The Argument from Reason

[KCfromNC]

Yes, I suppose your argument from emergence does interact with the first premise. I did grant that the first premise is central, which is why I took some time to defend it in the OP. Let's restate the first premise in the more traditional if-then format:

1. If a belief can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes, then it is not rationally inferred.​

In order to refute the premise one would have to provide an example of a belief that is both fully explained in terms of nonrational causes and is also rationally inferred.

I think it would make more sense to actually demonstrate the premise is correct rather than expect other people to refute it.

You conclude that Joe's belief was fully caused by nonrational causes x, y, and z. Can you at the same time hold that his belief was rationally inferred? Isn't a cause of a rationally inferred belief the rational inference itself, along with the premises from which it was inferred and the understanding of all these elements? And aren't all these things rational rather than nonrational causes? And if some causes which explain a rationally inferred belief are themselves rational, then how can the belief be fully explained by nonrational causes?

Yep, lots of questions for people who support this premise to investigate. I await the comprehensive naturalist model of belief formation they come up with in the process.

 

[KCfromNC]

Interestingly, Elizabeth Anscombe criticized Lewis' original use of the word "irrational" in much the same way that you did on the first page. In her criticism she said that there is a big difference between irrational causes of belief, such as wishful thinking, and nonrational causes of belief, such as neurons firing in the brain. Lewis amended his argument by using the word "nonrational" rather than "irrational." (I've found that some language groups take them to be the same thing, and some don't).

I would agree with Anscombe that a neuron firing is nonrational. Given the definition used here, neurons firing would not have reason or understanding.

It is perhaps worth noting that even if the Naturalist takes the firing of a neuron to be rational, they will take the ultimate cause of that firing to be nonrational. For example, I should think the Naturalist believes that everything which exists today in 2017 is fully caused by nonrational material events predating the dawn of humankind. Therefore the state of the world in 50,000 BC fully caused the firing of the neuron in 2017 no less than the more proximate antecedent causes.

OK. And? Non-fire ultimate causes can lead to fires. Non-red ultimate causes can lead to red things. Non-food ultimate causes can come together to make food. What evidence do you have that there's something magical about thoughts in this respect?

 

[KCfromNC]

That's silly. If that hodgepodge of things are what you mean by emergent then anything involving large quantity or complexity can be called emergent. I mean, chess, really?

Makes it weird you'd object so strongly to something so commonplace.

]What part of it do you disagree with?

The part where you just assert your conclusion.

No, the whole thing is not a mix and match of assumptions, it is based on one single fact: that all matter operates only according to physical forces.

Along with attempting to sneak in the idea that rational or irrational are some sort of inherent properties of matter.

 

[KCfromNC]

If you look at my first post, I explained what is required for something to be logical, which is seen as a prerequisite for a belief to be rational.

I'd disagree about this need. Abduction and induction are very rational approaches to reality even if they fail to meet strict logical standards (e.g. the problem of induction).

Logical validity cannot be established for Naturalism as it cannot determine if an inference is true.

Which inference in particular? I can think of lots which can be logically validated without the need for supernatural intervention. There is no largest integer, sums of the first n squares, and so on.

Now why this matters is because the grounding, the very reason given, to accept Naturalism, is its supposed logical derivation from empiric means. This leaves it inconsistent.

As others have said, all attempts to logically validate epistemological systems require basic premises. Naturalism is no different than the rest in that regard. Oh well, what are you going to do?

There is an extension of the Argument from Reason which actually is a variation of an old Scholastic argument. It says that our knowledge can be described in terms of irrational causes, yet our reason, if so described, loses all validity. Clearly though, we see our reason as being an existent property, that we reason. For if we did not, we have refuted the means by which we gained knowledge in the first place and therefore that knowledge itself.

I guess if you think that pure reason is a path to knowledge this would bother you. There are other approaches, though - validating pure reason against empirical observation, for example, which understand that our thought processes aren't as fool-proof as some arguments require.

