The Argument from Reason

[jayem]

It can certainly mimic it in this manner, but such a system would be deterministic and in toto dependant on the underlying physiology's unreasoned activity.

Of course. All cognition is dependent on brain physiology. Is this a problem?

As I explained in my initial post, it cannot establish the validity of its logic, nor is it rational.

Honestly, I don't mean to be difficult. I just want to understand the argument. What does it mean to establish the validity of its logic? Why is this important? In the practical sense, if an individual's brain is processing information in a rational manner, why isn't this enough?

And how does any of this lead to the necessity for some supernatural agency?

Thanks for your patience.

 

[zippy2006]

Thank you for posting that again. So hard to remember things from A DAY AGO! Haha. I'm not known for my impeccable memory.

Not a problem. I don't even expect you to read every post.

I wouldn't suggest that every characteristic is different from the parts that comprise it. Of course, that wouldn't preclude us from considering if our ability to reason (or be rational) is not, in fact, an emergent property of the mind.

Right, and in the post I quoted I gave some reasons to believe that a belief being the result of rational inference and a belief being the result of nonrational causes are mutually exclusive. If someone utters the phrase "It is raining outside" due to the brain damage they have received, then we have no need to look outside to verify their claim. We know it isn't a rational inference if we know it was caused by brain damage--a nonrational cause.

So we can talk about if we can be rational or not. We can also discuss the source of this rationality.

And I think that's all that is necessary to discredit Naturalism.

But even if someone were unable to properly account for our ability to reason or think rationally, that isn't then evidence of a supernatural explanation.

The same Wikipedia article goes on to give a summary of Lewis' argument for an eternal, self-existent rational being, but I did not include that argument in this thread for the purposes of brevity.

Although I don't want to get off-topic, I would say that if rationality exists and makes Naturalism untenable, then it is only logical to hold to some system which contradicts Naturalism.

And what if we determine that our reasoning is totally not rational? What then? Wouldn't the claim that we are irrational be irrational? We would then just go on living our lives under the illusion that our reasoning is rational because good luck surviving without trying to reason rationally.

That seems to be a large part of Lewis' argument: if we want to hold that our reasoning is rational we must reject Naturalism. To hold to Naturalism would be to determine that our reasoning is not rational, which is impossible.

 

[KCfromNC]

So what would be an example?

NOVA | scienceNOW | Emergence: Everyday Examples (non-Flash) | PBS

 

[KCfromNC]

Because reason is in a class by itself. If it operates in the same fashion as diseases, floods, earthquakes, etc., it is not in fact reason in the sense we know it.Every thought would then be merely an unavoidable event which cannot be true or false, the same as a flood cannot be true or false. A flood is still a flood whether its cause is natural or supernatural, but if reason is natural, it is not reason.

Argument by assertion?

I'm not really sure what you said there.

Similar point to the one quatona is making. The whole thing is a mix and match of assumptions not necessarily a part of naturalism to try and conclude the assumptions of naturalism are self-defeating. I'm just wondering if it is happening intentionally or if it is because the people who believe thoughts are magic can't get away from that assumption long enough to even to craft a hypothetical.

 

[KCfromNC]

But if it is an emergent property of irrational matter, it is still dependant on the unreasoned iterations that caused it - So quite frankly, this does not alter nor answer the Argument from Reason.

Or it shows that the premises of the argument are nonsense.

 

[KCfromNC]

It can certainly mimic it in this manner, but such a system would be deterministic and in toto dependant on the underlying physiology's unreasoned activity.

Are you implying that you can prove with 100% certainty that brains don't also have these characteristics?

 

[Gene Parmesan]

Not a problem. I don't even expect you to read every post.



Right, and in the post I quoted I gave some reasons to believe that a belief being the result of rational inference and a belief being the result of nonrational causes are mutually exclusive. If someone utters the phrase "It is raining outside" due to the brain damage they have received, then we have no need to look outside to verify their claim. We know it isn't a rational inference if we know it was caused by brain damage--a nonrational cause.



And I think that's all that is necessary to discredit Naturalism.



The same Wikipedia article goes on to give a summary of Lewis' argument for an eternal, self-existent rational being, but I did not include that argument in this thread for the purposes of brevity.

Although I don't want to get off-topic, I would say that if rationality exists and makes Naturalism untenable, then it is only logical to hold to some system which contradicts Naturalism.



That seems to be a large part of Lewis' argument: if we want to hold that our reasoning is rational we must reject Naturalism. To hold to Naturalism would be to determine that our reasoning is not rational, which is impossible.

I do find your example interesting in that to demonstrate someone who is irrational ("it's raining outside" guy) you use a guy who has damage to their brain; the thing the naturalist says is the source of reason. The example rather seems to be a case for the naturalist.

