Why a true omniscient cannot coexist with true free will.

[GenemZ]

Born into a Christian family, and raised to believe Christian mythology. Try not to take things literally.

That does not make anyone a Christian. That might make some be religious if so inclined. But, that in itself can not make anyone a Christian.

You apparently do not know what being a Christian is, and are assuming you do. That might explain how you think you understand us, but really do not.

Romans 8:16 (New International Version)
"The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's children."



Galatians 4:6 (New International Version)
"Because you are sons, God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, the Spirit who calls out, "Abba, Father."​

We do not do those things because we read about it, and then do it. That's religion.

Christians do these things, and then later discover what it is when we read about it.


It can not be faked. That is why some in this forum are really religious. They are obedient to creeds and rituals. Some say that they do not even know if they are saved. They simply "hope they are."


In Christ, GeneZ



They replied, "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved—you and your household.
​

​

 

[JacobHall86]

Some vessels are created for Wrath and Destruction, some for Joy and Grace.

Its his choice to make, not ours.

 

[GenemZ]

Some vessels are created for Wrath and Destruction, some for Joy and Grace.

Its his choice to make, not ours.

The trouble with that thinking is that God puts us all on the same potters wheel. Not two different potters wheels. He does not force us to be good, nor bad.

He brings circumstances and pressures our way to either form us, or it distort us. What allows the forming, is humility. What causes the distortion, (defective vessel) is arrogance and stubbornness. Destruction.

We all get put on the same potters wheel. So, its our volition that makes the difference. What we can not resist is not how we turn out. What we can not resist is the things we all receive in this life ordained by God that causes us to turn out according to our own wills.

God can decree that two people get cancer. They can not resist God's will. Its going to happen. One will curse God. The other will grow closer to God. Both on the same wheel. They could not resist God's will for the cancer. But, they could decide what they would think towards God. One will become noble in character. The other, a vessel of wrath.

1 Corinthians 10:13 (New International Version)
"No temptation has seized you except what is common to man. And God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can stand up under it."


​

With the potters wheel process there are all the temptations that come our way. Its says that they are common to man. Some choose God's will. Humility. Others, choose their own will. This is, in part, how the one who "forms it".. forms it.

Romans 9:20-22 (New International Version)
"But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?' " Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?
​

What if God, choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath—prepared for destruction?"


​

Who are we to talk back to God?

Some will try to say to God, the likes of.....

​

"If you did not let my young wife die! I would have believed in you! Its your fault I am doomed to the Lake of Fire! You made me like this! How can you find fault?!"


​

Yet? ..On that same potters wheel?



Another man who also lost his young wife. He will instead choose to draw closer to God in his sorrow. He will leave the other man to be without excuse.




Both souls were formed on the same potters wheel. God is not to be blamed for how they each turned out. They could not resist his will (both lost wives). But, that is what formed them, as they turned out to be.





Grace and peace, GeneZ








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[JonF]

You are aware of my definition of free will. You have yet to provide a definition that is both consistent with the colloquial useage and compatible with determinism.

Again, I did provide a definition of free will that is both compatible with determinism and the colloquial usage (actually I provided you with a link to pages of standard interpretations of free will from Stanford which you ignored – here is another one which you will probably ignore, then I gave you my own personal definition which you also seem to be ignoring also), a few pages back when you asked me to. And again, no one denies what you claim if that is how you define free will. The problem is that you are defining free will in a way that is contrary to how it is normally defined, did you read the links I provided you? Do you really think your definition touches on the same idea as their's? Where did you even get this definition?


I think you are feigning at ignorance at the point I’m making. Your existence “proof” is an entirely analytic argument - that should raise some red flags.

On the contrary, by demonstrating that your particular analogy is flawed, you are forced to present another that does convey your point, or explain your point more clearly.

you didn’t demonstrate my analogy is flawed, you pointed out something irrelevant to the comparison I was trying to make. So fine, throw out uniformity. If I drop a ball I know it will move in an aggregate direction towards the earth provided no non gravitational forces prevent it from doing so. Does my knowledge cause it to move in this direction?

The Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle places restrictions on how accurately we can measure a particles position and momentum at the same time, and also the time it is in a certain energy state and the energy of the state itself. The product of the uncertainity in momentum and position, or in duration and energy, is always greater than or equal to ħ/2. My statements are valid.

Yes, you were trying to use the UP to show the universe isn’t deterministic. Also you showed deep misunderstandings about how the UP affects uniform motion – but this isn’t really relevant to our conversation since it was a non sequitor objection to begin with that ignored the principle of chartable interpretation.

You said: Actually if this is how you want to define free will it can only exist with a super natural force because by definition that is the only way to get around the determination of causation.

I did say this and it is true, and your highlight is non sequitor. You’re claim was problematic not apodictical.

 

[JonF]

Think of it this way:

Since the central debate right now about “free will” is: is free will compatible with causal determinism; do you really think it’s legitimate to include in your definition of free will, that you made up and is contrary to the common usage, a denial of causal determinism?

 

[Nadiine]

Think of it this way:

Since the central debate right now about “free will” is: is free will compatible with causal determinism; do you really think it’s legitimate to include in your definition of free will, that you made up and is contrary to the common usage a denial of causal determinism?

basically why I quit posting in this thread. The source is problem, so why debate to get to the truth of it on a faulty premise?

 

[JonF]

basically why I quit posting in this thread. The source is problem, so why debate to get to the truth of it on a faulty premise?

It’s not really a faulty premise; it’s just meaningless. I am seriously starting to think that some people in this thread may be less interested in discovering truth and more interested in trying to win a debate, and it seems they are getting neither. Kinda tempted to leave myself.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Again, I did provide a definition of free will that is both compatible with determinism and the colloquial usage (actually I provided you with a link to pages of standard interpretations of free will from Stanford which you ignored – here is another one which you will probably ignore, then I gave you my own personal definition which you also seem to be ignoring also), a few pages back when you asked me to.

You merely shifted goalposts. You did not actually define anything useful.

And again, no one denies what you claim if that is how you define free will. The problem is that you are defining free will in a way that is contrary to how it is normally defined, did you read the links I provided you? Do you really think your definition touches on the same idea as their's? Where did you even get this definition?

I devised it myself to encompass the concept people think of when they hear the phrase, 'free will'. As far as I can tell, the various exhaustive websites you keep linking to just allude to, or paraphrase, my own definition.
So yes, I do think mine touches the same ideas.

I think you are feigning at ignorance at the point I’m making. Your existence “proof” is an entirely analytic argument - that should raise some red flags.

Given that our discussion does not rely on any facts, merely semantics, I'd be surprised if any conclusions drawn were synthetic.

you didn’t demonstrate my analogy is flawed, you pointed out something irrelevant to the comparison I was trying to make. So fine, throw out uniformity. If I drop a ball I know it will move in an aggregate direction towards the earth provided no non gravitational forces prevent it from doing so. Does my knowledge cause it to move in this direction?

No. Ironically, this alludes to the point I was trying to make.
Foreknowledge doesn't force or otherwise cause the foreseen outcome. For foreknowledge to exist, the outcome must be foreseeable (a trivial statement, but bear with me). The question then becomes, 'what is necessary for something to be forseeable?'

Yes, you were trying to use the UP to show the universe isn’t deterministic. Also you showed deep misunderstandings about how the UP affects uniform motion – but this isn’t really relevant to our conversation since it was a non sequitor objection to begin with that ignored the principle of chartable interpretation.

Perhaps, but let us continue this line of inquiry. As a theoretical physicist, I am interested in hearing why my understanding of the HUP is wrong, or at least inaccurate.

Think of it this way:

Since the central debate right now about “free will” is: is free will
compatible with causal determinism; do you really think it’s legitimate to include in your definition of free will, that you made up and is contrary to the common usage, a denial of causal determinism?

Not really, given that I believe the concepts are mutually exclusive. My definition was worded in the context of this thread. As I have said before, I believe my definition to be effectively synonymous with the definitions alluded to in those websites.

 

[JacobHall86]

The trouble with that thinking is that God puts us all on the same potters wheel.

