Reformational Philosophy

[jbarcher]

"Since unregenerate men do not receive this illumination, they will never agree with your exegesis. They will always make the Scriptures say what they want them to say. If you argue that their interpretation is invalid, they can simply shoot back that your interpretation is invalid. If you say that yours is based on exegesis, they just fire back that that is only a consensus approach to interpreting the word and might be incorrect."



Well then, this certainly is no competent Bible scholar.

My experience suggests otherwise, and this is one of the things I kinda want you to explain. If presupping is the way to go, how do you explain my experiences.

Among the brighter crowd of skeptics and unbelievers in general, I've been able to lay waste to interpretive relativism. I believe I've linked you to an argument for the necessity of socio-historical context in criticism. So far I've never seen a maintainable hermeneutic that does not take that context into use.

A counter-assertion against an exegesis is not an argument, and thus they are abandoning reason. Yeah, I've had people just not understand basic exegesis, and respond to a full-fledged argument by saying appealing to diversity of opinion. I typically slap them silly because that's just infantile; running away and saying that diversity of opinion entails impossibility of truth.

 

[Jon_]

Well then, this certainly is no competent Bible scholar.

My experience suggests otherwise, and this is one of the things I kinda want you to explain. If presupping is the way to go, how do you explain my experiences.

This simply begs the question, "How do you know your experiences are reliable?" How can you derive a universal truth from a particular observation? Do you really mean to appeal to your experience as true premises for such a deduction? You have not yet even begun to justify that your experiences are infallible, nor can you; therefore, how can you appeal to your experience as the premise for any valid argument?

Among the brighter crowd of skeptics and unbelievers in general, I've been able to lay waste to interpretive relativism. I believe I've linked you to an argument for the necessity of socio-historical context in criticism. So far I've never seen a maintainable hermeneutic that does not take that context into use.

I really don't understand what you're trying to express here.

(For this next section, I am going to pretend to be a skeptic and will raise some of the arguments that they typically bring. I am interested to see your responses.)

A counter-assertion against an exegesis is not an argument, and thus they are abandoning reason.

Exegesis is nothing more than an assertion because you cannot deductively show that exegesis always results in the exact same, truthful conclusion. An inductive argument (e.g., an exegetical argument) is nothing more than an assertion that appears plausible.

The burden of proof in on you. Show me a system of exegesis whereby anyone can apply its principles and always come to the same conclusion. You can't. There isn't one.

Not to mention that it cannot even begun to prove the Bible to be the word of God or to prove that the existence of a God necessarily ties to the God revealed in the Scriptures.

Yeah, I've had people just not understand basic exegesis, and respond to a full-fledged argument by saying appealing to diversity of opinion. I typically slap them silly because that's just infantile; running away and saying that diversity of opinion entails impossibility of truth.

They're absolutely right. Any inductive argument is formally fallacious because it can never be proven true. For any inductive argument there are infinite possible inferences that can be made, which means that it is impossible to prove or disprove them all, which makes any inductive argument impossible to prove. That is why I do not accept evidential proofs--they're not proofs at all. They're not even probabilities because to calculate a probability you must first know the maximum number of occurances and the number of possible true results. Since you cannot quanitify infinite inferences, you cannot even begin to formulate a probability for the truth of exegesis, which again, leaves you up a creek without a paddle.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[ClementofRome]

This simply begs the question, "How do you know your experiences are reliable?" How can you derive a universal truth from a particular observation? Do you really mean to appeal to your experience as true premises for such a deduction? You have not yet even begun to justify that your experiences are infallible, nor can you; therefore, how can you appeal to your experience as the premise for any valid argument? ...

Jon

And a big thanks to Protagoras and his great, great, great (x3000) grandchild, Postmodernism!

 

[jbarcher]

The creek without paddle image is very humorous. I will reply later.

That reminds me, I need to do reading on critical realism.

 

[Jon_]

That reminds me, I need to do reading on critical realism.

If you were implementing a presuppositional apologetic, you wouldn't need to.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[ClementofRome]

Vincent Cheung is among the most capable of any contemporary Christian philosophers I have found. You can read all of his works for free at his website, Reformed Ministries International: www.rmiweb.org.

