Theology and Falsifiability

[zippy2006]

The Church can deny the authenticity of alleged revelations that conflict with Church dogma. This denial is based on the Church's authority, ostensibly derived from the divine.

Okay.

'Dogma' implies something asserted to be incontrovertibly true and beyond question. It's hard to engage in criticism without questioning. The apologist's task, in defending dogma and exercising faith, is not to question or doubt it, but to develop a fortified case that shields it from the questioning and doubt of others. Following Luther, Craig — who happens to be one of the most popular apologists around today — distinguishes between the magisterial and ministerial uses of reason, emphasising that apologetics is a ministerial exercise, in which "reason submits to and serves the gospel" (p. 47), instead of judging it on the basis of evidence — in other words, instead of adjudicating whether gospel claims are true. If one were to adjudicate the matter fairly, one would need to at least accept the possibility that such claims are false and that inquiry may reveal it to be so.

First I just want to note that the syllogisms you give are nearly identical to those I used to describe your position, and yet you ignored my answer, namely that an apologist can admit the possibility of error for the sake of argument.

Second, we are arguing about whether theology (or the Church) can adjudicate competing religious claims. What does adjudication mean in this context? You seem to think it means or implies impartiality with respect to the two opposing religions. That is a kind of adjudication, but I don't think it is relevant to our case. Our question about the Church (or theology) could be rephrased as follows: does the Church provide justification for preferring Christianity to other religions? This is the critical question, and the answer is "Yes." The Church is open to the method of putting forward arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity's truth. This is precisely what Christian philosophers, apologists, natural theologians, and fundamental theologians do. The Church exhibits a willingness to engage in argument on the basis of natural reason in favor of the truth of Christianity, and there are many Catholics who do precisely this. The impartiality you desire is simply not required to refute your claim that, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." It does give us a way, apologists are part of that process, and an impartiality or doubt with respect to each of the opposing religions is not required. The role of the Church is to provide us with arguments in favor of Christianity. It is the role of other religious bodies to produce the opposing arguments in favor of their own religion.

Third, we can examine your claim about apologists and adjudication, but I'm not exactly sure what that claim is. Namely, what is the conclusion of your argument? Supposing apologists are not capable of this impartiality, what does that mean or entail? Are we simply back to the question of whether apologists are philosophers, or is there a more precise conclusion to be had? Explain the significance of your argument, and we can continue with that topic. Or if you want, we could start that topic in a new thread after you return from your trip.

Not the Church, no. The Church did not give us philosophy and cannot control what inquiries people undertake when they do philosophy. I was a Catholic when I first started philosophising. But even then I never thought of philosophy as something given to me by the Church as a means of adjudicating.

Catholic philosophers arguing for the truth of Christianity are part of the Church. Therefore the Church does give us a way of determining which religious claims have merit. The way is the particular philosophical arguments made by Catholic philosophers.

You are describing a different situation now because, presumably, there is room to doubt in the course of this reflection? You are allowing for the possibility that some crucial aspect of the theology either doesn't make sense or isn't true and therefore it needs to be revised or abandoned? To adjudicate fairly, it seems that you'd have to allow at least that much.

I was simply showing that it is possible to scrutinize beliefs, even if one is not ultimately willing to allow that scrutinizing to overpower faith. But the definition and importance of terms such as "adjudication" and "scrutinizing" will only become clear once you answer my third point above.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

First I just want to note that the syllogisms you give are nearly identical to those I used to describe your position, and yet you ignored my answer, namely that an apologist can admit the possibility of error for the sake of argument.

So can his interlocutor, the person that the apologist is trying to convince. If the apologist's arguments were successful, and the nonbeliever even admitted that they were successful, but she still withheld belief because she only ever conceded the possibility of error in her own judgment "for the sake of argument," what do you think the apologist would say?

Second, we are arguing about whether theology (or the Church) can adjudicate competing religious claims. What does adjudication mean in this context? You seem to think it means or implies impartiality with respect to the two opposing religions. That is a kind of adjudication, but I don't think it is relevant to our case. Our question about the Church (or theology) could be rephrased as follows: does the Church provide justification for preferring Christianity to other religions? This is the critical question, and the answer is "Yes."

That leads us back to the issue I raised in my first post; namely, that the Church does no better in this regard than any other religion.

Second, we are arguing about whether theology (or the Church) can adjudicate competing religious claims. What does adjudication mean in this context? You seem to think it means or implies impartiality with respect to the two opposing religions. That is a kind of adjudication, but I don't think it is relevant to our case. Our question about the Church (or theology) could be rephrased as follows: does the Church provide justification for preferring Christianity to other religions? This is the critical question, and the answer is "Yes." The Church is open to the method of putting forward arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity's truth. This is precisely what Christian philosophers, apologists, natural theologians, and fundamental theologians do. The Church exhibits a willingness to engage in argument on the basis of natural reason in favor of the truth of Christianity, and there are many Catholics who do precisely this. The impartiality you desire is simply not required to refute your claim that, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." It does give us a way, apologists are part of that process, and an impartiality or doubt with respect to each of the opposing religions is not required. The role of the Church is to provide us with arguments in favor of Christianity. It is the role of other religious bodies to produce the opposing arguments in favor of their own religion.

