A question for athiests

[Silenus]

So the problem of discerning how our notions
are connected to an assumed objective reality isn´t
solved by non-determinism.

Well, it depends on which theory of non-determinism
you deal with . . . If you're post-kant, yes the ding
au sich problem is always there; however, i don't
agree with most of kant or the emperasists for that
matter. But you are correct in saying that this is a
problem of conciousness that everyone has to deal
with.

The world as we know apparently differs from
person to person.
Anyways, it appears to be most reasonable to argue
from the world as we know it, but it does no appear to
be reasonable to argue from the world others know it.

i can't say I agree with this statement here, if both
myself and three other people see an event, I become
more certain that that event is not just an aspect of
my own conciousness, but exists outside of it because
other conciousnesses have percieved it as well. If we
didn't include other people's perception, all our
beliefs about history would be called into doubt
because I certainly wasn't there.

How would they have any more than ironic
content if they were arbitrarily chosen without the
"world as it is" being a determining factor?
You point out a fundamental problem of consciousness
and perception, but this problem exists for "choice"
at least as much as for "determinism".

Could you flesh this out some more and make it sweat a
little? This statement seems to assume a separation
between my perception and the world as it is . . .
something i don't agree with.

This is not a valid question in determinism.
You care because you are determined to care. You don´t
care because you are determined to not care.

It is true that my concern is determined, but that
doesn't make it a invalid question. As far as i can
tell, the concept of value is robbed of its potency,
and so, if I am determined to believe in detreminism
and i am determined to believe in logic, am I then not
determined to rob value of its value and thereforem
determined to not care unless I am also determined to
hold value in faith?

Admittedly, this theory has the problem of
being self-referential, just like any other theory
concerning this question. I find it not a good idea to
hold this basic problem against determinism, but to
ignore it when considering other theories.



Au contraire, in determinism you have plenty of
reasons that determine you to think you are right.

Would you mind also felshing this out a little more,
and also giving me what criteria you use when
considering other theories.

No, these are basic problem of conscious being
trying to explain consciousness and cognition. Every
theory will run into this dilemma. The theory that you
- independently an assumed objective reality - choose
what to believe more obviously than any other, because
it denies a causal connection between the supposed
objective reality and my idea of it right from the
start.

yea, and if you wouldn't mind fleshing this out some
more to . . . I read this and I think you could mean a
variety of things and I don't want to make an
assumption that takes the discussion off track . . .



However, i can't see your icon from the type thread
screen, so i don't know if you are athiestic or
agnostic, but woudn't determinism make (no pun
intended again) everyone an agnostic. You know, I
think this will get interesting because I don't know
if I've studied the problems of conciousness in as
much debth as I might have before I opened this can of
worms. Oh well, I like to see the slimy things crawl
anyway . ..



out of curiosity, how many on thie thread are
determinsitic in leaning . . . and quantona, are you
or are you just playing the advocate . . .

Oh, and I wasn't correcting any spelling, I just wanted to make sure we were both starting at the same point.

 

[quatona]

Your a rad dude.

A what?
(sorry, non-native speaker here, and unfamiliar with many colloquials)

 

[quatona]

Well, it depends on which theory of non-determinism
you deal with . . . If you're post-kant, yes the ding
au sich problem is always there; however, i don't
agree with most of kant or the emperasists for that
matter. But you are correct in saying that this is a
problem of conciousness that everyone has to deal
with.

Fair enough. So unless you give me a theory that conclusively and logically gets around this problem, I don´t see how the fact thait it is subjected to this problem makes a case against determinism more than against any other theory of cognition and consciousness.

i can't say I agree with this statement here, if both
myself and three other people see an event, I become
more certain that that event is not just an aspect of
my own conciousness, but exists outside of it because
other conciousnesses have percieved it as well.

This was not necessarily my statement. In order to find out what concept of „reality“ you have and in order to accept it for purposes of this argument, I asked you about it explicitly, and I understood you saying that you assume there to be an objective reality.
Now, what you describe above, is exactly the basis for determinism. We do not choose to see a car passing by, we simply see it. And this perception (in combination with other determining factors) determines our notion that a car passed by. The fact that other persons confirm this perception is another determining factor.

If we
didn't include other people's perception, all our
beliefs about history would be called into doubt
because I certainly wasn't there.

Yes, and therefore I don´t rely on historical „facts“. It is not necessary. Whether Cicero, Hitler or Jesus existed are questions that are not really relevant for my life. If what is reported is possible it makes not much of a difference for me whether these reports are facts or well thought out stories. But that leads us off-topic.
On topic: There are historical reports that you believe in and there are others you don´t believe in. The question is whether this belief is determined or freely chosen. „Other people´s perception“ certainly plays a part in this – for a determinist they are simply co-determining factors.
What you seem to be pleading for (if thinking your argument through to the end) is making „reality“ a majority vote. I do not necessarily disagree with this postulation, but I am afraid it clashes with your idea of an objective reality.

Could you flesh this out some more and make it sweat a
little? This statement seems to assume a separation
between my perception and the world as it is . . .
something i don't agree with.

Again: I was trying to work from what I understood to be your pemises: An „objective reality“ out there, and our perception of it that is either accurate or inaccurate. So (if I haven´t misunderstood you) this separation is part of your premise. If, however, you do not believe in separation, you have to assume a causal connection, which means: Our understanding of reality is determined by this reality.

It is true that my concern is determined, but that
doesn't make it a invalid question. As far as i can
tell, the concept of value is robbed of its potency,
and so, if I am determined to believe in detreminism
and i am determined to believe in logic, am I then not
determined to rob value of its value and thereforem
determined to not care unless I am also determined to
hold value in faith?

Depends on what you mean when saying „care“. If you are talking about „freely chosing to care“ – this would, of course not be compatible with determinism. You value what you value, you care for what you care. In determinism you simply do it. The question „why should I care?“ is somewhat absurd in a determinism. You either care or you don´t. You feel you should care or you feel you shouldn´t care. Depending on your „program“ (in lack of a better word). You have the feeling you „should“ care because you are determined to feel so.

Would you mind also felshing this out a little more,
and also giving me what criteria you use when
considering other theories.

