Theology and Falsifiability

[zippy2006]

That approach presupposes that the person you are trying to persuade is actually open to be convinced that their dogmas are in error, but if they are exercising faith of the kind you later describe, then your criticism, even if sound, will have no impact on their convictions.

As I said earlier, there does (or should) exist a belief that dogmas are not in themselves contradictory, and therefore charges of contradiction must be answered.

It's worthwhile highlighting that what you've written in this post is in keeping with the definition of faith I gave earlier:

The preponderance of evidence does not stand against faith. Faith is undertaken in the first place because of evidence, and dogmas are held because they are thought to be revealed by God, not because reason can see that they are true. Since reason is not able to see whether they are true or false, there is no "preponderance of evidence standing opposed to dogma." Objections to the contrary are addressed by Catholics in the four fields noted.

Yet the way you are describing it is practically indistinguishable from Craig's description of the magisterial and ministerial uses of reason, with the latter being the only legitimate use, according to Craig. For instance, in Craig's view, reason must remain subservient to faith. You agree:

No, you're just reading me selectively. The reason reason cannot overcome faith is because faith is reasonable, and to dispute something that God has revealed is irrational in itself. There is no arbitrary limiting of reason. Faith is thoroughly rational.

There is an extremely high level of confidence, but in the absence of reasons sufficient to warrant that level of confidence.

Of course I disagree.

If one's theological commitments are not amenable to reason, then in what sense are they reasonable?

In the sense that it is reasonable to believe what God has revealed, even if we cannot see that the articles of faith are true without God's help.

That begs the question for theism, and Christianity specifically, doesn't it?

Why? We believe revelation primarily because it came from Jesus' mouth and life, who is God.

Besides which, the fact that humans can be mistaken entails that they could also be mistaken in what they believe God to have said. So even if theism were true, the fallibility of human beings allows for distortions and misinterpretations to arise rather easily, necessitating a method for detecting and remedying errors. Based on the discussion so far, it's clear that theology offers no such method, probably because faith is the norm in the discipline.

The Apostles, those who lived with Jesus, had a kind of inspiration after the Holy Spirit came down upon them at Pentecost. This allowed them to write sacred scripture and define new articles of faith. The Post-Apostolic Church has only a kind of interpretive infallibility, and can define new truths of the faith that derive from the Scriptures and deposit of faith, but not new articles of faith. The Conciliar history of the Church is a testament to that interpretive power.

I'm not sure I follow here. What do you mean?

If intractability impedes our understanding of the world, then how does tractability further it?

Earlier, I asked you how you would overcome the dogmatism of other theologians to show that their dogmas were in error, and you offered some interesting suggestions. (All of your suggestions assumed an openness to criticism, in which case I refer you to the first paragraph of my response here). But now it seems that you are conceding that criticism can make no impact on dogma?

Naturally I don't think criticism can make any impact on Catholic dogma, but the Church is open to answering such criticisms.

That something is systematic does not entail that it also produces knowledge.

But it is a kind of prerequisite for the production of knowledge, especially when it can definitively settle disputes.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

No, you're just reading me selectively. The reason reason cannot overcome faith is because faith is reasonable, and to dispute something that God has revealed is irrational in itself. There is no arbitrary limiting of reason. Faith is thoroughly rational.

This appears to beg the question for theism. What indicates that a deity has revealed anything at all? We are presented with a diverse array of propositions that theists have asserted as revealed. The authority attributed to those propositions is directly predicated on their putative supernatural origin (e.g., "This is the Word of God.") What would be irrational about questioning this, particularly given the multitudes of such claims?

The preponderance of evidence does not stand against faith. Faith is undertaken in the first place because of evidence, and dogmas are held because they are thought to be revealed by God, not because reason can see that they are true.

They are thought to be revealed by God, but in the absence of good reasons to think that they were actually revealed by a supernatural being.

Since reason is not able to see whether they are true or false, there is no "preponderance of evidence standing opposed to dogma."

"Natural reason" is not permitted to say anything about their falsity, but it is allowed to speak to their truth, following the ministerial use of reason advocated by Craig and others. But reason clearly can challenge dogma. The question then is whether this challenge, if successful, has any effect on the convictions of the believer, or whether they exercise faith as a way of preventing the criticism from having any doxastic impact.

Regrettably, I don't have time to address the remainder of your post right now, so I've tried to address the most important parts, as I see it.

 

[Michael]

I think the place to start with that issue is exegesis. What does the Bible say, what does the Bible mean, what did the Church Fathers say, etc. I'm afraid I'm not familiar enough with that controversy to give much detail. Fortunately I think it is a difference of opinion which most Christians consider to be minor. For example, in Catholicism there is no dogmatic position on that issue.

Fair enough. Suppose we're talking about the theological afterlife differences between someone like Origen who taught early Christians about universal salvation, and Augustine who preferred pagan afterlife beliefs involving "eternal torment"? There's certainly nothing like eternal torment in Judaism today. How would you suggest we deal with something a bit more 'important'?