Romans 9.

 

[JonF]

You merely shifted goalposts. You did not actually define anything useful.

I devised it myself to encompass the concept people think of when they hear the phrase, 'free will'. As far as I can tell, the various exhaustive websites you keep linking to just allude to, or paraphrase, my own definition.
So yes, I do think mine touches the same ideas.

Did you read the definitions i gave you? None have anything to do with predictability

Given that our discussion does not rely on any facts, merely semantics, I'd be surprised if any conclusions drawn were synthetic.

Existence claims aren’t semantical claims…

No. Ironically, this alludes to the point I was trying to make.
Foreknowledge doesn't force or otherwise cause the foreseen outcome. For foreknowledge to exist, the outcome must be foreseeable (a trivial statement, but bear with me). The question then becomes, 'what is necessary for something to be forseeable?'

I agree that the outcome must be foreseeable, but foreeeability has nothing to do with free will in it's usual sense

Perhaps, but let us continue this line of inquiry. As a theoretical physicist, I am interested in hearing why my understanding of the HUP is wrong, or at least inaccurate.

Because you seem to be suggesting that the UP denies determinism, when it only makes a claim about what we can observe.

Not really, given that I believe the concepts are mutually exclusive. My definition was worded in the context of this thread. As I have said before, I believe my definition to be effectively synonymous with the definitions alluded to in those websites.

Please then argue that they are synonymous.

 

[JonF]

Romans 9.

or eph1 or john6

 

[Nadiine]

It’s not really a faulty premise; it’s just meaningless. I am seriously starting to think that some people in this thread may be less interested in discovering truth and more interested in trying to win a debate, and it seems they are getting neither. Kinda tempted to leave myself.

This is rampant in atheist (& even agnostic) debate and it's why I quit them - I saw very few that actually showed genuine concern over truth; they were more interested in either
1) DEBATE for the sake of "fun" / a hobby
2) Genuine disdain for God/Christianity to fight it regularly
3) Using their "Questions" (& skeptical points) to work to chip away at the faith of Christians (or open-minded onlookers) to cause THEM to doubt God.

It's more than common - (ps. they don't think we see the ploys & agendas, so keep this on the hush-hush). lol
(pss. when you point this out openly, you often get scolded for being unloving & judgmental). If you aren't blind, there must be something wrong with you.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Did you read the definitions i gave you? None have anything to do with predictability

They centered around moral agency and deserved reactions (punishment/reward, etc). If one can predict the actions of others, then there is one is not culpable for one's actions: they were preordained, out of your control.

Existence claims aren’t semantical claims…

We are not arguing whether free will or omniscience de re necessarily exist, but whether they can coexist. This is firmly rooted in our definitions of omniscience and free will.

I agree that the outcome must be foreseeable, but foreeeability has nothing to do with free will in it's usual sense

Which, it seems, is our new topic of discussion: are our definitions equivilent? I think they are, you think they aren't.

Because you seem to be suggesting that the UP denies determinism, when it only makes a claim about what we can observe.

The principle itself does not deny determinism, but the theoretical groundwork from which it is derived does deny determinism.

Please then argue that they are synonymous.

To which of your definitions would you like me to argue for?

 

[JonF]

The principle itself does not deny determinism, but the theoretical groundwork from which it is derived does deny determinism.

From what i understand it doesn't, it denies observability, not causal necessity. And since it’s science it really can’t deny causality.

To which of your definitions would you like me to argue for?

Why don’t you pick one you like, and argue equivalence.

*note: I don’t have any problem denying several forms of free will listed on those pages

 

[Wiccan_Child]

From what i understand it doesn't, it denies observability, not causal necessity. And since it’s science it really can’t deny causality.

It is based on the probabalistic wavefunctions of quantum particles (hence where Plank's constant comes in). I'd have to dig out my notes to give you a proper derivation, but I'm sure there are plenty of sites out there that could do a much better job than me.

Why don’t you pick one you like, and argue equivalence.

