What do we know?

[Patzak]

Alright, let's say we accept the definition of knowledge as a "justified true belief" (I don't know whose definition it is but I've seen it used and I find it quite acceptable).

So: I'm sitting here in front of my computer. There's a table in the other room of my apartment. But do I actually know this? I can certainly say I know it's been there whenever I stepped into that room, but can I say I know it's there at this moment? I can envision a scenario in which I would step into the other room and find the table missing. Someone could have broken into my appartment really silently and stolen it. It could have quantum-tunneled somewhere else. Whatever. I cannot be 100% certain to find it there - I believe it is (one part of the definition of knowledge), I'm pretty justified in believing so (it's always been there), but I can't ascertain the truth of this belief without getting up and taking a look. Note that the high probability of the table being there doesn't count as an indication of its truth - the probability falls under justification.

Okay, so I get up, go to the other room and - unsurprisingly - find the table still there. Now here's my question: did I
a) know it was there all along? - my belief turned out to be true, completing the definition of knowledge
or b) I didn't know it was there before finding out - my belief was true before I found out, but I didn't know it was true. Effectively, I have to know something to be true to really know it.

Argh, this came out a bit confusing. Alright, basically: if we believe something without knowing it to be true - and the object of our belief turns out to be true - did we know it before we found it was true or only afterwards? Do we have to know something to be true in order to know it? Or am I just being anal-retentive?

 

[Robbie_James_Francis]

Just because you walk into the room and perceive the table to be there, that doesn't make it so, since your perception is not necessarily a reliable medium through which to ascertain Truth. Sorry to make it more complicated...

 

[openeyes]

a)did I know it was there all along? - my belief turned out to be true, completing the definition of knowledge

No knowledge, but faith the table was there.

Faith
1.Confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness of a person, idea, or thing.
2.Belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence.
(source:dictionary.com)

b) I didn't know it was there before finding out - my belief was true before I found out, but I didn't know it was true. Effectively, I have to know something to be true to really know it.

or c) There is no table, except the one you envision to be in the spot you envision it, and you have created your person reality.
The real question is.... If someone else was to come to your apartment, would this table you describe actually exsist?

 

[Patzak]

I was considering pre-empting the epistemological scepticism you both point out but didn't want to further complicate the (already confusing) issue, but here goes: the queston remains the same regardless of whether the table is real or just an illusion of my senses - I can easily reformulate it to "Did I know that when I step into the other room, I would perceive the table to be there?" Same question really.

openeyes: I agree with you. It doesn't seem right to claim to know something before you find out whether what you "knew" was true or not. I just find it interesting that the reasonable definition of knowledge as a "justified true belief" actually seems to need an additional factor - that I effectively have to "know that I know" something.

 

[Merlin]

Things exist whether you believe in them, or know of them, or not.

 

[TeddyKGB]

It helps to consider what is meant by each term in "justified true belief."

• A belief is the intellectual acceptance of a proposition.
• A belief is justified if there exists something which justifies it, and which is intellectually obtainable by the believer.
• A belief is true if it refers to a true proposition.

I think the second point is the most important - a belief can be justified empirically or even inductively. Thus, if we consider the OP's belief about the table, it might be that he is justified in believing that the table is in the other room because a) his beliefs about the table have been true in the past, and b) he has no reason to believe otherwise.

 

[Jon_]

Ah, man, epistemology, my favorite subject. I guess I have to jump into this thread.

Alright, let's say we accept the definition of knowledge as a "justified true belief" (I don't know whose definition it is but I've seen it used and I find it quite acceptable).

Yes, belief, justification, and truth are the criteria for knowledge. Epistemology is the theory of these three criteria, but usually it more specifically focuses on justification and truth. For instance, for such and such truth claim there arises the epistemological inquiry, "How do you know?" In other words, what is your justification for this truth claim.

So: I'm sitting here in front of my computer. There's a table in the other room of my apartment. But do I actually know this?

No, you don't.

I can certainly say I know it's been there whenever I stepped into that room, but can I say I know it's there at this moment?

You can say you believe it's been there whenever you've stepped into the room. You don't know it, though.

I can envision a scenario in which I would step into the other room and find the table missing. Someone could have broken into my appartment really silently and stolen it. It could have quantum-tunneled somewhere else. Whatever. I cannot be 100% certain to find it there - I believe it is (one part of the definition of knowledge), I'm pretty justified in believing so (it's always been there), but I can't ascertain the truth of this belief without getting up and taking a look.

This is very similar to the Gettier problem. See this article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem. (Note that, even if you get up and check to make sure the table is still there, you still don't know if it's really there even if you empirically verify it.)