With each apologist accepting the possibility of error in their own dogmas only "for the sake of argument," correct? In which case you run back into the issue I described in my first post in this thread. Theology hasn't given us a way of adjudicating these incompatible religious claims; it's given each religion a way of defending their claims against whatever line of criticism is attempted, even if that criticism is successful — which is apt given that that is how the apologetics game is played.

 

[zippy2006]

So can his interlocutor, the person that the apologist is trying to convince. If the apologist's arguments were successful, and the nonbeliever even admitted that they were successful, but she still withheld belief because she only ever conceded the possibility of error in her own judgment "for the sake of argument," what do you think the apologist would say?

I think he would say, "So if you found my arguments successful, what prevented you from believing their conclusions?" And honestly I think this would be a common case among forum-going nonbelievers.

That leads us back to the issue I raised in my first post; namely, that the Church does no better in this regard than any other religion.

And you are free to give arguments for that assertion, but we are currently talking about your claim, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." Theology (or the Church) provides us with arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity, arguments which allow us to determine which religious claims have merit.

With each apologist accepting the possibility of error in their own dogmas only "for the sake of argument," correct?

No, that is a separate consideration. In my second point there is no need for them to admit the possibility of error, which is why I explicitly say that "impartiality or doubt with respect to each of the opposing religions [including Christianity] is not required." Perhaps you should re-read the second point with this in mind. Impartiality is simply not required in order for theology to furnish us with a means for determining which religious claims have merit.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

And you are free to give arguments for that assertion, but we are currently talking about your claim, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." Theology (or the Church) provides us with arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity, arguments which allow us to determine which religious claims have merit.

No, that is a separate consideration. In my second point there is no need for them to admit the possibility of error, which is why I explicitly say that "impartiality or doubt with respect to each of the opposing religions [including Christianity] is not required." Perhaps you should re-read the second point with this in mind. Impartiality is simply not required in order for theology to furnish us with a means for determining which religious claims have merit.

A seperate consideration? If none are open to be convinced that their dogmas might be false and in need of revision, and none are willing to accept legitimate criticism, though they would entertain it "for the sake of argument," then theology hasn't given us a way of determining which religious claims have merit. Instead, it's given the religious a means of dismissing any line of criticism that contravenes dogma, allowing them to continue believing regardless of whatever philosophical inquiry may reveal — faith in the religious sense.

 

[zippy2006]

A seperate consideration? If none are open to be convinced that their dogmas might be false and in need of revision, and none are willing to accept legitimate criticism, though they would entertain it "for the sake of argument," then theology hasn't given us a way of determining which religious claims have merit.

The Church provides multiple disciplines which are focused on arguments from natural reason in favor of one specific religion, Christianity. How is that not a way of determining which religious claims have merit? John Agnostic can take the arguments provided by such disciplines and be convinced by them, can "determine which religious claims have merit."

I can give a sound argument in favor of Catholicism without being convinced that Catholicism might be false, and someone else can take that argument and use it to determine which religious claims have merit. There is simply no reason to believe a Catholic must lay aside the faith in order to persuasively argue in favor of Catholicism. Why would you think that?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

The Church provides multiple disciplines which are focused on arguments from natural reason in favor of one specific religion, Christianity. How is that not a way of determining which religious claims have merit? John Agnostic can take the arguments provided by such disciplines and be convinced by them, can "determine which religious claims have merit."

I can give a sound argument in favor of Catholicism without being convinced that Catholicism might be false, and someone else can take that argument and use it to determine which religious claims have merit. There is simply no reason to believe a Catholic must lay aside the faith in order to persuasively argue in favor of Catholicism. Why would you think that?

So John Agnostic is expected to remain open to be convinced and to at least allow for the possibility that the Catholic's arguments will succeed, but Sarah Catholic isn't expected to remain similarly open and to at least allow for the possibility that some criticism of her beliefs will succeed and that she will therefore need to revise them? That seems to be what you are saying, which is consistent with the apologetics game I alluded to earlier, and definitely consistent with the notion that theology furnishes the religious with a means of dismissing criticism by exercising faith.

 

[zippy2006]

So John Agnostic is expected to remain open to be convinced and to at least allow for the possibility that the Catholic's arguments will succeed, but Sarah Catholic isn't expected to remain similarly open and to at least allow for the possibility that some criticism of her beliefs will succeed and that she will therefore need to revise them?

Your focus is immaterial to the question at hand. We are asking whether the Church provides a way of adjudicating competing religious claims. I.e. does the Church provide arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. We are not asking whether random agnostic persons, or other religions for that matter, provide their own way of adjudicating competing religious claims. Whether John or Sarah are "open to be convinced" has nothing to do with whether the Church, in providing them with arguments, has given them a way to favor one religion over another.

That seems to be what you are saying, which is consistent with the apologetics game I alluded to earlier, and definitely consistent with the notion that theology furnishes the religious with a means of dismissing criticism by exercising faith.

