the scientific community because of the success of cause and effect observations. As russel pointed out, science came from a pre-science metaphysic and that wasn’t naturalism. However, under naturalism and determinism, science is a blind leap of faith that loses its metaphysical foundations. I think this is why Rea at Notre Dame has taken to calling naturalism a research paradigm rather than a philosophical framework. If determinism is true, science loses the prompt that supports the house. Yet, determinism seems to me to be based largely on science.

3) Let us grant that all is cause and effect. This leads us back to the first argument I gave on this thread. The laws of thermodynamics show that the universe is not eternal given the second law of thermodynamics. However, It also shows by law three that the universe is sempiternal. To me, then we have an infinite succession of causes or an uncaused cause. Because the universe isn’t eternal but is sempiternal, it seems to me that occam makes us reject the infinite succession theory, which leaves us with the uncaused cause and the unmoved mover. Now, the only thing that makes this work is a freely acting cause, an agent. A necessary acting cause doesn’t explain the laws of thermodynamics. Hence, the probability of the existence of the supernatural and free agency increases dramatically.

 

[quatona]

can I be determined to determine to break myself out?

Only if these two "determine" in this sentence are used in different meanings.

 

[quatona]

Well, I agree that some of my arguments are from consequence, but this is hardly the same as your wings example . . . unless of course you are saying that those weird protrusions at the end of my shoulder blades used to hold wings . . .

Of course, it´s not the same. That´s why it is an analogy. Now, I have to remind myself that I recently started a thread about the futility of analogies in controversial discussions. So I´ll drop the analogy, and hope we agree that arguments from consequence are fallacious.

well, yes, I was jumping ahead in the chain of thinking by pointing out that determinism is necessarily subjective, except when it says that all is determined, then its actually being objective, except that it can’t be objective because . . . grrrrrr

Your problem is self induced (and I have been calling you upon it since my very first post in this thread: you are equivocating, and you are treating different levels of abstraction as if they were the same).

I would disagree with your assertion that might makes right is an aspect of theism because it is a conceptual reduction. It is not might that makes god right, but authorship and that is an entirely different bag o beans.

Ok, I don´t think it is an entirely different bag of beans, but it´s not that important at the moment. So I´ll drop this point for the time being.

My point is that the concept of justice depends on its ability to be chosen (hence responsibility) and true (i.e. Can be known to be true) to work.

How exactly does it depend on its ability to be chosen? To me it seems that the idea that it can be chosen makes even more arbitrary than the idea that it is determined.

Otherwise, justice is farce, but no one lives as if justice is farce.

That´s because they are determined to think in terms of justice.
I still have no idea how justice is in any way dependent on being chosen, and how not being chosen makes it a farce.

Many of the aspects of society are built on these two concepts and, you could say that I am determined to agree with them, but wouldn’t consistency force determinists to abandon them once they realize they have no foundation, I mean, if we are determined to think logically . . .

How do you get to "no foundation" praytell? How does being chosen would give them more foundation?

ahhh, but I’m not speaking of the ability to commit injustice, I’m talking about the ability to identify and punish injustice without hypocrisy or farce. I.e. That justice is actually justice, and not some random construct of delight.

I for one would associate "random construct of delight" with "being chosen" rather than with "being determined". I understand your desire for justice and punishing (although I don´t seem to share it), but I have no clue how this in any way relates to the question of choice, and as far as I can see you have so far not even attempted to explain that to me.
I see no problem with punishing someone even though his actions are determined. We are inflicting negative reactions on things and beings that we assume do not have free-will all the time. We can do that with humans, too. The only part that you might miss is the "You have chosen to be a bad guy!"

 

[toddpianoworks]

"Governs reality"? What exactly do you mean by that? The anthropic principle is your friend here. Stuff like the laws of physics just are how they are. If they weren't, you wouldn't be here to wonder about it, would you? It's pretty meaningless to say that they could have been any different.

To quote Bertie Russell:

So, Cantata, if that really is your answer, why don't you believe that God is just there?

 

[toddpianoworks]

Nothing has to govern reality.

Then how do we know what's right and wrong?

 

[MrGoodBytes]

Then how do we know what's right and wrong?

We don't, as evidenced by crimelibrary.com and every history book in existence.