Note that the high probability of the table being there doesn't count as an indication of its truth - the probability falls under justification.

Any probability less than 100% cannot qualifiy as truth, and hence, cannot qualify as justification. For any given truth claim if the probability of truth is 99.99% the truth claim is still false because the conclusion does not follow necessarily. If the proposition concerns the probability alone, then that is something else altogether. For instance, for any given random roll of a six-sided die the probability that it will come six is one in six. (This is actually not true, either, but illustrates the point.)

Okay, so I get up, go to the other room and - unsurprisingly - find the table still there. Now here's my question: did I
a) know it was there all along? - my belief turned out to be true, completing the definition of knowledge

No, your justification is faulty. Empirical observation cannot servce as the justification for belief because it is inductive, and hence, formally fallacious.

or b) I didn't know it was there before finding out - my belief was true before I found out, but I didn't know it was true. Effectively, I have to know something to be true to really know it.

Well, you never knew it and you still don't, so the answer to this is no as well.

Argh, this came out a bit confusing. Alright, basically: if we believe something without knowing it to be true - and the object of our belief turns out to be true - did we know it before we found it was true or only afterwards? Do we have to know something to be true in order to know it? Or am I just being anal-retentive?

What we really should discuss is the theory of justification.

I recommend that you read David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and A Treatise of Human Nature. Those will break you of empiricism really quickly, provided you understand them.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[Jon_]

I think the second point is the most important - a belief can be justified empirically or even inductively. Thus, if we consider the OP's belief about the table, it might be that he is justified in believing that the table is in the other room because a) his beliefs about the table have been true in the past, and b) he has no reason to believe otherwise.

Considering that empirical observation is inductive, which is a formal fallacy, I fail to see how we can accept empiricism as justification. All empirical observations affirm the consequent. That is to say, all empirical arguments follow this line of reasoning:

P1) If my car's battery is dead, my car won't start.
P2) My car won't start.
C) Therefore, my car's battery is dead.

This is obviously an illogical argument, and all empirical arguments follow this same form. As a result, empiricism is illogical and cannot serve as the basis of justification. It does not follow necessarily from the premises.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[TeddyKGB]

Considering that empirical observation is inductive, which is a formal fallacy, I fail to see how we can accept empiricism as justification.

Induction itself is not a fallacy. Hume's argument was not that induction is fallacious, but that it cannot be formally deduced.

All empirical observations affirm the consequent. That is to say, all empirical arguments follow this line of reasoning:

P1) If my car's battery is dead, my car won't start.
P2) My car won't start.
C) Therefore, my car's battery is dead.

This is obviously an illogical argument, and all empirical arguments follow this same form. As a result, empiricism is illogical and cannot serve as the basis of justification. It does not follow necessarily from the premises.

That is not an example of an inductive argument. An inductive argument has the form:

1) If A, then probably B.
2) A
3) Probably B.

In the current context, a epistemological argument might look something like:

1) If the sun rose today, then it will probably rise tomorrow.
2) The sun rose today.
3) It will probably rise tomorrow.

 

[CSMR]

1) If A, then probably B.
2) A
3) Probably B.

This is only an argument if probability is objective rather than a description of a degree of belief. I really don't know what it would mean for there to be objective probability.

 

[CSMR]

Okay, so I get up, go to the other room and - unsurprisingly - find the table still there. Now here's my question: did I
a) know it was there all along? - my belief turned out to be true, completing the definition of knowledge
or b) I didn't know it was there before finding out - my belief was true before I found out, but I didn't know it was true. Effectively, I have to know something to be true to really know it.

According to your use of the word justification, you knew it was there all along.

Argh, this came out a bit confusing. Alright, basically: if we believe something without knowing it to be true - and the object of our belief turns out to be true - did we know it before we found it was true or only afterwards? Do we have to know something to be true in order to know it? Or am I just being anal-retentive?

You are quite confused. To know that there is a table in the room is to know that that is true.
I do not advise studying analytic philosophy. If you misunderstand it you will be confused and if you understand it you will not have got anywhere.

 

[Patzak]

This is very similar to the Gettier problem. See this article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem.

Thanks for the article! It is quite similar to what I was getting at, only even more twisted and confusing . But yes, I'd basically agree that there seems to be a fourth condition to considering something to be knowledge - that it does not turn out to be truth coincidentally, but in a way connected to your justification.

Any probability less than 100% cannot qualifiy as truth, and hence, cannot qualify as justification. For any given truth claim if the probability of truth is 99.99% the truth claim is still false because the conclusion does not follow necessarily.