I do not even need to consider any theory in detail to make this claim.
Thinking about thinking is self-referential, speaking about language is self-referential.
Beliefs about how we acquire our beliefs are subject to themselves - i.e. self-referential. There is no way around that.

If I we have a choice we choose whether to believe we have a choice or haven´t.
If we are determined in our beliefs, our belief that we have a choice or haven´t is determined.

yea, and if you wouldn't mind fleshing this out some
more to . . . I read this and I think you could mean a
variety of things and I don't want to make an
assumption that takes the discussion off track . . .

Not sure I can explain it any better, but I will try in short:
The assumption that you choose your beliefs about reality assumes a disconnection between reality and beliefs even more than determinism does.
If you freely choose your beliefs about reality (without the elements of reality being the determining factors), you are completely lost in your arbitrary, random choice.

However, i can't see your icon from the type thread
screen, so i don't know if you are athiestic or
agnostic, but woudn't determinism make (no pun
intended again) everyone an agnostic.

Fair question: I don´t believe in any gods. (For more detailed information please read mig signature).
And, yes, being a determinist doesn´t allow for certainty in my opinion. Then again, I do not see how non-determinism allows for certainty, either. That you have chosen your opinions about reality does not really seem to make a good case for reality to be the way you believe it is.

out of curiosity, how many on thie thread are
determinsitic in leaning . . . and quantona, are you
or are you just playing the advocate . . .

Rest assured I am.
I do not, however, share your idea of reality. I am simply trying to accept it for the sake of the argument. I do not think that my ideas about reality are really relevant to the question „determinism vs. free determining agency“, so I am fine with following yours for purposes of this discussion.

Oh, and I wasn't correcting any spelling, I just wanted to make sure we were both starting at the same point.

You mean you wanted to adjust your spelling down to the level of mine?

 

[quatona]

Silenus, here is something that may help you get my point better (or not):

If we would all and in all cases agree on what reality is, the problem of discerning inaccurate from accurate wouldn´t even be there.
The problem arises because people - more or less often - disagree on reality.

Now let´s - for clarity´s sake - take an extreme example. Two persons sitting there on a bench, looking in the same direction.
A:"Man, what a beautiful car that is driving there!"
B: "Huh? There is no car driving there."

The problem/question "Whose perception of reality is accurate (is there a car or is there no car driving by)"?
Now I´d like you to explain how the assumption that the two guys have freely chosen their beliefs allows for discerning whose perception of reality is accurate any better than the assumption that their beliefs are determined?
And how does the assumption that they have freely chosen their beliefs give a more plausible explanation for the difference in their perception than the assumption that they are determined to believe what they believe?

 

[Silenus]

Okay, I think I’m going to deal with some of the things you said and then ask for a clarification of definitions.

Let me start with these quotes first and my objection to them . . .

We do not choose to see a car passing by, we simply see it. And this perception (in combination with other determining factors) determines our notion that a car passed by. The fact that other persons confirm this perception is another determining factor.

The problem/question "Whose perception of reality is accurate (is there a car or is there no car driving by)"?

Now I’d like you to explain how the assumption that the two guys have freely chosen their beliefs allows for discerning whose perception of reality is accurate any better than the assumption that their beliefs are determined?
And how does the assumption that they have freely chosen their beliefs give a more plausible explanation for the difference in their perception than the assumption that they are determined to believe what they believe?

But this assumes that all my beliefs and thoughts are on the level of sensation. It is true that I cannot help but see a car go by if a car goes by unless I choose to close my eyes and ignore the car, but that doesn’t cause any problem for free will. For this to be a devastating argument, we would have to assume that all human cognition acted at the level of the senses. I don’t think this is true. I touch a piece of wood that is grainy and I can’t help but feel the graininess has nothing to do with free will. Sensation is automatic. This is the problem with treating humans like rocks, plants, or dogs, our essence is drastically different than rocks, plants, and dogs, and the fact that we could even come up with the theory of determinism is a small proof of that. Just because I salivate because I smell food as a result of my hunger, just because sensation works, doesn’t mean all cognition is bound by these automations. This is where Aquinas was right and John Locke was wrong. Let me flesh this out by bringing in one of my main men, (not a Christian, but I surely do love this dude) Noam Chomsky.

In support of his belief (Skinner) that science will demonstrate that behavior is entirely a function of antecedent events, Skinner notes that physics advanced only when it stopped personifying things and attributing to them wills, impulses, feelings, and purposes, and so on. Therefore, he concluded, the science of behavior will progress only when it stops personifying people and avoids reference to internal states. No doubt psychics advanced by rejecting the view that a rock’s wish to fall is a factor in its behavior because a rock has no wish . . . For Skinner’s arguments to have any force, he must show that people have will, impulses, feelings, purposes, and the like no more than rocks do. If people differ from rocks in this aspect, then a science of behavior will have to point this out.

From Chomsky’s “For Reasons of State.”

Now, again, to talk about consciousness, we have to make a separation between sensation and other levels of cognition. One of the reasons we are stuck with Kantian and empirical notions of consciousness is because Locke never separated these things and then went on to say that all thoughts are things that we apprehend. However, this is not true. As Aquinas and Adler point out, some of our mental activities are the things by which we apprehend and that makes a load of difference. This subtle view of reality eliminates Kant’s thing –in-itself problem, a problem that is Locke’s fault for not differentiating between the modes of thought.

But before any continuation on this point, let me ask, do you distinguish a difference between behavioralism and determinism, and if so, what is the difference?

I admit that I have been using the words interchangeably and maybe I shouldn’t

Also, Do you think that all human thought is automatic, just like sensation, and if so, how does science establish a basis for this belief?

 

[quatona]

Howdy Silenus, and thanks for the response.
I notice that you have been shifting the goalposts. Basically that´s fine with me, and we can follow the flow of the discussion.
Yet, I would like to have clarification in one point, before we move on: The reason I entered this thread was my request to substantiate your claim that determinism is self-refuting, and you said you were going to provide it. So far you haven´t done that, whilst I have shown that everything that makes determinism self-referential, makes every other theory regarding this issue self-referential just as much. In the meantime you have started operating with the axioms of several philosophers that – as far as I can see – do not help your claim, but make other arguments against determinism.
So am I right in assuming that your claim is off the table, retracted? It´s not that I am fond of claiming victory or something – I´d just like to know where we stand and what exactly we are discussing at any given moment.
If you hold up your claim that determinism is self-refuting, I am still hoping for you to substantiate that claim.

