Let’s take your example here and pretend that it consists of 100 critical sections of matter that are necessary for the emergence of consciousness, take any one of these crucial areas away and no consciousness. We have 99 sections in place, so no consciousness. We ADD matter section #100 and consciousness also becomes ADDED to the picture. Physicalism is your model not mine, SHOW me that I’m wrong via empirical detection of this ‘Other’ ADDED part to the picture called consciousness! We can surely empirically detect the added matter, and we can surely empirically detect any patterns or changes of patterns. Explain under a framework of Physicalism how adding material section #100 magically added consciousness to the picture as well. And you can’t just stuff the emergence of phenomenal consciousness underneath the umbrella of the general concept of ‘Emergence’ and claim that they’re all the same basic thing. That would be equivocating the word emergence. Emergence like that of DNA replication is an emergent pattern of biological operations that are purely physical, and the entire process can be fully demonstrated physically.
For some reason you’re convinced that in a model of Physicalism “Adding a certain pattern of mechanics” makes the addition of consciousness an intelligible answer. You’re always making it a point that brain “PATTERNS” cause the addition of consciousness to enter the picture, not just brain matter. But adding a pattern to matter is just adding a pattern to matter, the problem is that consciousness got added too. In a model that says everything is physical, when we have added all 100 physical sections but we still have no consciousness, how is saying “Make it move like this and Wala there’s consciousness” an explanation that connects dots the way that a thorough (physical) scientific explanation usually connects dots? All that you’ve ADDED was a pattern of movement towards your 100 sections of matter. In a model of Physicalism It’s intelligible to explain why a moving fan blade causes a breeze but a static one doesn’t, why a ship in motion causes waves but a docked ship doesn’t. But it would not follow to say “When the yacht goes into motion and reaches full speed the members onboard become conscious and enjoy themselves.”
I'm afraid that looks like one long somewhat emotional argument from incredulity justified by distortion and exaggeration of my argument (i.e. straw-manning).
For the record, it is not being suggested that adding a final 'section of matter' switches on consciousness. Its evolutionary development, roughly mirrored in the structure of the brain, is gradual, from simple awareness through to the rich temporal, autobiographical, and social consciousness of humans.
When I refer to 'patterns' in the brain, I've made it clear that I'm referring to patterns of neural activity characterising a particular mode of brain function, that consists of a particular set of information processes.
But claiming that “Experiencing pain” is just an abstract way of describing “100 sections of matter moving like this” is not an intelligible example of abstraction.
I agree, that's why I don't claim that.
Heaping more & more purely physical complexities on top of the “Matter in motion” doesn’t magically account for the added something called consciousness that is not matter nor motion. Nor does claiming that it’s hard to pin down exactly WHEN consciousness comes into the picture solve anything. WHEN it happens is not the problem for Physicalism, that it happens at all is. And the reason that it doesn’t “Physically” follow is because that which was ADDED to the picture (consciousness) is something that spills outside of the domain of “Physical” description. Trying to bury the explanation underneath 1,000,000,000 interconnected descriptions of purely physical matter & pattern complexities solves nothing. It seems like you’re trying to “Science Talk” your way out of the fact that Physicalism lays on top of a foundation stone of a non sequitur.
You're banging on an open door - I already said the suggested model doesn't solve the hard problem.
What I've said is that the physical model is, in my view, currently the best fit for, and explanation of, the observational evidence. Yes, it has an unsolved problem in reconciling the objective and subjective viewpoints, but it works. It's been tested, it makes fruitful predictions, it has explanatory power, it's parsimonious, it raises only one major question, it's consistent with our existing body of knowledge.
It makes no sense for Dualism to claim that consciousness wouldn’t result in a physical change to the physical world. A non-physical causal influence on a living body would obviously then go ahead and affect the physical world. It’s rigging the game to make a claim that consciousness having an effect on the physical world is proof that consciousness is physical. Of course consciousness will “Lead to” a change to the physical world if Dualism is true.
Positing a non-physical causal power on our bodily actions runs into the Problem of Interaction, but the Dualism model will indeed have a physical body influencing the world and therefore this does not deem everything as physical. It COULD be all physical under these rules but it could also not be under these rules.
Dualism meets these qualifications.
Dualism
There’s no philosophical rock that that Physicalism stands on because Dualism faces the problem of interaction.
What, exactly, do you mean by 'a non-physical causal influence'? In what sense can a physical influence on the world not be a physical cause?
What kind of dualism are you referring to here? If it could all be physical why invoke dualism?
Brains plan action events. A certain area of the cortex are specifically involved in planning a motor movement. “Where those neurons get their input is one of the mysteries of modern neuroscience!” So we also have the problem of input initiations on the other side of the fence. It’s a wash.
Neurons get their inputs from other neurons, eventually ending in internal or external senses and feedbacks. All modified by neurotransmitters. Where the motor neurons get their input from is a mystery because we can't yet trace all the 'circuits' involved; tens of billions of intercommunicating nerve cells make the task tricky.