Additionally, I just posted a review of his Ultimate Questions in the Book Reviews forum: http://www.christianforums.com/t1952359-ultimate-questions.html.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Jon, here is an interesting refutation of Cheung. Let me know what you think:

http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/cheung.htm

 

[jbarcher]

This simply begs the question, "How do you know your experiences are reliable?" How can you derive a universal truth from a particular observation? Do you really mean to appeal to your experience as true premises for such a deduction? You have not yet even begun to justify that your experiences are infallible, nor can you; therefore, how can you appeal to your experience as the premise for any valid argument?

I think you misunderstood, but I didn't really qualify it too much. What I'm asking is, If presupping is the way to go, how come I have success though my methods? Or, from a presupper's POV, what is really going on in my exchanges.

(For this next section, I am going to pretend to be a skeptic and will raise some of the arguments that they typically bring. I am interested to see your responses.)

Exegesis is nothing more than an assertion because you cannot deductively show that exegesis always results in the exact same, truthful conclusion. An inductive argument (e.g., an exegetical argument) is nothing more than an assertion that appears plausible.

The burden of proof in on you. Show me a system of exegesis whereby anyone can apply its principles and always come to the same conclusion. You can't. There isn't one.

Not to mention that it cannot even begun to prove the Bible to be the word of God or to prove that the existence of a God necessarily ties to the God revealed in the Scriptures.

True, exegesis is an inductive method. But even deductive methods often have premises that rest upon inductive evidence; thus the form is no necessary indicator of certainty.

What you have done is appeal to diversity, and by doing that in an unqualified way, have assumed that all exegetical arguments are equal. This is strange and simply erroneous; an exegesis that makes crucial errors by anachronism is of course inferior to one who's errors are minor.

In demanding a perfect system you also demand a perfect exegete. I have not assumed that it is necessary for a good exegesis to be arrived at by all; but merely that it holds to examination. Thus if you wish to maintain your demands, the onus is on you to show that a complete and unbiased exegetor and system can exist. Thus by demanding perfect knowledge you create more problems for yourself than you believe I have.

But a fairly callous dismissal of inductive methods on the grounds that it "appears plausible", will not do. Inference to the best explanation has six steps:

1. Explanatory scope
2. Explanatory power
3. Plausibility
4. Less ad hoc
5. Accordance with accepted beliefs
6. Comparitive superiority

The question is not merely "does it seem plausible". The question is "what is the best explanation?"

Attempting to achieve an "objective" knowledge system is in error and has not learned from the past. We all have bias, yet by being able to quantify our own systems and understand others, we are able to temporarily step "out" of part of our own systems to critically examine them.

The question of the plenary truth of the Bible is a very wide topic; covering archaeology, literature, social sciences, philosophy, and many other fields. Exegesis seeks to discover the meaning of a text; not "prove" the text is correct.

They're absolutely right. Any inductive argument is formally fallacious because it can never be proven true. For any inductive argument there are infinite possible inferences that can be made, which means that it is impossible to prove or disprove them all, which makes any inductive argument impossible to prove. That is why I do not accept evidential proofs--they're not proofs at all. They're not even probabilities because to calculate a probability you must first know the maximum number of occurances and the number of possible true results. Since you cannot quanitify infinite inferences, you cannot even begin to formulate a probability for the truth of exegesis, which again, leaves you up a creek without a paddle.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

You seem to be asking for objective knowledge but yet make use of postmodernism in such a way that it would contradict your request. Mathematical certainty is quite difficult to achieve in many fields if not all. I'll be looking into Bayesian reasoning and other stuff in the future.

 

[Jon_]

Jon, here is an interesting refutation of Cheung. Let me know what you think:

http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/cheung.htm

Hey Clement,

I started on a full rebuttal of this article, but didn't have time to finish. I thought I would go ahead and post what I had, though.

I will assume the author's terminology and acronyms merely for sake of argument. In order to understand the acronyms used, you will have to read his article. In truth, I think he has oversimplified the matter, but it is not crtically important to show these distinctions as his own criticism is very much inconsistent. I have only refuted the beginning of his article, but since he first attacks Cheung's foundation and I believe I have adequately defended that foundation, none of his other arguments will follow, which means they are irrelevant.