Okay, I think I’m going to deal with some of the things you said and then ask for a clarification of definitions.

Ok.

Let me start with these quotes first and my objection to them . . .
Quote:
We do not choose to see a car passing by, we simply see it. And this perception (in combination with other determining factors) determines our notion that a car passed by. The fact that other persons confirm this perception is another determining factor.
Quote:

The problem/question "Whose perception of reality is accurate (is there a car or is there no car driving by)"?

Now I’d like you to explain how the assumption that the two guys have freely chosen their beliefs allows for discerning whose perception of reality is accurate any better than the assumption that their beliefs are determined?
And how does the assumption that they have freely chosen their beliefs give a more plausible explanation for the difference in their perception than the assumption that they are determined to believe what they believe?
But this assumes that all my beliefs and thoughts are on the level of sensation.

No, Silenus, this assumed nothing. It was a question, based on a fact that we often observe, which you and I agree upon, and which is the reason why we discuss this topic at all: People´s experiences differ. The question was clear and not loaded, as far as I can see. I would appreciate it if you would answer it.

It is true that I cannot help but see a car go by if a car goes by unless I choose to close my eyes and ignore the car, but that doesn’t cause any problem for free will.

My intention with this question was not to demonstrate a problem for freewill, but to give you the opportunity to show me how freewill is a more plausible explanation than determinism.

For this to be a devastating argument, we would have to assume that all human cognition acted at the level of the senses.

It was not meant to be a devastating argument. Please be so kind and go back and read the paragraph carefully. The question (and the implied potential conclusions and their limitations) is clear, I am sure.
I even told you what my intention was in asking this question (two questions, actually). It was not to disprove freewill.

I don’t think this is true. I touch a piece of wood that is grainy and I can’t help but feel the graininess has nothing to do with free will. Sensation is automatic.

I think „automatic“ is not the right term here. Sensation is determined.

This is the problem with treating humans like rocks, plants, or dogs, our essence is drastically different than rocks, plants, and dogs, and the fact that we could even come up with the theory of determinism is a small proof of that.

That´s why I don´t claim that humans are like rocks, plants, or dogs. I merely say that we (our thoughts, feelings, actions) are determined.

Just because I salivate because I smell food as a result of my hunger, just because sensation works, doesn’t mean all cognition is bound by these automations.

Sure it isn´t. You are anticipating and refuting arguments that I have not been making and would not have made.
Of course, the mechanisms of our sensation are but one determining factor.
But – correct me if I am wrong – you have just conceded that there are such determining factors. I am sure you will also concede that genetics is another determining factor. Thus, we have already shown that the unqualified claim that we are free determining agents is inaccurate. There are a lot of determining factors, as you concede. This changes the question from „Are we free to determine our actions?“ (inaccurate) to „To which extent are we determined?“. That there are determining factors seems undisputed, and I say it´s 100% determining factors.
The mechanisms of determining factors by the billions can be and are explained.

Now, if you introduce the idea of „freewill“, I suggest you tell me how I am supposed to imagine the mechanism by which „freewill“ works. I have never seen any such explanation, and that makes me suspicious. How does the free determining agency in me work? How do free decisions come into being?
An important prerequisite for considering your idea „I have freewill“ would be the question: What exactly do you include when saying „me“? Are your thoughts part of this „you“, are your sensations included in it, are your genetics included? What exactly do you mean by „I“ when saying „I am a determining agent“? Is this determining agent something in you? Why would you include it into „I“ (even equating it with „I&#8220 – as opposed to those things that you do not include?

This is where Aquinas was right and John Locke was wrong. Let me flesh this out by bringing in one of my main men, (not a Christian, but I surely do love this dude) Noam Chomsky.

Oh, Chomsky. I love him.

In support of his belief (Skinner) that science will demonstrate that behavior is entirely a function of antecedent events, Skinner notes that physics advanced only when it stopped personifying things and attributing to them wills, impulses, feelings, and purposes, and so on. Therefore, he concluded, the science of behavior will progress only when it stops personifying people and avoids reference to internal states. No doubt psychics advanced by rejecting the view that a rock’s wish to fall is a factor in its behavior because a rock has no wish . . . For Skinner’s arguments to have any force, he must show that people have will, impulses, feelings, purposes, and the like no more than rocks do. If people differ from rocks in this aspect, then a science of behavior will have to point this out.


From Chomsky’s “For Reasons of State.”

Certainly an interesting read, Silenus. Yet, I do not see a point in discussing statements that are meant to refute claims that someone else has made, and that I neither have made nor agree with.
Would you be willing to agree on the following procedure: I offer my thoughts and you offer yours, and we try to respond to these thoughts, and leave all name dropping and quoting of off-tangent sources aside?

Now, again, to talk about consciousness, we have to make a separation between sensation and other levels of cognition.

Since you have introduced the accuracy of our beliefs in reference to the „objective reality“ out there: if anything, our sensations are the contact to this „objective reality“, and therefore they are always part of the equation – a determining factor.
Sure there are other parts of cognition (sloppily said: those that process the information of our sensations), but their mechanisms are to a large extent known and classify as determining factors as well.
E.g. the fact alone that a small change of the hormonal balance can change thoroughly what we discern as the „individual traits“ of a person points to hormons and other chemicals in our bodies as being strong determining factors.
Whereever you look, you will find determining factors. I don´t seem to be under great pressure to present determinism as a plausible explanation. Whilst the mechanism and the location of „freewill“ have never been even attempted to be explained, to my knowledge.

One of the reasons we are stuck with Kantian and empirical notions of consciousness is because Locke never separated these things and then went on to say that all thoughts are things that we apprehend. However, this is not true. As Aquinas and Adler point out, some of our mental activities are the things by which we apprehend and that makes a load of difference. This subtle view of reality eliminates Kant’s thing –in-itself problem, a problem that is Locke’s fault for not differentiating between the modes of thought.

Actually, I don´t care much what Kant, Locke, Aquinas and Adler had to say on the subject. Again you refer to refutations of concepts that I neither have presented nor hold.
Maybe I am too demanding and my expectations are inappropriate, but I expect you to give me the honour of addressing my original thoughts. If possible with your own original thoughts.