 

[Silenus]

Your problem is self induced

But my problem can't be self-induced because it is the result of causes beyond my control. My problem is nature induced. Its her fault. The strumpet. Unless you are giving in and allowing me a self to do some inducing. However, to use an argument from consequence, I could blame hangovers on blind causes, i get off the hook and they don't mind so much.

Sorry, I know that this word play is the same as a bad shot of tequilla argumentitivly. I'm having trouble resisting word/concept play lately. If I have annoyed you with cheap wit, I beg pardon.

So I´ll drop the analogy, and hope we agree that arguments from consequence are fallacious.

I do not agree that arguments from consequence are worthless, they are just inconclusive, just like post hoc ergo prompter hoc inductions can lead to knowledge, although it also is not conclusive. Post hoc ergo prompter hoc can be used by a scientist consistently if his metaphysics assumes an ordered universe, and arguments by consequence can be used by those whose metaphysics allow the possibility that they can perceive objectively. But I agree, they only allow probabilities and just because you dislike something doesn’t make it untrue. However, I think they can be valuable, especially if you are convinced of the reality of something. In fact, you are using one of the above arguments when you choose determinism. I’m assuming that you believe determinism because it leads to a cause and effect universe, you don’t believe in a cause and effect universe because you are a determinist. After all post hoc is the logical fallacy that science is based on.

Your problem is self induced (and I have been calling you upon it since my very first post in this thread: you are equivocating, and you are treating different levels of abstraction as if they were the same).

Is this statement of equivocation referring back to your self-referencing comment? Otherwise, I’m not sure what you mean by levels of abstraction. Where is my equivocation? Which word in that last argument am I using in two different ways? Furthermore, how are there any levels of abstraction in determinism? All Abstraction is nothing more than the brain’s neurons firing at different speeds. If all is determined, isn’t it nonsensical to speak of levels of abstraction. So I guess I don’t understand how I am equivocating in any sense. What is the nature of my equivocation? Are you referencing the genetic fallacy?

I for one would associate "random construct of delight" with "being chosen" rather than with "being determined". I understand your desire for justice and punishing (although I don´t seem to share it), but I have no clue how this in any way relates to the question of choice, and as far as I can see you have so far not even attempted to explain that to me.

A scientist can make a truth statement because he can form a hypothesis based on an experiment that is not a result of the experiment he conducts. He, obviously, is a part and affects the experiment and its results, but his hypothesis is a thought about the content of the experiment, it is not a result of the experiment. If it were, the hypothesis would lose its truth telling power. You, yourself, have acknowledged that this is the logical result of determinism. It is the scientists’ ability to think and hypothesis ABOUT, not BECAUSE of the experiment that gives his hypothesis truth telling power. Free will means that there is an aspect of human nature that can think about the world around him, not because of the world around him. A man, therefore, can make hypothesis about the world in the same way that a scientist can hypothesis about his experiment. Free will grants truth-telling power and grants the ability to hold actual knowledge based on reasoned thought and not based on forced necessity. It also means that there is a standard of thinking that provides verifiability to thoughts and postulations, unlike determinism which makes all verifying impossible. Out of this comes a basis for true justice, virtue, etc. Again, people make judgments about things all the time and, as far as anyone can tell, those judgments are the results of a mind weighing beliefs and evidence and logic and desire. It is not the weight of reality or scientific evidence that makes a determinist think these judgments are cause and effect, it is the results of Determinist axioms. That is why you equate choice with randomness. But, when I make a judgment, determined or not, it is not random, it is based on thoughts and judgments, not just a mental coin flip.

Choice allows us to have thoughts about things not caused by things.

Choice allows the existence of an “I” present to reflect and judge events

Choice allows an agent who chooses based rationality and evidence alone, who thinks in ground and consequence.

I see no problem with punishing someone even though his actions are determined. We are inflicting negative reactions on things and beings that we assume do not have free-will all the time. We can do that with humans, too. The only part that you might miss is the "You have chosen to be a bad guy!"

Finally, as far as punishment is concerned, we punish entities without free will (I’m assuming you mean animals) because we believe we are superior and them inferior. This is some of the point C.S. Lewis makes in abolition of man. If a group of Orwellian behaviorists found your particular determined actions as unfavorable, you have no argument to make when they go clockwork orange all over your face. As they start attaching the electrodes to you and begin the shock theory because the Fascists find your determined actions unappealing, despite your moral outrage and bootless cries for justice, these pleas would be nothing more than a chemical shrug. This is what I mean by justice becomes farce. But with free will comes falsification, value, truth, and knowledge. I know this may be to you an argument from consequence, but I am responding to the statement about punishing things without free will.

