The source of moral obligation

[Jeremy E Walker]

Then, if I may give back the question you asked in your last response to me: What are these moral concepts grounded in?

God's nature as the Summum Bonum.

God is essentially, good, just, kind, loving, compassionate, longsuffering etc.

His commands which constitute our obligations, are expressions of His nature as the Summum Bonum.

This view renders the Euthyphro Dilemma effete, for it shows that it is a false dilemma.

 

[Freodin]

God's nature as the Summum Bonum.

God is essentially, good, just, kind, loving, compassionate, longsuffering etc.

His commands which constitute our obligations, are expressions of His nature as the Summum Bonum.

This view renders the Euthyphro Dilemma effete, for it shows that it is a false dilemma.

That would have to result in a world quite different from the one we experience.

 

[quatona]

Such an approach would not be a moral approach at all.

Yes, it would. That it isn´t to your liking or to your satisfaction is a different matter altogether.

It would just be a rehash of Sam Harris's argument which depends on redefining what words like "good" and "bad" mean.

At the end of the day Harris is not really talking about moral values. He is just talking about what's conducive to the flourishing of sentient life on this planet. Seen in this light, his claim that science can tell us a great deal about what contributes to human flourishing is hardly controversial. Of course, it can — just as it can tell us what is conducive to the flourishing of corn or mosquitoes or bacteria. His so-called "moral landscape" picturing the highs and lows of human flourishing is not really a moral landscape at all.

On the next to last page of his book, Harris more or less admits this. For he makes the telling admission that if people such as rapists, liars, and thieves could be just as happy as good people, then his moral landscape would no longer be a moral landscape; rather it would just be a continuum of well-being, whose peaks are occupied by good and evil people alike. What is interesting about this is that earlier in the book Harris observed that about 3 million Americans are psychopathic, that is to say, they do not care about the mental states of others. On the contrary, they enjoy inflicting pain on other people.

This implies that we can conceive of a possible world in which the continuum of human well-being is not a moral landscape. The peaks of well-being could be occupied by evil people. But this entails that in the actual world the continuum of well-being and the moral landscape are not identical either. For identity is a necessary relation. There is no possible world in which some entity A is not identical to A. So if there is any possible world in which A is not identical to B, it follows that A is not in fact identical to B. Since it's possible that human well-being and moral goodness are not identical, it follows necessarily that human well-being and moral goodness are not the same, as Harris has asserted. By granting that it's possible that the continuum of well-being is not identical to the moral landscape, Harris has rendered his view logically incoherent.

Thus, Harris has failed to solve the "value problem." He has not provided any justification or explanation of why, on atheism, objective moral values would exist at all. His so-called solution is just a semantic trick of providing an arbitrary and idiosyncratic redefinition of the words "good" and "evil" in nonmoral terms.



Read more: Navigating Sam Harris’ The Moral Landscape | Reasonable Faith

Again, you tell in a long post what one short sentence of mine is supposed to say (because this would be an argument you are prepared to tackle).
If you want to discuss with Sam Harris, well, you better discuss with Sam Harris.

 

[quatona]

And the Nazis imagined and reasoned and perceived that their extermination of certain homo sapiens was good and right and that to dissent would be bad and wrong.

According to you, since they arrived at this conclusion, they had a moral obligation to exterminate the Jews.

This is my reductio ad absurdum against your view.

Showing how the result is undesirable to you doesn´t constitute a reductio ad absurdum.
I always find it funny when we are told we need a certain source of morality to find out what´s good and bad, and then the result turns out to have been the premise all along.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

That would have to result in a world quite different from the one we experience.

Why?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

God's nature as the Summum Bonum.

God is essentially, good, just, kind, loving, compassionate, longsuffering etc.

His commands which constitute our obligations, are expressions of His nature as the Summum Bonum.

This view renders the Euthyphro Dilemma effete, for it shows that it is a false dilemma.

You've just shifted the dilemma to God's nature. The same fundamental problem remains. Is it good because it is an expression of God's nature, or is it an expression of God's nature because it is good?

 

[stevevw]

I have repeatedly pointed out to you that this is a misunderstanding of ethical subjectivism. Yet you persistently repeat the same misunderstanding over and over as though no one has called you on it.

These are not my explanations these are from different sites. Can you please give me your explanation of subjective and objective morality so I can understand what you mean by this. I have seen people give different explanations even on this site.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

It would just be a rehash of Sam Harris's argument which depends on redefining what words like "good" and "bad" mean.

At the end of the day Harris is not really talking about moral values. He is just talking about what's conducive to the flourishing of sentient life on this planet. Seen in this light, his claim that science can tell us a great deal about what contributes to human flourishing is hardly controversial. Of course, it can — just as it can tell us what is conducive to the flourishing of corn or mosquitoes or bacteria. His so-called "moral landscape" picturing the highs and lows of human flourishing is not really a moral landscape at all.

