The Argument from Reason

[KCfromNC]

What did I object to?

Go back and look.

Can you elaborate on why you disagree?

I already did.

I'm not sneaking it in, I've said it directly - irrationality is an inherent property of matter.

It is fine you believe this, but do all naturalists? If not, then the idea has no point in an attempt to prove the internal inconsistency of their beliefs.

 

[KCfromNC]

Secondly, if something occurs by sole action of impersonal forces

The question wasn't about impersonal forces, it was about deterministic ones.

Is a volcano reasoned? Or a rock falling off a mountainside?

Since some material interactions aren't thinking, then none of them can be? Pretty sure everyone can spot the obvious logical fallacy there :

Is a car lunchmeat? Is a boulder? Of course not, therefore lunchmeat is supernatural. Same argument as above.

 

[KCfromNC]

Petitio Principii are not logically consistent systems

Even granting your claim here is accurate, so what? They might not meet some arbitrary criteria made up by philosophers but they seem to work really well in practice. Given that, what reason do you have to assume that your criteria is the correct way to judge them?

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

It isn't that I don't understand what these things are, it is - as I and others have pointed out - the claim keeps shifting as the discussion goes on. As some times the issue is logic, at other times rationality, at others the validity of our senses, at others the causal nature of beliefs. Makes it really hard to know what the actual argument is about, and feels an awful lot like people are just throwing out stuff which feels like it needs to be magical rather than having any vigorous argument about much of anything.

They are all related concepts. For something is only rational if in accord with reason, reason is narrowly associated with logic, logic has to be valid, etc. and the validity of our senses was necessitated by those who claimed this somehow validated something.
In a discussion one needs to respond to your interlocutors or it is a lecture, not a discussion. It seems you object to this?

That's nice. What supernatural intervention is required for an inductive proof of the sum of the first n integers?

Reason - which partially has to be so derived or it doesn't exist.

Despite these theoretical objections, it works. Looks like the theory needs a bit of refinement.

Petitio Principii to assume it 'works' - please I have said this ad nauseam in this thread.

On occasion? Isn't that understating things just a bit?

Exactly - hence Naturalism needs to explain how this is possible, which it has failed miserably to do.

Oportet ministros manus lavare antequam latrinam relinquent.

Preferably. Good handwashing is integral to hygiene and stopping the spread of infections.

The question wasn't about impersonal forces, it was about deterministic ones.

Oh, so you agree there is a person behind these deterministic forces? Otherwise it does not alter what I said.

Since some material interactions aren't thinking, then none of them can be? Pretty sure everyone can spot the obvious logical fallacy there :

Is a car lunchmeat? Is a boulder? Of course not, therefore lunchmeat is supernatural. Same argument as above.

Not at all my point. They were examples of agreed unreasoned phenomena and I then explained thereafter why they would be of like kind.

Even granting your claim here is accurate, so what? They might not meet some arbitrary criteria made up by philosophers but they seem to work really well in practice. Given that, what reason do you have to assume that your criteria is the correct way to judge them?

How do they "work really well in practice"? This is a petitio principii itself, again.
Perhaps you don't know what petitio is? It is a type of begging the question.
How do I know it is erroneous? REASON.

 

[Chriliman]

No. The approach seems to be more assert a questionable premise, ignore objections to it, and then claim that no one can address it.

It could be shown impossible if the initial cause of our universe is an eternal state of being, encompassing all time/space, that created our universe for a reason. So you're actually wrong to say 'no' it can't be shown impossible.

 

[zippy2006]

I am wary to engage you because I find that whenever you lose an argument you just repudiate logic and philosophy themselves, often claiming in their stead some vague form of pragmatism (this is already happening in your exchange with Quid est Veritas). Nevertheless, I will tentatively engage what you've said:

Giving a single example where brains don't work perfectly doesn't do anything to establish your premise.

It illustrates the fact of reality that if nonrational causes fully explain some belief, then it is not also explained by rational inference. Indeed such a truth is not hard to comprehend for those who are looking.

You must have missed my response to the first post, and I have no idea what in the second post addresses the problem I raised.

The second post addresses the conflation of Lewis' argument with something like Plantinga's.

You did not reply to the relevant part of the first post, which I will quote in full:

You are claiming that the argument commits something like the fallacy of composition with respect to the set of causes and the effect. That is to say, even if no cause has property X, it does not follow that the effect of those causes does not have property X. But like the fallacy of composition, this is not universally true. For example, if I construct a wall out of bricks that are not red, I will never produce a wall that is red.