 

[Silenus]

sorry about the big font . . .

not intentional

 

[quatona]

But my problem can't be self-induced because it is the result of causes beyond my control. My problem is nature induced. Its her fault. The strumpet. Unless you are giving in and allowing me a self to do some inducing. However, to use an argument from consequence, I could blame hangovers on blind causes, i get off the hook and they don't mind so much.

Sorry, I know that this word play is the same as a bad shot of tequilla argumentitivly. I'm having trouble resisting word/concept play lately. If I have annoyed you with cheap wit, I beg pardon.

No problem. Since you apparently are not entirely seriously here I won´t address this point, ok?

I do not agree that arguments from consequence are worthless, they are just inconclusive, just like post hoc ergo prompter hoc inductions can lead to knowledge, although it also is not conclusive.

Well, I didn´t say they were worthless (that would depend on what you value - e.g. if mere self-affirmation is your kind of thing arguments from consequence can be price less). Yes, they are not conclusive, and since you use them in order to make the point that is disagreed, they do not help your case.

Post hoc ergo prompter hoc can be used by a scientist consistently if his metaphysics assumes an ordered universe, and arguments by consequence can be used by those whose metaphysics allow the possibility that they can perceive objectively.

Well, ok. But in case you want to base this discussion on the idea that you perceive objectively, we can go home right now. If you are the one who perceives objectively (and if you want me to agree with this idea) I have no point to make. You are right by virtue of your objective perception. Every further discussion would be redundant if at crucial points you refer to your objective perception. If, however, you do not insist on your objective perception for purposes of this discussion, your argument from consequence has no leg to stand on, either.

But I agree, they only allow probabilities and just because you dislike something doesn’t make it untrue. However, I think they can be valuable, especially if you are convinced of the reality of something.

As I said they may be valuable for self-affirmation, but not for a controversial discussion. I am not convince of the reality of "freewill", so an argument from consequence is pointless in the attempt to convince me.

In fact, you are using one of the above arguments when you choose determinism.

What a discussion method is that? I was talking about the fallacious argument from consequence - what do those other forms of arguments have to do with it? Why did you even bring them up?

I’m assuming that you believe determinism because it leads to a cause and effect universe, you don’t believe in a cause and effect universe because you are a determinist.

Neither is accurate. All I observe is that there is a multitude of determining factors and whenever we look for factors determining other events we find plenty of them. So, in lack of a good reason to introduce anything like "freewill" I don´t do it. But I have explained that several times.

After all post hoc is the logical fallacy that science is based on.

To be frank: I think this is utter nonsense.
Science makes great precautions to check the validity of cause-effect relations. The "post hoc fallacy" does not mean the establishing of cause-effect relations in general, but particularly uncareful, unsubstantiated instances of constituting them.
Anyways, this has been side-tracking, anyways. Your argument from consequence is invalid for purposes of this discussion, and I think we both know it. So there is no need to sidetrack and blow smoke by abusing clearly defined technical terms.

Is this statement of equivocation referring back to your self-referencing comment?

No.

Otherwise, I’m not sure what you mean by levels of abstraction.
Are you familiar with the idea of levels and metalevels in communication
Where is my equivocation? Which word in that last argument am I using in two different ways?

Here it was objective/subjective. In previous posts it were other terms (and I explained it several times). But nevermind, in this case it was merely meant as a helpful hint, because from your fragmentary sentence and the emoticons I meant to understand that you yourself had noticed how you had driven yourself into paradoxa.
It is not important for the ongoing discussion, unless you want me to consider this uncompleted thought/sentence as an argument.

Furthermore, how are there any levels of abstraction in determinism?

Everything can be there in determinism, it is just determined. I am getting a little impatient for having to repeat that time and again.

All Abstraction is nothing more than the brain’s neurons firing at different speeds.

Is that your idea or are you assuming it is mine? If the latter, you are mistaken. "Nothing more" is misleading because it simply ignores that the ways the neurons fire are of course not random, but determined by other factors again, which are determined...

If all is determined, isn’t it nonsensical to speak of levels of abstraction.

No, it isn´t. Whether our abstractions are determined or chosen doesn´t change anything about us abstracting (on different levels).

A scientist can make a truth statement because he can form a hypothesis based on an experiment that is not a result of the experiment he conducts.