This means that our reason, if it exists, must come from outside nature - for within nature, it is refuted. This property outside nature that is its cause, must itself possess reasoning or the problem of the rational deriving from the irrational repeats itself. You see where this is going?

An infinite regress of extra-super-duper-naturalist causes for reasoning?

A Reasoning Property outside of nature, denotes a Being in essence, of some sort.

Nope.

This is, of course, a suppositional extension of the basic argument, but it matters a great deal if we cannot show the essential 'correctness' of the means by which we process data, by which we gain knowledge.

If you're going to demand 100% airtight certainty that our brains can't possibly ever be wrong, I think you're going to be stuck. Luckily most people don't seem to have this handicap - and if you're going to pretend to address their beliefs on the subject it might be best to not fall back into this pointless solipsism as if it represented what they actually think.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

I'd disagree about this need. Abduction and induction are very rational approaches to reality even if they fail to meet strict logical standards (e.g. the problem of induction).

Whatever do you mean? They fit logical standards in that they are true inferences from the premises made. It does however impact its soundness, which in philosophical terms requires true premises as well. There are different criteria for inductive vs. deductive validity, but this does not alter my argument really. There are both Formal and Informal Logical constructs, and strictly speaking, they are excluded from the former.

Which inference in particular? I can think of lots which can be logically validated without the need for supernatural intervention. There is no largest integer, sums of the first n squares, and so on.

These still require our inferences to be true, so no.

I guess if you think that pure reason is a path to knowledge this would bother you. There are other approaches, though - validating pure reason against empirical observation, for example, which understand that our thought processes aren't as fool-proof as some arguments require.

Which boils down to a Petitio Principii, assuming the validity of our reason and then validating it against something we derived thereby.

If you're going to demand 100% airtight certainty that our brains can't possibly ever be wrong, I think you're going to be stuck. Luckily most people don't seem to have this handicap - and if you're going to pretend to address their beliefs on the subject it might be best to not fall back into this pointless solipsism as if it represented what they actually think.

Never said this. No idea how you derived this nor how you think it applicable to anything I wrote. Anyway, again a petitio principii to assume our 'brains' solely responsible. Obviously our reasoning would occur with a fallible material component, there are false inferences after all, but we must have some way to at least see that some of them are true.

 

[KCfromNC]

Whatever do you mean? They fit logical standards in that they are true inferences from the premises made.It does however impact its soundness, which in philosophical terms requires true premises as well. There are different criteria for inductive vs. deductive validity, but this does not alter my argument really. There are both Formal and Informal Logical constructs, and strictly speaking, they are excluded from the former.

The more I poke at it the less I'm sure that the claims about logical standards are being applied with any sort of consistency. It sounds like a claim that makes sense until you probe, but the more I do the less I have any idea what these logical standard actually are.

These still require our inferences to be true, so no.

Why not? What supernatural intervention is required for an inductive proof of the sum of the first n integers?

Which boils down to a Petitio Principii, assuming the validity of our reason and then validating it against something we derived thereby.

Observations aren't derived from pure reason.

Never said this. No idea how you derived this nor how you think it applicable to anything I wrote.

Something about proving essential correctness.

Anyway, again a petitio principii to assume our 'brains' solely responsible. Obviously our reasoning would occur with a fallible material component, there are false inferences after all, but we must have some way to at least see that some of them are true.

Yep, validation against external reality.

 

[jayem]

Yep, validation against external reality.

That's exactly right. I can't speak for all naturalists, but I believe that the universe is purely a function of matter/energy (which we know are interchangeable) and the fundamental forces of nature. This is clearly determined through systematic observation and empirical methods. Particles and their interactions are how the universe works. As I stated in an earlier post, invoking supernatural entities--though often attempted--has never been proven valid for anything. And any philosophy which takes this fact into account is not just rational, it's the ultimate and most fundamental form of rationality.