On the next to last page of his book, Harris more or less admits this. For he makes the telling admission that if people such as rapists, liars, and thieves could be just as happy as good people, then his moral landscape would no longer be a moral landscape; rather it would just be a continuum of well-being, whose peaks are occupied by good and evil people alike. What is interesting about this is that earlier in the book Harris observed that about 3 million Americans are psychopathic, that is to say, they do not care about the mental states of others. On the contrary, they enjoy inflicting pain on other people.

This implies that we can conceive of a possible world in which the continuum of human well-being is not a moral landscape. The peaks of well-being could be occupied by evil people. But this entails that in the actual world the continuum of well-being and the moral landscape are not identical either. For identity is a necessary relation. There is no possible world in which some entity A is not identical to A. So if there is any possible world in which A is not identical to B, it follows that A is not in fact identical to B. Since it's possible that human well-being and moral goodness are not identical, it follows necessarily that human well-being and moral goodness are not the same, as Harris has asserted. By granting that it's possible that the continuum of well-being is not identical to the moral landscape, Harris has rendered his view logically incoherent.

Thus, Harris has failed to solve the "value problem." He has not provided any justification or explanation of why, on atheism, objective moral values would exist at all. His so-called solution is just a semantic trick of providing an arbitrary and idiosyncratic redefinition of the words "good" and "evil" in nonmoral terms.



Read more: Navigating Sam Harris’ The Moral Landscape | Reasonable Faith

It is worthwhile noting that Craig has not provided any justification for why, on his theology, objective moral values should exist either. Rather ironically, his own solution seems to exhibit a different kind of semantic trick to the one he accuses Harris of. Craig redefines the words 'good' and 'evil' in terms of the dictates of a deity. As such, 'good' merely becomes an act of unquestioning obedience. Seeing as Craig has defended the morally dubious actions of the Biblical God, including his genocidal dictates, it seems that he really shouldn't be pointing fingers at Harris.

 

[Freodin]

Why?

Because it would have to result in a world where both states - the state of "is" and the state of "ought" - are identical. Everything else would go against the same moral obligations that you said are an expression of the "highest good".

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Showing how the result is undesirable to you doesn´t constitute a reductio ad absurdum.
I always find it funny when we are told we need a certain source of morality to find out what´s good and bad, and then the result turns out to have been the premise all along.

I didn't address the reductio ad absurdum to you but to variant. So I still await his reply.

Nor am I convinced that what you are doing is anything more than giving lip service to moral relativism.

I am skeptical.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Because it would have to result in a world where both states - the state of "is" and the state of "ought" - are identical. Everything else would go against the same moral obligations that you said are an expression of the "highest good".

Why?

And I am being very sincere.

Why think that?

 

[Freodin]

Why?

And I am being very sincere.

Why think that?

I don't want to be flippant here, but to quote a well-known movie: "With great power comes great responsibility."

I thought a lot about this question - even before this discussion here - and I could fill some space with the lines of reasoning, but basically they come down to:

A world that has "moral obligations" and the option of going against these "moral obliagtions" can never be "better" than a world where these "moral obligations" are always fulfilled.
A "summum bonum" creator could not create such a world without contradicting his nature.

 

[stevevw]

double post

 

[stevevw]

Ken-1122

Stating something in an affirmative way doesn’t make it objective. in order to be objective, it must be demonstrable.

This is where I dont get it. Arent you making a statemnet that I was wrong and therefore saying you know better or you know something about what is correct and incorrect whether you are proving it or not.

You just made a case for subjective morality. If there are mitigating circumstances when morality can be breached; that is subjective. 1+1=2; there are no mitigating circumstances where it can be another number. 4 quarts equals a gallon; there are no mitigating circumstances when it does not equal a gallon, because these things are objective. Subjective means it is determined on a case by case manner.

But there can be different ways people see the moral but the moral still stays the same. So the moral doesn't become a new moral version for that person just because they have seen it in a different way. It remains the original moral with an adjustment. When people use the example of subjective morality they say things like, but look at the past they use allowed killing. But they didn't allow killing like it was OK to kill for everyone or in any circumstance. They just allowed it for that one occasion and that one situation. All the other situations in their life killing was still wrong so they still had the same basic moral belief that killing was wrong. People turn it into that they thought killing was OK for no good reason. There is always a reason whether good or bad, justified or unjustified which qualifies it.