But before any continuation on this point, let me ask, do you distinguish a difference between behavioralism and determinism, and if so, what is the difference?
I admit that I have been using the words interchangeably and maybe I shouldn’t

I´m glad you noticed it yourself.
Silenus, again: I do not see much point in comparing certain labels that each signify a variety of different philosophies and a vast multitude of subsets, whilst actually we have each other to give precise descripitions of our individual concepts and convictions.
I gave one example in which sensations were involved to ask a specific question. You apparently understood that I was saying that sensation is the one and ultimate determining factor and hence start to discuss behaviourism (which at best can be considered only faintly related to determinism) instead of answering my question.
(For clarification: In my opinion „sensation“ – which itself is a complex mechanism of processes of determination – is just one of billions of determining factors.)
This process in which I find myself time and again asked to defend positions I don´t hold asks too much unnecessary effort from me. Don´t get me wrong – this is not a reproach and I am not blaming you. I am sure you do not misrepresent me purposely. It is just a request to spend some of your attention on avoiding doing this.

I think a good dictionary will give you a good explanation of determinism and behaviourism.

Also, Do you think that all human thought is automatic, just like sensation, and if so, how does science establish a basis for this belief?

As said above, I cannot relate to the term „automatic“ in this context, so I will keep to „determined“. Yes, I think all our thoughts are determined (beyond our control), and even if we perceive ourselves as controlling our thoughts, the causes for these "self-manipulations" (in lack of a better term) lie outside our control.
Either my thoughts are determined, or they are random. I see no third option. If assuming there to be a free determining agent in me this agent makes decisions either as a result of all determining factors involved, or it acts randomly.

Does science establish a basis for this belief? Most definitely, although it doesn´t provide any conclusive evidence or proof (let alone that this determinism is a philosophical concept, anyways).
Science all the time finds out about determining processes (biology, genetics, neuro-sciences, brain-research, chemistry etc.). The determining force of such processes can be shown so conclusively, that there are only small gaps - if any - left in which „freewill“ might fit in.
Whilst, to my knowledge, the concept of „freewill“ has not a single scientific finding for its support.

Anyways, Silenus, I am not a scientist. We started this as a philosophical and – in the first place – logical discussion (remember your claim that determinism is self-refuting?), and I personally would prefer to remain there. I definitely lack the required scientific knowledge.

 

[Silenus]

okay, i wasn't name dropping or purposfully trying to change the goal posts, so I apologise for giving that impression. Althought I do have original thoughts, not all of them are mine, as i imagine not all of your thoughts are your original thoughts. Sometimes we learn from other people. Name dropping for the point of proving the point was not my intention, I was just trying to give the credit to where some of my thoughts were coming from, instead of acting like they were all my own. I thought your car example, because you were asking how free agency would impact the perception of a car driving by and I thought you were using this to say, hey, we don't need free will. I would agree that my sensations have nothing to do with free agency and whether determinism is true or false has nothing to do with the level of sensation. And I have no problem using the word determined rather than automatic to talk about sensation or genetics. But then I wouldn't have been able to title my post automatic for the people.

But – correct me if I am wrong – you have just conceded that there are such determining factors. I am sure you will also concede that genetics is another determining factor. Thus, we have already shown that the unqualified claim that we are free determining agents is inaccurate. There are a lot of determining factors, as you concede. This changes the question from „Are we free to determine our actions?“ (inaccurate) to „To which extent are we determined?“. That there are determining factors seems undisputed, and I say it´s 100% determining factors.
The mechanisms of determining factors by the billions can be and are explained.

I disagree and I think our definitions of free will are different. Just because our human function work doesn't mean there isn't someone behind the wheel. Free will means exactly that, freedom of the will, free judgement. I don't put it into a percentage equation. Instaed of just enviroment and heredity creating action there is enviroment, heredity, and will.

But, at your request I will read through the posts and try to restablish the topic you wish to discuss tomorrow. Again, my apologies, i was not purposfully trying to move the conversation. I thought your example was an argument and I admit I might have been having flashbacks of other conversations when I made my response. my bad.

 

[Silenus]

oh, and my claim may be off the table . . . I was thinking about some of your points, but I'm not sure I see how all theories are self-referential in the same way that determinism is. I'll read back through the posts.

 

[Gus2009]

When I was a child, I would ask questions like "How come people speak other languages?" or "Why do birds fly and we don't?" and my father would invariably reply: "They just do." His response didn't answer the questions (which generally did have an answer even if he did not know them)- it was more a way of giving up without admitting ignorance. I feel more or less the same way about those who submit the same non-answer in response to the important questions of existence. Saying that the universe simply exists may be descriptively true, but it is not an answer to the question of why it does. If you do not have an answer for why the universe exists, at least have the dignity to say that you do not know- don't imagine that not having the answer is somehow an answer.

I dont buy the analogy. Birds fly because of explainable reasons, other than the descriptively true reason of "because they do". Asking, "why does the universe exist?" is much like asking "why is blue, blue?" or "why is hot, hot?". There is no other reason then "because it does or is". Asking, "why does the universe exist?" is basically asking "why does existence, exist?" . It does what it does because of the defintion of what it is.

 

[quatona]

Come on, Silenus, no need to apologize.

okay, i wasn't name dropping or purposfully trying to change the goal posts, so I apologise for giving that impression. Althought I do have original thoughts, not all of them are mine, as i imagine not all of your thoughts are your original thoughts. Sometimes we learn from other people. Name dropping for the point of proving the point was not my intention, I was just trying to give the credit to where some of my thoughts were coming from, instead of acting like they were all my own.

Oh, when saying "original thoughts" I didn´t mean "my own thoughts that are completely uninfluenced by the thinking of others" (this would be a funny thing to assume for a determinist, after all).

I disagree and I think our definitions of free will are different. Just because our human function work doesn't mean there isn't someone behind the wheel.