 

[zippy2006]

And any philosophy which takes this fact into account is not just rational, it's the ultimate and most fundamental form of rationality.

Except the argument in the OP shows that this "rational system" actually precludes any possibility of rationality, and no one has refuted it. Therefore it is not a rational system at all, but just the opposite.

That's exactly right. I can't speak for all naturalists, but I believe that the universe is purely a function of matter/energy (which we know are interchangeable) and the fundamental forces of nature. This is clearly determined through systematic observation and empirical methods. Particles and their interactions are how the universe works.

The very rationality that can so perfectly describe all of the phenomena of the natural world must necessarily stand above the natural world, transcend it. You say that you have an abstract account of all natural phenomena, but you do not see that your account itself cannot be merely a matter of particles and their interaction; you cannot account for the account. If it were just the result of particles smashing together, we would have no reason to believe it to be true.

As I stated in an earlier post, invoking supernatural entities--though often attempted--has never been proven valid for anything.

That's a theory, but it has nothing to do with this thread. The argument in the OP takes the premises of Naturalism and shows that they render the thesis of Naturalism invalid. It has nothing to do with supernatural entities. That is just a red herring.

Now it may well be that the conclusion of the argument leads to a further conclusion about accepting some system that contradicts Naturalism. But to reject an argument because it ultimately leads to an inconvenient place is bias, not reason. The rational inquirer looks at the argument, determines if it is sound or unsound, and then follows truth where it leads. He does not reject or ignore the argument because he doesn't like the implications of the conclusion.

I think it would make more sense to actually demonstrate the premise is correct rather than expect other people to refute it.

I did so in the OP. In the post you quoted I explained how to refute premise 1 since some were under the impression that claims like "Naturalism doesn't involve supernatural magic" magically refute premises. They don't. Rational argument refutes premises. And like I point out above, there isn't a single word about the supernatural in the argument.

OK. And? Non-fire ultimate causes can lead to fires. Non-red ultimate causes can lead to red things. Non-food ultimate causes can come together to make food. What evidence do you have that there's something magical about thoughts in this respect?

I address this claim here and here.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

The more I poke at it the less I'm sure that the claims about logical standards are being applied with any sort of consistency. It sounds like a claim that makes sense until you probe, but the more I do the less I have any idea what these logical standard actually are.

Then please feel free to ask about any inconsistency you see. Logic is obviously a vast subject, so it is difficult to fully explain in mediums of posts. If you are having trouble following, I would suggest looking it up straight from Lewis or other writers, and maybe brushing up on the properties of logical systems, like validity, soundness, completeness, consistency, complexity, etc. There are obviously people who would be able to explain this far better than I can.

Why not? What supernatural intervention is required for an inductive proof of the sum of the first n integers?

I explained the requirement of true inferences exhaustively in this thread, to determine validity of a proposition.

Observations aren't derived from pure reason.

You would validate reasoning by inferences drawn from observation, which would be done by reasoning. Observation in and of itself says nothing, it would need be by conclusions drawn therefrom. If I see an apple and another, it is an inference to determine the quantities of 1 or 2, that they are of like kind, etc.

Something about proving essential correctness.

Yes, about the method, not necessarily the result. That we can in fact draw valid relations on occasion.

Yep, validation against external reality.

Petitio Principii.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

That's exactly right. I can't speak for all naturalists, but I believe that the universe is purely a function of matter/energy (which we know are interchangeable) and the fundamental forces of nature. This is clearly determined through systematic observation and empirical methods. Particles and their interactions are how the universe works. As I stated in an earlier post, invoking supernatural entities--though often attempted--has never been proven valid for anything. And any philosophy which takes this fact into account is not just rational, it's the ultimate and most fundamental form of rationality.

Stated like a creed.

If everything is determined by the function of matter/energy by the fundamental forces of nature, then everything is deterministic, no reasoning as such occurs, as it is merely the blind consequence thereof, and rationality lies prostrate and broken - by the unanswered arguments presented in this thread.

