Theology and Falsifiability

[zippy2006]

Actually, as I noted earlier, I see no reason to privilege Catholicism or Catholic theology in this discussion. I have always been talking about theology generally, with Catholic theology being used only as an example.

Well I am a Catholic, so I will argue from the Catholic perspective.

They've provided me with a case to consider. I never denied this.

Okay good, then it seems the question is answered.

Again, I never denied that it presents arguments. That simply isn't the point at issue.

Assuming the arguments are a "way to determine which religious claims have merit," it is precisely the issue.

How does one evaluate that case according to the norms of theology? That's the issue. I addressed your depiction of those norms here.

The norm under consideration is nothing other than natural reason.

Then what impact does the theologian's doubt of his own position have on the question at hand? In order to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit," does a theologian need to doubt his own beliefs? Yes or no?

Yes, of course he does. His own claims may not have merit. How else is he to figure out whether they do except by examining his own beliefs?

I admit that he needs to submit his argument to scrutiny before making the argument, but we are talking about whether he must doubt his beliefs.

Suppose there are two theologians. One doubts his beliefs and one does not. They both provide you with the exact same argument. Apparently you are claiming that only one of them provided you with a "way to determine which religious claims have merit." But this begs the question: what is the difference? All you can see are two identical arguments.

And we are focused on whether it provides a means to do something with the diverse array of cases it presents; namely, whether it provides a means of distinguishing them on their merits. You are focused on whether it is able to provide a case. Sure it is. It provides many such cases, which is precisely the issue: we have a multitude of cases and now we need to figure out which is the strongest. If we apply the norms of the discipline, can we do this? Based on your description of how the discipline operates, it seems not.

If there are a multitude of cases then the person being presented with the arguments must examine them all and choose the strongest. There is no reason why the theologian would not be willing to provide additional arguments in favor of his own case, nor is there any reason to claim that he has not provided a "way of determining which religious claims have merit."

Yet you've fostered the distinct impression that the norm in theology is to use "natural reason" in a ministerial manner, never reconsidering the dogmas one is committed to, even if inquiry reveals that they are untenable. So "natural reason" appears to be no help because, to the theologian, "natural reason" must always remain subservient to faith.

Again, there is no reason to believe that the theologian must doubt his own beliefs, or reconsider his own dogmas, in order to provide a "way of determining which religious claims have merit."

From my point of view even a single argument constitutes a "way to determine which religious claims have merit." What are you envisioning here? An ongoing dialogue between religions? A methodology for resolving religious disputes? What exactly is the problem theology is presented with?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I admit that he needs to submit his argument to scrutiny before making the argument, but we are talking about whether he must doubt his beliefs.

Suppose there are two theologians. One doubts his beliefs and one does not. They both provide you with the exact same argument. Apparently you are claiming that only one of them provided you with a "way to determine which religious claims have merit." But this begs the question: what is the difference? All you can see are two identical arguments.

Why is he just submitting the argument to me? Why is he not submitting it for the consideration of other theologians, particularly those who disagree because they subscribe to a different theology? And how are those theologians to evaluate the argument using the norms of their discipline? Again, I'm not just talking about presenting arguments, but critically examining them with a view to improving understanding. You've insisted that theology is a "science". Yet the way it operates, by your own description, belies that assertion.

From my point of view even a single argument constitutes a "way to determine which religious claims have merit." What are you envisioning here? An ongoing dialogue between religions? A methodology for resolving religious disputes? What exactly is the problem theology is presented with?

I thought I was fairly clear in outlining the issue here.

Again, there is no reason to believe that the theologian must doubt his own beliefs, or reconsider his own dogmas, in order to provide a "way of determining which religious claims have merit."

If the goal is to improve understanding (implied by calling it a "science"), then doubt is essential. He needs to be able to reconsider and revise his commitments in light of inquiry. How else will he be able to detect and remedy errors in his understanding?

 

[zippy2006]

Why is he just submitting the argument to me?

He can submit it to anyone; it doesn't affect my point.

Again, I'm not just talking about presenting arguments, but critically examining them with a view to improving understanding.

It is not necessary for the theologian to improve his own understanding in order to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

If the goal is to improve understanding...

The goal is to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

(implied by calling it a "science"), then doubt is essential. He needs to be able to reconsider and revise his commitments in light of inquiry. How else will he be able to detect and remedy errors in his understanding?

The goal is not for the theologian to "detect and remedy errors in his understanding." The goal is for the theologian to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

If you want so badly to talk about "Why Christians are not beholden to your so-called 'norms of rational discourse'," then introduce the new subject. Don't keep up these red herrings, trying to introduce the topic through "science" or the question of whether theology provides a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

I thought I was fairly clear in outlining the issue here.

Okay:

Although considered dogma by the adherents of one religion, the "revealed premises" of theology differ greatly between religions. This would not be so problematic were it not for the fact that there is little agreement on the methods and results needed to resolve this and thereby move towards a consensus on the fundamental questions theology purports to address, such as how one establishes which of these so-called "revealed premises" are genuinely divine in origin.

From the Catholic vantage point consensus is approached through the common medium of natural reason. Arguments are made and dialogues had between different religious bodies and believers. There's nothing overly complicated about this. So again, by offering arguments theology would provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

I might say the same thing about viewpoints in science. Scientists who are proponents of Intelligent Design and scientists who are proponents of Evolution seem to be at a stalemate. "This would not be so problematic were it not for the fact that there is little agreement on the methods and results needed to resolve this and thereby move towards a consensus on the fundamental questions science purports to address, such as how one establishes which of these so-called "theories" are genuinely true." What is the answer? Argument and dialogue. It may never suffice, but it's the only option available.