If you use the maths example of 1 + 1= 2. If the moral was always 1+1= 2 in the basic true form of the moral as it was intended. The society or person has allowed an adjustment to the moral in that one situation so the total is still (2). The situation hasn't changed that number to 3 and made a new number for that person like a new moral. They still believe that killing is wrong or the answer is 2. Its just they have been allowed make an adjustment to the strict ruling of that moral being 1+1 and made it say 1+ .5 + .5 on that one occasion. But the moral still adds up to 2. It is still wrong to kill and no new moral has been allowed for that person or society or culture. So what happens is people use the adjustment and make that a new moral. So in reality we all see morals in their true strict form and we just make adjustments on special occasions.

But sometimes those adjustments can get out of hand. Normally the allowance or adjust has to be because of a greater moral harm that outweighs the original moral. So in the case of self defense a person will kill someone to save themselves or their family. Killing is still wrong and that person is not going to go around and say they allow killing now according to them. But sometimes people will justify untrue things or unjustified things to break a moral. This is where we have to use logic and reasoning to determine what the truth is.

But if its like some religious nutter like Charles Mason saying that He is Jesus and that his followers are to kill the Tates and its all justified in the name of God. We can check this out and see that its actually an immoral or wrong and unjustified act. But if you dont have that original moral truth and stick by it and you dont differentiate between the original moral and peoples views which are not new morals then this is when you begin to allow all sorts things. People seem to think that their view becomes a new justified moral just because they are allowed to have them when in fact its just a human opinion.

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

You've just shifted the dilemma to God's nature. The same fundamental problem remains. Is it good because it is an expression of God's nature, or is it an expression of God's nature because it is good?

Goodness is an essential property of God. God is good is another way of saying it. Holiness is an essential property of God. God is holy is another way of saying it.

So to answer your question, loving one's neighbor as you love yourself is good because it is a reflection of God's love. God is love.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Goodness is an essential property of God. God is good is another way of saying it. Holiness is an essential property of God. God is holy is another way of saying it.

So to answer your question, loving one's neighbor as you love yourself is good because it is a reflection of God's love. God is love.

You're just rephrasing the question. Is it good because it is an essential property of God, or is it an essential property of God because it is good? The question just shifts focus from God's dictates to his nature, while also raising the question of whether God can dictate his nature at will. As I recall, SisyphusRedeemed has a good video on this exact topic.

 

[Deidre32]

Why not?



This is true. People have different views about homosexuality.



Why do you say this?



You have unintentionally asked the one question that was the impetus for me starting this thread.

In your thought process, God is not an option for grounding moral values and duties and thus you rightly ask, "if not God, then where would they come from?"

The secular humanist replies by saying that man is the measure of all things. God is dead declared Nietzsche and so man leaps at the opportunity to take His place as the anchor of moral values. Man now is at the helm and determines what is morally obligatory by appealing to what he believes promotes human flourishing or something akin to that. So says the humanist. Man now is a cosmic orphan in an uncaring, indifferent, amoral universe. Thus he girds up his loins, lifts his chin up, and goes out, like a runaway teenager runs from the home of his father, with dreams and hopes of finally being free from that bondage and tyranny of absolutism. He finally feels free to command his own destiny on his own terms, without having to be subject to the dictates of authority. He has become his own authority, determining in and of himself, what is right and wrong, what is good and bad, what is meaningful and what is not.

He knows he has cut ties with the home in which he was raised and with the father who cared for him. He can never go back there now. For to do so would be to cut him where it would hurt most and he would once again have to be subject to another's dictates instead of his own.

So he presses on. Though storms loom large and foreboding on the horizon, he presses on. As the wind of desire blows him to and fro, he begins to lose his orientation and soon knows not up from down, left from right, nor how it was that he even came to be where he is at. There is no longer the solid ground beneath his feet that he once stood firmly upon and which afforded him that sense of stability and safety, but he knows he cannot go back so he tries to convince himself that he never really needed those things in the first place. That they were just childhood fancies to be laid aside when one comes to age as one lays aside their favorite lovey.

So out into the indifferent world he marches and soon encounters other runaways like himself. Those that are making use of their new found freedom to live according to their own dictates. Some decide to join him on his journey and provide him companionship and he is happy.

One day, while he is hopping and skipping along, he sees a young guy walking his way. He figures he too will be good company so he runs to greet him. To his dismay, upon coming to within arms reach of him, the man begins to beat him and strip him of his clothes. Bewildered, he exclaims: "That's wrong! You shouldn't do this!"

This remark made the man stop. He then speaks: "Surely dude, you must have forgotten where you are at. You are not at home anymore boy, you ran away remember? Just exactly who do you think you are anyway......my father?"

Even as a Christian at one point, I sort of felt that morality was subjective, in the sense that no one 'body' of people can dictate to others what morality should or shouldn't be. Morality is not a legalistic thing, but certainly the government can dictate what we can or cannot do, based on laws of the land. Secular laws. But, that begs the question...where did those laws come from? If we look back in the Bible, the ten commandments are definitely a foreshadowing if nothing else, for the secular laws we have in common today.