 

[Chriliman]

C. S. Lewis made famous what is now known as the Argument from Reason. The gist of the argument is that Naturalism is self-defeating because it cannot account for the act of reasoning itself. This is the argument as interpreted by Victor Reppert and Wikipedia:

1. No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes.
   
2. If naturalism is true, then all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes.
   
3. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then no belief is rationally inferred (from 1 and 2).
   
4. We have good reason to accept naturalism only if it can be rationally inferred from good evidence.
   
5. Therefore, there is not, and cannot be, good reason to accept naturalism.

The Wikipedia article and the sources listed below offer support for the premises and answers to common objections. I will just offer a brief overview of what I take to be the central premise, premise 1.

When someone reasons, we expect that they are able to understand the premises, see the logical connections, and affirm the conclusion based on these principles of validity and soundness. If they are not doing these things then there is no reason to believe that their conclusion is true.

Let's look at an example in which we lack such things. Suppose someone receives brain damage to the extent that the only words they utter are, "It is raining outside." I ask them their name and they answer, "It is raining outside." Do I have reason to believe that it is raining outside, given their assertion? Of course not, but why not? Ultimately, because truth and falsity cannot be fully determined by nonrational causes. Any set of nonrational causes which fully determine a proposition can never yield a reliable means of getting at truth. Yet on Naturalism the statement, "Naturalism is true," is fully determined by nonrational causes. This is because on Naturalism all that exists are material, deterministic, physical realities, to which all "rational" phenomena can be reduced.

If Naturalism were true, then we could never know it, for we could know nothing at all. Our so-called knowledge would be nothing more than the result of nonrational causes. There would be no reason to favor any one proposition over any other, no reason to believe in evolution or creationism over the other, no reason to believe 2+2=4 rather than 5. Yet we do have real knowledge, we can make true judgments, and we do know that 2+2=4. Therefore Naturalism is false.

Sources:

• Wikipedia
• The Argument from Reason and Lewis's Post-Anscombe Revision by Victor Reppert
  
• The Argument from Reason by Victor Reppert
• C. S. Lewis' essay Is Theology Poetry? and book Miracles.

Has it or can it be shown impossible for all reasoning beings(including God) to have come into existence via non-rational/non-intentional causes?

 

[Chesterton]

Makes it weird you'd object so strongly to something so commonplace.

What did I object to?

The part where you just assert your conclusion.

Can you elaborate on why you disagree?

Along with attempting to sneak in the idea that rational or irrational are some sort of inherent properties of matter.

I'm not sneaking it in, I've said it directly - irrationality is an inherent property of matter.

 

[quatona]

If everything is determined by the function of matter/energy by the fundamental forces of nature, then everything is deterministic, no reasoning as such occurs

1. I´m not sure I understand why reasoning isn´t reasoning when the process is a result of deterministic forces.
2. I´m not sure I understand why the fact that our reasoning about the reality is determined by this very reality would invalidate this reasoning. To me, this would point to consistency rather than inconsistency. Actually, I like the idea that my reasoning is determined by reality a lot. It actually seems to be the very criteria for "accuracy".

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

1. I´m not sure I understand why reasoning isn´t reasoning when the process is a result of deterministic forces.
2. I´m not sure I understand why the fact that our reasoning about the reality is determined by this very reality would invalidate this reasoning. To me, this would point to consistency rather than inconsistency. Actually, I like the idea that my reasoning is determined by reality a lot. It actually seems to be the very criteria for "accuracy".

Firstly, a petitio principii to assume reality corresponds to the material here.
Secondly, if something occurs by sole action of impersonal forces, it is not considered to have been reasoned. Is a volcano reasoned? Or a rock falling off a mountainside? By rendering our thought and reasoning ability as such, it is determined by the cascade of natural forces and matter back to the inception of the universe, each building on each, until we had a 'thought' which was as fully a consequence thereof and on account thereof, as the aforementioned volcano or rock.