Scientists make no truth statements, to begin with. Apart from that I think I know what you mean, but I am not sure.

He, obviously, is a part and affects the experiment and its results, but his hypothesis is a thought about the content of the experiment, it is not a result of the experiment.

I´m not sure I understand what you mean. Can you explain that in an example, perhaps?

If it were, the hypothesis would lose its truth telling power.

The truth telling power of a hypothesis?
Truth is not a scientific term, and "truth telling power" doesn´t seem to have it´s place there, either.
If, however, you are simply trying to communicate that the statement of a hypothesis does more than merely describe the concrete result of the experiments that it is based upon - I agree.

You, yourself, have acknowledged that this is the logical result of determinism.

I´m not aware I did. I don´t even recall that "truth telling power of hypothesis" has been a topic of our conversation until this very moment.
Since I am not even sure I understand what it is that I am supposed to have acknowledged, could you please elaborate on that and point me to the statement that you consider an admission? (Not that I necessarily deny having acknowledged it, but I am completely confused. Neither do I really know what it is that I allegedly have acknowledged, nor do I know when and where this was.)

It is the scientists’ ability to think and hypothesis ABOUT, not BECAUSE of the experiment that gives his hypothesis truth telling power.[/quote)
Even after the third repetition I am not sure I understand what you mean. Please try to explain more, and if possible don´t use inadequate terminology to describe the methodology and purpose of science. It confuses me.

Free will means that there is an aspect of human nature that can think about the world around him, not because of the world around him.

Wait, just to get that straight: Is that really all that freewill means to you? I recall there being a lot of other meanings, and I do not recall that this was your definition in this thread.
Anyways, I disagree. I don´t think that these are mutually exclusive, and in fact I think man think about the world around him because of the world around him. I´m not sure how you exactly distinguish "the world around him" - for example I do not know whether you count his physical characteristics and his genetics, for example, as the world around him or the world in him or himself or whatever. For me, this is not really important, because all these are merely determining factors, but in case "the world around him" is a crucial distinction for your argument, we need this distinction to be more clearly.

A man, therefore, can make hypothesis about the world in the same way that a scientist can hypothesis about his experiment.

Well, the way the scientists makes his hypothesis (beyond the concrete result of his experiment) is not pulled out of thin air, though. It is not random. It is based on former observations, on former experiences, on established methodology - all of which are part of the "world around him".

Free will grants truth-telling power and grants the ability to hold actual knowledge based on reasoned thought and not based on forced necessity.

Well, since "truth telling power" is not a scientifical parameter, anyways, better let´s go with what science really does: Check out whether ideas are confirmed by reality. So to disconnect the scientific method from reality and make it a matter of arbitrary choice undetermined by reality would make scientific theories pretty arbitrary. Maybe this is how you think about science, though. In which case my objection would be an invalid argument from consequence.
Whatever: Your implication that the experiment is the only outside factor relevant for the hypothesis is pretty weak.
You would have to support it in order to make an argument out of this example.
I am assuming that there are countless other factors determining the forming of the hypothesis, too. The usability of a hypothesis is tested by checking it against reality, and there is no such thing as "truth telling power" to it. It either proves usable or unusable.

It also means that there is a standard of thinking that provides verifiability to thoughts and postulations, unlike determinism which makes all verifying impossible.

I would have to repeat a question that I have asked I guess five or six times now and that you have ignored every time: You never demonstrate how "freewill" warrants those things that you say determinism doesn´t allow for. In each of these cases I see the same problem (actually even more pressing) with "freewill" as without it.
Here: You haven´t explained how chosing a hypothesis allows for standards for verifiability that determinism does not allow for.
Since this question and your following silence has become a running gag in our conversation, and since the answer to this question is quite obviously salient for your claims, I am getting a little frustrated.
Whatever, and for the umpteenth time, determinism allows for pretty much everything (except for choice) - there can be standards for verifiability just fine, but who holds which standards at which point in time is considered determined by the sum of all factors involved.
For simplicity´s and clarity´s sake (although this is not the exact idea of determinism, but it helps understanding how all these things can be there without "freewill" just the same as with free-will): think of us just following a program. The Matrix, if that helps. People in the matrix have and can do everything that people outside the matrix can do, and they feel just the same as them. Whether, e.g., your idea/feeling that you have "freewill" is chosen by "freewill" or programmed into you or determined by the sum of billions of factors doesn´t make any difference whatsoever for your idea/feeling that you have "freewill". So the question "how can there be ... in determinism" is missing the point: of course it can be there - it´s just determined that it is there.