But you're just asserting at this point. Exercising faith? The Church provides arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. It has nothing to do with faith. And the Church does not need to have doubts about its own beliefs in order to provide means for adjudicating competing religious claims. Indeed no one needs to have doubts about their own conclusions in order to put forward an argument for a specific religion.

If someone said, "There is no way to determine which religious claims have merit," I would give them a book produced by an apologist, a fundamental theologian, a natural theologian, or a Catholic philosopher arguing in favor of Christianity. There is no a priori reason to believe that the person's question would not be answered by this book. Someone who is convinced would say, "Gee, I guess the Church does provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit." Someone who is not convinced would say, "I remain unconvinced of the truth of Christianity, but I must admit that the Church does provide a way of determining which religious claims have merit." No one could justifiably say, "This argument for Christianity is invalidated by the fact that the Christian who put it forward doesn't doubt his own beliefs!"

 

[Michael]

Your focus is immaterial to the question at hand. We are asking whether the Church provides a way of adjudicating competing religious claims. I.e. does the Church provide arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. We are not asking whether random agnostic persons, or other religions for that matter, provide their own way of adjudicating competing religious claims. Whether John or Sarah are "open to be convinced" has nothing to do with whether the Church, in providing them with arguments, has given them a way to favor one religion over another.

The parallel in physics would be whether or not the "professional" particle physicists or astronomers have a way of adjudicating competing *hypothetical* claims from other "professionals", not whether or not "non-professional" opinions are welcome or of interest to the "professionals". In that analogy to physics, the 'professional' title (and the Phd that goes with it) represents the "Church". The keepers of Phd's (and jobs) end up being the equivalent of a "clergy" of sorts.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Your focus is immaterial to the question at hand. We are asking whether the Church provides a way of adjudicating competing religious claims. I.e. does the Church provide arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. We are not asking whether random agnostic persons, or other religions for that matter, provide their own way of adjudicating competing religious claims. Whether John or Sarah are "open to be convinced" has nothing to do with whether the Church, in providing them with arguments, has given them a way to favor one religion over another.

But you're just asserting at this point. Exercising faith? The Church provides arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. It has nothing to do with faith. And the Church does not need to have doubts about its own beliefs in order to provide means for adjudicating competing religious claims. Indeed no one needs to have doubts about their own conclusions in order to put forward an argument for a specific religion.

If someone said, "There is no way to determine which religious claims have merit," I would give them a book produced by an apologist, a fundamental theologian, a natural theologian, or a Catholic philosopher arguing in favor of Christianity. There is no a priori reason to believe that the person's question would not be answered by this book. Someone who is convinced would say, "Gee, I guess the Church does provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit." Someone who is not convinced would say, "I remain unconvinced of the truth of Christianity, but I must admit that the Church does provide a way of determining which religious claims have merit." No one could justifiably say, "This argument for Christianity is invalidated by the fact that the Christian who put it forward doesn't doubt his own beliefs!"

But we are not talking about merely putting forth an argument favouring a specific religion, but adjudicating incompatible religious claims and whether theology gives us the means to do so. How can the Church adjudicate fairly if it is committed only to defending its own dogmas, while also dismissing any criticism of them? The situation you have described is consistent with the ministerial use of reason I mentioned earlier, in which "reason submits to and serves the gospel" (p. 47, Craig) instead of examining whether gospel claims are true. The emphasis is, again, on defence. Criticism is entertained only "for the sake of argument," but ultimately has no effect on belief, especially if the particular critique is successful or the apologist's arguments are shown to be untenable.

Given this situation, it's hard to assert that theology has given you a way of adjudicating. It would be more appropriate to say that it's given you (and adherents of other religions) a way to defend your respective dogmas and to shield them from criticism. But that's the problem we started with. So in the end we are still left with no way of resolving the matter, with each religion committed to playing the apologetics game and none open to reconsidering its theological commitments. Yet without such openness, no progress can be made.

 

[zippy2006]

But we are not talking about merely putting forth an argument favouring a specific religion, but adjudicating incompatible religious claims and whether theology gives us the means to do so. How can the Church adjudicate fairly if it is committed only to defending its own dogmas, while also dismissing any criticism of them?

I would invite you to revisit this post, especially the second point I make, where I give an argument for the relevant definition of adjudication and point out that the impartiality you so desire is not necessary for adjudication.

Criticism is entertained only "for the sake of argument,"

Again, this is false. That was a different consideration, and is related to the third point I made in the post noted above.

Given this situation, it's hard to assert that theology has given you a way of adjudicating. It would be more appropriate to say that it's given you (and adherents of other religions) a way to defend your respective dogmas and to shield them from criticism.

Again, we are considering your claim, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." The scenario I envision is of someone searching among various religions to try to determine which claims have merit. Suppose they look to the Church. It offers them multiple disciplines which produce arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. This is a way of determining which religious claims have merit. The person in question has stumbled upon such a way, and that way comes from the Church (or theology).

But that's the problem we started with. So in the end we are still left with no way of resolving the matter, with each religion committed to playing the apologetics game and none open to reconsidering its theological commitments. Yet without such openness, no progress can be made.