No, it doesn´t. But I would need a good reason for assuming that.
So how do we get to the idea that an apple has no "freewill? I think it is because we have good explanations as to why apples do what they do. Nothing requires the assumption of "freewill" for apples. Parsimony, if you will. I think the same is true for humans (whenever we look for causal chains explaining their actions we seem to find them). The difference is that these processes are far more complex due to the greater complexity of a human compared to an apple), and if you want me to consider the idea of "freewill", it might help me if you told me what it can explain that determination can´t explain.

Free will means exactly that, freedom of the will, free judgement.

1. Free of what?
2. If my will is free, I am not. Then my will determines my actions. Am I controlling my will (am I the derterminer of what I will - Attention! Infinite regression lurking) or is my will controlling me? (Again we run into the problem of the definition of the "I/me/self).

I don't put it into a percentage equation.

And rightly so. I was mentioning the "100%" only to tell you that I am assuming unbroken chains of causes and effects.

Instaed of just enviroment and heredity creating action there is enviroment, heredity, and will.

I have no problem with the concept of will. I have a problem with the assumption that I am controlling what I will. My will is a result of all the factors that determine this will to will what it wills. And, for me, it would be a strange idea to assume my will to randomly determine what I will.

But, at your request I will read through the posts and try to restablish the topic you wish to discuss tomorrow. Again, my apologies, i was not purposfully trying to move the conversation. I thought your example was an argument and I admit I might have been having flashbacks of other conversations when I made my response. my bad.

Thanks. Again, no need to apologize - misunderstandings.

 

[quatona]

A hypothetical shows best what I mean when saying "determined":
If the very same person, at the very same age could be in the very same situation several times (with everything including his hormonal levels, his previous experiences - i.e. him being exactly in the same state - and every detail of the situation and all other conditions being identical), would he will differently, would he act differently?
I see no reason to assume he ever would. If it turned out he did, that immediately would cause me (and I am pretty confident everybody else, including "freewillies", too) to ask "Well, what made the difference then?" Why the heck was his will different? Is his will a random parameter? Is there no reason/cause whatsoever for his will to will what it wills?
If his will is a freely acting factor outside his control, how is the person "freely determining"?
Whilst if the man is in control of what he wills, how and based on what does he decide what his will wills, how does he exert the controllin of what he wills?

 

[Silenus]

Okay, it’s a day late I know, but I’m back. A little grading to do last night and it took me longer than anticipated. Anyway, I think I’d like to address your comments and take another stab at self-refuting, although I may acquiesce and say self-referential. Let’s start with the first statement.

The difference is that these processes are far more complex due to the greater complexity of a human compared to an apple), and if you want me to consider the idea of "freewill", it might help me if you told me what it can explain that determination can’t explain.

Well, I think that right there we have an assumption underneath your statement which makes a free will explanation unsatisfying to you. I believe that, since you believe all processes are cause and effect processes, any explanation I offer will be unsatisfactory. For instance, there are many examples of people who are raised in dire circumstances. Some of them pull themselves up and some of them give into despair. Many of these cases have striking similarities, but drastic differences in outcome. Poor environment, abusive parents, societal oppression, and yet some thrive anyway and some do not. I have a feeling you would look at these differences and say that, if we could see all the input into the individuals involved, we could predict why the one thrived and the other did not. However, this is to start the process of investigation with an already determined mindset that the difference is explainable by a hereditary or environmental cause. However, I see no reason to assume that these differences are not the result of a choice of will, rather than a determination of an obscure gene or environmental situation. It is true, environment and heredity have an impact, as I admitted in my last post. But, it seem more likely, given a simple metacognitive inspection, that we make choices and judgments and see no reason to assume they were forced determinations of environmental factors. Rest assured, I am not saying that the feeling of freedom makes freedom true. But, it does seem that the above approach needs to assume determinism first instead of exploring all the possibilities for difference. All is not cause and effect.

1. Free of what?
2. If my will is free, I am not. Then my will determines my actions. Am I controlling my will (am I the derterminer of what I will - Attention! Infinite regression lurking) or is my will controlling me? (Again we run into the problem of the definition of the "I/me/self).

Yes, and I am tempted to quote Aquinas again, but I will hold my breath. Of course, I could continue to ask what decides the will, then what decides the things that decides, but that is only a problem for someone who believes all is material and all is cause and effect. I am not one of those people. I can believe in causes that have no initial cause. Your will is you, just as your body is you. Body, soul, and spirit. Or maybe you're just a body and spirit kind of guy. And rest assured, I assume the two go together, I do not believe in a dualistic separation. Which leads me to the final statement . . .

My will is a result of all the factors that determine this will to will what it wills. And, for me, it would be a strange idea to assume my will to randomly determine what I will.

If the very same person, at the very same age could be in the very same situation several times (with everything including his hormonal levels, his previous experiences - i.e. him being exactly in the same state - and every detail of the situation and all other conditions being identical), would he will differently, would he act differently?
I see no reason to assume he ever would. If it turned out he did, that immediately would cause me (and I am pretty confident everybody else, including "freewillies", too) to ask "Well, what made the difference then?" Why the heck was his will different? Is his will a random parameter? Is there no reason/cause whatsoever for his will to will what it wills?
If his will is a freely acting factor outside his control, how is the person "freely determining"?
Whilst if the man is in control of what he wills, how and based on what does he decide what his will wills, how does he exert the controllin of what he wills?

But chance and free will are not synonymous terms. This is why I like the Latin form of the term that translates more literally into free judgment. Your will is a part of you, just like your body (heredity). Your will is not a result of factors. A definition for free will might be the power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will not affected by outside causes. i.e., the interplay of will and desire is a kind of psychological primary. Your use of word randomly and the situation above seem to indicate that these things are the same. I do not believe they are. Again, I would say the will is not caused, it is psychological unmoved mover. There are reasons for the choices we make , but they are logical ground and consequence reasons, not determined cause and effect reasons.

I think a better way to put this scenario would be to ask whether this theoretical person, if we had a method of predicting all outcomes based on heredity and environment and had all information, if we could predict what a person would do before he made his choice. The answer would be no. We would be able to talk in probabilities, but we would not be able to make a prediction, because there would be missing data.