On SS2 being incompatible with SGP.

In fact, SS2 does follow from Scripture because Scripture provides for reason through the existence of God. Christ, in particular, is revealed as the Logos, or Logic (reason, wisdom, etc.). Logic exists, and it exists within our minds through God's image. It is by logic (among other things) that we are able to learn. For instance, knowledge would be impossible if the law of noncontradiction were not true.

As reason is directly taught in Scripture (fulfills SS1) and deduction of true premises (Scriptural premises) always results in a true conclusion, it follows that what is deductively derived from Scripture is true.

This is consistent with the SGP.



On SS2 being incompatible with SGP, part 2

The author correctly observes the use of inference and the assumption of inductive practice by the authors of the Bible, especially the New Testament. What the author fails to realize is that it is only the expression of the underlying concepts that is inductive and not the concepts themselves. For instance, we would never argue that God "might" be love (induction, at best, only gives us a probability). The concepts that Scripture points to are unequivocally true.

The objection then comes, how do we know that we have made the correct deduction? How do we know that when the Scripture says "God is love" that is really doesn't mean "God is powerful"? To this we reply that it is transcendentally true. It is mere wishful thinking and argument from ignorance to say that even though the Bible says one thing it is possible that it means something else.

Another objection is that we do not have proof that Scripture is deducible. To that we reply quite the contrary! This too is transcedentally true. For instance, only Calvinist soteriology fits into a consistent biblical worldview. Arminianism is inconsistent and illogical. So while, on the surface it might appear that we could inductively reason Arminianism from the texts, this is deductively an invalid soteriology. As God is completely logical and rational, we should strive to make our understanding of the text parallel this directly. As our Lord says, "Be perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect." If God is perfect and logical, then it follows that we should strive to be perfectly logical with our evaluation of the texts.



On SS2 being incompatible with SGP, part 3

The author argues that Cheung's epsitemology is circular because it assumes that deduction is a valid proof for the principle that something can be validly deduced from Scripture. The author says that it assumes deduction is valid before it proves that deduction can be valid.

Now, this at best is just skepticism. Logic and deduction are necessary truths. When we speak of worldviews and rationalistic systems, we must assume that logic and deduction are valid ways to arrive at truth before we can even begin to establish these systems. The Scripture tells us why logic is necessarily true: because it reflects the thinking of God. Because God is logical he made everything logically, thus the only way to arrive at precise conclusions is to use logic.

If the author wishes to argue against logic, then he is free to do so and appear quite looney at the same time.

His objection here is simply invalid. Everything must first assume logic, which is precisely what the presuppositional worldview explains.



Can SGP be reconciled with SEP?

Here, the author really trips over himself. Little does he know, but he denies God's omniscience with his argument, which is:

"That is, the idea that all propositions not contained in or implied by Scripture cannot constitute knowledge, is itself either contained in or implied by Scripture (where ‘implied by’ means validly deducible, of course). . . . SEP isn’t a proposition of Scripture."

The Scriptural propositions that God is omnipotent and omniscient form the basis for SEP. I think the author has missed this point. Something is a true proposition if God knows it. What God knows he has willed through his omnipotence. God does not know anything that he has not willed. This would be a logical contradiction.

The Scriptural premise of SEP is therefore simply, "Only what God has willed is known by God and therefore knowable." This is the basis for Cheung's Occasionalism, which is attacked later and I will address later. Because the full rebuttal of this point relies on this reference to Occasionalism, I won't be able to complete it here.

Neverthesless, the author does try to refute this point with Scripture, but fails miserably. He cites Mt. 24:32, "Now learn the parable from the fig tree: when its branch has already become tender and puts forth its leaves, you know that summer is near." In the first, this argument is out of context because he is ignoring Cheung's Occasionalism which explains how this knowledge is possible. In the second, this is a parable for the second coming of Christ. It is not a literal saying, but a figurative one.

He then goes onto Acts 2:22, but this is explained by Occasionalism as well, along with any other circumstance in which knowledge is imparted to men by "occasion" of sensation.

The author clearly fails to understand that what is deduced from Scripture is not necessarily all true propositions, but the basis for all true propositions. Scripturalism does not say 2 and 2 are 4. Scripturalism does say how 2 and 2 are 4, though. Likewise is it so with sensation and other principles.