More troubling, IMO, is the indifference that some show toward this issue, which should give all religionists pause. If "revealed premises" and accompanying supernatural claims can only ultimately be defended by faith (in the religious sense), then the enterprise seems unproductive as a way of improving our understanding of the world.

Why?

 

[Michael]

It is not necessary for the theologian to improve his own understanding in order to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

Ok, I'll bite. Thus far I've stayed out of theology part of this discussion, but now I'm curious how you would suggest that different theologians from different religions might determine which religious claims have merit and which don't?

 

[zippy2006]

Ok, I'll bite. Thus far I've stayed out of theology part of this discussion, but now I'm curious how you would suggest that different theologians from different religions might determine which religious claims have merit and which don't?

Concretely, it would begin with dialogues to foster understanding of the different religious practices and doctrines. After that I think attempts at reconciliation would take place, seeing whether doctrines could be reconcilied with one another. For example, Buddhism's belief about the nature and evil of suffering could perhaps be subsumed under Christianity's doctrine of the passions of the flesh and Original Sin. This stage would also lead to recognition of which doctrines are irreconcilable, at which point arguments favoring falsification of opposing doctrines and conversion would ensue. Presumably accomodations would be made for converts, allowing them to retain their distinctive practices that are not at odds with the new religion. There is precedent for this sort of thing in reconciliation of Catholics with certain Eastern Churches, as well as with Anglican Churches that sought unity with the Catholic Church.

The Second Vatican Council produced a number of documents that provide some general ideas:

• Declaration on Religious Freedom – Dignitatis humanae
• Decree on the Catholic Churches of the Eastern Rite – Orientalium Ecclesiarum
• Decree on the Mission Activity of the Church – Ad gentes
• Decree on Ecumenism – Unitatis Redintegratio
• Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions – Nostra aetate

 

[Archaeopteryx]

The goal is to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

Which results in improved understanding, does it not?

The goal is not for the theologian to "detect and remedy errors in his understanding." The goal is for the theologian to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

Those are not seperate goals. He may discover errors indicating that his religious claims lack merit.

If you want so badly to talk about "Why Christians are not beholden to your so-called 'norms of rational discourse'," then introduce the new subject. Don't keep up these red herrings, trying to introduce the topic through "science" or the question of whether theology provides a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

If you recall, you introduced the topic of "science" in your OP. You later continued to discuss theology as a discipline more rigorous than scientific disciplines. So I don't see why this is suddenly off-topic. The question of whether theology enables people to determine which religious claims have merit bears upon whether it can legitimately be called a "science," even in the broadest sense of the word.

From the Catholic vantage point consensus is approached through the common medium of natural reason. Arguments are made and dialogues had between different religious bodies and believers. There's nothing overly complicated about this. So again, by offering arguments theology would provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

Earlier, you said that the theologian works from "revealed premises," which are ascertained through the traditions, scriptures, and councils of one's own religion. (1) The theologian thus works by appealing to supernatural authority, which he believes has been handed down by God to the prophets of his religion for distribution to others in the form of scripture — the "Word of God". By virtue of dogma, he only recognises this particular line of authority as legitimate, rejecting the purported authority of other religions and dismissing the authenticity of their "revealed premises" — this leads to the issue I described earlier. (2)*

Confronted with this, the question is how is the theologian to respond; how can he successfully apply the norms of his discipline to this situation? Given your description of how theology operates, the norm is to engage in apologetics and to exercise faith — in short, to defend dogma. As I pointed out, this is consistent with the ministerial use of reason advocated by William Lane Craig and others (3), in which reason is rendered subservient to faith and any criticism fatal to dogma is dismissed as illegitimate. The norm then is to protect dogma; "natural reason" can be used to defend it, but it may never be used to criticise it. Yet openness to criticism is essential to making progress in understanding. Unless valid critiques are allowed to have some impact on the theologian's convictions, no progress can be made and the issue I described remains intractable.

* To briefly recap, the issue I raised was that all religions claim supernatural authority as the grounds for their theologies. Collectively, however, they have failed to establish that any one of them possesses such authority.

I might say the same thing about viewpoints in science. Scientists who are proponents of Intelligent Design and scientists who are proponents of Evolution seem to be at a stalemate. "This would not be so problematic were it not for the fact that there is little agreement on the methods and results needed to resolve this and thereby move towards a consensus on the fundamental questions science purports to address, such as how one establishes which of these so-called "theories" are genuinely true." What is the answer? Argument and dialogue. It may never suffice, but it's the only option available.

This is an instructive example because we do in fact know what methods and results would resolve this and thus push us toward a consensus. Young earth creationism, for example, predicts a particular pattern of empirical results in astronomy, geology, and biology. That the observations of multitudes of studies in those fields differ from those expected given the theory is enough to cast YEC into serious doubt.

The example also highlights the importance of criticism in science. Presented with two incompatible theories, each purporting to explain the same phenomenon, how are we to select between them? Do we rely on intuition — what feels most true? No, instead, each theory is subjected to criticism in the form of observation and experiment. Because the theories are distinct from one another, they also lead to different empirical expectations. When the results don't fit with what is expected given a particular theory, that theory is cast into doubt: we need to revise it or abandon it. Evolution is considered well-established as a theory of biology because it has endured this process of ongoing scrutiny and has even been improved by it (the modern synthesis). However, as scientists, we are aware that, absent proof in a mathematical sense, we cannot be absolutely certain of the theory's truth, which is why being open to criticism is essential. Further inquiry may produce discoveries that successfully challenge the theory, prompting us to reconsider it.