Finally, I thought about and I do not see how other forms of thought are self-referential in the same way as dterminism. For determinism to be true, it cannot apply to itself. It’s like the example of the religions and the elephant. All religions are blind men touching an elephant and they all come to different conclusions because they are touching different parts. Everytime I hear that I gotta ask, who is the dude with sight watching all these blind dudes touching the elephant? In determinism, everything a person believes he has to believe. If this is true, no knowledge is possible because I have no assurance in the face of disagreement that I am right, and neither is the other guy. Therefore, no theory could cause greater plausibility than another. It seems, if you are a determinist, you arrived at your theory by mystical revelation (hard Calvinism) or assert that their belief in determinism is the exception to the rule. I don’t see how any other belief theory falls prey to this problem.

 

[quatona]

Okay, it’s a day late I know, but I’m back. A little grading to do last night and it took me longer than anticipated.

No worries – take your time. No obligations.

Anyway, I think I’d like to address your comments and take another stab at self-refuting, although I may acquiesce and say self-referential.

Hehe, I´m not sure you are doing yourself a good service by raising the standards and my expectations again.
And indeed, having read through your response in unpatient anticipation of the „self-refuting“ argument, I could not even find a serious attempt to provide such. With the exception of the last paragraph which, however, seems to have no logical connection with the rest of your post. So presupposing your agreement, I will first address your last paragraph first by measuring it by the „self-refutation“ standard, and then comment on the rest of your post by „normal“ argumentative standards.

Finally, I thought about and I do not see how other forms of thought are self-referential in the same way as dterminism. For determinism to be true, it cannot apply to itself.

Why not?

It’s like the example of the religions and the elephant. All religions are blind men touching an elephant and they all come to different conclusions because they are touching different parts. Everytime I hear that I gotta ask, who is the dude with sight watching all these blind dudes touching the elephant?

Sorry, Silenus, I seem to completely fail to understand what this is meant to be an analogy for in the context of our topic.

In determinism, everything a person believes he has to believe. If this is true, no knowledge is possible because I have no assurance in the face of disagreement that I am right, and neither is the other guy.

We have been there before, Silenus. I have responded to this argument, and since you didn´t continue the point I was assuming we were done with it. Now you simply repeat it.
Here is my refutation again: The assumption that you can freely choose your beliefs is subject to the same problem. It´s an inherent problem of being a perceiving subject, not a problem of determinism.
Next, you are equivocation „being correct“ with „knowing that I am correct“. Even though my beliefs are determined and indeed I can never know whether my beliefs are correct, they can be correct.
Same goes for freely chosen beliefs. The fact that you have chosen them freely does nothing for being able to know that you are right. In fact, I tend to think that a belief determined by factors that are part of a supposedly existing reality is more likely to be accurate than a freely chosen belief.

Therefore, no theory could cause greater plausibility than another.

How´s that any different with freely chosen beliefs?

It seems, if you are a determinist, you arrived at your theory by mystical revelation (hard Calvinism) or assert that their belief in determinism is the exception to the rule.

No. Simple parsimony is sufficient. Avoiding to introduce unnecessary exceptional assumptions.
Since I am not a theist the first option is moot, and as for the second: Which rule are you talking about?

I don’t see how any other belief theory falls prey to this problem.

Not knowing which rule you refer to I don´t even seem to understand the problem, in the first place.

Well, I think that right there we have an assumption underneath your statement which makes a free will explanation unsatisfying to you. I believe that, since you believe all processes are cause and effect processes, any explanation I offer will be unsatisfactory.

Unless they are not unparsimonous exceptional claims involving poorly defined and unexplainable concepts, for a change.
Interestingly you call me upon my axioms, and all you do is holding your axioms against them. The difference between our axioms is that mine are founded in demonstrable mechanisms whilst yours are wild assertions.

For instance, there are many examples of people who are raised in dire circumstances. Some of them pull themselves up and some of them give into despair. Many of these cases have striking similarities, but drastic differences in outcome. Poor environment, abusive parents, societal oppression, and yet some thrive anyway and some do not. I have a feeling you would look at these differences and say that, if we could see all the input into the individuals involved, we could predict why the one thrived and the other did not.

Pretty good representation. No objections.

However, this is to start the process of investigation with an already determined mindset that the difference is explainable by a hereditary or environmental cause.

Not really. I think I have made clear already that this is not an idea of monocausality. So the idea is not that it is explainable by „a“ cause, but as the only possible result of all the billions of factors involved.
In a way, I feel justified in assuming cause-effect chains, because that is how we observe things in our universe to work. They can be shown, they can be demonstrated, and they are investigable. We do not overthrow tried and tested and time and again confirmed paradigms in favour of an unnecessary assumption which is poorly defined, in the first place.
So the procedure is not a determined mindset, but looking for that which provides an explanation and setting off the escape to an shoulder-shrugging introduction of a poorly defined claim from ignorance to a point where our explanations fail.

However, I see no reason to assume that these differences are not the result of a choice of will, rather than a determination of an obscure gene or environmental situation.

Hey, I don´t appreciate it when my arguments are distorted into absurd strawmen.
Firstly, and I have made that clear several times already, it is not about this or that being the cause, but about the combination of billions of factors.
Secondly, genes are not „obscure“, and their impact is demonstrable. Since genes have been demonstrated to determine a lot of our properties, I see no major problem with assuming that they also determine how a brain works and which thoughts e.g. an individual brain is capable of thinking or uncapable of thinking. And indeed this can be demonstrated, too. That´s just one factor among billions, though.
In search for an explanation I am not asserting an „obscure gene“, but I am looking at all the factors involved. There are plenty of other things to look for before asserting that an unknown „obscure gene“ is responsible for something.

It is true, environment and heredity have an impact, as I admitted in my last post. But, it seem more likely, given a simple metacognitive inspection, that we make choices and judgments and see no reason to assume they were forced determinations of environmental factors.

„It seems more likely“ is a blanket apodictic statement that is hard to discuss. To me it doesn´t seem more likely.
Unfortunately something determines you to skip some parts in my posts that are important imo.

Rest assured, I am not saying that the feeling of freedom makes freedom true. But, it does seem that the above approach needs to assume determinism first instead of exploring all the possibilities for difference. All is not cause and effect.

Well, to me it seems all is cause and effect. And since the principle of cause and effect is demonstrably governing our world, I do not really feel off-base, in view of the fact that your alternative is based on the introduction of a poorly defined concept that lacks demonstrability and falsifiability.