What difference do you think it would make if the adherents doubted their own beliefs? Why do you think this would somehow make the arguments for their own religion different? They would be the exact same arguments. Nothing would be changed. Theology provides a way to determine which religious claims have merit whether or not the persons putting forward those claims doubt their own beliefs. You've given no reason to believe that theology doesn't offer a means of adjudicating between Christianity and another religion.

So what are you concerned about now? Let me try to describe your concern. You think that if religion X and religion Y both have an extra-rational means of arriving at beliefs--such as faith--then dialogue between them will be fruitless. Both will be unable to reconsider their own beliefs and will be limited to defending those beliefs, and thus the dialogue will be fruitless because it will be strictly impossible to convince either side by way of reason.

We can talk about that problem if you want, but it doesn't bear on the current question. Both religion X and religion Y could conceivably offer means of adjudication in the form of arguments for their own view. The one who is truly adjudicating is the person who is trying to decide which religion is true, and that person makes use of the arguments from each side as part of their assessment. Both religions are offering a means of adjudication with their arguments. This is how real life works: it is messy, you have to dig, you have to consider arguments, you have to look at the particulars, there is no magic bullet.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I would invite you to revisit this post, especially the second point I make, where I give an argument for the relevant definition of adjudication and point out that the impartiality you so desire is not necessary for adjudication.



Again, this is false. That was a different consideration, and is related to the third point I made in the post noted above.



Again, we are considering your claim, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." The scenario I envision is of someone searching among various religions to try to determine which claims have merit. Suppose they look to the Church. It offers them multiple disciplines which produce arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. This is a way of determining which religious claims have merit. The person in question has stumbled upon such a way, and that way comes from the Church (or theology).



What difference do you think it would make if the adherents doubted their own beliefs? Why do you think this would somehow make the arguments for their own religion different? They would be the exact same arguments. Nothing would be changed. Theology provides a way to determine which religious claims have merit whether or not the persons putting forward those claims doubt their own beliefs. You've given no reason to believe that theology doesn't offer a means of adjudicating between Christianity and another religion.

So what are you concerned about now? Let me try to describe your concern. You think that if religion X and religion Y both have an extra-rational means of arriving at beliefs--such as faith--then dialogue between them will be fruitless. Both will be unable to reconsider their own beliefs and will be limited to defending those beliefs, and thus the dialogue will be fruitless because it will be strictly impossible to convince either side by way of reason.

We can talk about that problem if you want, but it doesn't bear on the current question. Both religion X and religion Y could conceivably offer means of adjudication in the form of arguments for their own view. The one who is truly adjudicating is the person who is trying to decide which religion is true, and that person makes use of the arguments from each side as part of their assessment. Both religions are offering a means of adjudication with their arguments. This is how real life works: it is messy, you have to dig, you have to consider arguments, you have to look at the particulars, there is no magic bullet.

As I noted in this post, we are not talking about merely putting forth an argument favouring a specific religion. I never denied that the religious could present such arguments, which is crucial if any adjudication is to take place. That's not the point at issue. The issue is how the theologian engages with those arguments and what effect they have on his theological beliefs. Based on your description, the theologian is concerned with defending the dogmas he is committed to, rather than critically examining them. He will entertain criticism of his dogmas for the sake of argument, but ultimately it has no effect on his convictions; he is not open to reconsidering his theological commitments. If this is the norm in theology (and it is how you have portrayed it thus far), then you cannot say it provides us with a way to adjudicate incompatible religious claims. To adjudicate fairly, we would have to cast the dogmatism of the theologians aside and inquire openly, accepting the possibility that some argument may succeed in demonstrating or refuting the claims under examination. In other words, the theologian may present a case for consideration (again, I never denied this), but he does so in a purely ministerial manner, and because the norms of rational discourse apparently don't apply to theology, he need not revise or abandon his theology in light of successful criticism. He merely needs to insist upon faith.

 

[zippy2006]

As I noted in this post, we are not talking about merely putting forth an argument favouring a specific religion. I never denied that the religious could present such arguments, which is crucial if any adjudication is to take place. That's not the point at issue. The issue is how the theologian engages with those arguments and what effect they have on his theological beliefs. Based on your description, the theologian is concerned with defending the dogmas he is committed to, rather than critically examining them. He will entertain criticism of his dogmas for the sake of argument, but ultimately it has no effect on his convictions; he is not open to reconsidering his theological commitments. If this is the norm in theology (and it is how you have portrayed it thus far), then you cannot say it provides us with a way to adjudicate incompatible religious claims.

I think this is the point on which we have been differing. I have been talking about adjudication of incompatible religious claims, you have been talking about adjudication of incompatible religious dogmas.

To adjudicate fairly, we would have to cast the dogmatism of the theologians aside and inquire openly, accepting the possibility that some argument may succeed in demonstrating or refuting the claims under examination. In other words, the theologian may present a case for consideration (again, I never denied this), but he does so in a purely ministerial manner, and because the norms of rational discourse apparently don't apply to theology, he need not revise or abandon his theology in light of successful criticism. He merely needs to insist upon faith.