 

[zippy2006]

The goal is to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

Which results in improved understanding, does it not?

It may or may not, but my point is that there is no reason that it necessarily must. The theologian can provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit without increasing his own understanding.

The goal is not for the theologian to "detect and remedy errors in his understanding." The goal is for the theologian to provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

Those are not seperate goals. He may discover errors indicating that his religious claims lack merit.

But they are separate goals. "Detecting and remedying errors in one's understanding," and "providing a way to determine which religious claims have merit" are quite obviously separate goals. One can lead to another, but it doesn't need to.

Here are your two claims:

1. In order for a theologian to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit, he must be open to improving his understanding of his own religion.
2. In order for a theologian to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit, he must be open to detecting and remedying errors in his understanding.

Both are false. A theologian can present a case for why his religion is true, thus providing a way to determine which religious claims have merit, all without being open to improving his understanding of his own religion or being open to detecting and remedying errors in his understanding. Indeed, this applies to everyone. An Evolutionary scientist does not need to doubt Evolution in order to present arguments for Evolution to a YEC. One simply does not need to doubt one's own position in order to provide arguments in favor of it.

If you recall, you introduced the topic of "science" in your OP. You later continued to discuss theology as a discipline more rigorous than scientific disciplines.

I said, "[Catholic] Theology, with all of the machinery above mere academic journals, is arguably more rigorous than science in resolving disputes, not less."

So I don't see why this is suddenly off-topic.

Your claim that doubt of premises is essential to science is indeed off-topic, for there is nothing about this topic in the thread preceding your claim. Doubt of premises is not essential to science, but I am not going to entertain this new topic at this time, given our other pursuits.

From the Catholic vantage point consensus is approached through the common medium of natural reason. Arguments are made and dialogues had between different religious bodies and believers. There's nothing overly complicated about this. So again, by offering arguments theology would provide a "way to determine which religious claims have merit."

Earlier, you said that the theologian works from "revealed premises," which are ascertained through the traditions, scriptures, and councils of one's own religion. (1) The theologian thus works by appealing to supernatural authority, which he believes has been handed down by God to the prophets of his religion for distribution to others in the form of scripture — the "Word of God". By virtue of dogma, he only recognises this particular line of authority as legitimate, rejecting the purported authority of other religions and dismissing the authenticity of their "revealed premises" — this leads to the issue I described earlier. (2)*

I spoke that way when I was speaking of theology proper, such as systematic theology. Now we are talking about resolving disputed religious claims, and as I said, the theologian in this case, in order to convince non-Catholics, turns to natural reason.

Confronted with this, the question is how is the theologian to respond; how can he successfully apply the norms of his discipline to this situation? Given your description of how theology operates, the norm is to engage in apologetics and to exercise faith — in short, to defend dogma.

No. I said that the theologian provides the interested parties with arguments from natural reason in favor of his own religion.

The norm then is to protect dogma;

The norm is to convince the undecided by way of natural reason.

* To briefly recap, the issue I raised was that all religions claim supernatural authority as the grounds for their theologies.

And you are mistaken. "Faith" is a distinctively Christian concept. It is not found at all in Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, or Confucianism. It is in some ways found in Judaism and Islam, although not in the clear-cut way that Christians understand it.

Yet openness to criticism is essential to making progress in understanding. Unless valid critiques are allowed to have some impact on the theologian's convictions, no progress can be made and the issue I described remains intractable.

Again you equivocate. You suddenly change the goal from theology's readiness to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit, to "making progress in understanding," or "being open to doubt and criticism." Above and throughout the thread I thoroughly refute the claim that this is the same goal. At this point we're just going to stop pretending that you're not on the new topic I described earlier:

So what are you concerned about now? Let me try to describe your concern. You think that if religion X and religion Y both have an extra-rational means of arriving at beliefs--such as faith--then dialogue between them will be fruitless. Both will be unable to reconsider their own beliefs and will be limited to defending those beliefs, and thus the dialogue will be fruitless because it will be strictly impossible to convince either side by way of reason.
​

...this is the only possible "intractable" scenario. So how might one cross this impasse?

In general cases one would provide arguments for why the opposing doctrines are not divinely revealed. CF atheists do this all the time. Tactics could include showing the sacred writings to be self-contradictory, pointing out the possibility of psychological error in purported revelations, making historical arguments against the revelatory nature of the religion, etc. Protestant-Protestant disputes will most often focus on exegetical considerations. Disputes involving Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims will often involve historical considerations.

Given that you think dogmatic contradiction is so common, perhaps you would be willing to offer a concrete example of this occurring?

However, as scientists, we are aware that, absent proof in a mathematical sense, we cannot be absolutely certain of the theory's truth, which is why being open to criticism is essential. Further inquiry may produce discoveries that successfully challenge the theory, prompting us to reconsider it.

And this is part of the reason why Fmse is part and parcel of the modern hard sciences, as noted in my first OP.

 

[zippy2006]

Which results in improved understanding...

Obviously you have an interest in the topic of whether apologetics is "philosophical," whether it is illegitimate due to the fact that it holds beliefs that cannot be falsified by argument. But just because you have interest in this idea does not mean that it is relevant to our topic (of whether theologians can provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit). As noted earlier, the idea of providing is unidirectional. Whether the theologian provides arguments and whether he receives arguments from the opposing side are two different questions.

Instead of taking up the question about apologetics and philosophy here, I think it would fare better in a new thread.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Here are your two claims:

1. In order for a theologian to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit, he must be open to improving his understanding of his own religion.
2. In order for a theologian to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit, he must be open to detecting and remedying errors in his understanding.