Yes, and I am tempted to quote Aquinas again, but I will hold my breath.

Thanks, much appreciated.

Of course, I could continue to ask what decides the will, then what decides the things that decides, but that is only a problem for someone who believes all is material and all is cause and effect.

Not really. Rather for someone who tries to explain things by demonstrable mechanisms before he simply escapes to exceptional concepts.

I am not one of those people. I can believe in causes that have no initial cause. Your will is you, just as your body is you. Body, soul, and spirit. Or maybe you're just a body and spirit kind of guy. And rest assured, I assume the two go together, I do not believe in a dualistic separation. Which leads me to the final statement . . .But chance and free will are not synonymous terms.

Huh? Of course they aren´t. However, „chance“ was neither explicitly nor implicitly part of my statements you are responding to here.

This is why I like the Latin form of the term that translates more literally into free judgment. Your will is a part of you, just like your body (heredity). Your will is not a result of factors. A definition for free will might be the power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will not affected by outside causes. i.e., the interplay of will and desire is a kind of psychological primary. Your use of word randomly and the situation above seem to indicate that these things are the same. I do not believe they are. Again, I would say the will is not caused, it is psychological unmoved mover. There are reasons for the choices we make , but they are logical ground and consequence reasons, not determined cause and effect reasons. .

Now, all you are doing here is stating your beliefs (and don´t get me wrong: you are perfectly entitled and welcome to hold them), but I fail to see any argumentative support and hence no opportunity to discuss their plausibility.
An „unmoved mover“ working inside us is an exceptional claim if there ever was one. It requires exceptional evidence, while in fact it is an unsupported and on top unparsimonous assumption.

Here comes the question from my previous post (that something determined you to ignore ) into play: What makes us assume that an apple has no free will?

Let´s play this through: I say that to me „it seems“ as though apples have „freewill“, and unmoved mover working in them. Since you didn´t take the challenge to tackle this claim, I will do it for you.

You either debate it by that which you call a purely materialistc, natualistic approach, based on cause and effect thinking: E.g. you are likely to tell me that an apple has no brain, hence cannot have a consciousness in the first place. If we suspend naturalism, materialism and the cause-effect principle for a moment: Why should a brain be a prerequisite for consciousness?

Or you can be arguing by „spiritual“ assertions, e.g. by the assertion that an apple has no soul and humans have. In which case I would – modeling your reasoning for humans having „freewill“ - make the claim that apples upon „simple metacognitive inspection“ (whatever that may be) do have a soul, and that your concept of spirituality is just too narrow, too close to materialism and naturalism.
See how that works (or actually does not work at all)? Simply making an exceptional claim downright forces the other person into either arguing by materialism, naturalism, cause-effect or to also take the opportunity to make unsupported exceptional claims.

I think a better way to put this scenario would be to ask whether this theoretical person, if we had a method of predicting all outcomes based on heredity and environment and had all information, if we could predict what a person would do before he made his choice. The answer would be no.

Do you have anything in store to support this answer?

We would be able to talk in probabilities, but we would not be able to make a prediction, because there would be missing data.

You violate your premise here. If we had all the information there couldn´t be any data missing.

Bottom line: Whilst it is certainly true that we all start from axioms if trying to make sense of the issue, my axioms are founded in observable, demonstrable and agreed upon ruling principles (principles you yourself would be quick to refer to if facing an exceptional claim), whilst your axiom is a wild assertion (an unmoved mover inside us), poorly defined, assuming there to be something that is unprecendenced, unfalsifiable and based on an unclear concept of the „I“ and its relation to its parts.

 

[Electron]

I was reading a document called "The Mathematical Universe", written by Max Tegmark, which echoed a thought I have had for a long time.

It proposes that anything in the universe, whether it be matter, energy, or the laws of physics, can be broken down to simple 1's and 0's, or simple evens and odds, much like binary code.

I would post a link to the PDF file, but I don't yet have one hundred posts.

 

[ExistencePrecedesEssence]

I was reading a document called "The Mathematical Universe", written by Max Tegmark, which echoed a thought I have had for a long time.

It proposes that anything in the universe, whether it be matter, energy, or the laws of physics, can be broken down to simple 1's and 0's, or simple evens and odds, much like binary code.

I would post a link to the PDF file, but I don't yet have one hundred posts.

This is true, if you watch "Pi and the mysteries of the universe" by DA(creator of requiem for a dream) you will see a man who wishes to uncover a number through an equation that contains all the secrets to the universe. The entire movie is intriguing and made only on a budget of 100,000 dollars mostly pulled up by the director himself. It shows the patterns in existence and how his pursuit to unlock the mysteries of the mathematical creations of existence begins to drive him mad because his realizations are too large for himself to handle.

 

[Silenus]

Well, I’m back from a long absence of checking the forum and this thread hasn’t moved much, so I guess we’re alone here quanta, on this issue. I was kinda hoping to get some more reaction because there are Christians who are determinists and there are atheists who believe in free will and I was hoping for the sort of discussion that might break up the atheist vs. theist lines a little . . . but alas, my wish is not to be. So be it. Anyway, thanks for your comments, now allow me to retort.

Even though my beliefs are determined and indeed I can never know whether my beliefs are correct, they can be correct.

Same goes for freely chosen beliefs. The fact that you have chosen them freely does nothing for being able to know that you are right. In fact, I tend to think that a belief determined by factors that are part of a supposedly existing reality is more likely to be accurate than a freely chosen belief.

It seems that you are implying that only that which is necessary is that which is knowable or verifiable. But, being correct or incorrect is a mute concept under determinism. All simply is. Well, except for a non-determinist, they are incorrect. Except they can’t be because a determinist cannot claim to know he is correct because he simply is the casual chain working itself out. There is no ability to validate anything. However, if free will is true, there is the ability to validate beliefs because extra-sensory and sensory perceptions of reality can be judged. Without this ability, all knowledge is fragile, especially scientific knowledge. I can trust my sensations because I can judge them.

Not really. I think I have made clear already that this is not an idea of monocausality. So the idea is not that it is explainable by „a“ cause, but as the only possible result of all the billions of factors involved.