Is this or is this not what you are referring to:

So what are you concerned about now? Let me try to describe your concern. You think that if religion X and religion Y both have an extra-rational means of arriving at beliefs--such as faith--then dialogue between them will be fruitless. Both will be unable to reconsider their own beliefs and will be limited to defending those beliefs, and thus the dialogue will be fruitless because it will be strictly impossible to convince either side by way of reason.

...and in particular you seem to be concerned not with the undecided persons who do not belong to religion X and religion Y, but with the actual adherents of those religions. You are not concerned that an undecided person be able to adjudicate, but rather that a religious person be able to convert.

Is this what you want to talk about? How a person of religion X could convert a person of religion Y and vice versa? Or do you want to talk about why Christians are not beholden to your so-called "norms of rational discourse"?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I think this is the point on which we have been differing. I have been talking about adjudication of incompatible religious claims, you have been talking about adjudication of incompatible religious dogmas.



Is this or is this not what you are referring to:



...and in particular you seem to be concerned not with the undecided persons who do not belong to religion X and religion Y, but with the actual adherents of those religions. You are not concerned that an undecided person be able to adjudicate, but rather that a religious person be able to convert.

Is this what you want to talk about? How a person of religion X could convert a person of religion Y and vice versa? Or do you want to talk about why Christians are not beholden to your so-called "norms of rational discourse"?

In the context of the issue I raised earlier, the most recent discussion has centred on whether theology gives us a way of determining which religious claims have merit or which purported "revelations" genuinely emanate from the divine. (1) As such, the question has always been about the norms of theology and whether they enable us to do that. You seem to be talking about something different: an "undecided person" who is examining the diverse array of cases that theologians have presented to him with the aim of determining which case is the strongest.

 

[zippy2006]

In the context of the issue I raised earlier, the most recent discussion has centred on whether theology gives us a way of determining which religious claims have merit or which purported "revelations" genuinely emanate from the divine. (1)

Simple question: who is "us"? Clearly it is someone who wants to determine which religious claims have merit. Clearly that would be someone who is undecided in the matter. A Catholic theologian is by definition someone who has already determined which religious claims have merit. That is why they present a case for Christianity without doubting their own beliefs, because they have already reached a conclusion.

As such, the question has always been about the norms of theology and whether they enable us to do that.

Again, "us" would very commonsensically be defined as someone who is undecided.

You seem to be talking about something different: an "undecided person" who is examining the diverse array of cases that theologians have presented to him with the aim of determining which case is the strongest.

I am not talking about something different. When we ask whether theology provides a way to determine which religious claims have merit, we must have at least an implicit answer to the question "Provides to whom?" My answer is "An undecided person." Your answer is so complicated that I'm not even willing to try to explain it. Feel free to explain your answer.

Theology does give everyone a way of determining which religious claims have merit. This way is found precisely in the arguments from natural reason that theology presents, as I have noted ad nauseum. But the most obvious candidate for determining which religious claims have merit--indeed the only person who will make use of theology's offer--is someone who wants to determine which religious claims have merit, namely an undecided person.

In order for theology to give an undecided person a way of determining which religious claims have merit, it needs only to present arguments for a particular position. Done. Period. That's all. There is no reason to believe that theology must at the same time doubt its own beliefs. Again, if you want a new topic, name it.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Simple question: who is "us"? Clearly it is someone who wants to determine which religious claims have merit. Clearly that would be someone who is undecided in the matter. A Catholic theologian is by definition someone who has already determined which religious claims have merit. That is why they present a case for Christianity without doubting their own beliefs, because they have already reached a conclusion.

Again, "us" would very commonsensically be defined as someone who is undecided.

You could substitute the word "Catholic" for "Islamic" and the result would be the same: "An Islamic theologian is by definition someone who has already determined which religious claims have merit. That is why they present a case for Islam without doubting their own beliefs, because they have already reached a conclusion." Considering the incompatibility between Catholicism and Islam, the relevant question then is whether the norms of theology enable us to distinguish which religious claims have merit and are worthy of our assent. The "us" could be anyone — Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, atheist, "undecided" — who wants to apply the norms of theology to do this. Why would they want to do this? Presumably because they care whether their religious beliefs are true, and the presence of incompatible religious beliefs is enough to make them at least consider the issue.

Theology does give everyone a way of determining which religious claims have merit. This way is found precisely in the arguments from natural reason that theology presents, as I have noted ad nauseum.

Given your description, the norm in theology is to evaluate claims in accordance with the traditions, scriptures, and councils of one's own religion. The theologian is thus tasked with defending his own dogmas, first by arguments appealing to the divine and second by arguments that draw on philosophy, science, or history for support. In doing this, he presents a case for our consideration, something we can adjudicate on. However, as noted earlier (1), the theologian does so in a purely ministerial manner, meaning that he is focused on defending, not critically examining, his theological commitments. If his case is undermined, or inquiry reveals that some crucial aspect of his theology is untenable or false (e.g., certain "revealed premises" are cast into doubt), the norm, as you have portrayed it, is for him to exercise faith so as to avoid having to reconsider those commitments. This is why I said:

If none are open to be convinced that their dogmas might be false and in need of revision, and none are willing to accept legitimate criticism, though they would entertain it "for the sake of argument," then theology hasn't given us a way of determining which religious claims have merit. Instead, it's given the religious a means of dismissing any line of criticism that contravenes dogma, allowing them to continue believing regardless of whatever philosophical inquiry may reveal — faith in the religious sense.