Both are false. A theologian can present a case for why his religion is true, thus providing a way to determine which religious claims have merit, all without being open to improving his understanding of his own religion or being open to detecting and remedying errors in his understanding. Indeed, this applies to everyone. An Evolutionary scientist does not need to doubt Evolution in order to present arguments for Evolution to a YEC. One simply does not need to doubt one's own position in order to provide arguments in favor of it.

But that's not all that we are concerned with here, is it? It's not merely about presenting arguments, but critically examining them — a point I clarified here:

And how are those theologians to evaluate the argument using the norms of their discipline? Again, I'm not just talking about presenting arguments, but critically examining them with a view to improving understanding. You've insisted that theology is a "science". Yet the way it operates, by your own description, belies that assertion.

Anyone can "present an argument." It doesn't even need to be a valid argument. But again, I never denied this. It's necessary for us to be able to distinguish the merits of religious claims (presenting an argument is the first step!), but it's not sufficient. We still need to examine those arguments to see if they can endure scrutiny.

I said, "[Catholic] Theology, with all of the machinery above mere academic journals, is arguably more rigorous than science in resolving disputes, not less."

Yes, I know, but given what you've said since then that claim seems to be absurd.

I spoke that way when I was speaking of theology proper, such as systematic theology. Now we are talking about resolving disputed religious claims, and as I said, the theologian in this case, in order to convince non-Catholics, turns to natural reason.

No. I said that the theologian provides the interested parties with arguments from natural reason in favor of his own religion.

And he expects them to be open to be convinced by those arguments, does he not? He expects that the arguments will have some rational purchase on non-Catholics, some persuasive power. But what if they think that "natural reason" cannot legitimately be used in the critique of their [non-Catholic] theology? What if they think, like Craig and others, that "natural reason" can only ever be exercised legitimately in the service of their dogma and never as a way of undermining it? In their view, they can of course use "natural reason" to critique your theology. And they expect that criticism to be effective in challenging your theological commitments.

Again you equivocate. You suddenly change the goal from theology's readiness to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit, to "making progress in understanding," or "being open to doubt and criticism." Above and throughout the thread I thoroughly refute the claim that this is the same goal. At this point we're just going to stop pretending that you're not on the new topic I described earlier:

So what are you concerned about now? Let me try to describe your concern. You think that if religion X and religion Y both have an extra-rational means of arriving at beliefs--such as faith--then dialogue between them will be fruitless. Both will be unable to reconsider their own beliefs and will be limited to defending those beliefs, and thus the dialogue will be fruitless because it will be strictly impossible to convince either side by way of reason.
...this is the only possible "intractable" scenario. So how might one cross this impasse?

I don't see that as a "new topic" at all. It's precisely the same topic I introduced in my first post on this thread.

In general cases one would provide arguments for why the opposing doctrines are not divinely revealed. CF atheists do this all the time. Tactics could include showing the sacred writings to be self-contradictory, pointing out the possibility of psychological error in purported revelations, making historical arguments against the revelatory nature of the religion, etc. Protestant-Protestant disputes will most often focus on exegetical considerations. Disputes involving Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims will often involve historical considerations.

That's a good starting point. And again, I never denied that one could do exactly this. But the above points still weigh heavily on it, particularly on the issue of "provid[ing] arguments for why the opposing doctrines are not divinely revealed."

Given that you think dogmatic contradiction is so common, perhaps you would be willing to offer a concrete example of this occurring?

I think that could take us far away from the topic at hand and into a very specific discussion on the dogmas in question. You already feel that I've gone off-topic! However, one example would be the distinct ways in which Jesus is understood in Christianity, Mormonism, and Islam.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Obviously you have an interest in the topic of whether apologetics is "philosophical," whether it is illegitimate due to the fact that it holds beliefs that cannot be falsified by argument. But just because you have interest in this idea does not mean that it is relevant to our topic (of whether theologians can provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit). As noted earlier, the idea of providing is unidirectional. Whether the theologian provides arguments and whether he receives arguments from the opposing side are two different questions.

Instead of taking up the question about apologetics and philosophy here, I think it would fare better in a new thread.

I think I started a thread on that topic a while ago but it was closed under the General Apologetics rule. It's relevant here though, particularly in relation to the norms of theology, which bears upon whether it can be legitimately called a "science" in the broadest sense of the word.

 

[zippy2006]

But that's not all that we are concerned with here, is it? It's not merely about presenting arguments, but critically examining them — a point I clarified here:

Anyone can "present an argument." It doesn't even need to be a valid argument. But again, I never denied this. It's necessary for us to be able to distinguish the merits of religious claims (presenting an argument is the first step!), but it's not sufficient. We still need to examine those arguments to see if they can endure scrutiny.

Presenting an argument is "providing a way to determine which religious claims have merit," is it not?

And my answer applies at each level. After three levels of debate and dialogue, you seem to want to rephrase the question, "Does theology provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit?" There is no reason to doubt that theology, taking into account all that has happened during the three levels of debate, is willing to provide yet another argument in order to determine which religious claims have merit." Your basic response has been, "What if not everything is resolved after the first argument?" My answer is twofold: 1) this does not mean that the first argument did not constitute a way to determine which religious claims have merit, and 2) the same method I already gave would inevitably be repeated, further confirming the theologians ability to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

Yes, I know, but given what you've said since then that claim seems to be absurd.

That's only because you conflate theology (of all religions) with Catholic theology, the obvious context of my comment.