 

[zippy2006]

This appears to beg the question for theism. What indicates that a deity has revealed anything at all?

Jesus Christ, his followers, the resurrection, the Church, the Jewish people, etc.

We are presented with a diverse array of propositions that theists have asserted as revealed. The authority attributed to those propositions is directly predicated on their putative supernatural origin (e.g., "This is the Word of God.") What would be irrational about questioning this, particularly given the multitudes of such claims?

It would not be irrational for you to question, being an atheist. But it would be irrational for someone who believes God has revealed something to question that thing.

They are thought to be revealed by God, but in the absence of good reasons to think that they were actually revealed by a supernatural being.

To say that there are an absence of good reasons to believe is just begging the question. What you don't seem to comprehend is that your atheistic position is not inherently more objective than my Catholic position. I can give you my own take on the issues you raise, and can show you that they are not problematic from my perspective, but I am not currently interested in trying to convert you.

"Natural reason" is not permitted to say anything about their falsity, but it is allowed to speak to their truth,

It is allowed to speak of their truth or falsity indirectly insofar as God is believed or not believed to have revealed the thing.

But reason clearly can challenge dogma. The question then is whether this challenge, if successful, has any effect on the convictions of the believer, or whether they exercise faith as a way of preventing the criticism from having any doxastic impact.

If something could be shown to be contradictory, then it would not be of God and would not be worthy of belief.

Regrettably, I don't have time to address the remainder of your post right now, so I've tried to address the most important parts, as I see it.

Okay.

 

[zippy2006]

Fair enough. Suppose we're talking about the theological afterlife differences between someone like Origen who taught early Christians about universal salvation, and Augustine who preferred pagan afterlife beliefs involving "eternal torment"? There's certainly nothing like eternal torment in Judaism today. How would you suggest we deal with something a bit more 'important'?

In general I would point to the 15 anathemas directed against Origin at the Second Council of Constantinople. The first anathema reads:

1. If anyone asserts the fabulous pre-existence of souls, and shall assert the monstrous restoration which follows from it: let him be anathema.​

There is also the Fourth Lateran Council, citing the perpetual punishment of Satan:

All of them will rise with their own bodies, which they now wear, so as to receive according to their deserts, whether these be good or bad; for the latter perpetual punishment with the devil, for the former eternal glory with Christ.​

Ludwig Ott, in his Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, gives additional arguments in discussing the eternal nature of Hell:

The Caput Firmiter of the Fourth Lateran Council (121.5) declares: "Those
(the rejected) will receive a perpetual punishment with the devil." D 429.
Cf. D 40, 83.5, 840. A Synod at Constantinople (543) rejected the Apocatastasis
doctrine of Origen. D 211.

While Origen denied the eternity of hell-punishment altogether, H. Schell
(1906) limited it to those who sin "with raised hand," that is, from the
disposition of hatred for God, and who persist in this disposition in the other
world.

Holy Writ frequently emphasizes the eternal duration of hell-punishment
by speaking of it as an "eternal reproach" (Dn. 12, 2: Cf. Wis. 4, 19);
an " eternal fire" (Judith 16, 21; Mt. 18, 8; 25, 41 ; Judith 7), an
"everlasting punishment" (Mt. 25, 46), an "eternal punishment in destruction"
(2 Thess. 1, 9). That the word "eternal" is not to be understood in the
sense of a duration which is indeed long, but limited is proved by parallel
expressions like "unquenchable fire" (Mt. 3, 12 ; Mk. 9, 43), or Hell, "where
their worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished" (Mk. 9, 45 et seq.),
as well as by the contrast of "everlasting punishment"- "Life everlasting"
in Mt. 25, 46. According to Apoc. 14 (19, 3), "the smoke of their torments
(of the damned) shall ascend up for ever and ever," that is, without end.
Cf. Apoc. 20, 10.

The "restitution of all things" announced in Acts 3, 21, does not refer to
the lot of the damned, but to the renewal of the world which is to take place
on the coming-again of Christ.

The Fathers before Origen unanimously affirm the eternal duration of the
punishment of hell. cf. St. Ignatius, Eph. 16, 2, ; St. Justin, Apol I 28. I.
Martyrium Polycarpi 2, 3 ; 2: St. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV 28, 2 ; Tertullian,
De poenit. 12. Origen's denial proceeded from the Platonic doctrinal opinion
that the purpose of all punishment is the improvement of the delinquent.
Origen was followed by St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Didymus of Alexandria
and Evagrius Ponticus. St. Augustine defends the endless duration of hell
punishment against the Origenists and against "the merciful ones" (St.
Ambrose), who, in view of the Divine mercy, taught the restoration of
Christians who died in mortal sin. Cf. De civ. Dei XXI 23; Ad Orosium
6, 7 ; Enchir. 112.

On the ground of the teaching of Revelation it is to be inferred, that the
will of the damned is immovably hardened in evil and is, therefore,
inaccessible to any true repentance. The reason is that God refuses all further
grace to the damned. Cf. S. the I II 85, 2 ad 3 ; Suppl. 98, 2. S. 6.