Out of this comes a basis for true justice, virtue, etc.

Again: So far you have failed to give any reason whatsoever for your idea that a chosen view on reality allows for "true" (I am assuming you mean "objective" here) justice, virtue or whatever rather than a view determined by reality. Not only have you not explained it, it is also pretty counterintuitive (not that this would be a compelling argument - I just don´t get what it is with this idea that subjective choice is a prerequisite and warrant for objectivity.)
(This question asked for the 7th time)

Again, people make judgments about things all the time and, as far as anyone can tell, those judgments are the results of a mind weighing beliefs and evidence and logic and desire.

Agreed.

It is not the weight of reality or scientific evidence that makes a determinist think these judgments are cause and effect, it is the results of Determinist axioms.

It is exactly the weight of reality that determines me to assume we are determined.

That is why you equate choice with randomness. But, when I make a judgment, determined or not, it is not random, it is based on thoughts and judgments, not just a mental coin flip.

And unless these thought and judgements are determined by factors, they are random. That´s exactly what random means, after all.

Choice allows us to have thoughts about things not caused by things.

That would be random thoughts.
What you have shown in your experiment/hypothesis analogy (and I would agree so far) is merely that our thoughts about "thing" A are not exclusively determined by thing A. But that is not the idea of determinism, anyways. Our thoughts about "thing" A are determined by countless other "things" as well. So, whatever this analogy might contradict - it certainly doesn´t contradict determinism.

Choice allows the existence of an “I” present to reflect and judge events

And determinism allows the reflection and judgement of events just the same. They are just determined. It also allows the existence of an "I" reflecting and judging events - the way this "I" judges and reflects events is determined. You wouldn´t even notice the difference. (I personally don´t think the "I" is a particularly useful concept, though, but would make for a different discussion.)

Choice allows an agent who chooses based rationality and evidence alone,

So the idea of choice is assuming determinism?

who thinks in ground and consequence.

That would be cause and effect?

t.b.c.

 

[quatona]

part 2

Finally, as far as punishment is concerned, we punish entities without free will (I’m assuming you mean animals) because we believe we are superior and them inferior.

That´s an interesting thought I have never heard before. I don´t think I agree, though. At least not in this exact wording.

This is some of the point C.S. Lewis makes in abolition of man. If a group of Orwellian behaviorists found your particular determined actions as unfavorable, you have no argument to make when they go clockwork orange all over your face. As they start attaching the electrodes to you and begin the shock theory because the Fascists find your determined actions unappealing, despite your moral outrage and bootless cries for justice, these pleas would be nothing more than a chemical shrug. This is what I mean by justice becomes farce.

I hate to break it to you but: In case of unleashed violence (no matter whether it comes from "Orwellian behaviourists", religious fanatics or whomever you have no argument to make, no matter whether you have chosen the argument you would like to make them stop their violence or whether you are determined to desire to make it stop their violence.

But with free will comes falsification, value, truth, and knowledge.

Except that you haven´t even made the attempt to explain why with "freewill" comes value, truth and knowledge any better than with determinism. So far you have simply asserted it. (#8).

I know this may be to you an argument from consequence, but I am responding to the statement about punishing things without free will.

It is not even an argument from consequence - as far as I can see without any further additions it is no argument at all.
With "freewill" you choose your feelings as to what´s just, true and what you know, with determinism you are determined to have those feelings. Same difference in the effect.
"Freewill" doesn´t make violence go away, and "freewill" merely means that you make a subjective choice as to which violence you approve of and which you don´t (and how you react to it), whilst in determinism these opinions and reactions are determined by billions of factors. Both can hold values, both can act upon their values.

 

[Silenus]

I'm going to go back a few pages and maybe provide a summary post before I go on for my own edification. I am trying to provide for you some examples of how free will sets up a reality that can be verified . . . how judgements must be able to observe reality without being bound by it to be able to judge objectivly. I can see by your responses that I have some work ahead of me . . . I'm sorry you are frustrated. It is not my intention to frustrate just to discuss. If we have to agree to disagree, that is no problem.

I, however, am having a good time.

I'll re-read the last few pages and try to provide a summary page so I don;'t repeat points you think have been covered or resolved.