And he expects them to be open to be convinced by those arguments, does he not? He expects that the arguments will have some rational purchase on non-Catholics, some persuasive power. But what if they think that "natural reason" cannot legitimately be used in the critique of their [non-Catholic] theology? What if they think, like Craig and others, that "natural reason" can only ever be exercised legitimately in the service of their dogma and never as a way of undermining it? In their view, they can of course use "natural reason" to critique your theology. And they expect that criticism to be effective in challenging your theological commitments.

First, regardless of the response, it is true that the theologian has provided a way to determine which religious claims have merit. If this is not true then explain exactly why it is not true.

Second, the theologian is rationally obliged to respond to a rational objection to their creed. Contrary to your assertions and your quotations of Craig, that is precisely what apologetics does. (Continual references to Craig seem pointless both because I don't take him as an authority and because I believe you to be misrepresenting him) If they simply ignore an argument showing their religion to be contradictory or irrational, then they themselves are acting irrationally.

I don't see that as a "new topic" at all. It's precisely the same topic I introduced in my first post on this thread.

It is a separate question from whether theology provides a way to determine which religious claims have merit, since this could be done without entering into the limit case of dogmatic believer vs contradictory dogmatic believer.

That's a good starting point. And again, I never denied that one could do exactly this. But the above points still weigh heavily on it, particularly on the issue of "provid[ing] arguments for why the opposing doctrines are not divinely revealed."

So there is no reason to believe that the impasse is intractable, and even if there are intractable cases, what follows?

I think that could take us far away from the topic at hand and into a very specific discussion on the dogmas in question. You already feel that I've gone off-topic! However, one example would be the distinct ways in which Jesus is understood in Christianity, Mormonism, and Islam.

What are the distinct ways and how are they contradictory?

I think I started a thread on that topic a while ago but it was closed under the General Apologetics rule. It's relevant here though, particularly in relation to the norms of theology, which bears upon whether it can be legitimately called a "science" in the broadest sense of the word.

It is related albeit separate. The General Apologetics rule does not apply to the GA forum.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Presenting an argument is "providing a way to determine which religious claims have merit," is it not?

And my answer applies at each level. After three levels of debate and dialogue, you seem to want to rephrase the question, "Does theology provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit?" There is no reason to doubt that theology, taking into account all that has happened during the three levels of debate, is willing to provide yet another argument in order to determine which religious claims have merit." Your basic response has been, "What if not everything is resolved after the first argument?" My answer is twofold: 1) this does not mean that the first argument did not constitute a way to determine which religious claims have merit, and 2) the same method I already gave would inevitably be repeated, further confirming the theologians ability to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

First, regardless of the response, it is true that the theologian has provided a way to determine which religious claims have merit. If this is not true then explain exactly why it is not true.

The method of presenting arguments? As noted, presenting an argument is necessary, but not sufficient, to establishing whether a religious claim has merit. The argument may fail to establish what it purports to establish. The next argument may likewise fail, and so on. But we don't know whether the argument is sound unless we examine it critically — critical examination of the arguments given is essential to determining whether religious claims have merit. Without it, we merely have arguments of uncertain significance: we don't know whether they support the claims they purport to.

Second, the theologian is rationally obliged to respond to a rational objection to their creed. Contrary to your assertions and your quotations of Craig, that is precisely what apologetics does. (Continual references to Craig seem pointless both because I don't take him as an authority and because I believe you to be misrepresenting him) If they simply ignore an argument showing their religion to be contradictory or irrational, then they themselves are acting irrationally.

How am I misrepresenting Craig? I've quoted him directly. What he is proposing seems to be the norm in theology, and it's consistent with how you've presented the discipline here, particularly in relation to its apologetic motivations.

So there is no reason to believe that the impasse is intractable, and even if there are intractable cases, what follows?

I gave you a reason to think it intractable: the dogmatism of theologians. Unless it is overcome, progress cannot be made.

What are the distinct ways and how are they contradictory?

Is Jesus God Incarnate, the Son, part of the Trinity, as Catholics believe; or he is a prophet of God, as in Islam?

 

[Michael]

Concretely, it would begin with dialogues to foster understanding of the different religious practices and doctrines. After that I think attempts at reconciliation would take place, seeing whether doctrines could be reconcilied with one another.

How about giving me an example as to how we might theologically decide if "young earth creationism" is a valid theological position? Frankly that's been a pretty tough nut to crack in my experience. That seems like a good place to start because the variation within Christianity itself is tough enough without considering the variation in different religions.

I'd fancy a guess that you could start to reconcile them all by beginning with unconditional love, forgiveness of sin, and selfless service to others as the starting point.

 

[zippy2006]

The method of presenting arguments? As noted, presenting an argument is necessary, but not sufficient, to establishing whether a religious claim has merit. The argument may fail to establish what it purports to establish. The next argument may likewise fail, and so on. But we don't know whether the argument is sound unless we examine it critically — critical examination of the arguments given is essential to determining whether religious claims have merit. Without it, we merely have arguments of uncertain significance: we don't know whether they support the claims they purport to.

1. Our goal is not for the theologian to establish whether a religious claim has merit, it is for him to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.
2. Whether the argument is thought to be sound or unsound does not affect its role as a "way to determine which religious claims have merit." People can argue for all eternity about the soundness or unsoundness of particular arguments. Regardless of what any particular individual concludes, the theologian has provided a way to determine which religious claims have merit. Some will find the way sufficient, some will find it insufficient, but it is a way.
3. Critical examination is incumbent primarily upon those who receive the arguments.