In order for theology to give an undecided person a way of determining which religious claims have merit, it needs only to present arguments for a particular position. Done. Period. That's all. There is no reason to believe that theology must at the same time doubt its own beliefs. Again, if you want a new topic, name it.

But it must do so if it to detect and remedy errors in those beliefs and thereby make progress in understanding.

 

[zippy2006]

You could substitute the word "Catholic" for "Islamic" and the result would be the same: "An Islamic theologian is by definition someone who has already determined which religious claims have merit. That is why they present a case for Islam without doubting their own beliefs, because they have already reached a conclusion."

And this would not prevent the Islamic theologian from providing a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

Considering the incompatibility between Catholicism and Islam, the relevant question then is whether the norms of theology enable us to distinguish which religious claims have merit and are worthy of our assent. The "us" could be anyone — Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, atheist, "undecided" — who wants to apply the norms of theology to do this.

First I would ask, "How would they do this? How would they determine which religious claims have merit?" By assessing the arguments of Catholics and Muslims, or else by simply studying the content of the religions themselves. So what is the way by which they come to determine which religious claims have merit? It is by the arguments of Catholics and Muslims that they come to determine this. What other possible answer is there? And if it is precisely by way of these arguments that they determine which religious claims are true, how can we not say that the arguments have provided a way to determining which religious claims are true?

Second, I don't think anyone who is not to some extent undecided would inquire into this question. It is only the religious person who has doubts about their religion that will inquire, and thus it is still only an undecided person who will inquire.

Why would they want to do this? Presumably because they care whether their religious beliefs are true, and the presence of incompatible religious beliefs is enough to make them at least consider the issue.

There are many people--Muslim and Catholic--who are confident enough in their religious claims that they do not have the indecision and doubt necessary to inquire. This in no way invalidates the arguments they put forward in favor of their tradition. They are still providing a way for others to determine which religious claims have merit.

Given your description, the norm in theology is to evaluate claims in accordance with the traditions, scriptures, and councils of one's own religion.

The theologian has already come to the belief that his religion is true. There is no need for him to revisit that question.

Why do you think he is required to doubt his own beliefs in order to provide others with a way to determine which religious claims have merit!?

The theologian is thus tasked with defending his own dogmas, first by arguments appealing to the divine and second by arguments that draw on philosophy, science, or history for support.

No, his task in the case we are talking about is to provide others with a way to determine which religious claims have merit. As a Catholic believer, he will naturally do this from a Catholic vantage point.

In doing this, he presents a case for our consideration, something we can adjudicate on. However, as noted earlier (1), the theologian does so in a purely ministerial manner, meaning that he is focused on defending, not critically examining, his theological commitments.

So what? So what if he doesn't doubt his own beliefs? Why does this invalidate the arguments he puts forward?

If his case is undermined, or inquiry reveals that some crucial aspect of his theology is untenable or false (e.g., certain "revealed premises" are cast into doubt), the norm, as you have portrayed it, is for him to exercise faith so as to avoid having to reconsider those commitments.

I think a basic error you're making is that you're failing to understand the single direction of argument needed to resolve the issue. "Does theology provide..." It is unidirectional. "Does theology provide people with X." To answer the question we need only look at whether theology gives people something. We don't have to look at whether people give theology something.

The correct and obvious answer is, "Yes, theology does provide people with a way to determine which religious claims are true." The nonsensical answer you continue to give is, "No, theology doesn't provide people with a way to determine which religious claims are true because it isn't open to the arguments that it is presented with in return." The question of whether theology provides has nothing at all to do with the question of whether theology receives. If we are asking whether I provide you with food and I hold out an apple to you, the answer is, "Yes." It doesn't matter whether or not I am open to accepting the banana you offer in return. Whether or not I accept the banana, I have provided you with food.

But it must do so if it to detect and remedy errors in those beliefs and thereby make progress in understanding.

But the question has nothing to do with theology's own progress in understanding itself. It has to do with whether theology provides something. I offered to entertain these other questions of yours here, but you haven't yet taken me up on that offer. E.g.:

Is this what you want to talk about? How a person of religion X could convert a person of religion Y and vice versa? Or do you want to talk about why Christians are not beholden to your so-called "norms of rational discourse"?

