This presumes 1) that one can only believe false things if one's faculties are not functioning properly; If this were the case, taking into account all of the religions, sects, and denominations around the world, one would have to decare virtually everyone else in the world - other than you and your religious group, of course - to be mentally deficient. That is certainly not my position,
I think you should read that account of warrant a bit more carefully. Proper function is only one of the ingredients necessary for a belief to have warrant. The other is that one's faculties function “in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties.”
as I think that a healthy, normal brain is capable of believing all sorts of ridiculous things.
Yes, I'm inclined to agree with you there.
and 2) that the 'design plan' of human cognitive faculties is successfully aimed at truth, when, from an evolutionary standpoint, it need only be accurate enough for us, as a group, to successfully raise the next generation to breeding age.
Actually, from an evolutionary standpoint, I don't think they need be accurate even that much -- or at all, really. All evolution is “concerned” with is that an organism
behave in the requisite manner to survive and reproduce. It seems to me that having cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth
as such would be completely invisible to natural selection. I actually think this counts as evidence in favor of theism, because whereas evolution would “select” for cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth
only as a means to producing behaviors conducive to survival and reproduction, if God exists, then I think it would be reasonable to suppose that he might want to create beings who have the ability to think and reason to truth.
That we can do any better than that (iPods, Disneyland, the Internet) may be quite impressive to our ancestors, but I don't see that as being able to discern truths about the world without some sort of strict independently verifiable methodology.
I'm not sure that I follow you here. What sort of “independently verifiable methodology” are you referring to? Wouldn't cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth be required to successfully utilize such a methodology?
But I don't think Plantinga is trying to persuade everyone to accept the view that belief in his God is properly basic. I think he's taking the less ambitious route of arguing that
if his God were to exist,
then it would be reasonable to suppose that belief in his God is properly basic. As long as we operate
within that assumption, then I don't see how Great Pumpkin does damage to his position.
Indeed. As an ignostic, I would take another step back and say, what do you mean by "God"?
Well, that is the trick, isn't it? I have attempted to explain it on these forums before, but I seem only thus far to have managed to produce confusion. It is a highly-abstract concept, and thus not the easiest to communicate...
Take any set of true statements that contain an existential verb you like -- any at all: Davian
exists; Barack Obama
is human; two and two added together
is four; necessarily, all triangles
are trilateral, etc. Now isolate those existential verbs:
exists,
is,
are, etc. I take it that the existential principle those verbs signify is the most fundamental principle that everything in all of reality shares in common with everything else, as there is nothing more fundamental to any thing at all that exists in any way whatsoever than its
existence. It is because
existence, or
to exist, is so ubiquitous and so fundamental a principle amongst all beings of every kind that classical theists like myself identify it with the essential nature of God -- although not as a constitutive principle, as in beings other than God; but pure, absolute, unmingled, and unlimited. In other words, God's nature is simply, absolutely
to be.
If you're interested, I think
this is a pretty good primer on this particular subject.
That is not what I meant to say by that comment, but given the mutually exclusive nature of religions, that would summarize what I think about them, as they cannot all be right. And, there is the possibility that they may all be wrong.
As they cannot all be right, it follows that one must accept that the human brain is capable of religious experiences in the absence of real, external [insert reference to relevant god/s/spirits/supernatural] source.
But I don't think being 100% right or 100% wrong are the only possibilities for a religion. Maybe there's a spectrum of being closer to orthodoxy or further from it, and maybe no religions are 100% wrong. So I don't have a problem with persons who have different beliefs than my own having genuine religious experiences. If those experiences don't guide them all the way to 100% orthodoxy, then maybe they guide them just a little closer to it. I'm perfectly fine with that.
Unless, as I have seen it countered in these forums, you declare everyone that disagrees with your religion to be liars.
Nope, that ain't me.
Granting for a moment the existence of a god that is able to provide this feeling of “special revelation” that you speak of:
We observe two individuals, Theist A, and Theist B. Both want to believe, both study their bibles, and both participate in all the trappings of the associated religion.
Theist A somehow achieves this “special revelation” that you speak of. However, Theist B only manages to convince themselves of achieving this goal, in the self-deceiving manner of those that have religious experiences in those [for the purposes of this hypothetical] false regions.
Now, how do you and I tell the difference between the two? It's not like the one that has the "real" experience can demonstrate that he has an actual relationship with his god.
And, I know of no criteria by which we could prove the experiences of Theist B to be false, do you?
If what happened to Theist B can explain the experiences for both A and B, while you may disagree with my conclusion, you should consider it as a possibility.
I actually have trouble with the way this thought experiment is framed from the very outset. I take it that Theist B has had an experience that falls in line with what we call “religious experience,” and that said experience has had some sort of positive effect on his/her life. Why can't these alone suffice to constitute a genuine religious experience? I don't see why not, so I don't see any reason why we should say that Theist B has had a false religious experience.