To claim that the "way" given by the theologian must infallibly establish the conclusion to all hearers of the argument is unrealistic.

How am I misrepresenting Craig? I've quoted him directly. What he is proposing seems to be the norm in theology, and it's consistent with how you've presented the discipline here, particularly in relation to its apologetic motivations.

You claim that when natural reason is directed against faith it can simply be discounted since it does not fall within the purview of the "ministerial" use of reason. But that's false. The role of the apologist is to answer objections from natural reason leveled against faith.

I gave you a reason to think it intractable: the dogmatism of theologians. Unless it is overcome, progress cannot be made.

And I gave you a way to overcome the impasse. Define "progress."

Is Jesus God Incarnate, the Son, part of the Trinity, as Catholics believe; or he is a prophet of God, as in Islam?

Or is he both? Like all dogmatic disputes, it cannot be settled directly. This is because there is no argument from natural reason able to attain to the heights of revelation. To settle such a dispute one would have to convince the person of the opposing religion to convert to one's own religion. The arguments needed for such a task would be many and varied, and would depend strongly on the individual cases of persons involved.

 

[zippy2006]

How about giving me an example as to how we might theologically decide if "young earth creationism" is a valid theological position? Frankly that's been a pretty tough nut to crack in my experience. That seems like a good place to start because the variation within Christianity itself is tough enough without considering the variation in different religions.

I think the place to start with that issue is exegesis. What does the Bible say, what does the Bible mean, what did the Church Fathers say, etc. I'm afraid I'm not familiar enough with that controversy to give much detail. Fortunately I think it is a difference of opinion which most Christians consider to be minor. For example, in Catholicism there is no dogmatic position on that issue.

I'd fancy a guess that you could start to reconcile them all by beginning with unconditional love, forgiveness of sin, and selfless service to others as the starting point.

It would definitely be a good place to start.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

1. Our goal is not for the theologian to establish whether a religious claim has merit, it is for him to provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.
2. Whether the argument is thought to be sound or unsound does not affect its role as a "way to determine which religious claims have merit." People can argue for all eternity about the soundness or unsoundness of particular arguments. Regardless of what any particular individual concludes, the theologian has provided a way to determine which religious claims have merit. Some will find the way sufficient, some will find it insufficient, but it is a way.
3. Critical examination is incumbent primarily upon those who receive the arguments.

To claim that the "way" given by the theologian must infallibly establish the conclusion to all hearers of the argument is unrealistic.

But I'm not suggesting that it must "infallibly establish the conclusion to all hearers." I'm pointing out that merely presenting an argument establishes nothing.

You claim that when natural reason is directed against faith it can simply be discounted since it does not fall within the purview of the "ministerial" use of reason. But that's false. The role of the apologist is to answer objections from natural reason leveled against faith.

I never denied that answering objections was part of the apologist's role. The relevant issue here is whether what is revealed through inquiry (in this case, presenting and responding to arguments) is allowed to have an impact on the convictions of those participating in the discourse. (I've given a more detailed response here.)

I'd still like to know why (or how) you think I'm misrepresenting Craig. You may not regard him as an authority, but he is one of the most renowned apologists around today, so clearly many of your fellow Christians are interested in what he has to say.

And I gave you a way to overcome the impasse. Define "progress."

What way did you give for overcoming the dogmatism of theologians?

Or is he both? Like all dogmatic disputes, it cannot be settled directly. This is because there is no argument from natural reason able to attain to the heights of revelation.

What revelation? The "revealed premises" of Christianity or the "revealed premises" of Islam?

 

[zippy2006]

But I'm not suggesting that it must "infallibly establish the conclusion to all hearers." I'm pointing out that merely presenting an argument establishes nothing.

Then what is the middle ground between the two? As I noted earlier, there are many book-length apologetic resources. Something like this would seem to be the middle ground, and would seem to satisfy the requirement that the theologian provide a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

My claim is that theologians are willing to engage in argument based on natural reason in favor of their own religious convictions, and that these arguments can provide undecided persons with a way to determine which religious claims have merit.

Apparently you don't disagree with that. Your claim is that it is either hard or impossible to breach the large gap between different religions, especially on account of their opposing dogmas. That's fine, I don't disagree.

I never denied that answering objections was part of the apologist's role. The relevant issue here is whether what is revealed through inquiry (in this case, presenting and responding to arguments) is allowed to have an impact on the convictions of those participating in the discourse. (I've given a more detailed response here.)

Okay.

I'd still like to know why (or how) you think I'm misrepresenting Craig.

There is nothing other than what I already noted, which you responded to.

I tend to disagree with Craig's account of the "ministerial" use of reason. Reason is not divided into ministerial and magisterial. The reason we do not doubt matters of faith is because it would be irrational to doubt what God has revealed. Reason cannot prove or disprove articles of faith, and articles of faith are not held because they are directly seen to be rational, rather they are held because God proposes them to us as true.

What way did you give for overcoming the dogmatism of theologians?

I noted that one must take the route of arguing that a particular proposition is not in fact divinely revealed. I also asked a question that you did not answer: what negative consequence follows if there is an instance of intractability?

What revelation? The "revealed premises" of Christianity or the "revealed premises" of Islam?

Potentially both, although it is doubtful that Islam considers Jesus' non-divinity as a revealed premise.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

There is nothing other than what I already noted, which you responded to.

I tend to disagree with Craig's account of the "ministerial" use of reason. Reason is not divided into ministerial and magisterial. The reason we do not doubt matters of faith is because it would be irrational to doubt what God has revealed.