What Cheung defines is a biblical worldview, not an exhaustive copendium of every true proposition possible.



When I first came across Cheung I was somewhat enamored with his work. My head has since cleared and I now view it on a reasonable plane, but that does not mean that I no longer agree with it. In fact, I still agree with most of what Cheung presents, especially his Occasionalism and rejection of empiricism. What I disagree most with Cheung is his harsh and abrasive attitude in dealing with unbelievers. Yes, they are stupid and irrational in the grand scheme of things, but I reject the notion that bringing up such things is in anyway helpful, except perhaps for encouraging aspiring apologetists to not fear them.

In any case, I agree with much of what he writes, but take issue, in many cases, with how he rights it.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[Jon_]

There are also the follower of Gordon Clark - I'm not sure to what extent they would see themselve as intellectual heirs of Kuyper or opposed to him. They would be closet to Alvin Plantinga with their evidentialist approach.

I just wanted to correct this comment concerning Clark. He was a presuppositionalist, and a more able, apt, and consistent one on that than was Van Til. Clark's philosophy is actually understandable, whereas Van Til at times is utterly incoherent, at others outright contradictory.

Clarkians are not even close to Platinga's approach. His philosophy is best summed up as the "righ to be left alone" argument. He pretty much argues that we all the right to believe whatever we want to believe and that Christianity is, at least for Christians, a valid belief. But this doesn't get anywhere.

Clark rejected every single traditional and evidential proof that was not based first and foremost in a Sciprtural worldview. He rejected all of the big eleven traditional arguments and pretty much refused to even engage in textual criticism or proofs of biblical integrity seeing them as completely unnecessary (with which I agree). Seeing as his argument was that one must first assume the Bible to be true in order to know or question anything, it is inconsistent to criticize the Bible in anyway.

Clark has probably done more to show the philosophical necessity of the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy and the Protestant doctrine of Sola Scriptura more than any other theologian besides Calvin, even though he is relatively much less well-known.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[jgaive]

I just wanted to correct this comment concerning Clark. He was a presuppositionalist, and a more able, apt, and consistent one on that than was Van Til. Clark's philosophy is actually understandable, whereas Van Til at times is utterly incoherent, at others outright contradictory.

Dear Jon.

In what way would you see Van Til as incoherent and contradictory?

Jeremy

 

[Jon_]

Dear Jon.

In what way would you see Van Til as incoherent and contradictory?

Jeremy

An excellent example is the infamous Orthodox Presbyterian Church controversy between him and Clark over the "incomprehensibility of God." Van Til's position was that we can never known anything of God in the same way that God knows it.

If this is true, and God knows everything truly, then it follows that we can never know the truth! Or at least never in the truest sense! (But how is that any different from not knowing it truly?) This would intimate that we do not know truly know Christ as our Savior because Christ, as God, is incomprehensible.

Now, this is hardly what Van Til meant to imply, but it is nevertheless, the reduction ad absurdum (a method that Van Til himself espoused) result of his argument. Clark countered this quite well and forced the Van Til camp to its plan B argument qualitative difference. But no one would argue that there is no qualitative difference in what God knows versus what man knows. Even the stupid and rebellious heathen would acknowledge (if he were to uncharacterstically affirm a God, even for sake of argument) that God's knowledge is qualitatively different. My knowledge is qualitatively different from yours!

Herein we find the real problem of the controversy, but we also see that within the argument put forth by the Van Til camp the desire to revert back to the "argument from mystery" for God's incomprehensibility. If God's comprehensibility is a mystery, then it follows we cannot comprehend God at all. Van Til fails to specify any sense in which we do not truly understand God. He argues in return that if he could do so, then it would defeat his own argument! This is correct, but at the same time he has already defeated his own argument by asserting that God is incomprehensibly incomprehensible, meaning that we cannot even determine the manner in which we do not comprehend him. The philosophical implications lead us right back to the problem above (that we cannot know anything about God truly, meaning that everything we know about him is false).

If this were true, then we could never be saved because we could never believe on Jesus Christ in a salvific sense (the true sense that God requires).