But saying that makes justification a completely meaningless term. If I'm only justified in holding a belief which has already been proven true, I'm effectively only justified in believing what I know. And how am I supposed to know it if justification is the conditio sine qua non for knowledge? Anyway, by your take, I don't seem to be justified in my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow morning. While I agree that I do not know that it will rise, I would still consider it a rational and reasonable belief - and therefore quite justified.

Well, you never knew it and you still don't, so the answer to this is no as well.

As to the "still don't know it" part: I think we can reformulate our question to avoid such problems while still keeping the original point. How about not calling the table "my table" but just "a table" or even "something I will perceive as identical to my table". Avoids the "exact replica" situation from the wiki article, which is, I think, what you have in mind at this point.

I recommend that you read David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and A Treatise of Human Nature. Those will break you of empiricism really quickly, provided you understand them.

I've read some Hume in the past but can't remember whether it was any of the works you list or something else. I'll probably come across him again in the near future anyway, so I'll check it out eventually.

 

[Patzak]

According to your use of the word justification, you knew it was there all along.

You are quite confused. To know that there is a table in the room is to know that that is true.

But these two are exactly the dichotomy I presented. First you say I knew it all along - that I had knowledge of it being there regardless of actually knowing it, just because it turned out to have been there. Then you say the opposite.

I do not advise studying analytic philosophy. If you misunderstand it you will be confused and if you understand it you will not have got anywhere.

Don't worry, I'm studying continental philosophy, so I'm probably supposed to hate it. Anyway, analytical philosophy isn't where my interests lie, but I find that it brings up interesting questions from time to time. And I don't really mind being confused or not getting anywhere in particular (hence my interest in continental philosophy ).

 

[TeddyKGB]

This is only an argument if probability is objective rather than a description of a degree of belief.

Is it necessary to specify a probability? I believe the sun will rise tomorrow, but I have to say that it might not because of the limitations of induction. Do I have to say I believe there is a .0001% (or whatever) chance that the sun will not rise tomorrow?

I really don't know what it would mean for there to be objective probability.

Given a fair die-6, there is a .167 probability of getting a 6 on any single roll.

Is that not what you are talking about?

 

[CSMR]

Is it necessary to specify a probability?

No, I was just talking about objectivity. Something can be objective without our being able to specify it. And something can be subjective independently of whether we can specify it.

Given a fair die-6, there is a .167 probability of getting a 6 on any single roll.

Is that not what you are talking about?

In that case for example:
First let's suppose "fair" is a physical characteristic that is defined objectively. (Not meaning "which everyone believes will come out with each number with a 1/6 chance.)
Can there be objectively a 1/6 chance? You roll a die. It will come up with a 6 or not. It is surely down to our ignorance of what will happen that we assign probabilities.

 

[CSMR]

But these two are exactly the dichotomy I presented. First you say I knew it all along - that I had knowledge of it being there regardless of actually knowing it, just because it turned out to have been there. Then you say the opposite.

No I am not contradicting myself. I am not using knowledge and justification as I normally would. I am using both terms as you are using them, knowledge as justified true belief and justification as allowing inductive arguments.

If you have come to expect the table to be there when you check and justifiably (in your usage) believe the table to be there, and if the table is there, then your belief is justified and true (since the table is there).

If you have come to expect the table to be there and the table isn't there then you will have a justified false belief and so no knowledge.

This is just a simple application of your definition.

 

[TeddyKGB]

In that case for example:
First let's suppose "fair" is a physical characteristic that is defined objectively. (Not meaning "which everyone believes will come out with each number with a 1/6 chance.)
Can there be objectively a 1/6 chance? You roll a die. It will come up with a 6 or not. It is surely down to our ignorance of what will happen that we assign probabilities.

It depends.

If it is the case that all the factors influencing the roll can be known/predicted, then an objective probability can be assigned.

If it is the case that at least one of the influencing factors cannot be known/predicted (a la Heisenberg), then either an objective probability cannot be assigned, or an objective probability entails some fundamental randomness.

 

[Jon_]

Induction itself is not a fallacy. Hume's argument was not that induction is fallacious, but that it cannot be formally deduced.

It is formally fallacious because the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. The argument form is invalid, which is precisely what a fallacy is.

That is not an example of an inductive argument. An inductive argument has the form:

1) If A, then probably B.
2) A
3) Probably B.

And, as Karl Popper so clearly put it, the probability of any given open inductive argument is one out of infinity, that is, zero. An open induction is any inductive argument of which the exact probability of the premises is not known. Any premise based on empirical observation is an open induction, and any such defense of empiricism begs the question.