But would it be irrational to doubt that such propositions were revealed by a god? Apparently not, seeing as that is the approach you would take in attempting to overcome the dogmatism of other theologians.

I tend to disagree with Craig's account of the "ministerial" use of reason. Reason is not divided into ministerial and magisterial.

Craig appears to be describing the norm in theology. It's consistent with the way you've depicted theology here. For instance, I see little difference between his "ministerial reason" and your "natural reason". In both cases, reason is being put to the service of defending dogma, which in practice means that the apologist draws on philosophy, science, history, and other disciplines to argue for a particular theology. But "natural reason" is always, even on your account, subservient to faith. Its function is what Craig would call "ministerial".

Reason cannot prove or disprove articles of faith, and articles of faith are not held because they are directly seen to be rational, rather they are held because God proposes them to us as true.

Or is it that human beings propose them to be true, asserting that these purported "truths" were divinely revealed? Recall that a core component of the issue I raised earlier was that each religion claims to possess "truths" originating from the divine, but as variant put it:

And there is no way to tell whether a claim of divine revelation is appropriately emanating from the God it claims to describe.

I noted that one must take the route of arguing that a particular proposition is not in fact divinely revealed.

How does one go about arguing that?

I also asked a question that you did not answer: what negative consequence follows if there is an instance of intractability?

As I see it, this:

If "revealed premises" and accompanying supernatural claims can only ultimately be defended by faith (in the religious sense), then the enterprise seems unproductive as a way of improving our understanding of the world.

In the context of you calling a theology a "science", my focus has been on whether the norms of the discipline actually enable us to acquire knowledge. In any discipline legitimately called a "science", criticism is integral to that process because it exposes errors in understanding, allowing misconceptions to be corrected and knowledge to grow. Criticism requires questioning and doubt and can take many forms (e.g., empirical observation provides the strongest critique of YEC). But if criticism is not allowed to have any effect on the convictions of those participating in the discourse, then that intractability becomes an obstacle to progress.

 

[zippy2006]

But would it be irrational to doubt that such propositions were revealed by a god?

It would be irrational to both believe something is revealed by God and to doubt it at the same time. When one has the certainty that comes from living faith, they cannot at the same time doubt what is of faith.

Apparently not, seeing as that is the approach you would take in attempting to overcome the dogmatism of other theologians.

God does not contradict himself, and thus nothing false (or contradictory) can come under faith. Therefore two contradictory propositions cannot both be legitimate revelations. Now it would be irrational to doubt something that truly comes from God, but it would not be irrational to doubt something that does not in fact come from God.

If someone holds something which is irrational, I can highlight the irrationality of the belief as a sign that it does not in fact come from God. If someone holds something which contradicts Catholic dogma, then I can use arguments in favor of my own tradition to try to show that it does not come from God. If someone holds something which is neither irrational nor contradicts my own tradition, then I would not have any reason to believe it is not in fact from God.

Craig appears to be describing the norm in theology. It's consistent with the way you've depicted theology here. For instance, I see little difference between his "ministerial reason" and your "natural reason". In both cases, reason is being put to the service of defending dogma, which in practice means that the apologist draws on philosophy, science, history, and other disciplines to argue for a particular theology. But "natural reason" is always, even on your account, subservient to faith. Its function is what Craig would call "ministerial".

Natural reason is just the kind of reasoning that all men are capable of in their natural state. When I say the theologian makes arguments from natural reason, I just mean that the premises are natural, available to all, unlike with faith.

For the Catholic there is just reason. It is not divided into ministerial and magisterial. As I said earlier, it can probe or question matters of faith, but cannot overcome them. The reason it cannot overcome them is not because we arbitrarily limit the scope of reason, but rather because it would be intrinsically irrational for reason to falsify faith. There is more certitude in divine faith than in human reason. The contrary would be as if a small child who is told something by his father determines by his own weak reasoning powers that his father is incorrect and acts accordingly.

Matters of faith are above reason, for reason cannot by its own power rise to the height of those truths revealed by faith. That said, reason can see that the mysteries of faith do not entail contradictions, and therefore can defend the mysteries from charges of contradiction.

Or is it that human beings propose them to be true, asserting that these purported "truths" were divinely revealed?

Humans can be mistaken, but God cannot. This is why Christianity has a distinctively strong tradition of revelation and faith, because the source of Christian revelation comes from God's human mouth.

How does one go about arguing that?

Tactics could include showing the sacred writings to be self-contradictory, pointing out the possibility of psychological error in purported revelations, making historical arguments against the revelatory nature of the religion, etc. Protestant-Protestant disputes will most often focus on exegetical considerations. Disputes involving Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims will often involve historical considerations.​

As I see it, this:

How would the contrary serve as a way of improving our understanding of the world?

In the context of you calling a theology a "science", my focus has been on whether the norms of the discipline actually enable us to acquire knowledge.

Whether you consider faith a kind of knowledge depends entirely on whether you are a Christian.

In any discipline legitimately called a "science", criticism is integral to that process because it exposes errors in understanding, allowing misconceptions to be corrected and knowledge to grow.

But as I have noted, criticism and correction exists in theology, just not in dogmatic matters.

Criticism requires questioning and doubt and can take many forms (e.g., empirical observation provides the strongest critique of YEC). But if criticism is not allowed to have any effect on the convictions of those participating in the discourse, then that intractability becomes an obstacle to progress.

It's not even clear that this is true. Games have rules, rivers have banks; without the rules there is no game, without the banks there is no river. Absolute criticism at all levels prevents the possibility of progress, it does not further it. In natural reason the "rules" or "banks" are things like the principle of non-contradiction and sufficient reason. The reason something is not intractable is because of these foundations held in common among the participants. The dogmas of Catholicism are just like rules or banks, providing objective boundaries of "fair play."