Rational inference is another case where the fallacy does not obtain. If a set of nonrational causes come together to create some belief, that belief cannot have been rationally inferred. Rational inference requires reason, understanding, and an inferred conclusion based on the laws of logic and the premises at hand. Nonrational causes preclude such things. It cannot be the case that the statement, "It is raining outside," is fully explained by brain damage and at the same time is rationally inferred by the subject.

...as to the reply you did give:

Seems obviously false to me. I believe rocks will roll downhill. The cause of that belief is explained as seeing rocks - which have no reason or understanding - rolling down hills - which also have no reason or understanding.

If seeing rocks roll down hills were causes that fully explained your belief that all rocks roll downhill, then anything which saw rocks roll down hills would hold such a belief. Yet we know this is not the case, for there is no evidence that ants, mice, and birds who see rocks roll down hills also possess the universal belief that all rocks roll downhill.

Indeed, only the most pitiable philosopher would say that no intellectual act is required to infer gravity from particular instances. Particular instances are necessary to understand gravity, but the physical sight of them is not a sufficient cause for the inference. I explained this to Gene Parmesan earlier:

I agree. Lewis would not say that no nonrational elements are involved in the process of reasoning. He says that if nonrational causes fully explain a belief then it is not rationally inferred. There is no doubt that we make use of the brain in the process of reasoning, but that does not mean that nonrational causes in the brain fully explain our beliefs. A key phrase in premise 1 is, "Fully explained."

 

[Chesterton]

Go back and look.

I can't find it.

I already did.

No you didn't.

It is fine you believe this, but do all naturalists? If not, then the idea has no point in an attempt to prove the internal inconsistency of their beliefs.

Yes, everyone believes this, except maybe people under the influence of something like LSD. Maybe they can temporarily believe matter reasons, but maybe not even then. Don't know, I'm just guessing.

 

[variant]

Even granting your claim here is accurate, so what? They might not meet some arbitrary criteria made up by philosophers but they seem to work really well in practice. Given that, what reason do you have to assume that your criteria is the correct way to judge them?

He has to assume reason to get to Petitio Principii, but that assumes that reason is more basic than observation, sensation, verification ect.

The claim seems equally valid when levied against rationalism.

Why should we assume that reason is fundamental and not simply yet another observation that we have had and description of the universe as it appears to us?

If we do not merely assume this then the argument falls apart.

 

[zippy2006]

Why should we assume that reason is fundamental and not simply yet another observation that we have had and description of the universe as it appears to us?

You are free to abandon reason and rational inference, as quatona attempted here. The result, as the OP points out, is that the belief, "Naturalism is true," can no longer be held as a valid rational inference. Abandon reason all you like; just don't go on to claim Naturalism as reasonable.

 

[variant]

You are free to abandon reason and rational inference, as quatona attempted here. The result, as the OP points out, is that the belief, "Naturalism is true," can no longer be held as a valid rational inference. Abandon reason all you like; just don't go on to claim Naturalism as reasonable.

I am not abandoning reason, I just think it is derived from describing observed consistency and living as a being in the universe.

The unstated premise of this argument is that reasoning must come before and be more fundamental than observation or interaction, and I do not think that is likely true at all.

 

[zippy2006]

I am not abandoning reason, I just think it is derived from describing observed consistency and living as a being in the universe.

The etiology of reason is of no concern here, and I explain why here. What matters is whether you believe a belief can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and still be rationally inferred.

The unstated premise of this argument is that reasoning must come before and be more fundamental than observation or interaction, and I do not think that is likely true at all.

That's not a premise of the argument at all. Reason need not be an a priori faculty for the argument to work.

 

[variant]

The etiology of reason is of no concern here, and I explain why here. What matters is whether you believe a belief can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and still be rationally inferred.

We would need to know how rationality comes to exist to believe or disbelieve anything of the sort.

Do we know any such thing?

If rationality comes to exist via mundane means then what we mean by "rational" simply goes back to wherever it started and rationality is not purely independent of other faculties.

That's not a premise of the argument at all. Reason need not be an a priori faculty for the argument to work.

If rationality comes from other properties then there is no problem subordinating it to them.

Thus rationality does not necessarily need to be justified fundamentally by rationality alone.

 

[zippy2006]

We would need to know how rationality comes to exist to believe or disbelieve anything of the sort.