I'm not ready to admit that secularism has received some of its morality from the Bible, just yet.

Maybe some day. But, I happen to think that the ten commandments weren't of god, to be honest. I believe it was mankind's way of instilling order in that time period, and attaching the laws to a deity would bring greater authority over the land. This is just my opinion. I have a lot of problems with the Bible, as you know. lol

 

[Eudaimonist]

Goodness is an essential property of God. God is good is another way of saying it. Holiness is an essential property of God. God is holy is another way of saying it.

So to answer your question, loving one's neighbor as you love yourself is good because it is a reflection of God's love. God is love.

That has never made much sense to me. What does any of that have to do with human beings?

It treats goodness as something so abstract and unrelated to human nature that one becomes hard pressed to explain just what goodness even is and why it should matter to any of us.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I'm confused. You're the one who advocated morality as a system of conditionals based on our desires. Not me. I'm pointing out an example of a bad conclusion that can be drawn from the sort of morality you described.

Read, Im not convinced yet.

That isn't true. We might need a desire in order to act, but the existence of a moral fact doesn't depend on our desires. If it is true that torture is wrong, then it is wrong whether I desire to avoid torture or not.

I didnt say "we ought to do whatever we desire". What I mean is that desire and motivation bring a phenomenology of value* into the world. Like valuing food because we are hungry; but that doesnt entail we eat just any old food whenever we desire it. Desire is plastic, and so is therefore value - we can and do go wrong.

Yes, of course morality involves rational insight. I don't think anyone disputed that. But your claim was that morality was essentially a set of conditionals based on our desires (ie, "If you want to be healthy, you should exercise).

Nearly. I said health is the better option. It ought to be chosen whether we desire it or not. Desire is plastic, but our basic interests are more... basic; even if they take sophisticated culture to realise.

Clue to what I mean: scientific health care depends on a history of all kinds of manifestations of cultural life, and philosophically complex motivation etc.

The price we pay for psychological plasticity and cultural complexity is a vast flood of information and belief that is hard to make sense of. Such that we have hundreds of competing religious, ethical, metaphysical and political theories etc, which are often manifestly useless "cultural noise". But this predicament enabled science, agriculture, technology....


..and therfore scientific healthcare.

That sort of system doesn't compel us to do things that are contrary to our desires, which is an important feature of a good moral system.

Agreed, youre right, but I didnt come across clear enough I think.

*which is the basis of having conscious interests IMO

 

[Jeremy E Walker]

Even as a Christian at one point, I sort of felt that morality was subjective, in the sense that no one 'body' of people can dictate to others what morality should or shouldn't be. Morality is not a legalistic thing, but certainly the government can dictate what we can or cannot do, based on laws of the land. Secular laws. But, that begs the question...where did those laws come from? If we look back in the Bible, the ten commandments are definitely a foreshadowing if nothing else, for the secular laws we have in common today.

I'm not ready to admit that secularism has received some of its morality from the Bible, just yet.

Maybe some day. But, I happen to think that the ten commandments weren't of god, to be honest. I believe it was mankind's way of instilling order in that time period, and attaching the laws to a deity would bring greater authority over the land. This is just my opinion. I have a lot of problems with the Bible, as you know. lol

You hit the nail right on the head once again. We as humans have this, as C.S. Lewis once put it, a "queer" sense of good and bad and of right and wrong. But to what do we owe it to?

This was a clue for Lewis that our moral experience points us to a reality above and beyond the here and now.

Look at it this way....

Atheist philosopher Louise Antony remarks:

“I am more confident in my perception of objective moral values and duties than I am in the premises for any argument for nihilism.”

And I think that that is quite right. Any argument to show that these are illusory, that we don’t have them, will be less certain than your moral perceptions themselves. So it is not just an argument from outrage. It is an argument from moral experience that there are objective moral values and duties.

Think of it this way. What if I walked up to you and said Deidre, some people think that they are bodies lying in the matrix or that they are brains in a vat being stimulated to think they are living in physical world. Would this cause you to deny the existence of the physical world of objects you apprehend with your familiar five senses?

Of course not!

If the Roman Catholic church released a statement declaring that they believe priests should violate the dignity of the young boys under their care by molesting them, would the mere fact that they hold a different view than you do cause you to deny that which your moral experience tells you is an unjustifiable evil?

Of course not!

And while it is true that we cannot prove that our senses are veridical i.e. dependable in the sense that we can prove that a square has four ninety degree angles, we are justified in trusting them in the absence of some defeater.

Likewise, in the absence of some defeater, we can be confident about the conclusions drawn from moral experience.

Why not just say they are wrong and evil despite what they think?

Many deny these things because of their implications.

The one seeking truth must follow the evidence where it leads.