The Moral Argument

[anonymous person]

Well-being according to who?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Well-being according to who?

Not sure I understand what you mean.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

Well-being according to who?

Doesn't matter. It's objectively quantifiable and demonstrable, regardless of 'who'. The person who believes genocide is not harmful is as wrong as the person who thinks one is more than two, for the exact same reasons. This necessitates no appeal to 'consensus', unless you want to resort to the same brand of total subjectivity you like to accuse others of.

To the point - which you continue to dodge - nowhere in this process is it necessary or even remotely helpful to appeal to Yahweh and his purported moral commands, which again, you have no access to even if there is such thing.

 

[bhsmte]

No, you're not following. Could you please address what was actually said?

You are asking a lot.

 

[anonymous person]

Doesn't matter. It's objectively quantifiable and demonstrable, regardless of 'who'. The person who believes genocide is not harmful is as wrong as the person who thinks one is more than two, for the exact same reasons. This necessitates no appeal to 'consensus', unless you want to resort to the same brand of total subjectivity you like to accuse others of.

To the point - which you continue to dodge - nowhere in this process is it necessary or even remotely helpful to appeal to Yahweh and his purported moral commands, which again, you have no access to even if there is such thing.

You are talking about moral epistemology, not ontology.

Do you understand the difference?

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

You are talking about moral epistemology, not ontology.

I'm talking about both, actually, as both are relevant.

Do you understand the difference?

Yes. What's more, my moral philosophy has both. Yours has an incoherent mess of an ontology, and no epistemology whatsoever.

 

[anonymous person]

I'm talking about both, actually, as both are relevant.

Actually this is incorrect. The moral argument presented by myself and other Christians here does not attempt to demonstrate that belief in God's existence is necessary in order for us to know what is morally right or wrong, morally obligatory or not.

The argument attempts to demonstrate that God's existence is necessary in order to ground objective moral values and duties.

It is a matter of ontology, not epistemology.

Many atheists can and do live moral lives.

Dr. Craig states:

The claim that moral values and duties are rooted in God is a Meta-Ethical claim about Moral Ontology, not about Moral Linguistics or Epistemology. It is fundamentally a claim about the objective status of moral properties, not a claim about the meaning of moral sentences or about the justification or knowledge of moral principles.

I’m convinced that keeping the distinction between moral epistemology and moral ontology clear is the most important task in formulating and defending a moral argument for God’s existence of the type I defend. A proponent of that argument will agree quite readily (and even insist) that we do not need to know or even believe that God exists in order to discern objective moral values or to recognize our moral duties. Affirming the ontological foundations of objective moral values and duties in God similarly says nothing about how we come to know those values and duties. The theist can be genuinely open to whatever epistemological theories his secular counterpart proposes for how we come to know objective values and duties.



Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/keeping-moral-epistemology-and-moral-ontology-distinct#ixzz43gEREGRH

Yes. What's more, my moral philosophy has both. Yours has an incoherent mess of an ontology, and no epistemology whatsoever.

Yea bro, but check this out...

We are not talking about my moral philosophy.

We are talking about what you claim is the grounds for objective moral values and duties if there is no God.

Brining up what my moral philosophy is has nothing to do with the key premise you must deny, which is premise 1.

 

[anonymous person]

Well.....being

The problem with appealing to this as a grounds for objective moral values and duties is that the concept of well-being is already infused with moral quality, hence the well.

When Matt Dillahunty talks about well-being, he is not merely talking about survival, but that there is a particular way that human beings should survive. That there is a right way and a wrong way to survive and that the right way secures our well-being and that the wrong way secures our harm.

But these notions are moral notions.

Since these notions depend on and are infused with and presuppose moral value, they cannot be appealed to as a grounds for objective moral values and duties.

Who determines what well-being is anyway? Who determines what harm is? It has to be humans if there is no God. But then if this is the case, how do the subjective opinions of humans attain objective status?

 

[anonymous person]

 

[Oncedeceived]

If there is no other origin of morality but that of man himself and due to the naturalistic mechanisms from which any and all of a person's actions and thoughts arise then morality has no actual meaning other than what the individual must think or do. No act of heroism nor evil deed can be anything more than the chemical interaction within the brain. What then does moral, evil or even self sacrifice really mean?

 

[Davian]

Actually this is incorrect. The moral argument presented by myself and other Christians here does not attempt to demonstrate that belief in God's existence is necessary in order for us to know what is morally right or wrong, morally obligatory or not.

The argument attempts to demonstrate that God's existence is necessary in order to ground objective moral values and duties.

It is a matter of ontology, not epistemology.

Many atheists can and do live moral lives.

Dr. Craig states:

The claim that moral values and duties are rooted in God is a Meta-Ethical claim about Moral Ontology, not about Moral Linguistics or Epistemology. It is fundamentally a claim about the objective status of moral properties, not a claim about the meaning of moral sentences or about the justification or knowledge of moral principles.