We seem to be going on something like this:

Arch: Theology doesn't provide a way to determine which religious claims are true.
Zip: Sure it does; there are multiple disciplines devoted to providing arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity.
Arch: Islamic theologians also provide arguments in favor of Islam.
Zip: Then I would say that both Islamic and Catholic theologians provide a way to determine which religious claims are true.
Arch: But we need a way to determine whether Catholicism or Islam is true.
Zip: The way is simply natural reason. We look at the arguments and evidence and draw a conclusion.​

 

[Archaeopteryx]

First I would ask, "How would they do this? How would they determine which religious claims have merit?" By assessing the arguments of Catholics and Muslims, or else by simply studying the content of the religions themselves. So what is the way by which they come to determine which religious claims have merit? It is by the arguments of Catholics and Muslims that they come to determine this. What other possible answer is there? And if it is precisely by way of these arguments that they determine which religious claims are true, how can we not say that the arguments have provided a way to determining which religious claims are true?

Again, I never denied that Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and other religious persons are capable of presenting arguments. That simply isn't the issue under consideration. The question is, and always was, about whether the norms of theology — a discipline you insist on calling a "science" — enables us to distinguish which of these cases is the strongest and therefore which religious claims are most worthy of belief. The issue is, and always was, focused on the theologian. That's why, in my first post, I said:

... This would not be so problematic were it not for the fact that there is little agreement on the methods and results needed to resolve this and thereby move towards a consensus on the fundamental questions theology purports to address, such as how one establishes which of these so-called "revealed premises" are genuinely divine in origin.

I was talking about the norms of theology.

Second, I don't think anyone who is not to some extent undecided would inquire into this question. It is only the religious person who has doubts about their religion that will inquire, and thus it is still only an undecided person who will inquire.

And what might prompt the religious person to have doubts about their religion? The presence of incompatible religious claims asserted with the same conviction. This gives them pause, and it should give them pause (1), and compels them to inquire. From that point, the question would be whether they can apply the norms of the so-called "science" of theology to assess the merits of religious claims and thereby resolve the problem. If they approach the problem as a theologian would, they would only end up defending their own dogmas, rather than critically examining them. They would only inquire to the extent that they are able to find something, anything, that they can use to assuage their religious doubts. If they take the theologian's approach, then they exercise faith and continue believing regardless of whatever their inquiry may reveal about their religion, rejecting any line of criticism that threatens dogma. That's the theologian's approach, as you have depicted it, and it clearly does not give us a way of advancing our understanding.

The theologian has already come to the belief that his religion is true. There is no need for him to revisit that question.

Why not? The presence of incompatible religious claims that are asserted with the same conviction would seem to be reason enough to revisit the question. The presence of a multitude of other theologies, each treated with the same reverence by other religions, would seem reason enough to continue addressing it. The desire to advance understanding in theology would be yet another. The desire to be considered a serious discipline, one worthy of being called a "science"?

So what? So what if he doesn't doubt his own beliefs? Why does this invalidate the arguments he puts forward?

But I never said anything about the arguments. In fact, I noted that that is not the point at issue.

I think a basic error you're making is that you're failing to understand the single direction of argument needed to resolve the issue. "Does theology provide..." It is unidirectional. "Does theology provide people with X." To answer the question we need only look at whether theology gives people something. We don't have to look at whether people give theology something.

The correct and obvious answer is, "Yes, theology does provide people with a way to determine which religious claims are true." The nonsensical answer you continue to give is, "No, theology doesn't provide people with a way to determine which religious claims are true because it isn't open to the arguments that it is presented with in return." The question of whether theology provides has nothing at all to do with the question of whether theology receives. If we are asking whether I provide you with food and I hold out an apple to you, the answer is, "Yes." It doesn't matter whether or not I am open to accepting the banana you offer in return. Whether or not I accept the banana, I have provided you with food.

A more apt analogy: does theology provide people with answers to questions X and Y? Yes, it provides multitudes of diverse and incompatible answers on those questions? Does it provide people with the means of determining which of those answers is actually correct? So long as they are approaching the issue as a theologian would (i.e., someone applying the norms of theology to the question), it seems that the answer is no. Why? For the reasons given above.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Earlier, you claimed that theology was more rigorous than science in resolving disputes. I'm not sure how it is possible to be rigorous in science without questioning, being skeptical, and inquiring. You've fostered the distinct impression that this is not the norm in theology; yet we are still supposed to think of the discipline as a rigorous "science" capable of advancing our understanding on important questions. Ascribing rigour to it — greater than that found in science even — is presumably meant to inspire our respect and encourage us to take theology seriously. But absent any real sign of rigour, it seems that the only reason we have to take it seriously is because it inspires people to do things they otherwise would not (e.g., decline medical care in the futile hope of a miracle) and propose policies that lead to actual harm (e.g., defunding Planned Parenthood).

 

[zippy2006]

Having already given you an opportunity to officially change the subject, I will stick close to the question we have been examining. The claim we are discussing comes from your own post, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." The "theology" in question comes from my OP, and is Catholic theology, the Church.

Again, I never denied that Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and other religious persons are capable of presenting arguments in support of their religion.

And if a Catholic presents you with an argument for Catholicism over and against other religions, have they "Provided us with a way of determining which religious claims have merit"? Yes or no?

That simply isn't the issue under consideration. The question is, and always was, about whether the norms of theology — a discipline you insist on calling a "science" — enables us to distinguish which of these cases is the strongest and therefore which religious claims are most worthy of belief.

Catholic theology does so by presenting arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. We are "allowed" to distinguish by means of the arguments it presents us with.