"Minimally, to say that an agent has free will is to say that the agent has the capacity to choose his or her course of action... Let us then understand free will as the capacity unique to persons that allows them to control their actions." - Here.
Central to this definition is the notion of choice and control. Central to mine is unpredictability. If one's actions are wholly predictable, then one has no control over what one does. Consider an entity, A, that predicts what another entity, B, will do. If A predicts B will do a certain action, and tells B of this prediction, is B able to do something else?
Think of it another way. There are two scenarios: Free will is...

1. an entity's control over it's actions, which are predictable.
2. an entity's control over it's actions, which are unpredictable.

In the first instance, it is possible for an entity, A, to exist that is able to predict with 100% accuracy the future actions of another entity , B, with free will (here defined as control over it's actions). If A tells B what it predicts B will do, B becomes a logical paradox: if cannot do anything but what A says, thereby negating it's control, but it can control it's actions, thereby allowing it to do other than what A said.
Which negates scenario (1) from being possible.
Which leaves scenario (2).
Which is the concept my my definition covers.

 

[JonF]

[/font][/color][/font][/size]It is based on the probabalistic wavefunctions of quantum particles (hence where Plank's constant comes in). I'd have to dig out my notes to give you a proper derivation, but I'm sure there are plenty of sites out there that could do a much better job than me.

"Minimally, to say that an agent has free will is to say that the agent has the capacity to choose his or her course of action... Let us then understand free will as the capacity unique to persons that allows them to control their actions." - Here.
Central to this definition is the notion of choice and control. Central to mine is unpredictability.

If one's actions are wholly predictable, then one has no control over what one does.

No, predictability isn’t causal, as we have talked about before.

Consider an entity, A, that predicts what another entity, B, will do. If A predicts B will do a certain action, and tells B of this prediction, is B able to do something else?

Think of it another way. There are two scenarios: Free will is...
1. an entity's control over it's actions, which are predictable.
2. an entity's control over it's actions, which are unpredictable.
In the first instance, it is possible for an entity, A, to exist that is able to predict with 100% accuracy the future actions of another entity , B, with free will (here defined as control over it's actions). If A tells B what it predicts B will do, B becomes a logical paradox: if cannot do anything but what A says, thereby negating it's control, but it can control it's actions, thereby allowing it to do other than what A said.
Which negates scenario (1) from being possible.
Which leaves scenario (2).
Which is the concept my my definition covers.

You misunderstand foreknowledge. Foreknowledge isn’t causal. The occurrence of event A at time T causes Foreknowledge F. Not: the Foreknowledge F of event A causes Event A at time T.

I agree that if some entity knows that event A will happen, event A must happen. But the constituent of A still had a choice, in that the foreknowledge is predicate of their choice.

Look at this way. Did the allies win WWII? Do you know this with absolute certainty? Since you know this could anything else of happened? Notice this is a valid critique, your argument makes no use of temporality, so this is a parallel example.

 

[GenemZ]

Romans 9.

That in itself is not saying anything.


Romans 9 is not saying God makes people to choose salvation. But, that God makes use of what he knows they will choose to do. Some for bad things. Some for good things. And, that he knows their choice before they are born.


You're point was?

 

[JonF]

That in itself is not saying anything.


Romans 9 is not saying God makes people to choose salvation. But, that God makes use of what he knows they will choose to do. Some for bad things. Some for good things. And, that he knows their choice before they are born.


You're point was?

If that is what you get from romans 9 then you are forcing it to fit into your world view and ignoring what it clearly teaches…

 

[GenemZ]

or eph1 or john6

3Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ,
4just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before Him In love."
​

We were chosen 'in Him."

Was Moses chosen to be the Bride of Christ? No.

Was David chosen to be in the Church of God? No.

Some are confused over what "chose" means in this instance. Its something we have been chosen for because God knew we would believe.

Yet? Out of all God knew would believe? Only certain ones were Chosen to be his Bride. Chosen in Him.



.

 

[GenemZ]

If that is what you get from romans 9 then you are forcing it to fit into your world view and ignoring what it clearly teaches…

That's explains nothing other than spouting your world view. If your eye offends you? Pluck it out? That clearly teaches something, too.