In a way, I feel justified in assuming cause-effect chains, because that is how we observe things in our universe to work. They can be shown, they can be demonstrated, and they are investigable. We do not overthrow tried and tested and time and again confirmed paradigms in favor of an unnecessary assumption which is poorly defined, in the first place.
So the procedure is not a determined mindset, but looking for that which provides an explanation and setting off the escape to an shoulder-shrugging introduction of a poorly defined claim from ignorance to a point where our explanations fail.

I surely did not intend to pin you to a mono-cause. My response applies whether the difference is one cause or a million. Determinism as applied to human consciousness is not a tried and tested paradigm. I can grant necessary cause and effect chains in the case of matter. However, as I said before, consciousness is not the same as a rock. It is far from obvious that necessary causes and effect apply to consciousness. The differences in result from different people in similar circumstances could be because of a host of unidentified causes, but I have no reason to believe this unless I place human consciousness on the same level as the workings of matter. Observing the way I and others make judgments and decisions daily, I can, by an act of metacognition, see myself making choices based on deliberations. And I can detect no cause constraining me to a certain choice. Now, just because I am not aware of it, doesn’t mean it exists, but it doesn’t mean I should assume it does either. I have no reason to assume I am at the same level as matter, and so no reason to assume something which is not only undemonstratable (we are, by your own admission, unaware of these causes), but counter-intuitive. Determinism is undemonstratable and its very axiomatic nature makes in unable to be verified. There is no ability to know correct or incorrect. So, if the ability to be falsified is my test for accepting paradigms, determinism is out from the beginning.

Well, to me it seems all is cause and effect. And since the principle of cause and effect is demonstrably governing our world, I do not really feel off-base, in view of the fact that your alternative is based on the introduction of a poorly defined concept that lacks demonstrability and falsifiability.

What is my poorly defined concept? You are asking me to accept a host of causes which are unidentified as the cause of all my actions and a system with discounts all ability to verify, which is a stretch whether the definition is poorly defined or not.

Now, all you are doing here is stating your beliefs (and don´t get me wrong: you are perfectly entitled and welcome to hold them), but I fail to see any argumentative support and hence no opportunity to discuss their plausibility.

An „unmoved mover“ working inside us is an exceptional claim if there ever was one. It requires exceptional evidence, while in fact it is an unsupported and on top unparsimonous assumption.

No, I am not saying there is some alien unmoved mover inside of use. I am saying the will is a freely acting cause not a necessarily acting cause.

Bottom line: Whilst it is certainly true that we all start from axioms if trying to make sense of the issue, my axioms are founded in observable, demonstrable and agreed upon ruling principles (principles you yourself would be quick to refer to if facing an exceptional claim), whilst your axiom is a wild assertion (an unmoved mover inside us), poorly defined, assuming there to be something that is unprecendenced, unfalsifiable and based on an unclear concept of the „I“ and its relation to its parts

Your axiom is founded on a thing established over matter, not over consciousness, and definitely not over human consciousness. I can accept cause and effect for rocks and arrows, but not for consciousness. Furthermore, determinism disallows me any room for verification and appraisal and, is itself, unfalisifiable. The causes determinists appeal to that move our consciousness have not been observed, demonstrated, or defined, yet I am asked to believe them. The assertion that the nature of a rock’s existence is equal to human consciousness is a wild assertion in itself. When I follow the conclusions to the end, it seems the only metaphysical statement determinists can make is there are no meaningful metaphysical statements. It seems self defeating to me and a slim place put a fat theory.

 

[phsyxx]

Your axiom is founded on a thing established over matter, not over consciousness, and definitely not over human consciousness. I can accept cause and effect for rocks and arrows, but not for consciousness. Furthermore, determinism disallows me any room for verification and appraisal and, is itself, unfalisifiable. The causes determinists appeal to that move our consciousness have not been observed, demonstrated, or defined, yet I am asked to believe them. The assertion that the nature of a rock’s existence is equal to human consciousness is a wild assertion in itself. When I follow the conclusions to the end, it seems the only metaphysical statement determinists can make is there are no meaningful metaphysical statements. It seems self defeating to me and a slim place put a fat theory.

Well, the point of the matter is:- no-one on Earth is God, and no-one has the proposed knowledge of God.
Therefore, no-one will ever be able to predict actions or events accurately over a sustained period of time and on a consistent basis.

Therefore - whether or not determinism is a state of fact - really doesn't matter, because no one person has the required knowledge to prove it so, and therefore its relevance is almost void.

If i was determined to say that - I was always going to say it, but I'm determined that I was free to be determined about writing it.

 

[Silenus]

I missed this in your last post . . . apparently two posts in a row.

Here comes the question from my previous post (that something determined you to ignore ) into play: What makes us assume that an apple has no free will?

I don't think it has anything to do with assumtion. There a multitude of things which are associated with conciousness which an apple doesn't display. I'm not sure why I should assume all things have conciousness until proven otherwise, although Joseph Campbell did try this route in his moyers's interviews. Conciousness displays itself in many ways, and apples don't display the characteristics that accompany conciousness. To bring in the brain is a red herring, in my opinion. Yes, the animals that display the characteristics of conciousness also are the animals that have a brain, what relevence this has I'm not sure.

 

[bigredline]

everything has a cause.

every thought has a cause, whether it is upbringing, education, or current circumstance.

all circumstances have a cause.

the chain is infinite.

wht was done yesterday will determine what is done today.
what is done today will have consequences tomorrow. that goes on forever.

so no, there is no free will at all.

 

[FishFace]

No-one has ever satisfactorally defined free will for me. I usually give a similar thought experiment to others lined up above, essentially asking how do we decide whether something has free will?

The only way in which things happening, that I understand, are either caused (i.e. determined) or random (e.g. quantum mechanical fluctuations) For example, if we were able to run the universe twice, if we found that everyone made the same decisions, we would say they are determined, and if they were different, I could only understand them as having a random component.

Neither of these are free will though, are they? And the problems with trying to say that we exhibit something else are twofold: Firstly, how does one tell? What is the difference between something being random and something being "free?" Is there any way of testing or falsifying this?
And the other problem is that no-one has ever properly defined exactly what this other thing is. I can understand the concepts of cause and randomness, but those concepts already seem to cover all that can be. Any concept I've so far been confronted with either seems meaningless, or fits into caused or random.