The issue is, and always was, focused on the theologian.

The issue is whether the theologian can provide something, namely a way to determine which religious claims are true.

And what might prompt the religious person to have doubts about their religion? The presence of incompatible religious claims asserted with the same conviction. This gives them pause, and it should give them pause (1), and compels them to inquire. From that point, the question would be whether they can apply the norms of the so-called "science" of theology to assess the merits of religious claims and thereby resolve the problem. If they approach the problem as a theologian would, they would only end up defending their own dogmas, rather than critically examining them.

Is a defense of Christianity a "way to determine which religious claims have merit"? Yes or no?

They would only inquire to the extent that they are able to find something, anything, that they can use to assuage their religious doubts. If they take the theologian's approach, then they exercise faith and continue believing regardless of whatever their inquiry may reveal about their religion, rejecting any line of criticism that threatens dogma. That's the theologian's approach, as you have depicted it, and it clearly does not give us a way of advancing our understanding.

In order to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit," does a theologian need to advance his understanding? Yes or no?

So what? So what if he doesn't doubt his own beliefs? Why does this invalidate the arguments he puts forward?

But I never said anything about the arguments. In fact, I noted that that is not the point at issue.

Then what impact does the theologian's doubt of his own position have on the question at hand? In order to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit," does a theologian need to doubt his own beliefs? Yes or no?

A more apt analogy: does theology provide people with answers to questions X and Y? Yes, it provides multitudes of diverse and incompatible answers on those questions?

Catholic theology, which I am defending, does not provide incompatible answers.

The fact stands: we are trying to determine whether theology provides something, not whether theology receives something. In this is the vast majority of your error.

Does it provide people with the means of determining which of those answers is actually correct?

Yes, of course. It offers arguments from natural reason in favor of certain answers. My answer also addresses the meta-analysis.

So long as they are approaching the issue as a theologian would (i.e., someone applying the norms of theology to the question), it seems that the answer is no. Why? For the reasons given above.

Except you don't give any reasons above. Nothing you say above undermines the fact that the theologian "provides a way to determine which religious claims are true."

Earlier, you claimed that theology was more rigorous than science in resolving disputes. I'm not sure how it is possible to be rigorous in science without questioning, being skeptical, and inquiring. You've fostered the distinct impression that this is not the norm in theology; yet we are still supposed to think of the discipline as a rigorous "science" capable of advancing our understanding on important questions. Ascribing rigour to it — greater than that found in science even — is presumably meant to inspire our respect and encourage us to take theology seriously. But absent any real sign of rigour, it seems that the only reason we have to take it seriously is because it inspires people to do things they otherwise would not (e.g., decline medical care in the futile hope of a miracle) and propose policies that lead to actual harm (e.g., defunding Planned Parenthood).

Is this what you want to talk about? How a person of religion X could convert a person of religion Y and vice versa? Or do you want to talk about why Christians are not beholden to your so-called "norms of rational discourse"?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Having already given you an opportunity to officially change the subject, I will stick close to the question we have been examining. The claim we are discussing comes from your own post, "Theology doesn't give us a way of [determining which religious claims have merit]." The "theology" in question comes from my OP, and is Catholic theology, the Church.

Actually, as I noted earlier, I see no reason to privilege Catholicism or Catholic theology in this discussion. I have always been talking about theology generally, with Catholic theology being used only as an example.

And if a Catholic presents you with an argument for Catholicism over and against other religions, have they "Provided us with a way of determining which religious claims have merit"? Yes or no?

They've provided me with a case to consider. I never denied this.

Catholic theology does so by presenting arguments from natural reason in favor of Christianity. We are "allowed" to distinguish by means of the arguments it presents us with.

Again, I never denied that it presents arguments. That simply isn't the point at issue.

Is a defense of Christianity a "way to determine which religious claims have merit"? Yes or no?

How does one evaluate that case according to the norms of theology? That's the issue. I addressed your depiction of those norms here.

Then what impact does the theologian's doubt of his own position have on the question at hand? In order to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit," does a theologian need to doubt his own beliefs? Yes or no?

Yes, of course he does. His own claims may not have merit. How else is he to figure out whether they do except by examining his own beliefs?

Catholic theology, which I am defending, does not provide incompatible answers.

The fact stands: we are trying to determine whether theology provides something, not whether theology receives something. In this is the vast majority of your error.

And we are focused on whether it provides a means to do something with the diverse array of cases it presents; namely, whether it provides a means of distinguishing them on their merits. You are focused on whether it is able to provide a case. Sure it is. It provides many such cases, which is precisely the issue: we have a multitude of cases and now we need to figure out which is the strongest. If we apply the norms of the discipline, can we do this? Based on your description of how the discipline operates, it seems not.

Yes, of course. It offers arguments from natural reason in favor of certain answers.

Yet you've fostered the distinct impression that the norm in theology is to use "natural reason" in a ministerial manner, never reconsidering the dogmas one is committed to, even if inquiry reveals that they are untenable. So "natural reason" appears to be no help because, to the theologian, "natural reason" must always remain subservient to faith.