I’m convinced that keeping the distinction between moral epistemology and moral ontology clear is the most important task in formulating and defending a moral argument for God’s existence of the type I defend. A proponent of that argument will agree quite readily (and even insist) that we do not need to know or even believe that God exists in order to discern objective moral values or to recognize our moral duties.

Have you yet to list those "objective moral values" in this thread, and how you made that determination?

Affirming the ontological foundations of objective moral values and duties in God similarly says nothing about how we come to know those values and duties.

Indeed, you have said nothing about how "we" came to know those values and duties.

The theist can be genuinely open to whatever epistemological theories his secular counterpart proposes

(my bold)

I have not seen that demonstrated in this thread.

for how we come to know objective values and duties.

What objective values and duties?

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/keeping-moral-epistemology-and-moral-ontology-distinct#ixzz43gEREGRH





Yea bro, but check this out...

We are not talking about my moral philosophy.

Is that the one that says, anything goes, as long as you believe?

We are talking about what you claim is the grounds for objective moral values and duties if there is no God.

Brining up what my moral philosophy is has nothing to do with the key premise you must deny, which is premise 1.

I don't deny it, I just don't see it as coherent, in the absence of a demonstrably "objective" moral.

 

[Davian]

If there is no other origin of morality but that of man himself and due to the naturalistic mechanisms from which any and all of a person's actions and thoughts arise then morality has no actual meaning other than what the individual must think or do.

or, what the society as a whole projects onto those actions.

No act of heroism nor evil deed can be anything more than the chemical interaction within the brain.

What else might it be?

What then does moral, evil or even self sacrifice really mean?

In general, it is about the continuation of the species.

 

[anonymous person]

Davian, if the Nazis had won the war and saw to it that everyone who disagreed with their "final solution" was done away with, so that the only people alive were those who thought the "final solution" was good and ought to have been done, would the systematic extermination of people for being what they could not help being (mentally and physically disabled, a certain ethnicity etc.) be something that was bad and ought not to be done?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Who determines what well-being is anyway? Who determines what harm is? It has to be humans if there is no God. But then if this is the case, how do the subjective opinions of humans attain objective status?

Who determines? Eight Foot already answered this: "It's objectively quantifiable and demonstrable, regardless of 'who'." That's the point.

Well.....being

The problem with appealing to this as a grounds for objective moral values and duties is that the concept of well-being is already infused with moral quality, hence the well.

When Matt Dillahunty talks about well-being, he is not merely talking about survival, but that there is a particular way that human beings should survive. That there is a right way and a wrong way to survive and that the right way secures our well-being and that the wrong way secures our harm.

But these notions are moral notions.

Since these notions depend on and are infused with and presuppose moral value, they cannot be appealed to as a grounds for objective moral values and duties.

You're putting the cart before the horse, Jeremy.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Davian, if the Nazis had won the war and saw to it that everyone who disagreed with their "final solution" was done away with, so that the only people alive were those who thought the "final solution" was good and ought to have been done, would the systematic extermination of people for being what they could not help being (mentally and physically disabled, a certain ethnicity etc.) be something that was bad and ought not to be done?

I have this question still awaiting your answer:

Alright, you want to go down this road. Fine...

Suppose that you were among the Israelites when Yahweh commanded them to slaughter every man, woman, and child, as is recounted in the Bible. Would genocide still be a bad thing to engage in, or would it be "morally commendable" as you have stated in the past?

Looking forward to your evasions, which we all know are coming...

 

[Archaeopteryx]

If there is no other origin of morality but that of man himself and due to the naturalistic mechanisms from which any and all of a person's actions and thoughts arise then morality has no actual meaning other than what the individual must think or do. No act of heroism nor evil deed can be anything more than the chemical interaction within the brain. What then does moral, evil or even self sacrifice really mean?

It means that it's real? That the actions of living beings have real consequences for other living beings?

 

[Oncedeceived]

Davian, if the Nazis had won the war and saw to it that everyone who disagreed with their "final solution" was done away with, so that the only people alive were those who thought the "final solution" was good and ought to have been done, would the systematic extermination of people for being what they could not help being (mentally and physically disabled, a certain ethnicity etc.) be something that was bad and ought not to be done?

Excellent point.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Excellent point.

Perhaps you'd like to have a go at the question Jeremy is avoiding?

 

[Oncedeceived]

It means that it's real? That the actions of living beings have real consequences for other living beings?

How does that comport to the naturalistic view that we only think and act as we are hard wired to do? We can't have free will if naturalism is true. At least that is what the majority of scientists claim.

 

[Oncedeceived]

Perhaps you'd like to have a go at the question Jeremy is avoiding?

What is that?