In the current context, a epistemological argument might look something like:

1) If the sun rose today, then it will probably rise tomorrow.
2) The sun rose today.
3) It will probably rise tomorrow.

What is the probability that the sun will rise again? 1 out of 100? 99 out of 100? How do you know? Moreover, how do you know the sun rises? By empirical observation? How do you know the perception you have of the sun is a consequence of the object itself? David Hume spelled this out very clearly. No one has ever sensed an object. We have only perceptions of objects. As a result, nothing follows necessarily from our perceptions of the world because they are unverifiable.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[Jon_]

Thanks for the article! It is quite similar to what I was getting at, only even more twisted and confusing . But yes, I'd basically agree that there seems to be a fourth condition to considering something to be knowledge - that it does not turn out to be truth coincidentally, but in a way connected to your justification. But saying that makes justification a completely meaningless term. If I'm only justified in holding a belief which has already been proven true, I'm effectively only justified in believing what I know. And how am I supposed to know it if justification is the condition sine qua non for knowledge?[/

I don't see the possibility of a fourth criterion of knowledge. The problem the Gettier problem illustrates is the impossibility of empirical justification. The only system in which justification is possible is a deductive system, in which the conclusions follow necessarily from the premises. In such a system, the justification is logic, which is necessarily true.

At such a point, the only question left is, "What is true?" I don't believe this question has an objectively verifiable answer. I believe it is based entirely on one's presuppositions.

Anyway, by your take, I don't seem to be justified in my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow morning. While I agree that I do not know that it will rise, I would still consider it a rational and reasonable belief - and therefore quite justified.

That is certainly a plausible belief. Practically speaking, it is actually rather insignificant to say that you know the sun will rise over against simply believing the sun will rise. Unless you believe there is a moral obligation to believe what is true, and that it would be immoral to not believe the sun will rise, then I see no practical distinction between the two.

In any case, the former says that it is a necessary conclusion the sun will rise tomorrow. This, of course, does not follow from the premise, "It has every other day," or even, "According to physics, the spin of the earth on its axis will cause the sun to become visible to the naked eye in the sky at such and such time." That just simply raises the question of how we "know" that, which is by empirical observation and the selection of an apparently representative equation to quantify the spin of the earth on its axis; this, consequently, simply lands us back at the fallacy (or invalidity) of induction.

The latter says that we believe the sun will rise based on observation. We acknowledge that this is insufficient justification to assert the conclusion is necessarily true, but the practical consequences of believing the sun rises and sets in such a fashion outweigh the skeptical rejection of the argument on the basis of its invalidity. And it is just as invalid to argue that the sun will not rise tomorrow because it cannot be proven. That's an argumentum ad ignorantum.

As to the "still don't know it" part: I think we can reformulate our question to avoid such problems while still keeping the original point. How about not calling the table "my table" but just "a table" or even "something I will perceive as identical to my table". Avoids the "exact replica" situation from the wiki article, which is, I think, what you have in mind at this point.

Well, the real problem, which Hume addressed, is that no one has ever sensed a "real" object. The only experience we have of the world is our perceptions, which may or may not be correct at all. No one has ever seen the sun, for instance, we have only had the perception that we were seeing the sun. Think of The Matrix; it's kind of like that.

I've read some Hume in the past but can't remember whether it was any of the works you list or something else. I'll probably come across him again in the near future anyway, so I'll check it out eventually.

I think the Gutenberg Project has both of them. If not, I'm sure you can find them somewhere on the Internet. They're well out of copyright, so they're free if you can find them.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[TeddyKGB]

It is formally fallacious because the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. The argument form is invalid, which is precisely what a fallacy is.

It is not invalid, it just does not lead to a necessarily true conclusion. It is not deduction, in other words.

And, as Karl Popper so clearly put it, the probability of any given open inductive argument is one out of infinity, that is, zero. An open induction is any inductive argument of which the exact probability of the premises is not known. Any premise based on empirical observation is an open induction, and any such defense of empiricism begs the question.

What is the probability that the sun will rise again? 1 out of 100? 99 out of 100? How do you know? Moreover, how do you know the sun rises? By empirical observation? How do you know the perception you have of the sun is a consequence of the object itself? David Hume spelled this out very clearly. No one has ever sensed an object. We have only perceptions of objects. As a result, nothing follows necessarily from our perceptions of the world because they are unverifiable.

You know, I am actually okay with this. It dovetails with my larger point that this fixation on absolute epistemological justification is a red herring, because there ain't no such animal.

What good is it to define knowledge as something impossible in principle to obtain, then complain that we can't know anything?