This is just one of many examples. Another issue I have with Van Til is that his work is incredibly imprecise. You would think that a philosophy would pay careful attention to how he forms his arguments, but Van Til throws out all kinds of terminology without qualification and expects people to know what he means. This unqualified application of his own perculiar language makes identifying his points an exercise in frustration.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[jgaive]

An excellent example is the infamous Orthodox Presbyterian Church controversy between him and Clark over the "incomprehensibility of God." Van Til's position was that we can never known anything of God in the same way that God knows it.

If this is true, and God knows everything truly, then it follows that we can never know the truth! Or at least never in the truest sense! (But how is that any different from not knowing it truly?) This would intimate that we do not know truly know Christ as our Savior because Christ, as God, is incomprehensible.

Now, this is hardly what Van Til meant to imply, but it is nevertheless, the reduction ad absurdum (a method that Van Til himself espoused) result of his argument. Clark countered this quite well and forced the Van Til camp to its plan B argument qualitative difference. But no one would argue that there is no qualitative difference in what God knows versus what man knows. Even the stupid and rebellious heathen would acknowledge (if he were to uncharacterstically affirm a God, even for sake of argument) that God's knowledge is qualitatively different. My knowledge is qualitatively different from yours!

Herein we find the real problem of the controversy, but we also see that within the argument put forth by the Van Til camp the desire to revert back to the "argument from mystery" for God's incomprehensibility. If God's comprehensibility is a mystery, then it follows we cannot comprehend God at all. Van Til fails to specify any sense in which we do not truly understand God. He argues in return that if he could do so, then it would defeat his own argument! This is correct, but at the same time he has already defeated his own argument by asserting that God is incomprehensibly incomprehensible, meaning that we cannot even determine the manner in which we do not comprehend him. The philosophical implications lead us right back to the problem above (that we cannot know anything about God truly, meaning that everything we know about him is false).

If this were true, then we could never be saved because we could never believe on Jesus Christ in a salvific sense (the true sense that God requires).

This is just one of many examples. Another issue I have with Van Til is that his work is incredibly imprecise. You would think that a philosophy would pay careful attention to how he forms his arguments, but Van Til throws out all kinds of terminology without qualification and expects people to know what he means. This unqualified application of his own perculiar language makes identifying his points an exercise in frustration.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Thank you Jon for this cogent answer. I'm sorry you find Van Til frustrating. Thjis is often the case when we wrestle with different thinkers, Christian and non-Christian, even with those with whom we most closely agree.

I need to look at the Van Til /Clark controversy in greater detail, which I shall need to do as part of my comparative study of Kuyper, Van Til, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and am grateful for your summary, meanwhile. I would just comment that salvation is the act of the Triune God, not anthing we know or think. In terms of Romans 1, we suppress the truth as covenant-breakers, and need the work of the Holy Spirit to overcome this rebellion, and it is purely on the basis of the sacrifice of Christ, not anything we may do, or know, that we care saved.

From my own Trinitarian perspective, we need to see knowledge in the context of the relations bewteen the Persons of the Trinity. Obviously, firstly, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit know one another in ways which we cannot enter into. And for us, as those made in the image of God, there are different ways of knowing - if we see truth in terms of correspondence, or alternatively coherence or alternatively intrumental effectiveness alone, we will have an unbalanced picture. Only as we enter covenantally into a right relationship with God, can our thinking be orientated in the right way, situated in the right context and transformed. This is not to say that non-believers cannot gain knowledge truly of the created order, nor than believers are necessariliy right. But we are given the task of taking all thoughts captive in the light of Christ, as covenant-keepers, as Van Til puts it, rather than covenant breakers. This affects all areas of life - as Kuyper puts it: there are no areas of life over which Christ does say "mine".


Yours,

P.S. I have thoughts about a Trinitarian perspective on the arguments for the existence of God, which I shall reserve for another occasion.

 

[Jon_]

Thank you Jon for this cogent answer. I'm sorry you find Van Til frustrating. Thjis is often the case when we wrestle with different thinkers, Christian and non-Christian, even with those with whom we most closely agree.