 

[quatona]

Firstly, a petitio principii to assume reality corresponds to the material here.

Which is actually pointing to consistency rather than inconsistency.

Secondly, if something occurs by sole action of impersonal forces, it is not considered to have been reasoned.

Just because you say so?

Is a volcano reasoned? Or a rock falling off a mountainside?

No. But that´s not the reason why we don´t consider them reasoning. It´s because they aren´t considered alive nor conscious, in the first place,

By rendering our thought and reasoning ability as such, it is determined by the cascade of natural forces and matter back to the inception of the universe, each building on each, until we had a 'thought' which was as fully a consequence thereof and on account thereof, as the aforementioned volcano or rock.

Sounds quite consistent to me. If you wouldn´t call the result "reasoning", we have just a semantics problem between your terminology and someone elsé´s - here, not a consistency problem within the other person´s view.

 

[KCfromNC]

I did so in the OP.

Giving a single example where brains don't work perfectly doesn't do anything to establish your premise.

I address this claim here and here.

You must have missed my response to the first post, and I have no idea what in the second post addresses the problem I raised.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

Which is actually pointing to consistency rather than inconsistency.

Petitio Principii are not logically consistent systems, as they require their conclusion to be a premise, which can thus not be shown valid.

Just because you say so?

No. But that´s not the reason why we don´t consider them reasoning. It´s because they aren´t considered alive nor conscious, in the first place,

Sounds quite consistent to me. If you wouldn´t call the result "reasoning", we have just a semantics problem between your terminology and someone elsé´s - here, not a consistency problem within the other person´s view.

Yes, this can be described as a semantics problem. You merely need to define 'rational' and 'reason' in a manner completely different than it has historically been defined and used, then you have no problem. This is a bit silly, akin to saying that if you are on a runaway train and you define 'standing still' as the train's current state, that you have no problem anymore.

 

[KCfromNC]

Then please feel free to ask about any inconsistency you see. Logic is obviously a vast subject, so it is difficult to fully explain in mediums of posts. If you are having trouble following, I would suggest looking it up straight from Lewis or other writers, and maybe brushing up on the properties of logical systems, like validity, soundness, completeness, consistency, complexity, etc. There are obviously people who would be able to explain this far better than I can.

It isn't that I don't understand what these things are, it is - as I and others have pointed out - the claim keeps shifting as the discussion goes on. As some times the issue is logic, at other times rationality, at others the validity of our senses, at others the causal nature of beliefs. Makes it really hard to know what the actual argument is about, and feels an awful lot like people are just throwing out stuff which feels like it needs to be magical rather than having any vigorous argument about much of anything.

I explained the requirement of true inferences exhaustively in this thread, to determine validity of a proposition.

That's nice. What supernatural intervention is required for an inductive proof of the sum of the first n integers?

You would validate reasoning by inferences drawn from observation, which would be done by reasoning. Observation in and of itself says nothing, it would need be by conclusions drawn therefrom. If I see an apple and another, it is an inference to determine the quantities of 1 or 2, that they are of like kind, etc.

Despite these theoretical objections, it works. Looks like the theory needs a bit of refinement.

Yes, about the method, not necessarily the result. That we can in fact draw valid relations on occasion.

On occasion? Isn't that understating things just a bit?

Petitio Principii.

Oportet ministros manus lavare antequam latrinam relinquent.

 

[KCfromNC]

Stated like a creed.

More like a tentative conlcusion that works pretty well here in reality.

If everything is determined by the function of matter/energy by the fundamental forces of nature,then everything is deterministic[

false

no reasoning as such occurs

false

and rationality lies prostrate and broken

false

unanswered arguments presented in this thread.

false

 

[KCfromNC]

Has it or can it be shown impossible for all reasoning beings(including God) to have come into existence via non-rational/non-intentional causes?

No. The approach seems to be more assert a questionable premise, ignore objections to it, and then claim that no one can address it.