The problem of interaction for Dualism, and for Physicalism the bizarre problem that in a universe that is said to be a closed system of deterministic causes & effects based on strict laws of motion people would be having input initiations that lead to such bizarre behaviors like hopping on their left leg and singing Bruce Springsteen while clapping, or accidentally stepping off a cliff, or 1,000,000 other goofy and bone headed input initiations that lead to all the crazy & harmful actions of human organisms. This doesn’t resemble any scientific laws of motion that I remember hearing about. Gee it almost seems like people’s minds are exerting input initiations that steer the actions of their physical bodies to make changes in the physical world that have nothing at all to do with strict blind laws of motion inside a universe that’s a closed deterministic system of causes & effects. And it almost seems like these exerted input initiations actually match up to decisions that we make. So yeah Physicalism has it’s own interaction problem too, how to explain the behaviors that we see yet still insist on matter in motion based on strict laws that can’t be violated.
Again, argument from incredulity and misrepresentation. Nobody's suggesting that the laws of motion cause people's behaviour. The laws of motion are relevant to the
way things move, not the reasons. The bulk activity of the brain appears to be computational, processing interoceptive and exteroceptive information and initiating internal and external motor activity as a result. This can sometimes produce unpredictable or bizarre behaviour - how is this an argument against physicalism?
When we make decisions or choices, we process information - we assess available options, model their likely outcomes, evaluate those outcomes against our current preferences, try to rank the results and resolve conflicting desires. The whole process may trigger further considerations which feed back in, perhaps changing our current preferences or our option rankings. Finally, we pick an option to act on and act (or not). Most of this occurs below conscious awareness unless we're being particularly deliberative. But even then we generally have little insight into
why our preferences are as they are, the unconsciously learned result of a lifetime of evolving interactions between our innate predispositions and our life experiences.
There’s an emergent property called mind. It’s not physical because it runs into logical roadblocks when trying to give physical descriptions to explain it (hence it follows that all of reality can’t be physical), and the emerged mind has causal influence over the body that that mind emerged from.
I already explained that it's a mistake to reify mind. It's an abstract noun we use for the set of processes or activities that perform we call thinking. It has causal influence because it consists of physical processes in a physical substrate.
As I said in a previous post, there are so many claims that get made that are missing an implied “If Physicalism is true” at the end of them. Saying that Physicalism is true, and then saying that such & such isn’t real because we can’t physically reduce it, is arguing in a circle.
Sure. I don't recall anyone arguing that. We can never be sure of what is true about the world. It's not a question of whether physicalism is 'true' or not, we can't know that; the question is whether it can provide a useful model to explain our observations.
You have to decide what you mean by 'reality' and 'physical'. I've given a basic description of what I mean by them, and how I think they apply in this topic.
My implication was that something can’t be physically reducible if it’s not even physical.
That depends what you're talking about; we have different ways of describing the world, and we tend to use ways that are simple, convenient, and familiar. It's a mistake to mix descriptions. Actions, processes, concepts, ideas, etc., are abstract ways of talking about the world at a particular semantic level, much like the use of 'energy' in physics.
But at a different semantic level, actions and processes are reducible to the physical, and abstractions like concepts and ideas represent relations and associations that, however indirectly, ultimately reduce to physical representations of the physical. Concepts and ideas are themselves represented physically; in the brain, on paper, by vibrations in the air, etc.
Your fixating on the wrong thing with regards to Intenionality/Aboutness, and true/false questions not being properties of matter. The point is not that it’s some challenge to rework the terms in a more narrow way so that they can now describe brain processes too, the point is that with mental emergence a wider array of properties enter into reality that “Are about” a plethora of things that matter can’t be about, and that mental emergence introduces a plethora of true/false conditions that are nonsensical to apply towards matter. It is impossible to have a thought that is not about something (a thought about Jupiter, being cold, candy, the future, etc).
I'm not fixating on anything or reworking terms in a 'more narrow' way - I'm suggesting that Hebbian neural networks are excellent models for implementing intentionality as they implicitly create maps of the input data and associations between maps. This kind of mechanism supports the representation of phenomena, a form of memory, associative learning, generalisation, and conceptualisation.
I believe that the point of Intentionality had some type of qualifier where it MUST always be about an object in an Aboutness sentence (or something like that).
I'm not sure that's the case in general.
Intentionality is a word for the capability of minds or mental states to represent things, properties, or states of affairs.
I would define mind by coming up with a list of its properties. But again here you’re fixating on the wrong thing. At some point an experiential phenomena gets added onto purely physical materials, and the added phenomena falls outside the scope of explanation via physical description alone. You’re going to war with which word I choose to label it. And of course I don’t think it is physical stuff since that’s the position that I’ve been disagreeing with the entire time.
I'm simply saying that you appear to talk about 'mind' as if it is a 'thing' in its own right, rather than a set of processes or activities. It's a common and convenient way of talking, but it's not, IMO, correct.
But enough of me and my physicalist model; let's hear about
your model, explanation, whatever.
What kind of dualism are you suggesting? - your earlier description was confused/confusing.
What does it bring to the table?
How does it help explain or understand what people experience?
How would you test it?
You said it wouldn't have an interaction problem - can you explain how that would work?
BTW - I think predicate dualism is acceptable, even necessary - we need (and use) different ways to talk about the world in different contexts (e.g. subjective and objective).