I need to look at the Van Til /Clark controversy in greater detail, which I shall need to do as part of my comparative study of Kuyper, Van Til, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and am grateful for your summary, meanwhile. I would just comment that salvation is the act of the Triune God, not anthing we know or think. In terms of Romans 1, we suppress the truth as covenant-breakers, and need the work of the Holy Spirit to overcome this rebellion, and it is purely on the basis of the sacrifice of Christ, not anything we may do, or know, that we care saved.

From my own Trinitarian perspective, we need to see knowledge in the context of the relations bewteen the Persons of the Trinity. Obviously, firstly, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit know one another in ways which we cannot enter into. And for us, as those made in the image of God, there are different ways of knowing - if we see truth in terms of correspondence, or alternatively coherence or alternatively intrumental effectiveness alone, we will have an unbalanced picture. Only as we enter covenantally into a right relationship with God, can our thinking be orientated in the right way, situated in the right context and transformed. This is not to say that non-believers cannot gain knowledge truly of the created order, nor than believers are necessariliy right. But we are given the task of taking all thoughts captive in the light of Christ, as covenant-keepers, as Van Til puts it, rather than covenant breakers. This affects all areas of life - as Kuyper puts it: there are no areas of life over which Christ does say "mine".


Yours,

P.S. I have thoughts about a Trinitarian perspective on the arguments for the existence of God, which I shall reserve for another occasion.

For a good outside opinion of the controversy between Clark and Van Til, I would recommend the short book (only 86 easy pages) published by the Trinity Foundation written by Herman Hoeksema of the Protestant Reformed Churches. The PRC grew out of the Christian Reformed Churches, which is a Dutch Reformed denomination and not Presbyterian. His volume offers an uncommitted perspective of the controversy, something that is hard to come by in other sources (such as John Frame's passing treatment of it in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, and others; Frame is a loyal Van Tilian).

And I agree with what you have said. The most important aspect of our walk is to maintain a purely Christian presupposition. Where we stumble is when we start to admix worldly (un)wisdom with biblical wisdom. The resultant combination is as incompatible as oil and water.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[jgaive]

Thanks Jon - I shall look it up. Let's keep exchanging views.

You can find my site on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TrinitarianReformati

 

[Jon_]

Thanks Jon - I shall look it up. Let's keep exchanging views.

You can find my site on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TrinitarianReformati

I'll do that. Could you also fill me in on the distinction between Trinitarian theology and Reformed theology? I've heard the term before, but I'm unaware of what it entails. Thanks.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[jgaive]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

 

[Cajun Huguenot]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

Amen to that!!!!

In Christ,
Kenith

 

[ClementofRome]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

WOW...because I am strongly both, I never realized that the distinction was widespread or overly problematic.

 

[Jon_]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

That's an interesting perspective—one I hadn't really considered. I had frequently heard Calvinism referred to as theocentric (over and against Lutheranism, e.g., being christocentric), but wasn't really aware that it was considered theocentric to a fault (patricentric, perhaps?).

What emphases does the Trinitarian view promote above and beyond the Calvinist focus of the Trinity? Is the main thrust to integrate more of what the Triune God has done over against the Father's decrees? In a sense, I can understand this position.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

 

[jgaive]

That's an interesting perspective—one I hadn't really considered. I had frequently heard Calvinism referred to as theocentric (over and against Lutheranism, e.g., being christocentric), but wasn't really aware that it was considered theocentric to a fault (patricentric, perhaps?).

What emphases does the Trinitarian view promote above and beyond the Calvinist focus of the Trinity? Is the main thrust to integrate more of what the Triune God has done over against the Father's decrees? In a sense, I can understand this position.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Yes, that is probably right - at least for Calvin's successors who tended to concentrate on God (the Father's) decrees and did not sufficiently integrate this with the work of the Son and the Holy Spirit. This is not true of Calvin himself, who puts election under the Work of the Holy Spirit in the Institutes, nor indeed in the important covenatal strand, which is implilcitly in Calvin, but is developed later by people such as Witsius in the 17th Century, and indeed later by Abraham Kuyper.

I might also add - that your Jonathan Edwards was a profound Trinitarian thinker - sadly his insights were lost to a certain extent, although they are definately there in BB Warfield, for example. But, if it loses sight of its Trinitarian roots, Reformed thought can easliy degenerate into Unitarianism or, in the USA, into New England Transcendentalism.


Yours,

Jeremy