So if we can reason, and it proves to be the best method for determining reality, regardless of worldview, it seems rational to proceed to use reason. How would it not be rational, even if naturalism were true, to rely on the reasoning processes of our mind, given that they have shown themselves to be the best method for determining reality?

 

[KCfromNC]

So if our brain can reason, and it proves to be the best method for determining reality, regardless of worldview, it seems rational to proceed to use reason. How would it not be rational, even if naturalism were true, to rely on the reasoning processes of our mind, given that they have shown themselves to be the best method for determining reality?

There's an obvious conflict in this thread. One group thinks that the best way to learn stuff about reality is to make up assumptions and elaborate mental exercises based on those assumptions to end up with an answer about how reality must work. The other group looks at what actually happens in reality and tries to figure out the underlying mechanisms, even if they seem non-intuitive or disagree with "reasonable" assumptions. I think it is obvious which works better in practice, but good luck convincing the other group of that. "in practice" doesn't matter when you can put together a lot of words of a creative writing exercise to demonstrate that maybe that "in practice" is just a giant illusion we'll never find our way out of.

 

[zippy2006]

I do find your example interesting in that to demonstrate someone who is irrational ("it's raining outside" guy) you use a guy who has damage to their brain; the thing the naturalist says is the source of reason. The example rather seems to be a case for the naturalist.

I used the example to illustrate the fact that nonrational causes and rational inference are incompatible in the way spelled out in the OP. If the Naturalist thinks the brain deterministically produces beliefs in the way of a nonrational cause then the same problem presents itself. Nonrational causes coming from the brain are no more compatible with rational inference than nonrational causes coming from brain damage.

So if we can reason, and it proves to be the best method for determining reality, regardless of worldview, it seems rational to proceed to use reason. How would it not be rational, even if naturalism were true, to rely on the reasoning processes of our mind, given that they have shown themselves to be the best method for determining reality?

If Naturalism is true, then the reasoning process is just a fiction. If you believe that you can reason, and Naturalism says you can't, then you should reject Naturalism.

 

[Gene Parmesan]

I used the example to illustrate the fact that nonrational causes and rational inference are incompatible in the way spelled out in the OP. If the Naturalist thinks the brain deterministically produces beliefs in the way of a nonrational cause then the same problem presents itself. Nonrational causes coming from the brain are no more compatible with rational inference than nonrational causes coming from brain damage.



If Naturalism is true, then the reasoning process is just a fiction. If you believe that you can reason, and Naturalism says you can't, then you should reject Naturalism.

I don't currently see a way out of the circle of our discussion, so I'll take this chance to thank you for engaging with me. I appreciate it.

 

[KCfromNC]

Nonrational causes coming from the brain are no more compatible with rational inference than nonrational causes coming from brain damage.

I'm not sure why anyone would assume this.

If Naturalism is true, then the reasoning process is just a fiction.

No, it means it just doesn't involve supernatural magic. In other words, if naturalists are correct then non-naturalists are wrong. Not exactly an earth shattering revelation, but it'll do for now.

 

[zippy2006]

The problem in this thread is that no one is addressing the Original Post. To my memory the only person who has engaged the argument in the OP is quatona in post 10, but he bowed out of the conversation rather quickly.

 

[Gene Parmesan]

The problem in this thread is that no one is addressing the Original Post. To my memory the only person who has engaged the argument in the OP is quatona in post 10, but he bowed out of the conversation rather quickly.

It looks like a lot of us couldn't get beyond the first premise:
"No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes."

But my objections were in the previous posts. Just offering some perspective to why the rest of the OP was not explicitly addressed.

 

[zippy2006]

It looks like a lot of us couldn't get beyond the first premise:
"No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes."

But my objections were in the previous posts. Just offering some perspective to why the rest of the OP was not explicitly addressed.

Yes, I suppose your argument from emergence does interact with the first premise. I did grant that the first premise is central, which is why I took some time to defend it in the OP. Let's restate the first premise in the more traditional if-then format:

1. If a belief can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes, then it is not rationally inferred.​

In order to refute the premise one would have to provide an example of a belief that is both fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and is also rationally inferred.

Suppose you're an investigator and Joe just uttered a belief. You conclude that Joe's belief was fully caused by nonrational causes x, y, and z. Can you at the same time hold that his belief was rationally inferred? Isn't a cause of a rationally inferred belief the rational inference itself, along with the premises from which it was inferred and the understanding of all these elements? And aren't all these things rational rather than nonrational causes? And if some causes which explain a rationally inferred belief are themselves rational, then how can the belief be fully explained by nonrational causes?

(I don't expect you to answer these questions personally. I was just trying to set up a discussion of the first premise.)

 

[jayem]

Yes, I suppose your argument from emergence does interact with the first premise. I did grant that the first premise is central, which is why I took some time to defend it in the OP. Let's restate the first premise in the more traditional if-then format:

1. If a belief can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes, then it is not rationally inferred.​

In order to refute the premise one would have to provide an example of a belief that is both fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and is also rationally inferred.