I don't think we do, but if you think you can produce an account of the development of rationality which makes it possible for a belief to be fully explained by nonrational causes and also rationally inferred, you are free to present such a case. I don't think there's any doubt that you have the burden of proof.

If rationality comes to exist via mundane means then what we mean by "rational" simply goes back to wherever it started and rationality is not purely independent of other faculties.

I think our understanding of rationality is fairly clear. If you think we fundamentally misunderstand what rationality is then you are again free to make such an argument.

 

[variant]

I don't think we do, but if you think you can produce an account of the development of rationality which makes it possible for a belief to be fully explained by nonrational causes and also rationally inferred, you are free to present such a case. I don't think there's any doubt that you have the burden of proof.

I see you have no way of demonstrating how rationality comes about either yet I have to demonstrate how it works for you to be wrong?

We would have to know a bit more about how brains are made to do that.

However, simpler models can be found nearly everywhere on earth that are not capable of our type of linguistic rationality, but are capable of all sorts of other functions that are likely to be necessary before such a thing could come to exist via mundane means.

The possibility that rationality might depend on less effective precursors, does not really tell us much.

I think our understanding of rationality is fairly clear. If you think we fundamentally misunderstand what rationality is then you are again free to make such an argument.

Our understanding of rationality doesn't extend to how it comes to exist, so an argument that it can't come to exist via natural means fails out of the gate as an argument from ignorance.

An argument that rationality that came out of some precursor would be "worse" than rationality that came to us via supernatural means is an argument from wishful thinking.

 

[zippy2006]

We would have to know a bit more about how brains are made to do that.

However, simpler models can be found nearly everywhere on earth that are not capable of our type of linguistic rationality, but are capable of all sorts of other functions that are likely to be necessary before such a thing could come to exist via mundane means.

The possibility that rationality might depend on less effective precursors, does not really tell us much.

Okay.

Our understanding of rationality doesn't extend to how it comes to exist, so an argument that it can't come to exist via natural means fails out of the gate as an argument from ignorance.

But again, you're just misrepresenting the argument. It doesn't say reason can't come to exist via natural means. It says a belief that is fully explained by nonrational causes is not a rational inference. You're stuck in the Plantinga thread. What our understanding of rationality does imply is premise 1.

It isn't an argument about the past, it is about the present. It says there is a present act of rational inference that Naturalism requires; if Naturalism is true then all present acts are fully explained by nonrational causes; if a belief is fully explained by nonrational causes then it is not a rational inference; therefore Naturalism cannot support the rational inference it requires.

Premise 1 is nothing like an argument from ignorance. It is a basic premise of rational discourse, and there are no known exceptions. Every human being holds some version of premise 1, and it is not because they don't know the etiology of rationality.

An argument that rationality that came out of some precursor would be "worse" than rationality that came to us via supernatural means is an argument from wishful thinking.

This is another strawman. Try reading the OP and responding to the argument. Which premise is incorrect and why?

 

[variant]

But again, you're just misrepresenting the argument. It doesn't say reason can't come to exist via natural means. It says a belief that is fully explained by nonrational causes is not a rational inference. You're stuck in the Plantinga thread. What our understanding of rationality does imply is premise 1.

It isn't an argument about the past, it is about the present. It says there is a present act of rational inference that Naturalism requires; if Naturalism is true then all present acts are fully explained by nonrational causes; if a belief is fully explained by nonrational causes then it is not a rational inference; therefore Naturalism cannot support the rational inference it requires.

Premise 1 is nothing like an argument from ignorance. It is a basic premise of rational discourse, and there are no known exceptions. Every human being holds some version of premise 1, and it is not because they don't know the etiology of rationality.

Rationality is a process of thought. If it comes to exist via some other similar process it doesn't change.

Rationality does not need to be justified by what came before it, as it can only be justified to it's origins.

This is another strawman. Try reading the OP and responding to the argument. Which premise is incorrect and why?

Premises 1 and 2 are both unsupported.

We do not explain rational beliefs fully via non rational causes, they are explained by their own process and the processes that led up to them.

Premise two is also flawed because naturalism does not leave out rationality when explaining rational beliefs.

To support either of these premises you would have to demonstrate that neither rationality nor sufficient precursors to rationality can be found in living systems.

I think the fundamental problem you are having with naturalism and rationality is that you think that natural systems have to be foundationally irrational up to the point where they begin to be rational, which I do not think is an assumption the naturalist is bound to.