From my point of view there is no intractability. The first reason for this is that, "[Catholic] Theology, with all of the machinery above mere academic journals, is arguably more rigorous than science in resolving disputes, not less." Catholicism is very orderly, and there is no lack of authority to resolve disputes. Indeed the presence of a living Magisterium is a characteristic I would expect to find in something that truly comes from God. Most religions can't even definitively decide what their own doctrines are, much less determine how they relate to other religions. Catholicism does both, and I think that in itself is an argument for its veracity.

The second reason is that there is no ultimate intractability. After death comes the particular judgment, and after that the final judgment. Everything will be resolved. And things that remained intractable on earth are less problematic due to the doctrine of invincible ignorance. Someone of another religion who does the best they can with what they have been given, even if they are ultimately mistaken, can be saved.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

God does not contradict himself, and thus nothing false (or contradictory) can come under faith. Therefore two contradictory propositions cannot both be legitimate revelations. Now it would be irrational to doubt something that truly comes from God, but it would not be irrational to doubt something that does not in fact come from God.

If someone holds something which is irrational, I can highlight the irrationality of the belief as a sign that it does not in fact come from God. If someone holds something which contradicts Catholic dogma, then I can use arguments in favor of my own tradition to try to show that it does not come from God. If someone holds something which is neither irrational nor contradicts my own tradition, then I would not have any reason to believe it is not in fact from God.

That approach presupposes that the person you are trying to persuade is actually open to be convinced that their dogmas are in error, but if they are exercising faith of the kind you later describe, then your criticism, even if sound, will have no impact on their convictions.

Natural reason is just the kind of reasoning that all men are capable of in their natural state. When I say the theologian makes arguments from natural reason, I just mean that the premises are natural, available to all, unlike with faith.

For the Catholic there is just reason. It is not divided into ministerial and magisterial. As I said earlier, it can probe or question matters of faith, but cannot overcome them. The reason it cannot overcome them is not because we arbitrarily limit the scope of reason, but rather because it would be intrinsically irrational for reason to falsify faith.

It's worthwhile highlighting that what you've written in this post is in keeping with the definition of faith I gave earlier:

When we talk about 'faith' in the religious sense, we are not talking about mere confidence. We are talking about believing irrespective of how well grounded the belief is, and maintaining belief even if the preponderance of evidence stands opposed to it. This is why religious faith inexorably tends toward dogma.

For the Catholic there is just reason. It is not divided into ministerial and magisterial.

Yet the way you are describing it is practically indistinguishable from Craig's description of the magisterial and ministerial uses of reason, with the latter being the only legitimate use, according to Craig. For instance, in Craig's view, reason must remain subservient to faith. You agree:

As I said earlier, it can probe or question matters of faith, but cannot overcome them.

Matters of faith are above reason, for reason cannot by its own power rise to the height of those truths revealed by faith.

There is more certitude in divine faith than in human reason.

There is an extremely high level of confidence, but in the absence of reasons sufficient to warrant that level of confidence.

The reason it cannot overcome them is not because we arbitrarily limit the scope of reason, but rather because it would be intrinsically irrational for reason to falsify faith.

If one's theological commitments are not amenable to reason, then in what sense are they reasonable?

Humans can be mistaken, but God cannot. This is why Christianity has a distinctively strong tradition of revelation and faith, because the source of Christian revelation comes from God's human mouth.

That begs the question for theism, and Christianity specifically, doesn't it? Besides which, the fact that humans can be mistaken entails that they could also be mistaken in what they believe God to have said. So even if theism were true, the fallibility of human beings allows for distortions and misinterpretations to arise rather easily, necessitating a method for detecting and remedying errors. Based on the discussion so far, it's clear that theology offers no such method, probably because faith is the norm in the discipline.

How would the contrary serve as a way of improving our understanding of the world?

I'm not sure I follow here. What do you mean?

But as I have noted, criticism and correction exists in theology, just not in dogmatic matters.

Earlier, I asked you how you would overcome the dogmatism of other theologians to show that their dogmas were in error, and you offered some interesting suggestions. (All of your suggestions assumed an openness to criticism, in which case I refer you to the first paragraph of my response here). But now it seems that you are conceding that criticism can make no impact on dogma?

It's not even clear that this is true. Games have rules, rivers have banks; without the rules there is no game, without the banks there is no river. Absolute criticism at all levels prevents the possibility of progress, it does not further it. In natural reason the "rules" or "banks" are things like the principle of non-contradiction and sufficient reason. The reason something is not intractable is because of these foundations held in common among the participants. The dogmas of Catholicism are just like rules or banks, providing objective boundaries of "fair play."

This is a felicitous analogy, I think, because of how the apologetics game is played.

From my point of view there is no intractability. The first reason for this is that, "[Catholic] Theology, with all of the machinery above mere academic journals, is arguably more rigorous than science in resolving disputes, not less." Catholicism is very orderly, and there is no lack of authority to resolve disputes. Indeed the presence of a living Magisterium is a characteristic I would expect to find in something that truly comes from God. Most religions can't even definitively decide what their own doctrines are, much less determine how they relate to other religions. Catholicism does both, and I think that in itself is an argument for its veracity.

That something is systematic does not entail that it also produces knowledge. Millions of people are fooled by their horoscopes into thinking that something will definitely happen on this day or that because astrology is highly systematic: there are zodiac signs, celestial bodies moving through them, and various rules for determining the significance of those motions in human affairs.