Suppose you're an investigator and Joe just uttered a belief. You conclude that Joe's belief was fully caused by nonrational causes x, y, and z. Can you at the same time hold that his belief was rationally inferred? Isn't a cause of a rationally inferred belief the rational inference itself, along with the premises from which it was inferred and the understanding of all these elements? And aren't all these things rational rather than nonrational causes? And if some causes which explain a rationally inferred belief are themselves rational, then how can the belief be fully explained by nonrational causes?

(I don't expect you to answer these questions personally. I was just trying to set up a discussion of the first premise.)

This will help me understand: First, we'll assume Joe has a healthy brain. Do you believe that the neuronal activity in his brain is what you would consider nonrational? And if so, on what do you base that belief?

 

[zippy2006]

This will help me understand: First, we'll assume Joe has a healthy brain. Do you believe that the neuronal activity in his brain is what you would consider nonrational? And if so, on what do you base that belief?

Interestingly, Elizabeth Anscombe criticized Lewis' original use of the word "irrational" in much the same way that you did on the first page. In her criticism she said that there is a big difference between irrational causes of belief, such as wishful thinking, and nonrational causes of belief, such as neurons firing in the brain. Lewis amended his argument by using the word "nonrational" rather than "irrational." (I've found that some language groups take them to be the same thing, and some don't).

I would agree with Anscombe that a neuron firing is nonrational. Given the definition used here, neurons firing would not have reason or understanding.

It is perhaps worth noting that even if the Naturalist takes the firing of a neuron to be rational, they will take the ultimate cause of that firing to be nonrational. For example, I should think the Naturalist believes that everything which exists today in 2017 is fully caused by nonrational material events predating the dawn of humankind. Therefore the state of the world in 50,000 BC fully caused the firing of the neuron in 2017 no less than the more proximate antecedent causes.

 

[Gene Parmesan]

In order to refute the premise one would have to provide an example of a belief that is both fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and is also rationally inferred.

I don't see why we cannot rationally infer something based off of "nonrational" causes. Things are nonrational, or incapable of being rational. Humans can be "rational" or "irrational" but not "nonrational," unless maybe we are brain dead. Calling an atom or a neuron* "not rational" seems to be as useful as calling a basketball an "idiot." It's true, but trivially so. What's more, these "nonrational" elements that make up the human mind are absolutely necessary in our ability to reason. You might contest that our ability to reason can come about through natural processes, but it is a fact that our ability to reason or think rationally is impossible without certain "nonrational" things. Our ability to reason can only be understood by way of these "nonrational" elements.

But you could be correct, at least in part. We've developed a lot of irrational thought processes, thanks to the ability seeming to arise through natural processes. Those times when we are irrational seem to be expected if evolution by natural selection was true. Like our propensity to assume agency or danger where there is none. Elements of the brain that specialize in critical thinking shutting down in order to focus on an immediate threat, which happens at totally unhelpful times; like when people get worked up on the internet or over the phone (not really a concern for the majority of our lineage). Seeking immediate gratification with diminished concern for the long term. I could go on here. Our "rationality" seems to be linked to our survival (and thus heavily selected for). So we aren't totally rational, in that sense. But it is the type of "rational" we would expect to arise if it were an emergent property.

We cannot prove that naturalism is true. And I wouldn't claim that it is true. But it can be refuted by demonstrating the supernatural's role in the universe (like how the supernatural impacts our ability to reason, for example). I'm open to that, should anyone provide compelling evidence.

*You replied while I was typing this and you sort of addressed this particular example (you psychic, bro?). But if a neuron firing by your definition is rational, I think the goings-on for the entirety of the universe can fall under that definition of rational. The initial cause may still be nonrational though, but I think we'd have to push it back that far if a neuron firing does not fall under your "nonrational" causes argument.

 

[zippy2006]

I don't see why we cannot rationally infer something based off of "nonrational" causes.

In the post you responded to I gave the condition the Naturalist needs to meet in order to refute premise 1, "In order to refute the premise one would have to provide an example of a belief that is both fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and is also rationally inferred." If you've provided such an example, I missed it. What is an example of a belief that is fully explained by nonrational causes and is also rationally inferred?

Things are nonrational, or incapable of being rational. Humans can be "rational" or "irrational" but not "nonrational," unless maybe we are brain dead. Calling an atom or a neuron* "not rational" seems to be as useful as calling a basketball an "idiot." It's true, but trivially so.

Nonrational just means not rational. Humans perform nonrational acts when they blink or unconsciously scratch their beard. It may be obviously true that a neuron firing is nonrational, but how does that affect premise 1?