 

[Michael]

In general I would point to the 15 anathemas directed against Origin at the Second Council of Constantinople. The first anathema reads:

1. If anyone asserts the fabulous pre-existence of souls, and shall assert the monstrous restoration which follows from it: let him be anathema.​

There is also the Fourth Lateran Council, citing the perpetual punishment of Satan:

All of them will rise with their own bodies, which they now wear, so as to receive according to their deserts, whether these be good or bad; for the latter perpetual punishment with the devil, for the former eternal glory with Christ.​

Ludwig Ott, in his Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, gives additional arguments in discussing the eternal nature of Hell:

Well, while I might be able to reconcile Origen's position with Judaism, how would we possibly reconcile those two religions under the umbrella of "eternal torment"? There is no such thing, and no such fate in Judaism, whereas there actually are quotes in the Bible about Jesus potentially being a prophet "reborn".

I'd say that Origen's theological position is much closer to Judaism than Augustine's position, and Augustine came *centuries later*.

 

[zippy2006]

Well, while I might be able to reconcile Origen's position with Judaism, how would we possibly reconcile those two religions under the umbrella of "eternal torment"? There is no such thing, and no such fate in Judaism, whereas there actually are quotes in the Bible about Jesus potentially being a prophet "reborn".

I'd say that Origen's theological position is much closer to Judaism than Augustine's position, and Augustine came *centuries later*.

I agree that it would be easier to reconcile Judaism with Origen's positions on reincarnation and apocatastasis than traditional Christianity's.

 

[Michael]

I agree that it would be easier to reconcile Judaism with Origen's positions on reincarnation and apocatastasis than traditional Christianity's.

I don't think Islam has any trouble with God letting people out of their concept of "hell", so it appears that *later* Christianity is irreconcilable with other religions, whereas *earlier* versions seem to be considerably more compatible.

How then can you be absolute sure that the *later* version is actually the correct "interpretation" from a theological perspective? How then would it be possible to "reconcile" such huge chasms in belief with respect to forgiveness?

Frankly the values taught during Sermon on the Mount seem a lot more congruent with *early* forms of Christianity. Why not just leave out the 'pre-existence' concept and embrace more standard "Jewish" afterlife position? If we can't reconcile Christianity to Judaism, I don't see how your method can provide a clear path to reconciliation among all "believers" of God.

 

[zippy2006]

I don't think Islam has any trouble with God letting people out of their concept of "hell", so it appears that *later* Christianity is irreconcilable with other religions, whereas *earlier* versions seem to be considerably more compatible.

How then can you be absolute sure that the *later* version is actually the correct "interpretation" from a theological perspective? How then would it be possible to "reconcile" such huge chasms in belief with respect to forgiveness?

What about all of the Fathers who came before Origen and affirmed an eternal Hell, such as St. Ignatius, St. Justin, Polycarp, St. Irenaeus, and Tertullian? Origen's isn't the early position.

Frankly the values taught during Sermon on the Mount seem a lot more congruent with *early* forms of Christianity. Why not just leave out the 'pre-existence' concept and embrace more standard "Jewish" afterlife position? If we can't reconcile Christianity to Judaism, I don't see how your method can provide a clear path to reconciliation among all "believers" of God.

But I never said that there was a clear path to reconciliation among all believers of God. In fact I explicitly pointed out that after the reconciliation phase comes the phase of irreconcilable doctrines and attempts at conversion.

 

[Michael]

What about all of the Fathers who came before Origen and affirmed an eternal Hell, such as St. Ignatius, St. Justin, Polycarp, St. Irenaeus, and Tertullian? Origen's isn't the early position.

I'm going to assume that the theology section was closed for a reason, and I'm going to resist the urge to get into a full blown discourse on Christian theology in the science forum.

Suffice to say there were "earlier" (I'll grant you they were not necessarily the earliest) versions of Christianity that were far more compatible theologically with other religions as it relates to afterlife beliefs, even without embracing any concepts of pre-existence.

If there isn't a defined way to reconcile various religious beliefs together, particularly religions that begin as closely together as Christianity and Judaism, then theology doesn't appear to offer a credible "theological method" that allows for a full reconciliation of all "believers".

But I never said that there was a clear path to reconciliation among all believers of God. In fact I explicitly pointed out that after the reconciliation phase comes the phase of irreconcilable doctrines and attempts at conversion.

Hmmm. I'm feeling like the "theological method" that you're describing is a bit incomplete from my vantage point.

Don't get me wrong now, I'm not suggesting that the scientific method is perfect or that it's correct 100 percent of the time either, but the scientific method does seem to have a pretty good set of basic guidelines in terms of sorting out various competing beliefs, particularly with respect to empirical physics. It tends to get much more messy and fuzzy of course as it relates to *hypothetical* claims, which would be a reasonable comparison to theology. Even in that realm, there are some basic guidelines to work with.