The naturalist need only think that the basic building blocks of things be physical in nature, which means that rationality is free to be a property of a any living system that develops the basics needed to support rational thought.

living systems develop all sorts of things to the naturalist, so, this odd idea of yours isn't going to work.

 

[zippy2006]

We do not explain rational beliefs fully via non rational causes, they are explained by their own process and the processes that led up to them.

Do you believe rational beliefs can in principle be fully explained by nonrational causes?

I explain what is needed to reject premise 1 here.

Premise two is also flawed because naturalism does not leave out rationality when explaining rational beliefs.

Premise 2 doesn't say Naturalism leaves out rationality when explaining rational beliefs (whatever that means). It says Naturalism believes that all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes. In order to refute premise 2 you would have to show some belief that the Naturalist believes cannot be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes.

 

[zippy2006]

It looks like a lot of us couldn't get beyond the first premise:
"No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes."

Here are two excerpts from Lewis regarding the first premise. The two systems he is talking about are cause-effect and ground-consequent (a logical relation):

But unfortunately the two systems are wholly distinct. To be caused is not to be proved. Wishful thinkings, prejudices, and the delusions of madness, are all caused, but they are ungrounded. Indeed to be caused is so different from being proved that we behave in disputation as if they were mutually exclusive. The mere existence of causes for a belief is popularly treated as raising a presumption that it is groundless, and the most popular way of discrediting a person's opinions is to explain them causally--'You say that because (Cause and Effect) you are a capitalist, or a hypochondriac, or a mere man, or only a woman'. The implication is that if causes fully account for a belief, then, since causes work inevitably, the belief would have had to arise whether it had grounds or not. We need not, it is felt, consider grounds for something which can be fully explained without them. (Miracles, pg. 24)

An act of knowing must be determined, in a sense, solely by what is known; we must know it to be thus solely because it is thus. That is what knowing means... The act of knowing has no doubt various conditions, without which it could not occur: attention, and the states of will and health which this presupposes. But its positive character must be determined by the truth it knows. If it were totally explicable from other sources it would cease to be knowledge, just as (to use the sensory parallel) the ringing in my ears ceases to be what we mean by 'hearing' if it can be fully explained from causes other than a noise in the outer world--such as, say, the tinnitus produced by a bad cold. If what seems an act of knowledge is partially explicable from other sources, then the knowing (properly so called) in it is just what they leave over, just what demands, for its explanation, the thing known, as real hearing is what is left after you have discounted the tinnitus. Any thing which professes to explain our reasoning fully without introducing an act of knowing thus solely determined by what is known, is really a theory that there is no reasoning. (ibid. 26-27)​

 

[variant]

Do you believe rational beliefs can in principle be fully explained by nonrational causes?

I explain what is needed to reject premise 1 here.

The wording is difficult because I don't think any beliefs are possible that have no rationality attached, but I also think that life, brains and beliefs are material systems so I am confused.

I think that natural systems would have the ability to approach logic because they can incorporate abstractions and ideas that may be based upon material, but are composed of relationships.

Premise 2 doesn't say Naturalism leaves out rationality when explaining rational beliefs (whatever that means). It says Naturalism believes that all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes. In order to refute premise 2 you would have to show some belief that the Naturalist believes cannot be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes.

Again, I don't think rationality can be left out in the explanation of beliefs, I think that rationality comes from material systems but is incapable of being left out of any explanation.

Our difference of opinion is over what we think "rationality" is and how it comes to be.

Mine lives within a natural system but is not dictated by non-rational elements, it is a fully functional piece of the system.

 

[zippy2006]

I guess I should ask: Do you consider yourself a Naturalist?

The wording is difficult because I don't think any beliefs are possible that have no rationality attached, but I also think that life, brains and beliefs are material systems so I am confused.

I think everyone holds that rationality is attached to our beliefs. The question is whether that attached rationality can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes. Can life, brains, and beliefs be fully explained apart from rationality?

I think that natural systems would have the ability to approach logic because they can incorporate abstractions and ideas that may be based upon material, but are composed of relationships.

So you only think they can approach logic?

Again, I don't think rationality can be left out in the explanation of beliefs, I think that rationality comes from material systems but is incapable of being left out of any explanation.

It seems to me that you are saying rationality cannot be fully explained by nonrational causes.

Our difference of opinion is over what we think "rationality" is and how it comes to be.

Mine lives within a natural system but is not dictated by non-rational elements, it is a fully functional piece of the system.

Okay.