What's more, these "nonrational" elements that make up the human mind are absolutely necessary in our ability to reason. You might contest that our ability to reason can come about through natural processes, but it is a fact that our ability to reason or think rationally is impossible without certain "nonrational" things. Our ability to reason can only be understood by way of these "nonrational" elements.

I agree. Lewis would not say that no nonrational elements are involved in the process of reasoning. He says that if nonrational causes fully explain a belief then it is not rationally inferred. There is no doubt that we make use of the brain in the process of reasoning, but that does not mean that nonrational causes in the brain fully explain our beliefs. A key phrase in premise 1 is, "Fully explained."

But you could be correct, at least in part. We've developed a lot of irrational thought processes, thanks to the ability seeming to arise through natural processes. Those times when we are irrational seem to be expected if evolution by natural selection was true. Like our propensity to assume agency or danger where there is none. Elements of the brain that specialize in critical thinking shutting down in order to focus on an immediate threat, which happens at totally unhelpful times; like when people get worked up on the internet or over the phone (not really a concern for the majority of our lineage). Seeking immediate gratification with diminished concern for the long term. I could go on here. Our "rationality" seems to be linked to our survival (and thus heavily selected for). So we aren't totally rational, in that sense.

Those are good examples of cases where rational inference is excluded due to the presence of nonrational causes which fully explain the beliefs and behavior. For example, when someone is in an extremely panicked state we take it that their rationality is diminished to the extent that they are less responsible for their actions.

We cannot prove that naturalism is true. And I wouldn't claim that it is true.

So do you think that Lewis' argument succeeds?

But it can be refuted by demonstrating the supernatural's role in the universe (like how the supernatural impacts our ability to reason, for example). I'm open to that, should anyone provide compelling evidence.

To disprove Naturalism we could demonstrate Supernaturalism, sure. Another way to refute it is to show that it is self-refuting, as the argument in the OP does.

*You replied while I was typing this and you sort of addressed this particular example (you psychic, bro?).

Catholics receive psychic powers at confirmation.

 

[Chesterton]

NOVA | scienceNOW | Emergence: Everyday Examples (non-Flash) | PBS

That's silly. If that hodgepodge of things are what you mean by emergent then anything involving large quantity or complexity can be called emergent. I mean, chess, really?

Argument by assertion?

What part of it do you disagree with?

Similar point to the one quatona is making. The whole thing is a mix and match of assumptions not necessarily a part of naturalism to try and conclude the assumptions of naturalism are self-defeating. I'm just wondering if it is happening intentionally or if it is because the people who believe thoughts are magic can't get away from that assumption long enough to even to craft a hypothetical.

No, the whole thing is not a mix and match of assumptions, it is based on one single fact: that all matter operates only according to physical forces. That seems like something you and I could easily agree on. It's pretty much the basis of all physical sciences.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

Of course. All cognition is dependent on brain physiology. Is this a problem?

Not to me, but I am not a Naturalist. Obviously the material brain has a role in cognition.

Honestly, I don't mean to be difficult. I just want to understand the argument. What does it mean to establish the validity of its logic? Why is this important? In the practical sense, if an individual's brain is processing information in a rational manner, why isn't this enough?

And how does any of this lead to the necessity for some supernatural agency?

Thanks for your patience.

If you look at my first post, I explained what is required for something to be logical, which is seen as a prerequisite for a belief to be rational. Logical validity cannot be established for Naturalism as it cannot determine if an inference is true. Validity means that a false inference is not derived from the premise in the argument.

Now why this matters is because the grounding, the very reason given, to accept Naturalism, is its supposed logical derivation from empiric means. This leaves it inconsistent.

There is an extension of the Argument from Reason which actually is a variation of an old Scholastic argument. It says that our knowledge can be described in terms of irrational causes, yet our reason, if so described, loses all validity. Clearly though, we see our reason as being an existent property, that we reason. For if we did not, we have refuted the means by which we gained knowledge in the first place and therefore that knowledge itself. This means that our reason, if it exists, must come from outside nature - for within nature, it is refuted. This property outside nature that is its cause, must itself possess reasoning or the problem of the rational deriving from the irrational repeats itself. You see where this is going? A Reasoning Property outside of nature, denotes a Being in essence, of some sort.

This is, of course, a suppositional extension of the basic argument, but it matters a great deal if we cannot show the essential 'correctness' of the means by which we process data, by which we gain knowledge. For it strikes at the root of all human thought, if we have to admit a determined and solely physiologically-derived method is at play. The thing is, everyone here agrees that we reason, so Naturalism basically needs to show how this is logically possible based on their premises, which I have never seen a convincing argument for. If none is given, then the extension of the Argument from Reason kicks in, and I am forced to either conclude the existence of 'external Reason' or that reason is an illusion, a fraud, an artifact of determinism fully derived from previous iterations of matter, akin to a snowball rolling down a hill or water flowing from higher to lower.